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There are many problems with Turkish spellings. The silent Iii, namely l1l, 
pronounced as in -lion, presents a challenge not overcome by lyl or indeed /il. 
Although Kyrgyz is fine for Ktrgt.z for instance, Osmanly does not render Osmanh. 
Likewise lgl is a softening not a hardening of lgl, so that lghl as in Oghuz or 
yoghurt renders neither Oguz nor yogurt. Both lol and lui now seem acceptable, lc;l 
as in I chi and I ~I as in I shl are becoming more so. I have retained all six in proper 
Turkish nouns, so that care should be taken also with lcl, which is pronounced as ljl. 
Thus for instance Sancar should be read as San jar and Altuncan as Altunjan. 
Finally, I have given Arabic and Persian names and titles minimal transliteration due to 
their complexity. Initial hamzas and (ayns have been omitted, but they are indicated in the 
middle of words. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this thesis is to present for the ftrst time in English the corpus of Turkish 
scholarly writing on the Great Seljuks and to assess the internal consistency of the 
individual conclusions. In the West, the Great Seljuks are studied in the context of 
medieval Persian or Arabic history in particular and Islamic history in general 
[Lambton, 1987; Morgan, 1994a; Frye, 1993; Kennedy, 1994; Hodgson, 1974; Lewis, 
1993]. In Turkey, the perspective that has emerged is quite different. 
According to Turkish scholars, besides Biblical studies and missionary activity, from the 
19th century colonialism and industrialization were the main driving forces behind the 
study of Islamdom. This was because Western powers had to learn the languages and 
religion of their subjects in order to administer them and for industrialists to sell their 
goods to them [Koprilli.i, 1940:xxviii-}\.'Xix]. The racially and religiously biased 
Eurocentric histories that resulted also prejudged the Turks' historical role as solely 
military and destructive, arguing that they had not made a single contribution that 
furthered civilization [Ibid. 149-50 & 1981 :23; also Berktay, 1983:14-5]. At the Sevres 
Peace Talks, a memorandum to the Turkish delegation clearly expressed this prejudice 
Qune 23, 1919). According to the Allies, the Turks had ravaged and destroyed the lands 
they had conquered in Christendom and in Islamdom, because it was not in their nature 
'to develop in peace what they had won in war' [Berktay, 1992:138-9]. 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that Atatiirk initiated the search for a historical identity 
outside the confmes of Islamic history and the West's assertion concerning the 
superiority of Grreco-Roman culture [Avctoglu, 1979/1 :18-27; Afetinan, 1981 :194ff]. 
I-Iaving said that, the roots of modern Turkish historiography must be sought in the 
century before Atatiirk founded the Society for the Study of Turkish History (April15, 
1931). 
1.1 Ottoman Influences 
Re~it Pasha (1800-58), who drafted the imperial edict of November 3, 1839, the 
Tanzimat-t Hqyriye Fermam, which proclaimed that persons of all religions would be 
treated equally and that the inviolability of their life, property and honour would be 
recognized, also founded the Enciimen-i ddni:f or Ottoman Academy Q uly 18, 1851 ). The 
forty members of the academy were charged with the tasks of emphasizing Turkish 
history rather than that of the Ottomans in an Islamic context, simplifying the Turkish 
language, and translating Western European works on art and science as textbooks 
[Berkes, 1998:144-7; Eren, IA Vol. 11:709ff; ~apolyo, 1945:161; Irmak & <:;aglar, 
1994:11]. 
The most illustrious member of the Enciimen-i ddnij was Cevdet Pasha (1822-95). 
Credited with drafting the opening address to the academy, he undertook to write a 
history of Ottoman attempts at reform between the years 1767/8 and 1825/6. 
Although he included the most important events of each year in chronological order, 
unlike previous Ottoman chroniclers, Cevdet Pasha based his twelve-volume Tarih-i 
Cevdet on a wide variety of archival materials. He analyzed, compared and criticized in a 
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clear language official and private chronicles, memotrs, diaries, memorandums and 
reports produced by government officials, as well as legal and treasury documents. 
Cevdet Pasha is also credited with writing the ftrst Turkish grammar [Berkes, 1998:178; 
Olmezoglu, IA Vol. 3:114ff; Irmak & c;aglar, 1994:12-4]. 
Nevertheless, Ottoman historiography did not gain a Turkish emphasis until the last 
quarter of the 19th century, when the innermost reaches of Asia were penetrated by Col. 
M. N. Prezhevalski, S. Hedin, Sir A. Stein, W. Radlov (Radloff) and A. Vambery, to 
mention but a few. As a result the 8th century Kok Tiirk Orkhun stone inscriptions were 
discovered in present day Mongolia ane translated, as was Yusuf Has Hajib's Kutadgu 
Bilig (1069-70), a 'mirror for princes' modelled on Firdausi's Shah-Nama. Since J. de 
Guignes' work in the 18th century knowledge had been building up in western Europe 
that showed the Turks to have had an extensive and deeply rooted culture in Asia prior 
to the advent of Islam - one that was closely related to people who had remained 
outside Islamdom, such as the Finns, Hungarians, Mongolians and Tungus [Minorsky, 
IA Vol. 12/2:107ff; also Avctoglu, 1979/1:16]. 
In this intellectual atmosphere, Pan-Turanism, which became synonymous with Pan-
Turkism, ftrst emerged as a political concept in Hungary (1839). Initially, the term 
appears to have been a romantic expression of the Hungarian intellectuals' interest in 
their ancestral lands and related people, very much as a reaction to Pan-Germanism and 
Pan-Slavism. According to them the Finno-Ugri.c and Altaic peoples had originated on 
the steppe between the Caspian Sea and the Altay Mountains, namely Turan [Ibid]. 
When Ottoman intellectuals such as Necip Astm appropriated the concept, they 
differentiated a Lesser Turan for the Turks and a Grand Turan inclusive of the Finns 
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and Hungarians. In particular Ziya Gokalp avowed that the Turks' native country were 
neither Tur~ nor Turkistan, but Turan: that grand and eternal place. 
There were others besides .Asun at the Dar iii-Fiinun-u Osman-i (Ottoman Imperial 
University), which was ftrst established in 1846, then in 1869, 1870-71, 1874-81 and 
fmally once again in 1900, until replaced by the Istanbul University in 1933. For 
instance, according to Ahmet Veftk Pasha (1823-91) there was a difference between 
Turkish and Ottoman in terms of language and history [fanpmar, IA Vol. 1 :207ff; also 
Berkes, 1998;314]. Elsewhere, concerned that translations from European works 
showed Turks in a false light, Siileyman Pasha excluded them from the curriculum in 
military schools under his jurisdiction, and published instead the ftrst and only volume 
of his Tarih-i Alem (History of the World, 1876). More importantly, Mustafa Celruettin 
Pasha, a Polish immigrant, argued in his Les Turcs: anciens et modernes (1869) that 
linguistically and racially the Europeans were related to the Turks. This is noteworthy 
not so much from the point of view of Pan-Turkism, but because it clearly 
foreshadowed the ideas that went into the Turkish Historical Thesis' more than half a 
century later [Berktay, 1983:29; Timur, 1994:138-43; Berkes, 1998;316-7]. 
On the whole, however, during this period Ottoman intellectuals were concerned with 
the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, not Pan-Turkism. Swayed in particular 
by Montesquieu's ideas, the Young Ottomans (Yeni Osmanlzlat), thought to have been 
founded in 1865, advocated the separation of powers through the constitution of an 
elected parliament to which the administration, namely the Servants of the Porte, would 
1 Presented at the First Turkish Historical Congress held in Ankara in 1932, this proclaimed the Turks were not 
of the yellow, but a brachyocephalic white race; Turkish history did not consist merely of the Ottoman; the 
Turks were the nation that had dispersed culture to all other nations from Central Asia [Birinci Tiirk T arih 
Kongresi, 1932]. 
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be held answerable [Berkes, 1998:208-14 & 304-13; Mardin, 1992a:31-45; Kuran, 1945]. 
The most influential Young Ottoman was without doubt Nfuruk Kemru (1840-88). He 
voiced his wide ranging ideas through various publications, both at home and abroad 
(Tasvir-i Ejkdr, Terciiman-t Ahva~ Hiirrfyet, jbre~. His opinions on constitutional 
monarchy, which he tried later to reconcile with Shari law [Berkes, 1998:218-22; <::avdar, 
1995:30], were less than welcome. Posted to Erzurum and forbidden from publishing, 
he went into self-exile in Paris (1867). Although he continued to publish while abroad, 
on his return at first he desisted (1870). However, this did not last; public excitement 
over his fervently nationalistic play Vatan yahut Silistre (lv[y Country or Silistria) caused him 
to be arrested and exiled (1873). Although subsequently pardoned (1876), largely due to 
his involvement and opposition to Sultan Abdiilhamid II (1875-1909) in the drafting of 
the Constitution of 1876 [Berkes, 1998:223-50], he was arrested again and after five 
months in prison posted to the Aegean islands where he died. While in Rhodes Natruk 
Kemru started a history of the Ottoman Empire (1299-1919), which attacked the 
Byzantinist view of Ottoman history. This was frnally published in 1908-10, some 
twenty years after his death [Akiin, IA Vol. 9:54ff]. 
If Nfuru.k Kemru among others thus determined the tenor of Turkish historiography, as 
in the case of A. Cevdet Pasha, ~emseddin Sami (1850-1904) continued to set the 
scholastic standard. Gainfully employed in the palace and decorated on several 
occasions by Sultan Abdiilhamid II, ~emseddin Sami did not belong to either the Young 
Ottomans or their successors the Young Turks. A journalist by profession, he published 
educational pamphlets (Cep Kiitiiphanesi or Pocket Library) and encyclopaedic articles in 
various weekly magazines until his death. His main opus as an encyclopaedist was the 
Kamus al-a 'lam. This was based on Bouillet's Dictionnaire U niversel d'Histoire et de Geographic, 
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which he expanded considerably by adding his own articles and others from different 
western European sources. More specifically there are his . dictionaries: the Kamus-t 
Franseti, Dictionnaire T urc-Fran;ais, Kamus-t Tiirki and the incomplete Kamus-t Arabi. As a 
lexicographer ~emseddin Sfu:ni was well aware of the differences in the Turkic language 
group, pointing to Central Asia for the origins of Turkish literature. He was the first to 
translate the Orkhun stone inscriptions and Yusuf Has Hajib's Kutadgu Bilig into 
(contemporary' Turkish. Originally from Albania, ~emseddin Sfu:ni is also credited with 
the modern Albanian alphabet [Akiin, IA Vol. 11 :411 ff; also Berkes, 1998:320]. 
~emseddin Sami's influence is easily traceable. Not only the concept but also the name 
Cep K.iitiiphanesi continues to be used to this day. His encyclopaedia, the Kamus al-a'lam 
clearly foreshadowed the jsldm Ansiklopedisi. The Hqyat magazine's Bfiyiik Tiirk S ijz/iigii, 
too, published in the 1950's, was based on Kamus-t Tiirki. ~emseddin Sfu:ni took care to 
simplify written Turkish, thus also beginning the movement to ccleanse' it of Persian 
and Arabic vocabulary and grammar, a task taken up by the now defunct Turkish 
Language Institute (Tiirk Dil Kuntmu). Last but not least, it must be noted that although 
strongly criticized at the time, his method of translating word for word is still adhered 
to rigidly in Turkey. 
Last but not least, any assessment of Ottoman influences on the development of 
historiography in the Republic of Turkey must include Yusuf Akc;ura (1876-1935), who 
was born in Simbirsk on the Volga River south of Kazan. His father appears to have 
died soon afterwards (1878). Although his mother moved to Istanbul (1883), she kept in 
touch with her husband's family and her own through regular visits to Kazan. One of 
these relations was Ismail Gasprinski, her sister's husband, who thought the Tatar 
community in Crimea would survive the Slav yoke only if Muslims throughout Russia 
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united or at least co-operated. Akc;ura, on the other hand, came to believe that being a 
Turk was more important than being a Muslim. He appears to have been affected by his 
father's brother, who had an extensive library and spoke several European as well as 
Turkic languages. During one of his visits, Akc;ura stayed for some time with the 
nomadic pastoral Ba~kurt, whose language and customs showed little outside influence. 
Later, at the Military Academy in Istanbul, Akc;ura avidly followed the writings of Asun 
and other adherents of Pan-Turkism. Having joined the Young Turks whilst at the 
academy, Akc;ura was arrested and imprisoned (1896). The following year he was tried 
along with others and exiled to North Africa. Although pardoned (1898), he was not 
allowed to return and escaped to Paris via Tunis with some friends (1899). In Paris, he 
enrolled in the L'Ecole de Science Politique and contributed to the Young Turk 
publication Metveret, as well as the journal .fura-:Jt Ommet, which was published in Cairo 
[Karal, 1976:1-18; Georgeon, 1996:15-7,20-2 & 28]. 
After graduation (1903), Akc;ura returned to Simbirsk where he wrote the article he is 
best remembered for, 0; Tarz-t Sfyaset (Three Kinds of Poliry). The said piece, which 
established the theoretical basis of Turkish nationalism, was ftrst published in Cairo in 
the periodical Tiirk (April-May 1904). In it Akc;ura argued that Pan-Islamism was 
impractical given the West's almost complete hegemony over Islamdom [1976:21-3 & 
31-3]. On the other hand, according to Akc;ura, Pan-Turkism was not as yet a viable 
alternative either. National consciousness had remained slow to take root among Turkic 
people [Ibid. 23-4 & 33-4]. Nevertheless, his preference for the latter policy was already 
clear. In his university thesis he had argued that despite Chinese, Persian, Arabic, and 
Byzantine influences, not to mention Buddhist ones, Turkic people had retained not 
only their languages but also many common cultural traits. These were a patriarchal 
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family structure, the common ownership of land, a focusing of political power in the 
person of an elected ruler whose sovereignty was curtailed by customary law, an 
aristocratic class, a tendency for statecraft and an exceptional religious tolerance 
[Georgeon, 1996:29]. 
Soon after the restoration of the 1876 Constitution by the Young Turks Quly 23, 1908), 
Ak<;ura returned to Istanbul. He became an outspoken leader of the nationalist 
movement, but did not join the Young Turks' Society fo.r Union and Progress [Ibid. 60-
72]. In 1919, however, he became a founding member of the first political party to 
include the name Tii.rk, namely the Milli Tiirk Ft.rkast (National Turkish Party) [funaya, 
1952:383, 418 & 441-2]. After the occupation of Istanbul by the Allies (March 1920), 
Ak<;ura left to join Atatii.rk and fought at Sakarya Qanuary and March 1921 ). These two 
battles .reversed the Greek invasion of western Anatoliti. On the establishment of the 
Republic of Turkey (October 29, 1923), Ak<;ura became a Member of Parliament fo.r 
Istanbul for the Republican People's Party. In 1932 Atatiirk appointed Ak<;ura to the 
head the Society for the Study of Turkish History. Ak<;ura was a founding member. As a 
result, that same year he chaired the First Turkish Historical Congress [Georgeon, 
1996:126-8]. 
Despite his self-evident political appeal, however, it was the successful application of his 
thesis to the origins of Ottoman institutions by Kopriilii (1890-1966) that has 
determined Ak<;ura's defining influence on Turkish historiography [Ibid. 29; Berktay, 
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1983:35]. 2 As a result the cultural traits he remarked upon have become de rigueur among 
Turkish scholars. 
1.2 Republican Concerns 
Atatiirk's concern in setting up the Society for the Study of Turkish History was to 
draw attention away from the Islamic Ottoman past so as to better focus Turkish 
patriotic feeling on its independent republic in Anatolia and eastern Thrace. But in his 
efforts to consolidate the Turkish nation-state Atatiirk could not ignore the West's 
perception of the Turks' place in history. 
As early as 1 735 C. de Linne categorized people by their physical and moral 
characteristics. Accordingly, those blond and blue eyed were superior to those with 
yellow skin, namely the 'melancholic, mean and ruthless Asiaticuf. Basing his views on 
men of letters such as P. Belen who had travelled in the Ottoman Empire, de Linne 
classified the Turks in the former category. Nearly half a century later, in 1775,]. C. 
Lavater argued that the Turks' physiognomy showed a mi.xture of aristocratic Anatolian 
and crude Tatar blood - a downgrading to be sure. However, as indicated by his 
contemporary, the craniologist P. Camper, who like de Linne thought the Turks to be of 
the white race, scientific opinion appears to have been divided at this time. In 1839 
another craniologist, S. G. Morton fmally classified the Turks under the Mongols while 
agreeing with Lavater that they had inter-married with the Aryan and Semitic races. In 
2 Bizans Miiesseselerinin Osmank Miiesseselerine Tesin' (The bif/llence of Byzanti1re Institlltions 011 Ot/Qman blStitutions) was 
published first in 1931 as an article in the Tiirk H11kuk ve lktisat Tarihi Mecmuasr (Maga!{jnefor Tllf'kish Legal and 
Economic History), of which Kopriilii was chief editor. 
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1879, coincident with growing interest in the whereabouts of the Indo-Europeans' 
ancestral lands, the anthropologist G. de Mortillet claimed that the Neolithic 
Revolution, namely the domestication of animals and plants, was the product of a 
brachyocephalic people. By tracing the domestication of animals he proposed that these 
people had originated in the Caucasus [fimur, 1994:120-5]. However, 'civilization' had 
already been correlated with 'race' by men of letters such as A. de Gobineau (Essai sur 
I'Inigalite des Races Humaines, 1853-55). 
Another such work, Leon Cahun's Introduction a I'Histoire de I'Asie (1896), which was 
translated by Astm, considered both the Turks and Mongols to be half-Chinese, though 
derisory of scientific claims to that effect. Be that as it may, in his opinion the Turks and 
Mongols had not progressed beyond being intermediaries between China and Persia. 
This was because of their self-serving greed, which had prevented them from 
appropriating either civilization. Given that they were 'the least able among human 
beings in comprehension and preferred simply to believe', by becoming Asia's Islamic 
representatives against a Christian Europe, from the Seljuks onward the Turks had 
dissipated their genius, namely the virtues of 'courage, obedience, straightforwardness, 
common sense' - without ever becoming aware of what they were doing [Ibid. 135-6; 
also Berkes, 1998:315]. 
Cahun's portrayal of the Turks as noble savages seems to have been overlooked by 
adherents of Pan-Turkism in favour of his attempt to demonstrate through a 
comparison of Kutadgu Bilig and the Great Seljuk Sultan Malik-Shah's vizier Nizam al-
Mulk's S fyasat-Nama that the origins of the Turks' national character lay in Central Asia 
not Islamdom [Ibid. 137]. Given that in Cahun's view the Turks were 'decent and 
decisive administrators' whose 'nationhood was personified in the military' [Ibid. 136], 
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the idea of a martial elite born to rule may have seemed appealing, particularly as the 
Ottoman intellectuals' overriding concern remained the salvation of their imperial 
polity. It is clear, however, that this did not blind them to European claims of racial 
superiority; quite the opposite. There is good evidence that they were beginning to 
despair of this attitude well before the First World War [femo, 1939:170-2; also Berkes, 
1 998:308 & 313-4 and Mardin, 1992a:27 4]. 
Certainly, such ideas were sufficiently widely accepted in the West to appear in French 
textbooks taught in Turkey during the late 1920's. Atatiirk's adopted daughter Afetinan 
drew his attention to one such book at her school that classified the Turks as racially 
second-class Mongoloids. While other textbooks also referred to the Turks as an 
'invasive barbaric tribe', none included their contributions to civilization [Avc1oglu, 
1979/1:20; also Berktay, 1983:51]. Already involved in how history was being taught 
[Ibid. 19], Atatiirk now set to work with the express purpose of "reconstructing Turkish 
history on the basis of new discoveries [ ... that would] bring to light the works of 
ancient Turkish civilization" [Afetinan, 1981:194-8]. 
Nevertheless, that Atatiirk was not satisfied with the initial drafts of the Turkish 
Historical Thesis presented at the First Turkish Historical Congress held in 1932 is clear 
[Avc1oglu, 1979/1:21-7; also Timur, 1994:144-50 & ~avdar, 1995:299-322]. Certainly, 
Mehmet Fuat Kopriilii and Zeki Velidi Togan (1890-1970), both of whom were to gain 
international recognition, took the presenters of the Thesis to task at the Congress 
[Birind Tiirk Tarih Kongresi, 1932:42-7, 79, 82-3, 167-176, 308-20 & 369-76]. 
Significantly, E. Pittard was the honorary chairman of the Second Turkish Historical 
Congress (1937). Having studied the Turks in the Balkans in 1911 he had come to the 
conclusion that their skulls were mesocephalic, a cross between brachyocephalic and 
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dolichocephalic [fimur, 1994:125-6]. In a paper presented at the congress he put 
forward the view that the citizens of the Republic of Turkey were the inheritors of all 
the cultures there prior to the conquest of Anatolia and the Balkans [Avctoglu, 
1979/1:28 & 30-1; Timur, 1994:147-8]. That this was also Atatiirk's perception is certain 
[Avctoglu, 1979/1 :27-32].3 
During this period many Turkish scholars continued to build on the direction and 
scholarly standards established during the final century of the Ottoman Empire. 
Notably, Faruk Siimer, Osman Turan and Mehmet Altay Koymen, three famous 
scholars who specialized in Seljuk history, were Kopriilii's assistants or students 
[Berktay, 1983:90]. 
1.3 Why the Seljuks? 
Kopriilii maintained that a nation's history could not be studied properly until set in its 
correct historical perspective. In his opinion, given Turkic hegemony over Islamdom 
during the 2"d millennium, just as Islamic history can not be evaluated without an 
understanding of Turkic history, so medieval Turkish history can not be understood 
outside an Islamic context. For instance, in order to study Islamic jurisprudence it is not 
sufficient to understand the theory of Islamic law, one must also evaluate the origins 
and development of Turkic legal institutions, not to mention those of the Arabs and 
Iranians (Kopriilii, 1940:xvii-xx]. 
J "Many years ago a long since departed friend, H. H. von der Osten, an archaeologist who excavated the Hittite 
capital of Bogha.z Koy, related how at a reception in Ankara he was congratulated by Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk 
on recovering the past of his [that is, the Turks1 ancestors. Von der Osten was about to protest, but an unseen 
kick by the German ambassador restricted his comment to Yes,yourexcellenry." [Frye, 1996:4] 
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Kopriilii thought that the distinguishing characteristic of a comparative methodology 
should be the historian's ability to disregard thousands of reported incidents that have 
no bearing on the historical evolution of a society, because these are either of a 
secondary nature or totally irrelevant [Kopriilii, 1994:25]. That said, Kopriilii did not 
approve of the selection of historical facts to justify dogmatic interpretations [Ibid xxi-
xxii]. Quite to the contrary, it is his open admiration of L. Febvre and hence M. Bloch, 
thus the historians associated with the Annales d'Histoire Economique et Sociale [Ibid. xix], 
which pinpoints his influences [Berktay, 1983:84]. His insistence on the importance of 
social factors, that is, religious, legal and economic as well as structural characteristics, 
distinguished him not only from doctrinaire philosophers and political historians, but 
also from empiricists such as his contemporary Orner Liitfii Barkan [Ibid. & 1992:109-
184; see also Kopriilii, 1994:24]. 
After extensive research on the origins and development of Turkish literature/ Kopriilii 
addressed the question of whether or not the Ottomans had taken their institutions 
from the Byzantines. Western European historiography claimed that the nomadic clan, 
which had been situated by the Seljuks of Anatolia near the Byzantine Empire's 
marches and had founded the Ottoman Empire, consisted of simple shepherds. 
Moreover, since they had only recently accepted Islam under their chieftain Osman, 
they must have acquired the civilizatory elements of statecraft from their non-Muslim 
subjects- in particular after the conquest of Constantinople [Kopriilii, 1981:24-5]. 
4 Tiirk Edebfyall Tarihinde Usiilwas published in 1913 [1966:3-47], Tiirk Edebfyatmda Ilk Mntasavvrjlar followed in 
1918 [1993) and later there came Tiirk Edebfyall T arihi [also IA Vol. 12/2:530-65). 
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Koprillii's argument was that with the exception of kapudan pa1a (grand admiral), which 
he dated to the 17th century, Ottoman titles and institutions were derived from the 
Seljuks of Anatolia and hence the so-called Great Seljuks in Iran and Iraq, not 
Byzantium. As a result he concluded that the origins of Ottoman titles and institutions 
were in the main Sasanian, although he thought that some concepts were notably 
Turkic. Kopriilii argued that the Anadolu and the Rumeli beylerbeyi, or the governors 
general of Anatolia and the Balkans correlated to the Turkic bipartite principle 
according to which polities were divided into a Right and a Left Wing. Similarly, 
according to Kopriilii, the Ottoman concept of world dominion and the symbol of the 
crescent, both of which Western historians thought had been taken from the 
Byzantines, were essentially Turkic - although not uniquely so. The former had also 
been part of Abbasid ideology and the Sasanians had employed the latter. Furthermore, 
the drum and banner had been symbols of Kok Tiirk sovereignty, so that these could 
not have been taken from Islamdom. As for the Ottoman tlmar system, in Kopriilii's 
opinion, this was developed by the Seljuks and did not derive from the Islamic iqtac, a 
form of land holding (see below, 7. 7.2). He argued that under the Seljuks lands and a set 
amount of their revenues were apportioned among the military on a hereditary basis, 
whereas previously the military had been paid quarterly. Last but not least, in Koprillii's 
estimation, the office of defterdar (minister of frnance or director of provincial 
finances) was originally Ilkhanid. 
In short, his argument was that the Abbasid Caliphate and hence the Seljuks and their 
successor states, namely the Khwarazmshahs, A yyubids and Mamluks, not to mention 
the later Ilkhanid Empire, all had adopted and modified Sasanian and, therefore, Irano-
Islamic institutions. Not surprisingly, in his subsequent work, Kopriilii argued that the 
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origins of the Ottoman Empire must be sought in the socio-economic as well as the 
political evolution of various Turkic polities in Anatolia. during the 13th and 14th 
centuries [Kopri.ilii, 1994].5 However, Kopri.ilii did not stop there. Over the next decade, 
in papers published in the scholarly journal Belleten [see Kopriilii, 1938 & 1941], he 
further defmed the themes that Turkish scholars on the Seljuks explored. 
According to Kopri.ilii, the Turks entered Islamdom with their tribal customs and laws. 
Although some of these changed after they established Turko-Islamic states, it was 
natural for many others to continue under an Islamic veneer. In his opinion, the most 
important of these was the Turkic leaders' tradition of lawmaking. Kopriilii thought 
that because their empire was founded by former affiliates of the K.tnt.k. and other Oguz 
lineages, that is, rather than by Turkic mamluks as in the case of the Ghaznavids, the 
Seljuks could not command the loyalty of the Tiirkmen without their chieftains' fealty. 
As a result, at first customary rather than Shari laws prevailed among the Tiirkmen. But 
as their empire took on an Islamic character, the Seljuks allied instead with the 
indigenous aristocracies, who became their civil servants, and broke up the Tiirkmen by 
settling them on the marches or on smaller, individual or clan iqtacs, that is, rather than 
situating them on large tribal ones. In Kopri.ilii's opinion, this policy was supported by 
the autocratic traditions of the Great Seljuks' viziers, namely Kunduri and Nizam al-
Mulk. Although he thought that it was only partially successful, according to Kopri.ilii, 
the policy succeeded in strengthening central government, because it lessened the 
influence that the Tiirkmen chieftains could wield over the Seljuks, whom they regarded 
as first among equals (primus inter pares) [Berktay, 1983:68-73]. 
s The argument was put forward at three lectures at the Sorbonne in Paris, in 1934, and first published the 
following year in French under the title of Les Origines de /'Empire Qtf(}man. 
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In challenging Western historical conceptions of the Ottoman Empire, therefore, 
Kopriilii not only directed Turkish scholars to the study of Seljuk history, but, as this 
thesis will demonstrate, also established a framework from which Turkish historians 
have rarely strayed. 
1.4 Sources 
The first Turkish history of the Seljuks was Miik.remin Halil Yman<;'s Se/plklular Devri 
Tiirkiye Tarihi (The S efjukid Period of Tur~'s History), which was published immediately 
after the Second World War. According to Y man<;, he was not able to gain access to all 
the .relevant documents since some of these were in Europe. The documents he did 
have access to, however, are neither discussed nor referc.uced in a clear and systematic 
fashion by him. There is a general list of primary sources in the introduction to his 
book and more specific lists at the end of each chapter, so that it is difficult to ascertain 
which primary or secondary sources he used to arrive at his conclusions. Although the 
aim of this thesis does not include evaluation of the Turkish scholars' use of sources 
concerning the Seljuks, for these reasons Y man<;'s history has not been referenced 
except where other Turkish scholars have done so. 
Zeki Velidi Togan (1890-1972) did not write a history of the Seljuks, but he did refer to 
them in his Umumi Tiirk Tarihi'ne Girij (Introduction to the General History of the Turks) and 
Oguz Destam- Repdeddin Ogut!lamesi, Terciime ve Tahlili (The Oguz Epic- Translation and 
Anafysis of Rashid a/-Din's Oguz-Nama). A protege of Sir Aurel Stein, Togan was a 
Ba~kurt who had studied at Kazan University and had done research work at the 
Petersburg Academy before the First World War. Politically active, he was instrumental 
22 
in establishing the B~kurt army, which sided with the Bolsheviks. For a time Togan was 
also a member of the Committee of Six, which included Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky, but 
as a leader of the Ba~kurt independence movement he later came into conflict with the 
Bolsheviks and fled to Turkey (1924) [Togan, 1969]. There he became an advisor to the 
Ministry of Education and then Professor of Turkish at Istanbul University. When 
asked to teach the Turkish Historical Thesis he resigned and went to Vienna where he 
studied Medieval History under Professor Dopsch. He gained his doctoral degree with a 
thesis on the Arabic text of Ibn Fadlan's journey to the Urals in a manuscript he had 
discovered in Mehshed [Koestler, 1976:212-3]. Togan returned to Turkey a year after the 
Second Turkish Historical Congress (193 7) and was appointed Professor of Medieval 
Turkish History at Istanbul University. 
Since the historical framework that he proposed in Umumi Turk Tarihi'ne Giri; was based 
on an internationally acclaimed standard of scholarship, Turkish scholars could not 
ignore his views on the Seljuks. Togan argued that the Mongols not only unified Turkic 
people but also enabled them to become established in the Middle East [1946:182ffj, a 
view with which Siimer agreed [1965:7]. Togan also argued that without a further Turkic 
influx under the Mongols, the Tiirkmen could have become assimilated by the Iranians 
and the Greeks [1946:206-22]. Togan extended his analysis to include the Ottomans. 
Accordingly, it was Timur's defeat of Sultan Bayezid I that enabled the consolidation of 
the Ottoman Empire. Otherwise, the Tiirkmen could have become spread thin across 
the Middle East, the Balkans, and possibly also Italy [Ibid. 347-50], a point with which 
Turan by and large agreed [1971 ]. Togan's argument that Sels:uk Beg was the descendant 
of a tent pole sharpener, however, was strongly challenged by Kafesoglu in his Sel;uklu 
Ailesinin Men;ei Hakktnda (On the Origins of the S efjuk Famify). 
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ibrahim Kafesoglu (1914-84) was not only familiar with Islamic sources on the Seljuks, 
but also western European, Hungarian and Russian research on Inner Asia A 
scholarship student from Anatolia, he studied initially with A. Alfoldi, Gy. Nemeth and 
L. Rasonyi, then Yman~, who interested him in the Seljuks, and fmally with Togan, 
being appointed to the latter's chair at Istanbul University upon his death. In view of his 
strong interest in Turkic history it is not surprising that Kafesoglu also maintained that 
Seljuk and Ottoman history can not be understood without reference to the Turks' own 
cultural past. Apart from S e/plklu Ailesinin Men;ei Hakktnda, he also wrote a review of 
Seljuk history and culture in the isldm Ansiklopedisi, which has been translated recently 
into English by G. Leiser as A History of the Se!Juks, as well as Sultan Melikjah Devrinde 
Bi!Juk Sel;uklu imparatorlugu (The Great Sefjuk Empire at the Time of Sultan Malik-Shah) and 
Harezm;ahlar Devleti Tarihi (History of the Khwarazmshah State). 
Osman Turan (1914-78), who was Kopriilii's student and assistant, is remembered best 
for his history of the Seljuks in Anatolia, Se/plklular Zamantnda Turkiye (Tur~ at the Time 
of the Se!Juks) and Dogu Anadolu Turk Devletleri Tarihi (History of the Turkish States in 
Eastern Anatolia). He also wrote an overview of Seljuk civilization, namely S e/plklular 
Tarihi ve Turk-isldm Meden!Jeti (S efjuk History and Turko-Islamic Civilization), not to mention 
others such as S e/plklular ve isldm!Jet (The S efjuks and Islam) and Turk Cihan Hakim!Jeti 
Mefkiiresi Tarihi (History of the Turkic Concept of World Dominion). These latter works have 
cast a shadow over his earlier scholarship, in part due to his stormy academic and 
political career. Having entered Parliament as a member of the Democrat Party in 1954, 
Turan was imprisoned for 18 months as a result of the coup d'etat of May 27, 1960. He 
was tried along with others such as his mentor Kopriilii and cleared of violating the 
constitution. Turan was expelled from the Turkish Historical Institute for writing a 
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series of articles ostensibly criticizing Atat:iirk's reforms. When he left politics, he was 
refused a university posting. It was his Se/ptklular Tarihi ve Tiirk-jsfdm Medenfyeti, however, 
which caused the greatest controversy. This book-length review of the Seljuks' history 
was rejected by the editorial board of the jsfdm Ansiklopedisi, in the main for 
administrative reasons, favouring Kafesoglu's much shorter article. When this latter was 
published in 1964-5, however, Tu.ran accused Kafesoglu of plagiarism in the scholarly 
journal Belleten. 
Whatever the truth of the matter [Akpmar, 1993:46; also Leiser, 1988], both Tu.ran and 
Kafesoglu have been accused of allowing xenophobia to influence their work [Ibid. 47-
9; also Humphreys, 1991:166]. Tu.ran was sweeping in many of his conclusions, which 
were couched in language that invariably exalted the Seljuks' deeds as heroic. Apart 
from an occasional use of emotive language, however, K.afesoglu can not be accused of 
having allowed his judgement as a historian to be influenced by patriotic concerns [see 
Akpmar, 1993:43 & 46-9 for Strohmeier, 1984:151-97]; quite the reverse. Most of the 
views for which in particular Akpmar criticized him are becoming part of the current 
consensus. In any case, it is useful to compare Kafesoglu's sentiment on 'Turkish 
spiritual and moral strength' with, for instance, Rene Grousset's view, which in today's 
cultural climate seems racist. According to Kafesoglu [1994:54]: Even if the result of 
necessi!J, to flow towards unknown horizons, to be ready to breast at any moment the etident dangers 
and to live in a constant lift-and-death struggle is not a behaviour that can be regarded as natttral for 
every nation. According to Grousset [1997:xxx]: Governing races, imperial nations, are Jew. The 
Turko-Mongols, like the Romans, are of their number. 
Mehmet Altay Koymen (1915-1993), who was also Kopriilii's student, concerned 
himself solely with the history of the Seljuks in Khurasan and Iraq, the so-called Great 
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Seljuks. Although not as ambitious in its scope, his S e/ptklu Devri Tiirk Tarihi (The 
Sefjukid Period of Turkish History) is the better summary when compared to either 
Kafesoglu's article in the isldm Ansiklopedisi or Turan's S elfllklular Tarihi ve Tiirk-isldm 
Medenfyeti. Only the first and last volumes of his proposed five-volume history of the 
Great Seljuks, namely Biiyiik S elfllklu imparatorlugu Tarihi (History of the Great S efjuk 
Empire) were published. According to Koymen, his books Tugrul Bry ve Zamant (Tugrul 
Beg and His Time), Alp Arslan ve Zamant (Aip-Arslan and His Time) and associated articles 
in the isldm Ansiklopedisi, the Ankara University DTCF's Tarih Ara;tzrmalan Dergisi 
(journal of Historical Research) and the Se/ptklu Ara;tzrmalan Dergisi (journal of Se/jukid 
Research) were to provide the basis for his proposed second and third volumes. Likewise, 
although according to Koymen it required revision and expansion in light of new 
material, Kafesoglu's Sultan Melik;ah DerJTinde Bityiik S e/ptklu imparatorlugu was to provide 
the basis for the fourth volume. The problem with this framework is that the proposed 
series did not include the reigns of Sultan Berk-Yaruk and Sultan Tapar. Like Kafesoglu 
and Turan, Koymen was well aware of European scholarship and made references to 
relevant studies in his work, such as C. E. Bosworth, J. A. Boyle, C. Cahen, G. Makdisi, 
0. Franke, A. K. S. Lambton, B. Lewis, H. Tollner, etc. 
Faruk Siimer (1924-95) wrote Oguzlar (Tiirkmenler)- Tarihlen: Bqy Te;kilatt, Destanlan (The 
Oguz (Tiirkmen) - History, Organization, Epics), Yabanltt Pazan - Selptklular Devrinde 
Milletlerarasz Biiyiik Bir Fuar (Foreigners' Market- A Large International Fair During the S e/juk 
Period) and S e/ptklular Devrinde Dogu Anadolu'da Tiirk Brylikleri (The Turkish Bryliks in 
Eastern Anatolia During the S efjuk Period), as well as numerous articles in both the isldm 
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Ansiklopedisi/ various Turkish periodicals and the 2"d edition of the Enryclopaedia of 
Islam. Although his magnum opus, Oguzlar, reads as if it is an amalgamation of lecture 
notes, it is well worth the effort despite its brevity on the Seljuks, particularly as Siimer 
excludes and sometimes criticizes material incorporated by his contemporaries, namely 
Y man<;, Kafesoglu, Turan and Koymen. 
There is also Ali Sevim, who has written several studies of the Seljuks in Syria and 
Palestine, the most notable being Suriye-Filistin S e/ptklu Devleti Tarihi (The History of the 
S e/juks of Syria and Palestine). His reviews of the Tiirkmen chieftains' raids into Anatolia 
under the Seljuks' direction, 0 nlii S e/ptklu Komutanlan - Afpn, AtStZ) Artuk ve Aksungur 
(Famous S e/juk Commanders - Af;in, AtStZ) Artuk and Aksungut), and of Siileyman-Shah, 
Anadolu Fatihi Kutalmz;ojJu SiilrymanJah (The Conqueror of Anato/ia, Siilqman-Shah), 
however, are comparatively lightweight, as is his Se4'i1klu-Ermeni ili;kikeri (Se/juk-
Armenian Relations). 
All the above mentioned works are now quite dated. Kafesoglu wrote his work on 
Khwarazmshahs and the Seljuks in the first half of the 1950's, his article on the Seljuks 
in the isldm Ansiklopedisi being published in 1965. Turan published all his work on the 
Seljuks between 1965 and 1971. Koymen, on the other hand, published his work on the 
Seljuks in a steady stream over four decades, from the 1950's into the 1980's. 
Nevertheless, all but one of his major works on the Seljuks was published in the 1970's. 
The new generation of historians who have published in recent years have not 
reassessed the research done by any of the above-mentioned historians, seemingly 
~ The first is a translation, revision and expansion of the first edition of the Engclopaedia of Islam commissioned 
by the Ministry of Education. The second is a separate and as yet incomplete series commissioned by the Pious 
Foundation for Religious Affairs. 
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taking care to write histories of the Seljuks not covered by them. There are Abdiilkerim 
Ozaydm's Sultan Ber~aruk Devri Sel;uklu Tarihi (485498/1092-1104) (Se!Juk History 
During the Reign of Sultan Ber~aruk) and Sultan Muhammed Tapar Devri Sel;uklu Tarihi (498-
511/1105-1118) (Se!Juk History During the Reign of Sultan Muhammed Tapa!}. Also 
noteworthy is Erdogan Mer<;il's Kirman S e/plklulan (S efjuks of Kirman), not to mention 
Ahmet Ya~ar Ocak's study of the Babai uprising and still others on specific aspects of 
Seljuk art and society in Anatolia. 
Mention must be made also of Dogan Avc1oglu's five volume evaluation of Turkish 
history up to the Ottoman Empire, Tiirklerin Tarihi (The History of the Turks), as from the 
latter part of the third volume the work concerns itself solely with the Seljuks. Having 
on his own admission taken a Marxist approach, however, Avc1oglu arguably became 
embroiled in ascertaining whether or not nomadic pastoral cultures and Islamdom were 
'feudal', not to mention the applicability of Karl Marx's Asiatic Mode of Production. 
Unlike Gordlevski (Gosudarstvo S e/plkidov Maii?J Azii, translated into Turkish as Anadolu 
Se/ptkltt Devleti or The Anatolian Sefjuk State), Avc1oglu based his conclusions only in part 
on primary sources. Since his use of secondary sources is also highly selective, the work 
at best airs certain questions of political history at issue between Turkish intellectuals in 
the second half of the 20th century. 
Last but not least, some reference has been made to Western scholarship other than that 
found in the isldm Ansiklopedisi. For instance, Barthold, Grousset and Cahen's major 
works are not only available in Turkish, but are also widely used by Turkish scholars 
alongside articles in the isldm Ansiklopedisi. Having said that, it must be pointed out that 
because for a time he worked in Turkey, the Sinologist D. W. Eberhard published most 
of his books in Turkish first and, therefore, is regarded here as belonging also to 
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Turkish historiography. Eberhard has been referenced in the context of Inner Asian 
history. 
1.5 Methodology 
As noted with regard to Yman<;, the aim of this thesis does not include the evaluation 
of the Turkish scholars' use of primary sources concerning the Seljuks. As well as 
providing detailed footnotes, almost without exception Turkish scholars discussed their 
use of sources in their books. As an example, Koymen's evaluation of primary sources 
on the Seljuks is given in APPENDIX 3. In Chapters 3-6, namely CONQUEST, 
EMPIRE, INTERREGNUM and DISSOLUTION, the Turkish historians' works on 
the Great Seljuks are reviewed and their views summarised. APPENDIX 1 contains 
maps relevant to the text and APPENDIX 2 charts the genealogy of the Oguz and the 
Seljuks. There is a comprehensive BIBLIOGRAPHY at the end. 
Chapter 2, ORIGINS, offers a brief summary of steppe culture in light of modern 
scholarship, because of the importance Togan, Kafesoglu and Turan attached to it as an 
influence on the Seljuks. The chapter also analyses in some detail the tribal origins of 
the Oguz, from whom the Seljuks and possibly many of the Tiirkmen stemmed. The 
reason behind this analysis is the source of the Seljuks' and their Tiirkmen affiliates' 
ideology and cultural expectations, which is taken up at length in Chapter 7, 
EVALUATION. 
Chapter 3, CONQUEST, begins with the Seljuks' and their Tiirkmen affiliates' exploits 
before they became established in Khurasan, at the expense of the Ghaznavids. The 
chapter concentrates on the Seljuks' conquest of Khurasan and the struggles between 
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vanous members, inclusive of the Tlirkmen raids launched from Azarbayjan into 
Anatolia under the Seljuks' leadership. 
Chapter 4, EMPIRE, covers the reigns of sultans Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shah, under 
whom the Seljuks were united into an empire that expanded into Anatolia, Transoxania, 
Syria and Palestine. 
The internecine struggle between the Seljuks on Sultan Malik-Shah's sudden death, 
which coincided with the arrival of the Crusaders and the rise of the Ismacilis, is 
covered in the Chapter 5, INTERREGNUM. 
Chapter 6, DISSOLUTION, covers the reigns of sultans Tapar and Sancar, during 
which the Great Seljuk Empire reverted to bipartite Turkic rule, before being fatally 
weakened by Kara Khitay and ftnally destroyed by the Oguz. 
In Chapter 7, EVALUATION, the basis on which Turkish scholars view the Great 
Seljuks as the beginning of Turko-Islamic civilization is analysed. Since they are 
disagreed on what was Turkic in the Great Seljuk Empire, fresh interpretations are 
proposed for the issues raised by them, such as the 'Tiirkmen problem' and questions 
concerning succession, legitimacy and dominion. The proposed reinterpretations are 
based on a full discussion of primary sources on Turkic ideology and culture, with some 
reference to modem anthropological studies on nomadic pastoralism. 
Perhaps the most comprehensive review is A. M. Khazanov's Nomads and the Outside 
World. This is because it draws not only on anthropological research but also on the 
historical record, as well as other disciplines such as archaeology and climatology. There 
are more general anthropological works, too, such as M. Gluckman's Politics Law and 
Ritual in Tribal S ocie!J or R. Fox's Kinship and Marriage, not to mention field studies such 
30 
as E. E. Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer and Fredrik Barth's Nomads if South Persia. Along 
with specific papers such as Marshall D. Sahlins' The Segmentary Lineage: An Organization 
if Predatory E:-<pansion, these works shed much light on the nature and enduring 
concerns of pastoralism. 
Mention should be made also of more modern studies of steppe empires. In the main 
influenced by Owen Lattimore's Inner Asian Frontier.\ qf China rather than works such as 
Grousset's The Empire if the Steppes, these incorporate social and economic 
considerations as well as geographical factors in making historical assessments. T. J. 
Barfield's The Perilotts 1-:;;-ontier and S. Jagchid & V. J. Symons' Peace, War, and Trade along the 
Great Wall are two such works that spring to mind. 
None of these specifically addresses the question of ideology. This may be defined as a 
political expression of socio-economic institutions, which are determined by a culture's 
technological basis. Ho\vever, any assessment of development must include 
geographical and demographic factors as independent determinants alongside that of 
cultural interaction. Even if invention requires genius, it is invariably driven by necessity. 
Arguably this releases discussion of culture change from being conducted in terms of 
historical cycles or equally arbitrary scales of progress. In this perspective emphasis falls 
on acculturation not diffusion, that is, wf!J, when and how something was incorporated, 
not solely 1vhat by whom. The advantage of this is that the question of cultural historicity 
no longer clouds the answers to where. 
Apart from Owen Lattimore's Inner Asian Frontiers if China, my defmition of ideology is 
derived from works such as Marshall D. Sahlins and E. R. Service's Culture and EtJo/tttion, 
Julian I--I. Steward's Theory if Culture Change- The Methodology if Multilinear EtJo/ution, R. 
G. Wilkinson's Pover!J and Progress, Milton I-I. Fried's The Ewlution if Political Socie!J, H. J. 
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M. Claessen and P. Skalnik's The Stut!J of the State and Marvin Harris' Cannibals and Kings: 
The On[ins of Cultures, not to mention K A. Wittfogel's Onental Despotism. 
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2. ORIGINS 
As in the case of Togan, Kafesoglu's original interest in Turkic culture clearly influenced 
his evaluation of Seljuk history. Given that this was also true for Turan, problems 
concerning the history of nomadic pastoral people across Eurasia need to be put into 
perspective, particularly with regard to the origins and ancestry of the Oguz. Map A1.1 
in Appendix 1 attempts to chart the migrations mentioned in the following section. 
2.1 Steppe Culture 
The Eurasian steppes are interrupted by a complex of mountains, namely the Pamir, 
T'ien-Shan (fengri or Ak-Tag), Targabatay, Altay (Altun-Y1~), Tannu-Ula (Kogmen), 
Hangay (Otiiken-Y1~) and Sayan (Kogmen) Mountains. The grasslands are higher and 
hence drier eastward toward Manchuria, while lush pastures abound westward into 
Eastern Europe. This is why to the east horses and sheep appear to have predominated, 
whereas to the west initially cattle were favoured alongside sheep, with horses being 
kept as in draught animals. Since the steppes to the west also favoured agriculture, 
agrarian and urban concerns remained to the fore, a point that is confirmed by Turkic 
loan words in Hungarian [Kafesoglu, 1994:165; also Rasonyi, 1983:10].7 Nevertheless, it 
7 Arpa (barley), buza = bugrlay (wheat), tad6 = tarla (field), alma (apple), szolo = sidleg (grape), tyuk = tavuk 
(chicken), kos = ko~ (ram), btka = buka or buga (bull), okor = okiiz (cattle), etc. 
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seems clear that agriculture was practised also in Inner Asia [Ogel, 1962:88-90 & 164-5; 
also Barfield, 1989:45-9]. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that migration routes were 
ftxed, regardless of distances. Tombs and fortifications discovered by archaeologists 
indicate that even in Inner Asia pastoralists had seasonal residences [Esin, 1980a:4-5], 
most of which were doubtless winter quarters. 
Having begun to dry during the previous millennium, the Eurasian steppes are thought 
to have been at their driest around 800 BCE [Lamb, 1995; also K.hazanov, 1994], which 
is when the Scythians entered the historical record. Although thereafter fully nomadic 
pastoralists periodically irrupted on the steppes west of the Altay, whether or not such 
appearances were likewise due to drought must be a secondary consideration. Arguably 
it was the development and spread of agriculture throughout northern China that 
forced full blown pastoralism to emerge in Inner Asia among those cultures whose 
herders were driven to the margins [Ogel, 1962; Esin, 1980a; Eberhard, 1987; also 
Lattimore, 196 7]. Having spread to forest people, pastoralism nevertheless remained 
dependent on agriculture and manufacture [Lattimore, 1967; Khazanov, 1994], and 
hence trade Uagchid & Symons, 1989; also Kafesoglu, 1956]. Although herders appear 
to remain healthier than farmers do [Barth, 1986; also Khazanov, 1994], unlike 
agriculture, pastoralism has never provided the means of intensifying food production 
to absorb population growth - at least not to a comparable magnitude. Thus, for 
instance, it can not be known at present whether the Western Huns, who evidently also 
practised agriculture [Maenchen-Helfen, 1973:174-8], were displaced by an expansion of 
predominantly agrarian culture(s) in the Pontic-Caspian region or by the collapse in 
Inner Asia of the Hsiung-nu Empire (21 0 BCE - 155 CE). What is certain is that even 
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when nomadic pastoralists were united into empires, sedentary people outnumbered 
them by as much as 100:1 [Divit<;iogiu, 1987:210].8 
For nearly three thousand years people from Central and Inner Asia migrated across the 
Eurasian steppe zone, sowing fear wherever they appeared. Not that anyone could 
determine how many made up a 'horde' [Roux, 1995:80ff], or who. A clan's ancestry was 
secondary to the lineage to which it was politically affiliated at the time [Evans-
Pritchard, 1978; Sahlins, 1968; Fox, 1967]. Moreover, marriage alliances were as much 
between people of different ethnic and linguistic origins as between dynasties [fiirkone, 
1995; Togan, 1946; Esin, 1980a; Ogel, 1962; also Fox, 1967], further complicating the 
latter day search for the ethnic origins [fogan, 1946; Esin, 1980a; also Golden, 1992]. 
Consequently, nomadic pastoralism is currently thought to have been inclusive not 
exclusive [Barfield, 1993; Sahlins, 1968; Fox, 1967; Leach, 1977], its hierarchical 
organization making it indigenously capable of statecraft [Barfield, 1993 & 1989]. This 
is what Turkish scholars have been arguing [fogan, 1946; Kafesoglu, 1994; Koymen, 
1979]. 
Recent research likewise concurs with Turkish scholars that statecraft rather than 
written records is the differentiating characteristic between primitive and advanced 
cultures [Sahlins, 1968; Sahlins & Service, 1973; Claessen & Skalnik:, 1981]. Arguably it 
is the organization and distribution of an agricultural surplus that necessitated writing, 
B According to Tonyukuk, Bilge Kagan's Chief Counsellor and Commander-in-Chief, the Kok Turk made up 
less than 1% of the T'ang period Chinese [Divit~oglu, 1987:210]. Given that Tonyukuk was born in China and 
before helping to rejuvenate the Kok Turk Empire was also in hereditary service in the Chinese administration 
[fekin, 1994:2], this percentage has to be taken seriously. Based on a census conducted in 2 CE, the Chinese 
are thought to have totalled 12.3 million hearths, or 58.5 million people l1-fcNeill, 1989:119]. Using the same 
multiplier for arithmetic consistency, by 703 CE the total number of hearths would have fallen to 6.9 million, 
thus 32.8 million people, rising by 742 CE to 8.6 million hearths or 40.9 million people (see Elvin, 1973:206]. 
Accordingly, less than 1% would make at the most 300,000 people, as by 716 CE Tonyukuk already was 70 
years of age. 
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reading, and arithmetic [Lattimore, 1967; Wittfogel, 1959]. A nomadic pastoral way of 
life did not, except when the leaders of such polities needed to communicate with or 
administer sedentary empires. According to the Chinese the Hsiung-nu did not have a 
script [Eberhard, 1942:76], which may explain why a few tantalising lines of Hsiung-nu 
poetry thought to be in Turkic were rendered in Chinese characters [Tekin, 1993]. 
Certainly, in their written communications with the Chinese, the Hsiung-nu used the 
latter's language [Barfield, 1989:52-3], as did the Kok Turk, who also used Soghdian in 
Transoxania [Divitc;:ioglu, 1987]. While the Great Seljuks and their military spoke Turkic 
among themselves, they administered their subjects in Persian [Kafesoglu, 1994 & IA 
Vol. 10:353ffj. Similarly, although the Mongols adopted the Uygur version of the 
Soghdian cuneiform script, they administered their empire(s) in local languages. 
Not surprisingly, the further one goes back, the less chance of finding records left by 
nomadic pastoral people. As Togan pointed out [1946:26; see Herodotus, 1992:304-5], 
the Royal Scythians had seven interpreters who spoke seven languages to communicate 
with the different people situated as far east as the flat-nosed, bald Argippreans by their 
lofty mountains. Nevertheless, the recent discovery of a tomb in Central Asia suggests 
that an archaic version of the runiform script used by the Kok Turk existed as early as 
the 5th century BCE. Two of the letters have been found only in the Kok Tiirk alphabet, 
which is thought to have evolved from Tiirk clan seals (tamga). At present scholars 
appear agreed that at least one of the words inscribed on a silver cup found in the said 




2.2 The Oguz 
UZJ Guzz and Gur, not to mention Guz and also Gu", all come up repeatedly in the 
works of Muslim and other chroniclers and geographers with reference to the Oguz, 
the Ogur and the Uygur, Turkic polities that not only knew each other but also 
intermingled. Turkic nomenclature further complicates the problem of ascertaining 
their whereabouts at any specific time. 
The root for Oguz and Ogur appears to have been og- or ogu-, as in the Argu ogla for 
youth or hero [Atalay, 1992/1:129], or ogul for son [Ibid. 51, etc.]. Ogul initially meant 
human child [Arat, IA Vol. 9:376-8], so that un oglan was a male child [Ibid.; also Atalay, 
1992/1:88 & 251] and ktz oglan a female child [Ibid.]. Appropriately, ogu/ptk was womb 
[Atalay, 1992/1:149]. Oguf meant family, or more correctly kin as in clan or relative [Ibid. 
61 & 88 and II:83 & 103]. Consequently, Og- or better still Ogu- and the collective 
suff1X -z or-r are thought to mean the clans [Siimer, 1965:13-4; Kafesoglu, 1994:141-2; 
Divit<;ioglu, 1994:11 ]. The collective suff1X -z originated east of the Altay while -r 
prevailed westward [Kafesoglu, 1994:51 & 185-6; Yiice, IA Vol. 12/2:445ff; Bozkurt, 
1992]. Interestingly enough, one meaning of ogur was to split a bone and separate its 
parts, and another felicity/ statecraft [Atalay, 1992/1:53].9 Similarly, ok or arrow denoted 
a share of an inheritance [Ibid. 1:37 & 48], possibly as a variation of og-. The Orkhun 
stone inscriptions refer to the Western Kok Tiirk as the On Ok [Tekin, 1988:13, etc.]. 
Chinese annals mention that the Kok Tiirk kagan resident in the East presented the 
9 Admittedly, due to a lack of firm evidence too much can be made of etymology throughout Eurasian pre-
history. However, the Turko-Mongolian differentiation between those descended from the White and Black 
Bone, namely Ak and Kara Kamag Bud1111 is clearly valid [Sumer, 1965; Kafesoglu, 1994], as is the connection 
between felicity and statecraft [Atalay, 1992/1:92, 301, 304, 320 & 508 and II:229]. 
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leader of each ruling lineage in the West with an arrow [Siimer, 1965:20], which is 
interpreted to denote that they were subordinate [Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 12/2:219]. 
Chinese annals refer to the Ogur, but not the Oguz. Initially mentioned between the 
Sayan and T'ien-shan Mountains in the 3rd century BCE, the Ogur seem to have spread 
westward as far as the Urals by the 2nd century CE [Kafesoglu, 1994:185-7]. As for the 
Oguz, they and the Ktp<;ak are thought to have been the Wu-huan that Chinese annals 
mention immediately east of the Altay, between the Tannu-ola and Hangay Mountains 
[Esin, 1980a:7]. The earliest known reference to the Oguz, to be more precise the Alt1 
(Six) Oguz under a certain Oz Yigen Alp Turan, is on the Yenisei stone inscriptions 
dated to the 6th and 7th centuries [Siimer, IA Vol. 9:378]. The Yenisei River flows north 
from the Tannu-ola Mountains. The Oguz are next referred to on the 8th century 
Orkhun stone inscriptions; the Tokuz Oguz are mentioned on the Tonyukuk inscription 
[fekin, 1994:4 & 5] and the U<; (Three) Oguz on the Bilge Kagan inscription (735) 
[fekin, 1988:49]. As is clear from these inscriptions [Ibid. 13, 45 & 1994:6], at the time 
the Tokuz Oguz were situated in present day Mongolia. This is where Kudug or Ilteri~ 
Kagan (682-91) re-established the Kok Tii.rk Empire by defeating their newly appointed 
Baz1° Kagan [Si.imer, 1965:16; see Tekin, 1994:5]. Prior to this defeat, the Tokuz Oguz 
were allied with the Otuz (Thirty) Tatar and the Chinese, going so far as to migrate to 
northern China [fekin, 1988:51], where some are thought to have stayed. However, 
archaeological evidence suggests that some of the Oguz migrated from Inner Asia, 
reaching the region between Lakes Balkash and Issyk-Kol during the 6th to 7th centuries 
[Esin, 1 980a]. 
to Baz could mean stranger [Atalay, 1992/III:148 & 159], or subjugated [Divit~ioglu, 1987:184], but in this 
context most likely denoted the species of the goshawk, an Oguz avian emblem [Esin, 1994:202]. 
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The Oguz migration to Central Asia may explain the reference to the On Ok's 
successors, the Tiirgi~ [fekin, 1988:13, 19, 23, 33, 43 & 47], who, according to the 
Orkhun stone inscriptions, were represented at Bilge Kagan's funeral (731) by a Makara; 
tamgap and an Oguz Bilge tamgap [Ibid. 23]. Possibly Makara; is a title derived from 
maharac (more commonly maharaja) [Ibid. 153]. Bilge means knowledgeable/wise, while 
tamga is seal [Atalay, 1992/IV:92, 567]. On the other hand, of the six lineages that made 
up the Tiirgi~, who were originally on the Left Wing of the On Ok, four were headed 
by patriarchs with the title of <:;or, which may indicate that they were of the $ul (from 
<:;ol or desert, and hence <:;or [Esin, 1980a:62-3]). The $ul are thought to have been in 
Jurjan, south-east of the Caspian Sea, from at least as early as the 5th century [Ibid.]. As 
far as the Kok Tiirk's great kagan was concerned, it seems that the Tiirgi~ were the 
senior members of the Left Wing of the On Ok. 
The Right Wing of the On Ok, the Nu-she-pi, appear to have consisted of three 
lineages, namely the A-si-kie, the Ko-shu (the Ezki~ or Ezgi~) and the Pay-say-kan. 
These are thought to have become the 0~ (fhree) Ok of the Oguz, which included the 
Kuuk. Once again, however, there is a link to Inner Asia. The regent of the 1Oth century 
Oguz polity between the Caspian and A.ral Seas was called Kill Erkin (also Kuzerkin), 
the title of the senior rulers of the A-si-kie and Ko-shu. The Karluk, at the time 
situated from the northern slopes of the Pamir and central T'ien-shan Mountains 
toward the Irtish River, also called their regent Kill Erkin [Sii.mer, 1965:21, 33 & 35-7; 
Togan, 1982:137; Kafesoglu, 1994:137 & IA Vol. 12/2:165; Divit~ioglu, 1992:130; 
$e~en, 1975:37]. 
The question of whether or not the Oguz were related to their namesakes in Inner Asia 
is confused further by the origins of the Uygur, who as the On (fen) Uygur seem to 
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have been well known to the Khazar, namely nine Oguz and one Uygur. Uy- meant to 
go along, to ally [Atalay, 1992/III:146], and uya- relative/brother [Ibid. 1:85]. 
Accordingly, Uy+ (o)g11r (Uygur) would be allied/ related/brotherly clans [Kafesoglu, 
1994:122; Bozkurt, 1992:66]. The -r suffiX suggests an origin to the west of the 
Eurasian mountain-complex, which appears to be confirmed by Chinese sources that 
mention them in the Ili River valley north of Issyk-Kol (50-43 BCE) [Esin, 1980a:204]. 
The Uygur re-emerge in present day Mongolia during the initial collapse of the Kok 
Tiirk Empire. Having been recognized by the Chinese court (646), they seem to have 
reinforced their independence of the Kok Tiirk by helping defeat remnants of the On 
Ok (657), advancing as far as Tashkent. Around this time some of the Tokuz Oguz 
already appear affiliated to the Uygur [Kafesoglu, IA Vol.12/2:180]. Along with the nine 
Uygur clans, the Buku, Bay1rku, Siker, K'i-pi, Ediz and Izgil (or Sse-ki [Divit<;ioglu, 
1994:11 ]), the Toiira and Kun1 are thought to have made up the Tokuz Oguz 
[Divit<;ioglu, 1987; Siimer, 1965:33]. Of these the Izgil are named on the Orkhun stone 
inscriptions as having been dispersed by Kill Tekin [fekin, 1988:21 ]. Thus the 
Esgil/Isgil mentioned in association with the Bulgar polity established on the Volga 
during the 9th and 1Oth centuries may possibly be the Izgil. 
There is also the final collapse of the Kok Tiirk Empire and the ensuing struggle to 
consider (I 44-55). This may have given impetus to the westward migration mentioned 
above and explain an unconf1rmed reference to the Oguz in conjunction with al-
Muqanna's (c. 77 6-83) revolt against the caliphate in Transoxania [Kafesoglu, 1994:143; 
Divit<;ioglu, 1994:13-4]. Although during this struggle the Bastrul's leader Iduk Kutu, a 
relation of the imperial Kok Tiirk A-shih-na clan [fekin, 1988:47], had declared himself 
kagan upon defeating the Kok Tiirk Tengri Kagan's successor, their allies, the Uygur 
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and Karluk, did not accept this. The Basnul were beaten, never to recover. The Uygur 
next defeated the Os: Karluk, consolidating their ascendancy. The Karluk (most likely 
the <::igil and Yagma lineages) migrated south-west from between Lake Zaysan and Lake 
Ulungur, where the current borders of Kazakhstan, China, Mongolia and Russia meet 
in the Altay, displacing the Pes:enek toward the Caspian Lowlands [Siimer, 1965:28ff; 
Divits:ioglu, 1992:131]. 
Pes:enek derives from Becenek (currendy bacanak), meaning brother-in-law, but in the 
context of men who have married sisters. They are thought to have been initially of the 
Left Wing of the On Ok because two of the eight Pes:enek lineages were called <::or and 
<::oban (<::opan), which were the tides of the Left Wing chiefs of the On Ok other than 
the Tiirgi~ [Siimer, 1965:21 & 44]. Thus the Pes:enek recorded as a lineage of the Os: Ok 
Oguz [Ibid. 169-71; also Atalay, 1992/1:57], are thought to be a branch of the main body 
subsequendy driven from between the Ural and Volga rivers by the Khazar and the 
Oguz in 898-902 [Ibid 45]. Although there is an 8th century reference to a Ba-cha-neg 
affiliation northeast of the Orkhun River, noted as having been at war with the Uygur, 
these may have been a branch that migrated eastward rather than westward. 
Consequendy, as Siimer proposed [1965:21, 33 & 35-7], most likely the Oguz of the 10th 
century were Turkic people of western Eurasian origin with whom in time other Turkic 
people from Inner Asia became affiliated. The senior lineage of the Os: Ok Oguz, the 
Bayanchr, for instance, whose name stems from bC(J, meaning rich [Atalay, 1992/1:349 & 
III:158, 239], thus from a rich place, are considered to have been originally of the 
Kimek. Moreover, the Eymiir clans, also of the Os: Ok Oguz, are possibly the Aymur 
clans of the Uygur [Divits:ioglu, 1994:12-3]. 
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3. CONQUEST 
This chapter follows Kafesoglu's S e/ptklu Ailesinin Men;ei Hakktnda (1955) for the origins 
of the Seljuks and Koymen's Biiyiik Selruklu imparatorlugu- Kumlu; Devri (1979) for the 
Seljuks early years in Transoxania and Khurasan. Koymen's Tugml B~ ve Zamam (1972) is 
the main Turkish source for the years between Dandankan and Sultan Tugrul's death. 
Siimer's Oguzlar (1965) and Koymen's Selruklu Devri Tiirk Tarihi (1963) have been 
referred to alongside other works for supplementary material pertinent to the events 
being reviewed. 
The regions and cities mentioned in the remainder of the thesis are identified on maps 
A1.2&A1.3. 
3.1 The Seljuks 
Togan thought the Seljuks (originally Sal<;uk, then Sel<;iik and thus now Sel<;uk) were of 
the Oguz, but initially affiliated to the Khazar Kaganate [1946:183], with which 
Divit<;ioglu agreed [1994:55]. In the main this is not accepted by Turkish scholars 
[Kafesoglu, 1955:22-5 & IA Vol. 1 0:353ff; Siimer, 1965:65; Koymen, 1979:7 & 1963:23]. 
First of all, while dialects of the eastern group of Turkic languages most likely were 
spoken alongside those of the western group - the Khazar kagans were of the Kok 
Turk imperial clan - even at its peak the kaganate does not appear to have stretched 
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further east than the Caspian Sea. Moreover, the Pe<;enek intruded over the Caspian 
Lowlands in the middle of the 9d1 century, when among others the Magyar left the 
kaganate. Subsequently, Kiev fell to the Rus (866) and the Khazar Kaganate went into 
decline, being over-run between 965-9 [Togan, IA Vol. 5/1:397ff; Kafesoglu, 
1994:157f~. 
As for the Oguz, it is considered doubtful that the report concerning the death of the 
Oguz ruler in battle against the Karluk can be interpreted as taking place in the 9th 
century or even earlier [Siimer, 1965:64]. What is certain, however, is that the Khazars 
required help from the Oguz throughout the latter half of the 9th century against the 
Pe<;enek intrusion (860-89) [Kurat, IA Vol. 9:537], allying to drive them from between 
the Ural and Volga rivers (898-902) [Siimer, 1965:45]. Moreover, Ibn Fadlan's embassy 
presented a letter from the caliphate to the Oguz Siibap11 (Commander-in-Chief), in 922 
[~e~en, 1975:38]. This suggests the Oguz had established a polity well before the end of 
the 9th century, coincident with Khazar decline. The Oguz Commander-in-Chief was 
the brother-in-law of the (Volga) Bulgar king, Ahru~ [Ibid. 39]. That Ahru~ was a vassal 
of the Khazar kagan is also clear from Ibn Fadlan's report. The Khazar kagan held 
Alrru~'s son hostage and collected an annual tax [Ibid. 63-4]. Having become a Muslim, 
Ahru~ had asked the caliph for aid. As a result Ibn Fadlan was assigned with a group of 
jurists who would teach Islam throughout Bulgar realms, not to mention craftsmen who 
would construct mosques and a fortification against Alrru~'s enemies that Ibn Fadlan 
concluded were the Khazar [Ibid 20 & 64]. At the time the Khazar held some Oguz 
prisoner, but not hostage. One of the Oguz leaders proposed that Ibn Fadlan and his 
" SiJ meant soldier [Atalay, 1992/1:69, etc.], or army [fekin, 1988:55], and ba; head/leader, thus Selfiik SiJ ba;r was 
the grandfather ofTugrul Beg and his brother <;agn Beg [Atalay, 1992/1:478]. 
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group should be exchanged for these. Another Oguz leader entitled Tarkan became 
suspicious that Ibn Fadlan, hence the caliphate was colluding against them with the 
Khazar [Ibid. 39]. All of this appears to confu:m that the Oguz were independent of the 
Khazar Kaganate [Siimer, 1965:61-7; Koymen, 1979:2 & 15; Kafesoglu, lA Vol. 
10:353ff]. 
There is no doubt that the Seljuks were of the Km1k Oguz [Atalay, 1992/1:55]. The 
earliest known Seljukid, Sel<;uk Beg's father Dukak (or Tukak possibly from the original 
tugag, or standard-bearer [furan, 1965:32], thus also Dokak or Tokak) was renowned as 
Temir Yahg (Iron Bow). Temir is thought to refer to his strength, while Yahg is 
considered to indicate that Dukak was of a ruling lineage [Kafesoglu, 1955 & IA Vol. 
10:353ff]. As noted in reference to the Kok Turk [Siimer, 1965:20], the bow is thought 
to have symbolized sovereignty among Turkic people [Kafesoglu, 1955 & IA Vol. 
10:353ff]. Nonetheless, it is not known where the Km1k were at this time [Kafesoglu, 
1955], or if Dukak was of their ruling lineage [Koymen, 1979:30 & 1963:23]. 
Another suggestion is that Temir Yahg instead indicates Dukak was an alp, a warrior in 
the service of the Khazars whose son was raised by the Oguz yabgu (possibly from 
shan-yii, the name of the Hsiung-nu leaders) [Divit<;ioglu, 1994:55-8 & 60-3; Esin, 
1980a:5 7]. To be sure, on the steppe a commoner or for that matter an adopted son 
could merit nobility through martial prowess and leadership [Mardin, 1992b:81 ]. Togan 
proposed that the Seljuks stemmed from a tent-pole sharpener [1981:182-6]. While 
there is no evidence for this either [Kafesoglu, 1955], Sel<;uk Beg's sons did have biblical 
names: Israil (Israel), Mikail (Michael), Musa (Moses), Yusuf (Joseph) and/ or Yunus 
(Jonah) [Siimer, 1965:69; Koymen, 1979:31]. This has been argued to reflect Khazar 
cultural pre-eminence in the region where the Km1k were situated, as each had also 
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Turkic names or tides: Israil's was Arslan/2 Musa's was Inane;, and Yusuf's was Ymal 
[furan, 1965:34-7 & 49]. According to Divitc;ioglu, however, Selc;uk Beg's name stems 
from the <;;uva~ for white, namely ~iire, ~an, or san, hence Sar-c;uk (the ending -c;uk 
meaning little) and through an orthographic mistake Salc;uk [1994:56-7]. He argued that 
this interpretation of Selc;uk Beg's name was supported by the Seljuk's legend of origin. 
According to the legend, Dukak had objected to a campaign against a group of 
Muslims with such vehemence that he had come to blows with the Khazar kagan's 
regent, the Hakan-beh. Although it was ordered that he be captured and killed, this was 
ignored. Instead the parties were persuaded to reconcile their differences. Divitc;ioglu 
proposed that the legend concerns the Khazar soldiery's reported refusal to campaign 
against the Muslims in the Caucasus (913). These had attacked and killed the Rus 
merchants permitted to trade in Islamdom by the Khazar Kagan in return for money 
(912) [Ibid. 55-6]. This is highly unlikely since on Dukak's death the Oguz yabgu is said 
to have taken Selc;uk Beg, then 17-18 years old, under his wing, appointing him later still 
Commander-in-Chie£ The importance of this appointment can be determined from 
Ibn Fadlan, according to whom the letter from the caliphate was presented to a person 
in this position. 
Whatever Dukak's origins, legend has it that the Oguz yabgu's wife became wary of 
Selc;uk Beg's growing popularity, not to mention his flagrant ambition, insisting he be 
killed. Accordingly, when Selc;uk Beg heard this he left with his family and followers 
12 According to Kopriilii [IA Vol. 1:598-609], the original may be ans (being related to arsr/ or reddish-yellow 
[Atalay, 1992/IV:37], as in a light chestnut horse, light-brown hair, or dark complexioned person) with the 
suffix -/an as in kaplan or tiger, etc. so that in some Turkic dialects it is anslan, particularly as red-haired lions 
were known in Kazeriin in Fars, lions also being reported on the western banks of the Amu-Darya River. The 
lion was a Buddhist heraldic emblem, which entered Turkic culture during the 5th century, and became 
frequent as a name or title after the Kok Turk Taspar Kagan (572-81), who was a Buddhist, used it [Esin, 








[Koymen, 1979:7-11 & 1963:23-4; Siimer, 1965:65; Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff; Turan, 
1965:40-2; ~e~en, 1975:37]. 
The decision to migrate to Jand, which was on the left bank of the Syr-Darya near the 
: ~.~·.·.·.' .•;tl 
Aral Sea, southeast of Yengi-Kent where the Oguz rulers wintered, appears to have 
i 
been a judicious move [Koymen, 1979:18-9 & 21-3; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff & :ij 
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Turan, 1965:40-5]. Whereas Yengi-Kent and Huvara, founded by Muslim colonists from 
Transoxania, were inside Oguz territory, Jand was considered to be on the marches [Ibid. 
17 & 1963:24]. The border lands between Islamdom and the Oguz polity stretched 
from Khwarazm, south of the Aral Sea, northeast to Isfijab [~e~en, 1985:210]. The 
region around present day ~imkent, Isfijab, had nearly 1700 ribats, namely fortifications 
built by notables or a city for the gazi from their region [Barthold, 1990:190]. Thus 
Transoxania was considered to be at the forefront of jihad, the war against non-
believers [Koymen, 1979:18; see also ~e~en, 1985:210]. Selc;:uk Beg appears to have taken 
advantage of this. Said to have arrived in Jand with only a hundred horsemen, their total 
wealth with their spare mounts being 1500 camels and 50,000 sheep [Ibid 20], he rallied 
the local gazis against the Oguz yabgu's tax collector. The reason put forward was that 
Muslims should not have to pay tax to the non-believer [Ibid 24; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 
10:353ff & Turan, 1965:40-5]. This and possibly similar martial activity at the forefront 
of the war against the non-believers is thought to have increased the Seljuks' wealth and 
number [Ibid 26 & 30], such that Selc;:uk Beg came to be referred to as al-Malik al-Gazi 
[Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 1 0:353ff; Turan, 1965:40-5]. As a result the Seljuks were able to 
come to an agreement with the Samanids sometime between 985 and 993. Accordingly, 
they would defend the Samanid borders in exchange for pasturage around the village of 
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Nur, between Bokhara and Samarkand. The TiirkmentJ who took up these pastures 
were under the command of Selc;uk Beg's son Arslan (Israil) (Koymen, 1979:34-5; also 
Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff & Turan, 1965:40-5]. 
The Samanids had established themselves in Transoxania at the beginning of the 9th 
century, taking Isfijab from the ft.rst Karakhanid, Bilge Kill Kadir Khan, in 840 
[Barthold, 1990:228; also Pritsak, IA Vol. 6:253]. By the end of the century Samanid 
hegemony extended south-west into Khurasan, but thereafter their power began to 
wane [Ibid 225ff; also Buchner, IA Vol. 10:140-3]. In 962, Alp Tekin (originally Tigin, 
then Tegin), the Turkic mamluk commander of the Samanid palace corps, attempted to 
establish a dynasty in Ghazna [Ibid 269], which his own mamluk Sebiik Tekin was able 
to do (977) [Ibid 280]. 
The Samanids also lost control of their remaining Turkic commanders. One of these, 
Ali made a secret agreement with the Karakhanid Bugra Khan Harun to keep Khurasan 
in exchange for Transoxania. The Karakhanids entered from Isfijab and took Bokhara 
(992), having defeated the other main Turkic commander, Faik, who then joined them. 
However, Bugra Khan Harun had to withdraw to Samarkand due to sudden illness, not 
to mention growing danger from the Tiirkmen under Arslan, who pursued and 
plundered his retreating forces. Bugra Khan Harun never recovered from his illness and 
died [Ibid 276-9 & 289; Koymen, 1963:27-8]. Left alone, Faik allied with Ali against the 
Samanids who turned to the Ghaznavids for help. Sebiik Tekin defeated Ali, but kept 
Khurasan when the Karakhanids re-entered Transoxania (994-6). The Ghaznavids and 
tJ According to Siimer [1965:60], the Tiirkmen were Turkic people who had accepted Islam [also Divits:ioglu, 
1994:53-5]. 
47 
the Karakhanids agreed on the Amu-Darya as their border, leaving only Bokhara to the 
Samanids. In 997 both the Samanid and Ghaznavid rulers died. At the same time Sebiik 
Tekin's eldest son Mahmud fmally overcame his brother, the Karakhanid llek Khan : 'l .. ~· . " 
;. 
Nasr took Bokhara and with it the Samanid treasury (999). Nonetheless, the Samanid 
prince, Ismacil Muntasir, was able to escape and gather an army in Khwarazm. Having 
taken Bokhara back (1000), he was defeated and withdrew to Khurasan, where his 
brother Nasr and Mahmud of Ghazna also defeated him. Thus he came to Jand to 
enlist the Seljuks' help (1003) [Ibid 280-9; Koymen, 1979:48 & 1963:28]. 
Sel<;uk Beg's eldest living son Israil is referred to as Arslan Peygu (Beygu--Yabgu) in this 
context [Ibid 289]. This is taken to suggest the Oguz polity had dissolved sometime 
after the Khazar Kaganate (625-1015) [Siimer, 1965:68-9]. Certainly, a branch of the 
Oguz is known to have attacked the (Volga) Bulgar in 985 with the Rus [Ibid 65-6]. As 
these may have been from the Oguz wintering in the Caspian Lowlands at least as early 
as the first half of the 10th century and raiding across the frozen Volga in sufficient 
numbers to necessitate the Khazar Kagan to take the field against them [Ibid 62; ~e~en, 
1985:49], it is doubtful that they were affiliated to the Oguz yabgu. The Oguz polity 
appears to have been situated further south, in the main stretching from Ust-Yurt, 
through Kyzyl-Kum into the mountains parallel to the Syr-Darya [Siimer, IA Vol. 
9:378ff]. In any case, having agreed to help Ismacil Muntasir, the Seljuks defeated the 
forces under the Karakhanid Commander-in-Chief, Tekin, near Samarkand, which 
prompted the Karakhanid Ilek Khan N asr to advance. The Seljuks surprised him in a 
raid and took 18 commanders prisoner. Ismacil Muntasir withdrew when the Seljuks 
refused to hand these over, undecided whether to keep them hostage or release them to 
Ilek Khan Nasr [Koymen, 1979:49-50 & 1963:29; also Siimer, 1965:69]. 
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Ismacil Muntasir returned to Transoxania soon afterwards but was defeated outside 
Bokhara and retired to N ur, from where he appears to have been able to rally the people 
of Samarkand, not to mention also the Seljuks. Once again the Seljuks surprised the ~ .•  ... ''l;l 
... 
Karakhanids' forces under Ilek Khan Nasr, defeating them near Samarkand (1 004). 
When the Karakhanid returned that same year, however, Arslan did not take the field. 
The assumption is the Seljuks had plundered enough baggage, weapons and horses, not 
to mention prisoners who would be held to ransom or sold into slavery. Thus Ismacil 
Muntasir was defeated one last time when 5,000 Oguz under Hasan Tak deserted to Ilek 
Khan Nasr on the battlefield [Koymen, 1979:59-61 & 1963:29; also Siimer, 1965:69-70]. 
In view of the new balance of power in the region, namely Ghaznavid expansion into 
Khurasan and that of the Karakhanid into Transoxania, Arslan appears to have 
withdrawn to his pastures near Nur, where the Karakhanid Ilek Khan Nasr took up 
residence [Koymen, 1979:100]. When Sel<;uk Beg died soon afterwards and was buried 
in Jand (1 007 -8), at the age of 107, Arslan was his eldest living son since it is presumed 
Mikail had been killed in action sometime afterwards 995. Sel<;uk Beg had raised Mikail's 
sons Tugrul and ~ago Beg,'4 but after his death they were forced to leave Jand with 
their uncle Musa for the environs of Bokhara, or possibly Samarkand [Siimer, 1965:65]. 
Seeing the Seljuks as his main obstacle to the complete conquest of Transoxania, Ilek 
Khan N asr is said to have gathered his forces. Although Tugrul and ~ago. Beg are 
thought to have approached the Karakhanid Bugra Khan, who resided near Talas, this 
initiative does not appear to have worked out. Tugrul Beg was taken hostage, but ~agn 
Beg launched a successful surprise attack that enabled him to trade Bugra Khan's 
t4 <;ago meant blue-eyed merlin, the avian emblem of the Kuuk, and Tugrul crested goshawk [Esin, 1994:202]. 
Beg is the lowest tide ofTurkic nobility, commonly that of a clan leader [Atalay, 1992/I:22, etc.] 
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commanders for his brother. As a result, Tugrul Beg retired into the desert and <;agn 
Beg took 3,000 mounted archers with him into Anatolia [Koymen, 1979:96-104 & 
1963:32; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ffj. 
Sumer accepts that the Seljuks left Jand to join Arslan sometime after Sel<;uk Beg's 
death, possibly under pressure from the Baran clan. 15 Shah-Malik, who was of the 
Baran, thus possibly the grandson of the Oguz yabgu with whom Sel<;uk Beg fell out 
[Divit<;ioglu 1994:58-9], is known to have reigned there from at least 1030. Sumer 
accepts also Tugrul and <;agn Beg approached the Karakhanid Bugra Khan, but not 
that either stayed in Talas or that <:;ago Beg then went on to Anatolia and the Caucasus 
[Siimer, 1965:76]. 
Originally proposed by Y man<; and accepted by all Turkish scholars except Sumer, the 
expedition to Anatolia attributed to <:;ago Beg is thought to have lasted five years (1 016-
21). If correct, <:;ago Beg appears to have been able to enlist the aid of the Turkmen 
already in the region and attack the Armenian kingdom of Vaspurakan (1018-19). Next, 
<;ago Beg is thought to have attacked the realms of the Shaddadid dynasty. Having 
sacked Georgia, the Tiirkmen under <;ago Beg are said to have been held by the 
Armenians in Ani near present day Kars and retired to go their own ways (1021) 
[Yman<;, 1944:35-6; thus Koymen, 1979:104-10 & 1963:33, Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff 
& Turan, 1965:52-3]. 
On his way westward, reputedly <;ago Beg had crossed Khurasan without the 
permission of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna. Accordingly, the Ghaznavid governor of 
t> While Siimer does not consider the Baran of the Oguz, according to Turan they stem from the Yazu: clan of 
the Oguz, namely Baran, ruler of Yengi-kent [1965:47-8]. After the collapse of the Oguz polity, a branch is 
known to have helped found the Karakoyunlu polity. 
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Tus, Arslan Jadhib, had sent a force to capture c;agn Beg. As his failure made Sultan 
Mahmud suspicious, Arslan Jadhib, now fearful for his life, is said to have taken 
extensive precautions for c;agn Beg's return. Clearly c;a.gn Beg got through once again. 
With his prestige thus enhanced by his exploits, c;agn. Beg is said to have rallied the 
Tiirkmen (presumably those still not affiliated to Arslan Yabgu) around Bokhara to his 
banner. When Tugru1 Beg joined him, Arslan Yabgu advised his nephews to disperse, as 
the Seljuks would be perceived as a threat to Karakhanid power in Transoxania. This is 
why it is thought that the brothers did not emerge again until Su1tan Mahmud had 
tricked Arslan Yabgu into captivity [Koymen, 1979:106, 111-4 & 1963:33; also Turan, 
1965:52-3]. 
What appears certain is that the Karakhanid prince, possibly Ilek Khan Nasr's brother 
(d.1012-3), Ali Tekin, became the ru1er of Bokhara (1014). Although subsequently taken 
prisoner by his great uncle (1 017 -8), the Karakhanid Arslan Khan, Ali Tekin escaped 
and returned (1020-21). Having married Arslan Yabgu's daughter, he appears to have 
defeated a Karakhanid army led by Arslan Khan's brother with the Seljuks' help. The 
people of Bokhara, however, are said to have not liked Ali Tekin. Moreover, members 
of the Karakhanid dynasty in Transoxania had been attempting to wrest Khurasan from 
Su1tan Mahmud since 1006. As a resu1t Su1tan Mahmud entered Transoxania (1 025), 
ostensibly encouraged by complaints from the people there. Simu1taneously, the 
Karakhanid Kadir Khan entered from Kashgar and took Samarkand [Koymen, 1979:68-
72 & 1963:30; see also Turan, 1965:52, Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff, Siimer, 1965:70-1 
and Barthold, 1991:292-5 & 299-304]. 
Su1tan Mahmud and Kadir Khan decided that Bokhara shou1d be given to the latter's 
son. More importantly, they agreed that the Seljukid Arslan shou1d be recruited or 
otherwise dealt with by Sultan Mahmud. Arslan Yabgu and Ali Tekin had retired to the 
desert. Sultan Mahmud did not pursue Ali Tekin although he captured . his wife and 
daughter. He sent an envoy to Arslan Yabgu, inviting him to discuss the defence of 
Khurasan during his annual campaigns into India. When Arslan Yabgu arrived at court, 
Sultan Mahmud asked how strong a force he could muster if called upon? Arslan Yabgu 
replied that his own followers totalled 30,000 but that he could call also on the Seljuks, 
another 10,000. When Sultan Mahmud pressed him for more Arslan Yabgu bragged he 
could call upon 100,000 horsemen from Balkhan (Balhan), a mountain situated between 
the Kara-Kum Desert and the Caspian Sea, below Ost-Yurt, and if need be a further ··' 
200,000 from Turkmenistan. Mahmud tricked Arslan and imprisoned him in the 
fortress of Kalinjar in India [Koymen, 1979:78-89 & 1963:31; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 
10:353ff & Siimer, 1965:71]. 
Arslan Yabgu had two sons, Kutalnu~ and Resul-Tekin who reputedly tried for years , ... ~· 
thereafter to free their father. Upon Arslan's death (1032), however, both are thought to 
have joined their cousins, Tugrul and ~ago Beg. Nevertheless, some, if not all, of 
Arslan's followers refused right from the outset. After Arslan's capture, 4,000 families 
asked Sultan Mahmud for pasturage in Khurasan in return for their martial services. 
Their request was granted despite objection from the governor of Tus, Arslan Jadhib 
(1025-6). The reason given by their leaders, namely Yagtnur, Buka, Gok-Ta~ and Klztl, 
was persecution by Tugrul and ~agn begs who wanted to subordinate them. Even 
though thus weakened, Tugrul and ~agn begs appear to have refused Ali Tekin's 
invitation to support him in the conquest of Samarkand. As a result, Ali Tekin is 
thought to have invited Yusuf Ymal to become the leader of the Tilikmen, giving him 
Arslan's tide of yabgu. When Yusuf accepted, reputedly ~agn Beg had to restrain 
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Tugrul Beg from attacking his uncle. According to this interpretation of events, Ali 
Tekin had Yusuf killed and attacked the Seljuks who suffered heavy losses (1 029) 
[Koymen, 1979:121-8 & 1963:34-5; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff & Turan, 1965:56]. 
Whereas both Kafesoglu and Turan proposed that the Seljuks consequently withdrew to 
Khwarazm, Siimer (and Koymen) was of the opinion that Tugrul and <;ago begs had 
been wintering there for some time with the permission of Altun-Ta~, its Ghaznavid 
governor since 1017. It is noteworthy that this date is coincident with that proposed for 
<;agn Beg's expedition to Anatolia, not to mention Ali Teki.n's imprisonment. Siimer 
also suggested Yusuf acceded to the leadership of the Seljuks on merit rather than 
intrigue, and did not take into consideration Tugrul and <;agn Beg's alleged conflict with 
Ali Tekin. He suggested instead that on Ali Tekin's death the Seljuks fell out with his 
commander-in-chief and regent Alp Kara (1 034), which is when he thought also that 
Yusuf was killed. In support of his argument he pointed out that the Seljuks are 
thought to have fought with Ali Tekin against the Ghaznavid forces under Altun-Ta~ 
(1032), who was ordered to invade Transoxania by Sultan Mascud after he had 
succeeded to the throne of Ghazna. According to Barthold, on Altun-Ta~'s death from 
wounds sustained during the said battle, his son Harun allied with Ali Tekin and the 
Seljuks against Sultan Mascud (1034) [Koymen, 1979:131-160 & 1963:37 & Siimer, 
1965:72 & 76-7; see also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff, Turan, 1965:57 & Barthold, 
1990:315-7]. 
In any event, on their arrival in Khwarazm, the Seljuks were surprised by Shah-Malik 
during a dawn raid and lost seven to eight thousand men, not to mention countless 
women and children who were taken captive (1 034). The Seljuks appear to have been so 
badly depleted that the gazi of the Nemek ribat on the northern banks of the Amu-
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Darya are said to have considered killing them. When soon after Sultan Mascud had 
their new ally the Khwarazmshah Harun assassinated, the Seljuks were forced to c.ross 
the Amu-Darya into Khurasan (1035) [Ibid.]. 
3.2 The so-called Tiirkmen of Iraq 
The 4,000 tents of Tiirkmen who had been affiliated to Arslan Yabgu are referred to in 
Turkish historiography as the Tiirkmen of Iraq because of their adventures in western 
Iran. They are also known as the Tiirkmen of Balkhan, the Yabgulu or the Navekkiye 
(men of the quiver). Rather than join Tugru1 and <;agn Beg on Arslan Yabgu's 
imprisonment, they requested pasturage in Khurasan from Su1tan Mahmud, in exchange 
for their martial services (1 025-6). The pastures that were granted were in the vicinity of 
N esa, Baverd and Ferave, which were situated along the A trek River. The river flows 
from the Kopetdag Mountains into the Caspian Sea, south of the Kara-Kum Desert 
and the Balkhan Mountain, from where others are said to have joined them during the 
following two years. This appears to have strained their relationship with the local 
administration and inhabitants, because the Tiirkmen let their flocks graze in the fields 
and went off with the peasants' animals. On the other hand, when the Tiirkmen were 
unable to pay their taxes, allegedly collectors confiscated their livestock and sold their 
children into slavery. Mounting local complaints finally led Sultan Mahmud to command 
the governor of Tus, Arslan Jadhib, to restore public order. This he seems to have failed 
to do despite several attempts. At Arslan Jadhib's request, Su1tan Mahmud personally 
took the field and defeated the Tiirkmen near the Ferave ribat, reportedly killing 4,000 
men, women and children (1 028) [Koymen, 1979:165-17 4 & 1963:39-40; also Siimer, 
1965:73, Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff & Turan, 1965]. 
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Having cleared Khurasan of the Tiirkmen, Sultan Mahmud took Rayy (Rey), outside 
present day Tehran, appointing his son Mas cud governor (1 029). When he died, his 
other son Muhammad initially acceded to the throne (1 030). Mas cud revolted and 
invited Yagtnur Beg back to Khurasan. When Mascud had acceded to the throne of 
Ghazna with his help, Yagmur persuaded his mentor to allow also Klztl, Buka and Gok-
Ta~ back into Khurasan. Although these Tiirkmen begs served Sultan Mascud well on 
his campaigns, their conduct remained cause for complaint in Serakhs and Baverd. They 
are said also to have fought a Ghaznavid force, but no reason is given for this. Possibly 
the said force was sent to restore public order. Whatever the case, Sultan Mascud 
ordered his Commander-in-Chief of Iraq, Ta~-Fara~ to press them into service under 
Humar-Ta~, their commander when on campaign. Since Yagt"nur and fifty Tiirkmen 
begs were executed on the way back from Iraq, the suggestion is that possibly they 
resisted becoming mamluks (1033). Yagtnur's son and Klztl, both of whom had been in 
Balkhan at the time, took up arms. In turn this appears to have incited Buka and Gok-
Ta~ who were still in Rayy. Although Sultan Mas cud then ordered Buka and Gok-Ta~ to 
be executed, for some reason this was not carried out. When the Tiirkmen in 
Transoxania joined those from Balkhan, Sultan Mascud was forced to take the field with 
his best commanders in order to end the devastation the raids were causing (1 034) 
[Koymen, 1979:174-197 & 1963:40-1; also Siimer, 1965:74-5 & Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 
10:353ffJ. 
Sultan Mascud had also ordered the assassination of the rebellious Khwarazmshah 
Harun. Although the order was executed successfully, it merely worsened the situation. 
Coming as it did hard on the heels of Ali Tekin's death and Shah-Malik's dawn raid, the 
Seljuks, politically isolated, entered Khurasan. They had with them the Tiirkmen under 
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Ibrahim Ytnal, who was Tugru1 and <;ago Beg's mother's son from their uncle Yusuf; 
according to custom Yusuf had married her upon his elder brother Mikail's death. The 
Seljuks are said to have crossed the Amu-Darya with only 900 mounted archers but 
soon had 10,000. The suggestion, therefore, is that many of the Tiirkmen raiding 
Khurasan rallied to their banner. Three envoys, representing Musa Beygu (yabgu), 
Tugru1 and c,;agn. Beg, presented a letter to the Ghaznavid governor of Khurasan, 
requesting pasturage around Nesa, Baverd and Ferave, in exchange for their martial 
services. This is where Su1tan Mahmud had situated Arslan Yabgu's followers, with the 
same intention. When Su1tan Mascud's minister received the letter, he is reported to have 
exclaimed that Khurasan was lost. The Seljuks' letter clearly stated their reasons for 
entering Khurasan- Ali Tekin and Harun's deaths- and also offered to send members 
of their dynasty in rotation to the su1tan's palace as hostage for good behaviour 
[Koymen, 1979:197-201 & 1963:41; also Siimer, 1965:77 & Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 
10:353ff]. 
Su1tan Mascud responded by sending an army equipped with war elephants. Although 
his commander, Beydogdu, objected that the chain of command, which the su1tan had 
set up, was too complicated, this was disregarded. Sure enough, as the Ghaznavid 
advance units came upon the Seljuk camp, despite Beydogdu's orders to push on, they 
began to kill the shepherds, women and children left behind, taking their animals and 
tents. Consequently, Beydogdu was forced to lead the Ghaznavid centre through the 
melee to the village of Nesa, where the Seljuks were lying in wait. During the battle that 
ensued some of the more inexperienced commanders tried to water their horses, which 
had become thirsty on the hot desert sand. The Ghaznavid soldiery panicked, thinking 
their commanders were deserting, and the Seljuks routed the 17,000 strong force, 
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plundering all its supplies and baggage Qune 29, 1035). Sultan Mascud capitulated 
without further action, giving Dihistan to c;agn Beg, Nesa to Tugrul Beg and Ferave to 
Musa Yabgu. The Seljuks, however, did not send their members in rotation to the palace 
and laughed at the presents sent by the sultan. Their success attracted fresh groups to 
Khurasan, including a branch of the so-called Tiirkmen of Iraq- though which branch 
is not specified. Within four months the Tiirkmen were once again letting their livestock 
graze in the fields and leaving with the locals' animals. Sultan Mascud deployed a force 
of 15,000 men from Nishapur to ensure public order, which appears to have been 
successful. The Seljuks did, however, then request three urban centres, namely Man~ 
Serakhs and Baverd, ostensibly to support their growing number (1 036). Accordingly, in 
return for the taxes collected by G·haznavid officials, the Seljuks offered to clear 
Khurasan of marauding bands. When their request was not met, having instead been 
appointed dihkans, notable land owners who acted as tax collectors, the Seljuks 
embarked on a series of raids [Koymen, 1979:201-37 & 1963:42-5; also Siimer, 1965:78-
9 & Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ffj. 
Apparently encouraged by the Seljuks' success, Buka and Gok-Ta~ routed the 
Ghaznavid forces under the cotnmand of Ta~-Fara~ and dismembered his body, sacking 
and plundering Rayy (1 036). Buka, Gok-Ta~ and two other Ti.irkmen begs, namely 
Oguzoglu Mansur and Dana, then migrated to Azarbayjan, possibly at the invitation of 
Vahsudan of the Rawwadid dynasty, known to have been at odds during this period 
with al-Khaija of the Hezebaniyye clan. In view of their relentless plundering, however, 
Vahsudan, his adversary al-Khaija and the local populace united against Buka, Gok-Ta~ 
and Mansur who withdrew to Iraq al-Ajam as Western Iran was then known (1037). 
Having married Vahsudan's sister or daughter, Dana appears to have stayed behind. 
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Gok-Ta~ and Mansur besieged I-Iamadan, while Buka joined K.tztl outside Rayy. These 
latter sacked Rayy (1038), then joined Gok-Ta~ and together sacked also Ramadan 
(1038). Ktztl appears to have married Tugrul and ~ago Beg's sister at some point and 
settled in Rayy where he died (1041). What happened to Arslan Yabgu's followers 
thereafter is part of Seljuks history [Siimer, 1965:80-2; also Yman<;, 1944:37-8]. 
3.3 Victory at Dandankan 
Although strongly advised to do so by his council of ministers, Sultan Mascud decided 
not to lead his forces against the Seljuks. Arguing that he had taken the requisite 
defensive measures throughout Khurasan, the sultan embarked instead on a campaign 
into India (1037). There he learned of the sacking of Rayy by the Tiirkmen of Iraq and 
of the Seljuks' raids on urban centres in the environs of Jurjan. Insisting on the wisdom 
of his decision, he ordered the force he had based in Nishapur to engage the Seljuks. 
The Ghaznavid army did so, but, as his ministers had feared, lost the battle (1 038). The 
Seljuks now divided northern Khurasan among themselves; the regions around Serakhs, 
Marv and Nishapur were apportioned respectively between Musa Yabgu, ~ago and 
Tugrul Beg. More importandy, Tugrul Beg was chosen leader, or more correctly 
appointed primus inter pares. Accordingly, he entered Nishapur with 3,000 mounted 
archers, a drawn bow in his hand and three arrows in his belt. Since the Seljuks had sent 
only two envoys with their request for Marv, Serakhs and Baverd, it seems the 
suggestion is that Musa Yabgu had lost any authority he had over Tugrul and ~agn Beg 
[Koymen, 1979:238-78 & 1963:46-8; also Siimer, 1965:82 & Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 
10:353ff]. 
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Upon receiving news of his army's defeat, Sultan Mascud had to concede his error of 
judgement and finally took the field against the Seljuks. With this in mind he arrived in 
Balkh, in eastern Khurasan. Once there, however, he prevaricated on whether to deal 
ftrst with Bori Tekin, the son of Ilek Khan Nasr [Barthold, 1990:20], who had been 
raiding Khurasan. Although he decided to do so, severe winter conditions prevented 
him from gaining an advantage and he was forced back. In Balkh, he received news that 
one of ~ago Beg's units had skirmished with a Ghaznavid force. Sultan Mascud 
advanced and met ~agn Beg at Pul-i Karvan, but the Seljuks did not commit their 
forces. They sent out a company of archers and when these tired replaced them with 
another. Frustrated by these tactics, Sultan Mascud took command and advanced on the 
Seljuks, whereupon they melted away into the desert (April 1 039). ~ago Beg is thought 
to have been assessing the Ghaznavids' strength and commitment under Sultan Mascud. 
This seems to have proved crucial at a council that the Seljuks held to assess their 
situation. At this meeting Tugrul Beg and Ibrahim Yrnal are said to have suggested they 
evacuate Khurasan for the environs of Rayy and Jurjan, from where they could raid 
Azarbayjan and Anatolia at will. Apparently ~agn Beg objected, arguing that Sultan 
Mascud would follow them there, too. According to ~ago Beg the Ghaznavids were 
superior in number, equipment and supplies, but their dependence on supplies, not to 
mention their reliance on war elephants and foot soldiers as shock troops, all slowed 
them down, making them vulnerable to the hit and run tactics of steppe warfare. Tugrul 
Beg and Musa Yabgu are said to have also expressed concern for the loyalty of the 
Turkic mamluks who had defected from the Ghaznavids, but once again ~agn Beg 
prevailed. Accordingly, he argued that they had deserted because their commanders had 
been executed on Sultan Mascud's orders and proposed they should be put at the 
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vanguard to prove their allegiance [Koymen, 1979:278-90 & 1963:49; also Siimer, 
1965:83 & Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353f~. 
As a result, the Seljuks held their ground when Sultan Mascud advanced on Serakhs. 
They harried and harassed the Ghaznavid forces, preventing their cavalry from 
procuring sufficient water and pasturage. Nevertheless, Sultan Mascud held back for 
Ramadan to end. When he tried to engage in battle, however, the Seljuks withdrew to 
resume their hit and run tactics Oune 14-21, 1039). On the advice of his war council 
Sultan Mascud offered the Seljuks peace on the condition they returned to Nesa, Baverd 
and Ferave. Although they accepted, the Seljuks did not evacuate Serakhs, Marv and 
Nishapur, or send an envoy to Herat as agreed. Sultan Mascud had retired there to 
prepare for an autumn campaign in case they did not comply. During this period the 
Seljuks are thought to have strengthened their alliances with the Khwarazmshah and 
Bori Tekin whom they helped to defeat Ali Tekin's sons. Meanwhile the Oguz migration 
into Khurasan seems to have also intensified. When an old woman with one eye, one 
hand and one leg, who was wielding an axe, was asked why she had come, she is said to 
have replied that she wanted a piece of the treasures she had heard were being 
unearthed [Koymen, 1979:290-315 & 1963:49-51; also Siimer, 1965:83-4 and Kafesoglu, 
IA Vol. 10:353ff]. 
At the end of autumn Sultan Mascud took command of a lightly equipped force to 
counter the Seljuks' superior manoeuvring ability, and the second phase of the war 
commenced (November 1039). Despite countless skirmishes, however, Sultan Mascud 
failed to engage the Seljuks who withdrew to Balkhan Mountain. There was famine in 
Khurasan, due to drought and the constant warfare. Nevertheless, Sultan Mascud retired 
to Nishapur where he had his troops trained in desert tactics Oanuary 1040). In the 
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spring, he advanced on the Seljuks via Tus (March 1 040). The Seljuks again considered 
whether to leave Khurasan, but c;agr1 Beg prevailed once more. Sultan Mascud was not 
able to stay in Tus, due to the desperate shortage of supplies, and he attacked Serakhs. 
Although he took the city from the Seljuks, the Ghaznavid army lost countless animals 
and foot soldiers on the way (May 1 040). The sultan was advised to return to Herat, 
where there was ample food, water and pasturage, but instead he decided to push on to 
Marv in pursuit of the Seljuks (May 1 040). This proved to be disastrous as the drought 
had dried all the wells. The Seljuks continued to harry the now abject Ghaznavid forces. 
Although Sultan Mascud reached the fortification of Dandankan, due to a lack of 
sufficient water there, too, he ordered his forces on to a nearby reservoir. Despite Sultan 
Mascud and his son Mawdud's personal attempts to marshal their forces against the 
Seljuks' raids, when a group of these joined their former comrades, the Ghaznavid army 
lost its discipline and was routed (May 23, 1 040). During this last encounter, which 
never progressed beyond the early skirmishes into a set-piece, the Seljuk leaders are said 
to have remained behind the lines until informed of Sultan Mascud and his 
administration's flight. Thus it was the former Ghaznavid mamluks who claimed victory 
for the Seljuks and took most of the plunder. In open appreciation of their success, 
Tugrul Beg is thought to have promised them land in the environs of Rayy and Isfahan 
[Koymen, 1979:312-45 & 1963:52-3; also Siimer, 1965:84-6, Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff 
& Turan, 1965:63-6]. 
3.4 Seljukid Sovereignty 
According to Koymen, the nature and purpose of the newly founded Seljuk polity can 
be deduced from the words attributed to Tugrul Beg at the council held in Marv later 
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that month (May 1 040). These are that world dominion can not be achieved without unity 
among the Seljuk dynasty. Once a letter had been sent to the caliphate requesting the 
legitimization of their rule, in keeping with Turkic ideology the Seljuks apportioned 
their newly gained realm and those to be conquered among the dynasty. <;ago Beg took 
Marv, thus the major part of Khurasan. Musa Yabgu was given the task of conquering 
Herat and Sis tan. Later that year Ibrahim Y mal's brother Er-Ta~ was assigned to Mus a 
Yabgu with this purpose. <;ago. Beg's eldest son Kara-Arslan Kavurt was given the 
separate task of conquering Kirman. In the West, Tugrul Beg took upon himself the 
conquest of Iraq al-Ajam and al-Arab (Western Iran and Mesopotamia) from Nishapur, 
with his subordinates Ibrahim Y mal, <;ago Beg's son Alp-Sungur (more commonly 
referred to as Yakuti) and Arslan Yabgu's eldest son Kutahru~. Ibrahim Ymal was 
assigned the conquest of Kuhistan Qibal), Kutalmt~ that of Jurjan northeast of 
Tabaristan. As conft.rmed by the khutba, the special Friday midday prayers that referred 
to Tugrul and <;ago Beg respectively as Sultan and Malik, instead of Kagan and yabgu, 
theirs was the senior branch of the Seljuk dynasty [Koymen, 1979:345-66 & 1963:53-5, 
100; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff]. 
As decided, Selc;uk Beg's only living son, Mus a, now referred to as Yabgu Kalan, 16 took 
Herat and from there Er-Ta~ incorporated Sistan, whose ruler al-Fadl proclaimed 
allegiance (November 1040). Er-T~ then fell out with Yabgu Kalan and returned to 
Khurasan because Musa wanted to appropriate Sistan from him. Be that as it may, when 
he had decided to take the field against the Seljuks, Sultan Mascud had offered 
Khwarazm to Shah-Malik on the condition he proclaimed allegiance (1038). Shah-Malik, 
t6 More correctly Kelan from Yabgu-i lee/an, or Ulug:yabg11 (literally Great Yabgu) [furan, 1965:49]. 
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however, had not moved against Khwarazm until after Sultan Mascud's demise at 
Dandankan. Now Shah-Malik defeated Altun-T~'s son Ismacil, who withdrew to 
Gurganj (February 1041). However, on learning that a Ghaznavid army was on its way, 
the Khwarazmshah Ismacilleft Gurganj and took refuge with ~agr1 Beg (Iv.farch 1041). 
Shah-Malik entered Gurganj unaware that Sultan Mascud had been killed Qanuary 1041) 
and had the khutba read in the latter's name (Apri11041). Shah-Malik at first defeated 
~agn Beg and the Khwarazmshah Ismacil, but when Tugrul Beg joined them he was 
routed and Gurganj fell (1 042). The Seljuks did not restore Khwarazm to Ismacil and 
instead a governor was appointed. Meanwhile Er-T~ had returned to Sis tan upon news 
from al-Fadl that Sultan Mawdud of Ghazna had sent an army to Khwarazm. He 
defeated this army (July 1 042) and later captured Shah-Malik on his way to Ghazna with 
his family and treasury (1042/3). Er-T~ handed him over to ~ago Beg who had Shah-
Malik imprisoned and killed. [Koymen, 1963:221; also Siimer, 1965:88, Kafesoglu, IA 
Vol. 10:353ff, Barthold, 1990:322-3 & Turan, 1965:69-71]. 
When ~ago. Beg became ill the following year (1043/ 4), his son Alp-Arslan (thought to 
have been boro on January 20, 1 029) is said to have defeated another army sent by 
Sultan Mawdud. Alp-Arslan conquered Tirmiz and its environs, immediately north of 
Balkh and the Amu-Darya, successfully defending these against the Karakhanid Arslan 
Khan who was forced to recognise the Seljuks' sovereignty along the Amu-Darya from 
Tirmiz to Bokhara (1047). Alp-Arslan then helped ~ago Beg in his unsuccessful 
attempts to conquer Ghazna. When Ibrahim acceded to the throne of Ghazna, 
however, ~ago Beg made peace (1 059). As the Hindu Kush became the agreed border 
between them, the Ghaznavids lost communication with Transoxania and the 
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Karakhanids. c;agn Beg died the following year at the age of 70 (1060) [Koymeo, 
1972:3-7 & 1963:222; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:364 & Turan, 1965:69-71]. 
Before being called back by c;ago Beg to help fight Shah-Malik, Tugrul Beg had 
incorporated Jurjan and Tabaristan. When Klztl died, Ibrahim Ymal took Rayy and 
Tugrul Beg moved his capital from Nishapur to Rayy (1 042). The Seljuks' success is 
thought to have attracted more Tiirkmen. Thus possibly it was their depredations that 
caused Caliph al-Qa'im (1031-75) to send his chief judge, al-Mawardi, to Tugrul Beg, 
who replied that the Seljuks' realms had grown too small for their number, referring to 
the Tiirkmeo as 'my soldiers' (1043/ 4). It is possible, however, that these were the 
Tiirkmen of Iraq. On Klztl's death Tugrul Beg sent an envoy to Gok-Ta~, Buka, 
Oguzoglu Mansur and Aoas1oglu who refused his invitation, stating their suspicion that 
he wanted to trick them into captivity. Presumably unable to return to Khurasan 
because Ibrahim Ymal had cut off their retreat, or to Azarbayjan where Vahsudan had 
had thirty Tiirkmen begs killed at a feast in their honour (1041), the Tiirkmen of Iraq 
are said to have moved toward Lake Urmia, immediately west of Tabriz. Here others 
akeady in Azarbayjan appear to have joined them and together entered eastern Anatolia. 
Since the Byzantine governor general refused them passage, however, they seem to have 
headed south. With Mansur possibly busy elsewhere, Gok-Ta~, Buka and Anas1oglu 
defeated a force gathered by the U qailid and Marwaoid dynasties. Nevertheless, the head 
of the latter dynasty, Nasr al-Dawla appears to have tricked Mansur into captivity. 
Although released to Gok-Ta~, Buka and Aoas1oglu with many goods in exchange for 
their departure, the Tiirkmen apparently reneged. While Buka and Anas1oglu raided the 
environs of Diyarbaktr (Amid), Gok-T~ and Mansur took Mosul, having the khutba 
read in Tugrul Beg's name (1 043). Their rough treatment of the inhabitants caused the 
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Buyid ruler, who was in Baghdad at the time, to complain with the Marwanid Nasr al-
Dawla to Tugrul Beg who promised to bring them under control. Before he could do 
so, however, the local Arab and Kurdish rulers rallied to the Uqailids and together they 
defeated Gok-Ta~ and Mansur who returned to the environs of Diyarbaku- (April 1 044). 
There they received an envoy from Tugrul Beg who suggested that instead of raiding 
within Islamdom they should move to Azarbayjan and join in the jihad against the 
Byzantine Empire. On their way they defeated a Byzantine force near Lake Van and 
captured its commander, the governor who had refused them passage. He was sold on 
the slave market in Tabriz (1 045). Although there is no further record of Gok-Ta~ and 
Mansur, Buka and Anas1oglu are said to have fought one night when drunk outside 
Diyarbakt.r, which they had been assigned to conquer, and died from their wounds 
[Koymen, 1963:160-1 & 241-2; also Sfuner, 1965:88-9, Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:364, 
Yman~, 1944:40-4 & Sevim, 1990b:2-3]. 
The Ti.irkmen began their Anatolian campaigns by raiding the Armenian kingdom of 
Ani and Georgia with the Shaddadid dynasty. The Byzantines, who had pursued a policy 
of annexation in eastern Anatolia since the beginning of the 11th century, sent an army 
to Ani and another against the Shaddadids (1045). Tugrul Beg responded by dispatching 
Kutaltru~ with Yabgu Kalan's son Hasan and ~agn Beg's son Yakuti. Kutaltru~ defeated 
a Byzantine army under the command of the Georgian Prince Liparit near Erzurum 
(1046). These assignments appear to have been supported by a redirection of other 
Ti.irkmen to Azarbayjan. Apart from those who had threatened to sack Nishapur (1047), 
there was also a large group from Transoxania who had offered Ibrahim Ymal their 
services (1048). When Hasan and Yakuti tried to expand the Ti.irkmen raids southward, 
they were met by a Byzantine army commanded by Katakalon and Aaron; Hasan was 
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killed (1047 /8). Consequently, Tugrul Beg appointed Ibrahim Ytnal governor of 
Azarbayjan and assigned Kutalmt~ to him (1 048). By now the regions immediately south 
of the Caspian Sea, Dailam and Jibal had been incorporated fully into the Seljuk realms 
and Ibrahim Y mal's name was being read after Tugrul Beg's in the khutba. Ibrahim 
Y tnal defeated Prince Liparit had reinforced another Byzantine army under Katakalon 
and Aaron, which had been reinforced by Prince Liparit, at Hasan-Kale, on the plain of 
Pasin near Erzurum (September 1 048). Prince Liparit is said to have been among the 
tens of thousands of prisoners of war Ibrahim Ytnal sent to Tugrul Beg in Rayy. It is 
not clear whether Emperor Constantine Monomachus or Tugrul Beg then sued for 
peace. Nonetheless, this seems to have fallen through when Tugrul Beg demanded an 
annual tribute once paid to the Abbasids (1 050). However, Constantine Monomachus 
agreed to repair the mosque in Istanbul (Constantinople) and to have the khutba read in 
Tugrul Beg's name [Koymen, 1963:163, 232 & 245-8; also Siimer, 1965:88-89 & 95, 
Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:364-5, Ymanc;, 1944:45-8, Sevim, 1990b:3-4 & Turan, 1965:79-
85]. 
Ibrahim Ytnal now became the most renowned commander in Iraq al-A jam, Azarbayjan 
and eastern Anatolia. Although he had conquered Rayy, Tugrul Beg had taken the city 
for his capital. When Tugrul Beg asked also for Hamadan and the fortresses he had 
conquered in Iraq al-Ajam, Ibrahim Ytnal refused. Said to have held his vizier 
responsible for Tugrul Beg's request, he left to gather his forces after he had him 
tortured. Although Tugrul Beg defeated Ibrahim Ytnal, who retired to the fortress of 
Sarmaj, he is said to have pardoned him. Offered to stay with him or take up tenure of 
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his share of the Seljukid realms, Ibrahim Y mal chose to remain with Tugrul Beg, which 
is taken to suggest that he felt penitent for having taken up arms [Koymen, 1963:59]. 17 
Tugrul Beg is assumed to have spent the next four years consolidating his conquests in 
Iraq al-Ajam. Toward the end of 1054 he once again took command of the raids into 
Anatolia and incorporated most of the rulers in eastern Anatolia as vassals, namely the 
Rawwadid, Shaddadid and Marwanid dynasties. Having failed to take the fortress of 
Malazgirt (Manzikert) near Lake Van despite help from the Armenians, however, he 
advanced deep into eastern Anatolia where he annihilated a Byzantine army 
commanded by Gagik. On the invitation of Caliph al-Qa'im, Tugrul Beg left for 
Baghdad (1055), assigning Yakuti to co-ordinate the raids into Anatolia from Azarbayjan 
[Koymen, 1963:248-51; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:366, Yman<;, 1944:49-50 & Sevim, 
19.90b:14]. 
3.5 Ruler of the East and the West 
When Caliph al-Qa'im had sent his chief judge al-Mawardi as his envoy to Tugrul Beg 
at the very least he had recognized the Seljuks' sovereignty over the Tiirkmen (1 043/ 4). 
The envoy's task is thought to have been the establishment of peaceful relations 
between the Seljuks and the Buyids. On receiving Tugrul Beg's envoy in return, Caliph 
al-Qa'im had given him a diploma recognizing the Seljuks' sovereignty over Khurasan 
(1046/7). This is what the Seljuks had requested six years earlier, after Dandankan. That 
17 In this context there is die as yet unresolved issue of whether or not Kuta~ joined Ibrahim Y mal. According 
to Y man<; [1944:49-50], when Ibrahim Y mal was defeated, Ku~ fled to eastern Anatolia and laid siege to 
Kars. If this is true, then Kutalnu;; also appears to have been forgiven since he is known to have entered 
Baghdad with Tugrul Beg. 
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same year the Buyid ruler, Abu Kal~jar, married his daughter to Tugrul Beg and took 
one of ~agn Beg's daughters for his son, Mansur. When Kalijar died the following year, 
however, the Buyids began to war among themselves. One of their members, Khusraw, 
took refuge with Tugrul Beg and married a Seljuk princess. It is at this juncture that the 
Buyids' Turkic commander responsible for public order in Baghdad and its environs, 
Arslan al-Basasiri, began to gain influence, such that the khutba came to be read in his 
name throughout Lower Mesopotamia (1 050). After Tugrul Beg sent his own envoy to 
the caliph with gifts and money (1 052), the caliph appears to have declared the Fa timid 
caliphs heretics (1052/3) [Koymen, 1963:168-9 & 172; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:366 & 
Kitap<;1, 1 994:21] 
Matters appear to have come to a head when the Uqailids took the city of Enbar, which 
was under al-Basasiri's command, and secretly sent two envoys to the caliph 
(November/December 1054). When the caliph's vizier prevented al-Basasiri from 
arresting them, al-Basasiri is said to have accused him not only of keeping in touch with 
the Seljuks but also encouraging them to come to Baghdad. Nevertheless, al-Basasiri 
does not appear to have been in a strong position. l-Ie is thought to have turned to the 
Fatimids in Egypt because he did not have the full support of the Buyids' T'urkic 
soldiery. Perhaps more to the point, however, when al-Basasiri took back Enbar, his 
soldiery in Baghdad was attacked and his personal wealth plundered (November 1 055). 
Although Caliph al-Qa'im is said to have requested that al-Basasiri be withdrawn from 
Baghdad, his withdrawal appears to have had more to do with the Buyid ruler al-Malik 
al-Rahim's proclamation of allegiance to the Seljuks while in Baghdad. Ironically this 
seems to have prompted most of al-Malik al-Rahim's Turkic soldiery to defect to al-
Basasiri [Ibid. 169-73; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:366 & Kitap<;1, 1994:21]. 
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Tugrul Beg entered Baghdad against this backdrop (December 25, 1055), at the head of 
a 60,000 strong force that included eight war elephants. The reputed size of his forces is 
taken to indicate that the Seljuks did not expect a warm welcome. When the following 
day a soldier tried to buy some straw for his horse, he is thought to have been 
misunderstood because he did not speak Arabic. Thinking instead he wanted to 
appropriate the bales free of charge, a crowd soon formed and then began to attack the 
Seljuk troops billeted in their houses and those of the Turkic garrison. Interestingly 
enough, initially the Shicite members of the public are said to have tried to protect the 
Seljuk forces. Be that as it may, when some of the Buyids' remaining Turkic soldiery 
joined the .rioting, matters appear to have become ugly. The .rioters and the Tu.rkic 
soldiery supporting them camped outside Baghdad, hoping the Buyid soldiery would 
join them. When the Seljuks regained control many inhabitants were enslaved and part 
of Baghdad sacked. Moreover, Tugrul Beg is said to have blamed the .rioting on the 
Buyids, using Caliph al-Qa'im to trick al-Malik al-Rahim into captivity [Ibid. 175-7; also 
Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:366, Siimer, 1965:89-90 & Turan, 1965:92-3]. 
Now fully in charge, Tugrul Beg seized the treasury, minted money and appointed his 
own commander to ensu.re public order in Baghdad, increasing the caliph and his 
council's annual allowances. Caliph al-Qa'im also married <::ago Beg's daughter, Khadija 
Arslan Khatun. Finally, Tugrul Beg had a palace built on the outskirts of Baghdad, with 
villas for his commanders and barracks for their soldiery, thus ending the distu.rbances 
that ensued from having his troops quartered with the inhabitants. Meanwhile, al-
Basasi.ri had been adding to his soldiery with the help of the Fatimids. When he 
defeated Kutal.tru~ at the head of a Tiirkmen force near Mosul (December 1 056), 
Tugrul Beg advanced with Ibrahim Ymal and Yakuti. Al-Basasiri withdrew to Syria. 
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After a number of minor conquests and proclamations of allegiance, Tugrul Beg 
appointed Ibrahim Y mal to Mosul and its environs, giving him the requisite robes of 
honour and 20,000 dinars. On his return to Baghdad, Tugrul Beg was crowned by 
Caliph al-Qa'im who proclaimed him Ruler of the East and the West, a title not decreed 
before but one in accord with Turkic ideology (January 1 058). Turkish historians take 
this as confirmation that Sultan Tugrul now had sole sovereignty over worldly matters in 
Sunni Islamdom [Ibid. 59, 177-80 & 1976:102; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:366-7, Sumer, 
1965:90 & Turan, 1965:93-5]. 
3.6 Seljukid Discord 
While Tugrul Beg was thus occupied, Kuta.lrru~'s brother Resul-Tekin is said to have 
rebelled, though it is not clear where (1057). More importantly, a rumour spread that 
Ibrahim Y mal was preparing to revolt. Having defeated Resul-Tekin, Sultan Tugrul sent 
Ibrahim Ymal robes of honour and gifts, inviting him to Baghdad (Apri11058). While 
Ibrahim Ymal was in Baghdad, however, the caliph's vizier approached the sultan who 
assured him that although Ibrahim Y mal had been forgiven once, he would not be if he 
rebelled again. The caliph's vizier then informed Ibrahim Y mal of Caliph al-Qa'im's 
goodwill and satisfaction concerning his allegiance. Although no reason is given for the 
caliphate's involvement in this affair, there is the caliph's reported reluctance to allow 
Sultan Tugrul to take the field against al-Basasiri. In view of later events, the caliph 
appears to have been right to fear for his safety in the sultan's absence. On the caliph's 
suggestion, therefore, Sultan Tugrul entrusted Ibrahim Ymal to deal with al-Basasi:ri 
who had continued to gain ground in Upper Mesopotamia. Back in Mosul, Ibrahim 
Ymal sent an envoy to al-Basasiri. Under the guise of inviting him to proclaim his 
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allegiance to the sultan, he is said to have secretly requested money, robes of honour, 
titles and a banner from the Fa timid caliphate, which were granted (August 1 058). In 
exchange Ibrahim Y mal promised to have the Shicite khutba proclaimed throughout his 
realms once he had dethroned Sultan Tugrul. When he learned that Sultan Tugrul had 
been alerted and was advancing on Mosul, Ibrahim Y mal left for Hamad an. Sultan 
Tugrul sent his wife and vizier back to Baghdad, hurrying to head off Ibrahim Ymal 
[K6ymen, 1963:60-1; also Siimer, 1965:90, Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:367, Yman~, 1944:52 
& Turan, 1965:95-6]. 
The sultan is said to have reached Ramadan fu:st (November 23, 1058), preventing the 
money, weapons and supplies stocked there from falling into Ibrahim Y mal's hands. 
Although the region was his stronghold, Ibrahim Y mal had to promise the Tiirkmen he 
would never make peace with the sultan, or force them to campaign in Iraq al-Arab, or 
appoint a vizier without consulting them. Initially defeated, Sultan Tugrul returned to 
Hamad an (December 10, 1 058), from where he sent word to his wife and vizier. During 
the three months or so the sultan was confined, his vizier is said to have attempted to 
crown his wife Altuncan Khatun's son. This is thought to indicate that he did not hold 
out much hope for Sultan Tugrul's chances. Despite the caliph's objection, the khatun 
took the Seljukid treasury and soldieries in Baghdad to relieve her husband while 
Kunduri remained behind. When Ibrahim Ymallearnt of her approach he sent a force 
to have her intercepted. In the hope of gaining plunder, other Tiirkmen are said to have 
joined in, such that the sultan was able to make a sortie. Having defeated Ibrahim 
Y mal's remaining forces he retired to Rayy where the khatun, who had managed to 
disengage herself from the Tiirkmen by leaving her personal baggage train behind, 
joined him. After this setback, Ibrahim Y mal requested help from his nephews 
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Muhammad and Ahmad who reportedly turned up with some 30,000 men, their father 
Er-Ta~ having died in 1048/9. The sultan advanced with the reinforcements his wife 
had brought. Ibrahim Y mal once again defeated him, but when c;agn. Beg's sons, 
Kavurt, Yakuti and Alp-Arslan joined Sultan Tugrul, Ibrahim Ymal lost the battle 
outside Rayy and was captured Quly 1 059). In accordance with Turkic custom, the 
sultan had Ibrahim Ymal strangled with his own bowstring. Muhammad and Ahmad 
were also killed. Meanwhile, al-Basasiri took Mosul and then Baghdad, sacked the 
caliph's palace and placed him in captivity elsewhere while he embarked on the conquest 
of Basra. However, he withdrew on learning that Sultan Tugrul was approaching 
Baghdad. The caliph was released voluntarily by his captor and the sultan set off after 
al-Basasiri, whom he defeated and had killed Qanuary 1060) [Koymen, 1976:62-3 & 67-
70 and 1963:61-2; also Siimer, 1965:90-1, Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:367 & Turan, 1965:97-
8]. 
It appears that Kutalm.t~ and his brother Resul-Tekin had sided with Ibrahim Y mal. 
Consequendy, Sultan Tugrul is thought to have next dispatched an army against them. 
Kutalm.t~ and Resul-Tekin withdrew to the fortress of Girdkuh, near Damghan, from 
where they repulsed Sultan Tugrul's forces (April-May 1061 ). With the help of the 
deceased Ibrahim Ymal's Tiirkmen, Kutal.mt~ and his brother also repulsed a subsequent 
attempt (August 1061). Sultan Tugrul, however, appears to have been more concerned 
with strengthening the Seljuks' ties to the caliphate [Koymen, 1963:62-4; also Siimer, 
1965:92, Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:367-8 & Turan, 1965:98-100]. 
Sultan Tugrul had secured the caliph's wife Arslan Khatun's release from captivity 
before attempting to have the caliph freed. When the caliph's wife sent an envoy to 
request that Arslan Khatun return to Baghdad, Sultan Tugrul dispatched the chief jurist 
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for Rayy with a request to marry the caliph's daughter. Although at f1rst Caliph al-Qa'im 
is said to have refused, eventually he accepted on condition that the sultan resided in 
Baghdad, having handed over Wasit, 300,000 dinars in compensation and the deceased 
Altuncan Khatun's real estate. By the time Arslan Khatun returned to Baghdad with 
Kunduri to frnalise the arrangements (April 1061), however, the caliph appears to have 
had a change of mind. In subsequent discussions, first with Arslan Khatun and then 
Kunduri, Caliph al-Qa'im is said to have threatened to leave Baghdad if the sultan 
insisted. As a result Kunduri is thought to have made preparations to leave Baghdad, 
prompting the chief jurist for Baghdad and a member of the caliph's retinue to warn 
the caliph of the dangers of refusing the sultan's request. Although apparently 
persuaded by them to go through with the marriage, the Hanafi and Shafici jurists in 
Baghdad now issued a fatwa against the marriage. The caliph once again changed his 
mind and Kunduri left Baghdad Ouly 17, 1061). When Sultan Tugrul instructed the 
governor of Iraq to confiscate his iqtacs, the caliph changed his mind one last time and 
sent an envoy to Rayy, accepting to marry his daughter to the sultan as requested 
(August 22, 1062). The marriage ceremony took place in Baghdad (February 17, 1063). 
Despite her protests, Sultan Tugrul is said to have taken his new wife with him on 
leaving Baghdad with the caliph's permission (April 13, 1 063). Kunduri once again laid 
siege to Girdkuh (May 1063), but the sultan died soon afterwards (September 1063) 
[Koymen, 1963:190-3; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:367-8 & Turan, 1965:101-2]. 
3.7 Summary 
Divit<;ioglu proposed that Sel<;uk Beg's father Dukak had been in the service of the 
Khazar kagan's regent, the Hakan-beh. Togan thought the Oguz yabgu was the Hakan-
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beh. Si.imer, Kafesoglu, Koymen and Turan thought the Seljuks' legend of ongm 
concerned the Oguz yabgu. Although Divit<;ioglu did not commit himself, Togan 
proposed that the Seljuks were of humble origin. Koymen concluded that they must 
have been freemen. Kafesoglu and Turan, on the other hand, thought that the Seljuks 
were of noble origin, the latter basing his argument on the similarity of Sel<;uk Beg's 
position to that of the Khazar Hakan-beh, a post he thought was hereditary [1965:40-
1]. 
Turan and Kafesoglu argued that the Seljuks' conquests and the subsequent influx of 
Ti.irkmen were precipitated by overcrowding on the Eurasian steppes [Ibid. 72ff; 
Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff]. While Turan justified his conclusion with reference to the 
Kimek (Kuman/Ktp<;ak) migration from Inner Asia, which is accepted to have been 
precipitated by Khitay expansion, Kafesoglu offered shortage of pasturage, that is, 
overpopulation among the Oguz. Turan and Kafesoglu agreed that the Ti.irkmen who 
could not be situated in Iraq had been encouraged to migrate to Anatolia, because not 
only was it ecologically more suited but also this prepared it for annexation. The 
reasoning appears to stem from Y man<;'s proposition that ~agn Beg had made an 
'exploratory raid' to Anatolia. Both accepted further that the Seljuks' other subjects 
suffered repeated pillages at the hands of the 'homeless' Ti.irkmen, but without 
specifying why. 
Si.imer and Koymen on the other hand explained the Ti.irkmen migration to Anatolia 
without reference to overcrowding. Although both also accepted without explanation 
that the pillaging of Muslims was a factor, they argued that some of the Tiirkmen came 
to be excluded right from the outset, because the Seljuks had accepted institutions 
already existent in Iran, especially the mamluk system [Si.imer, 1965:87 & 94-9; Koymen, 
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1963:158-67; also Togan, 1946:193-5]. Kafesoglu agreed [1953 & IA Vol. 10:353fij, but 
Turan went out of his way to criticise Siimer for having followed Togan,. to whom he 
attributed this conclusion [1965:75]. According to Turan, the Seljuks were honour-
bound to fmd the Tiirkmen a home in keeping with the ideological tenet according to 
which the Seljuk dynasty had apportioned their conquests [Ibid. 72]. This ignores the 
fact that Siimer also agreed that the Seljuks not only directed but also led the Tiirkmen 
westward into Anatolia [1965:99-120]. 
Last but not least, there is also the Turkish scholars' view of Tugrul Beg's investiture by 
Caliph al-Qa'im as the Ruler of the East and the West to consider. Kafesoglu interpreted 
this on the one hand as the Seljuks' assumption of the defence of Islamdom against 
Shicism and on the other as the Abbasid Caliphate's abdication from worldly affairs [IA 
Vol. 10:366-7]. Turan was of the opinion that the caliph applied to the Seljuks fo.r help 
against the Shicite Buyids. He also claimed that Tugrul Beg asked permission to come to 
Baghdad in order to be elevated to the task of opening the hajj .routes and fighting the 
Fatimids. Accordingly, the caliph declared Tugrul Beg sultan once Iraq al-Arab had been 
cleared of Sh{ites, [1965:90-1 & 94-5]. By comparison, Koymen argued that although 
Caliph al-Qa'im thought he could use the Seljuks to free himself of Buyid oppression, 
from the outset Tugrul Beg behaved like a conqueror rather than his protector. As a 
result the caliph was forced to declare Tugrul Beg sultan and forgo all claims to political 
power [1963:168fij. 
In short, while Turkish scholars accepted that the Seljuks were of the .Ktruk, they were 
not agreed that Dukak was of noble birth, or that Sel<;uk Beg had been the Oguz 
yabgu's Commander-in-Chie£ Likewise, although they concurred that the Seljuks had 
conquered Khu.rasan and then Iraq with the Tiirkmen, and that they had led rather than 
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followed the Ti.irkmen into Anatolia, they were not agreed on either the causes or the 
consequences of their conquests. 
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4. EMPIRE 
This chapter follows Koymen's Alp-Arslan ve Zamam (1972) for Sultan Alp-Arslan's reign 
and Kafesoglu's Sultan Melikjah Devrinde Bi!Jiik Sef;uklu jmparatorlugu (1953) for Sultan 
Malik-Shah's reign. Although Koymen mentions that Kafesoglu's work needed to be 
updated in light of new material that had emerged since its publication [Koymen, 
1979:12*], this has not happened. Kafesoglu's work is augmented with Merc;il's K.irman 
Selptklulan (1980), Turan's Sel;uklular Zamamnda Tiirkiye (1971) and Sevim's Sunje 
Sef;uklulan I- Fetihten Tutu;'un 0/iimiine Kadar (1965) for Kirman, Anatolia, and Syria and 
Palestine respectively. As in the previous chapter, references to other works are for 
supplementary material pertinent to the events being reviewed. 
4.1 Unification of the Great Seljuk Empire 
A fortnight after learning of Sultan Tugrul's death, Caliph al-Qa'im invited the Seljuk's 
Arab and Kurdish vassals, ostensibly to discuss the future of the region. The Seljuk 
representative in Baghdad, Sacid Qa'ini, seems to have protested, but apologized and 
accepted the caliph's demands on learning that both Kutaltru~ and Alp-Arslan had 
refused to recognize Silleyman as sultan. Having dropped Sultan Tugrul's name from 
the khutba (September 17, 1 063), however, the caliph sent an envoy to Qa'ini 
demanding that he return his iqtacs and depart. Concurrent with these demands, the 
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caliph replaced with his own officials that had been appointed to his diwan by Sultan 
Tugrul and lifted non-Shari taxes. Presumably to legitimize his actions, the caliph asked 
the jurists in Baghdad for a fatwa concerning conduct in the face of disobedience and 
rebellion. They complied by ruling that the caliph should wage war against those 
culpable [Koymen, 1972:11-2 & 96-100]. 
The collapse of Seljuk authority in Iraq al-Arab did not enable the caliph to regain 
dominion; quite to the contrary. Invited to drive out the Seljuk forces in the region, the 
Arab and Kurdish rulers began to try to improve their situation at each other's expense, 
the Uqailid Muslim going so far as to pillage the caliph's palace. When the caliph 
appointed a commander to lead a force gathered from the other rulers, Muslim 
apologized and withdrew after receiving additional lands (December 25, 1 063). More 
likely, however, given that this date coincides with news of Alp-Arslan's victory over 
Kutaltru~, the Uqailid Muslim thought it best to vacate the Seljuk palace in Baghdad 
where he had taken up residence and withdraw. Be that as it may, during this period 
Seljuk dominion in Iraq al-Ajam does not appear to have fared any better. In Ramadan, 
for instance, the inhabitants are known to have attacked the Seljuk officials, killing them 
and 700 of their men llbid. 12 &100-1]. 
Clearly the three-month period of uncertainty from Sultan Tugrul's death to Sultan Alp-
Arslan's accession did not aid matters. Siileyman was the youngest of C::agn Beg's sons. 
It is thought that since Sultan Tugrul was childless, on the instigation of c::agn Beg's 
wife, whom he had married when his brother died, Siileyman had been appointed heir 
apparent with Kunduri's support. According to Koymen, Kunduri may have wanted to 
become the de facto ruler of the Great Seljuk Empire. If so, he appears to have failed at 
the first hurdle. On Si.ileyman's being declared heir apparent, one of his mamluk 
78 
commanders, Erdem, had left to join Alp-Arslan. Now another, Yagt-Styan, also left. He 
and Erdem then had the khutba in Qazvin read in Alp-Arslan's name. The vizier is said 
to have distributed 700,000 dinars and 16,000 suits of armour worth 200,000 dinars 
among the remaining soldiery. Having received their allegiance to Siileyman, Kunduri 
sent Alp-Arslan a letter stating that he was merely executing the sultan's will and would 
not hesitate to take up arms if challenged, advising him to make do with his father's 
inheritance [Ibid. 14-5]. 
When Kutalmt~ arrived in Sawa, however, some of the mamluk commanders are said to 
have accepted his invitation to join him. Encouraged by them to attack Rayy, Kutalrm~ 
advanced at the head of 50,000 Tiirkmen and irregulars that raped and pillaged in the 
surrounding countryside. Arriving outside Rayy (November 16, 1063), Kutalmt~ 
defeated Kunduri's advance guard under the command of Inane; Beg, capturing him 
with 500 mamluks. Now besieged in Rayy, the vizier appears to have sent an envoy to 
Alp-Arslan, proclaiming his allegiance and seeking help. On news of Alp-Arslan's 
advance units' arrival in Damghan (November 24-25, 1063), Kutalmt~ is said to have 
attacked, forcing Erdem to seek refuge in a nearby village. Despite having flooded the 
valley below the village to hinder Alp-Arslan, Kutalrm~ lost the ensuing battle and died 
in flight after falling off his horse (December 7, 1 063). On receiving news that Alp-
Arslan was on his way to Rayy (December 25, 1063), Siileyman seems to have gone to 
Shiraz where Kara-Arslan Kavurt had the khutba read in his nephew's name [Ibid. 16-7 
& 82-5]. 
Alp-Arslan does not appear to have been in any hurry to gain an audience with the 
caliph, embarking instead on a campaign into the Caucasus (February 22, 1 064). He sent 
an envoy requesting that the khutba be read in his name (March 6, 1064), which was 
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effected sometime later (May 11, 1 064). Coins were struck in Sultan Alp-Arslan's name 
and although the caliph once again decreed temporal affairs to be in the domain of the 
Seljuk sultan, he appears to have continued to resist Seljuk dominion. Prior to the arrival 
of the sultan's envoy, the governor of Iraq, Nihavandi had sent a deputy to Baghdad 
who is thought to have been unsuccessful in re-establishing Seljukid authority. Some 
time afterwards, when Nihavandi took up residence in Baghdad with his shihna (the 
commander responsible for enforcing official decisions such as by a jurist or tax 
collector), Ay-Tekin, the caliph's vizier objected that Seljuk officials were interfering 
with the administration and taxation of iqtacs. Nihavandi is said to have complained to 
the caliph, but al-Qa'im supported his vizier. As a result Nihavandi confiscated the 
vizier and his officials' iqtacs. This seems to have had the desired effect in that the caliph 
is said to have appealed to Nizam al-Mulk, Alp-Arslan's vizier in Khurasan. Although 
reprimanded, Nihavandi does not appear to have taken much notice since at this time 
Kunduri was still the sultan's vizier. He is not reported to have returned the iqtacs until 
after news of Sultan Alp-Arslan's conquest of Ani reached Baghdad (September-
October 1064). When soon afterwards Nizam al-Mulk replaced Kunduri (December 29, 
1064), he is known to have replaced Nihavandi with Sacid Fasi on a three-year tenure in 
exchange for 500,000 dinars, which suggests Nihavandi may have continued to 
experience problems collecting taxes. Whatever the case, the caliph is also known to 
have dismissed his vizier on grounds that he received robes of honour from the sultan 
without his permission, taking care to blame him also for inviting the Uqailid Muslim to 
Baghdad. When Sultan Alp-Arslan insisted that he appoint al-Ala as his vizier, however, 
the caliph restored him to his post. The sultan later sent al-Ala to Baghdad as his 
deputy, decreeing half of the caliph's vizier's iqtacs to him (December 1071) [Ibid. 19, 35 
& 103-6]. 
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4.2 The Caucasus and Transoxania 
During Tugrul Beg's reign as sultan, Tiirkmen chieftains such as Dinar, Kapar, Cemcem, 
Tug-Tekin and Salar-i K.hurasan continued to raid eastern Anatolia The key event 
appears to have been Yakuti's defeat of the Byzantine forces under the command of 
Briennios with the Tiirkmen Sabuk Beg (1057). This enabled a second force to besiege 
Kars and Ani before joining a third and raiding as far as Erzincan while a fourth under 
Dinar sacked Malatya (Melitene) (1 058). The following year, on Sultan Tugrul's orders 
the Tiirkmen once again entered Anatolia under Yakuti's direction. Salar-i Khurasan 
failed to take Urfa (Edessa), but Sabuk Beg sacked Sivas (Sebasteia) (1060). The year 
following that a Byzantine army under Pankaras was defeated (1 061 ). Sultan Tugrul's 
reported visit to Azarbayjan to review Yakuti's conduct of operations indicates that the 
raids on Anatolia were being conducted on his orders (1 062) [Sevim, 1990b:5-6; Turan, 
1965:109]. 
Yakuti appears to have died the same year as Sultan Tugrul, because on his arrival in 
Azarbayjan Sultan Alp-Arslan is said to have divided his forces into two on Tug-Tekin's 
advice (February 1 064). The sultan entered Georgia at the head of one and having 
conquered the region south-west of Tbilisi (Tillis) turned back toward Kars, in north-
eastern Anatolia Quly 1064). Next he advanced on the Armenian kingdom of Lori, 
which proclaimed its allegiance. The second force under the command of his nine-year-
old son Malik-Shah, who was supported by Nizam al-Mulk, took the fortresses situated 
along the Aras River south of Kars. When they rejoined him, Sultan Alp-Arslan 
continued to sack the fortified towns in his path and devastate the countryside, finally 
laying siege to Ani. When the city fell it too was pillaged without remorse and torched. 
Lastly, the sultan is said to have assigned the government of the realms he conquered to 
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his commanders (August 1064) [Koymen, 1972:24-34; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:368 & 
1953:9-12, Turan, 1965:110-13, Sevim, 1990b:7-8 & Yman~, 1944:57-9]. 
Having thus secured Azarbayjan and Armenia for the raids on Anatolia, Sultan Alp-
Arslan appears to have returned to Khurasan to put down the ageing Yabgu Kalan's or 
his son's revolt in Heart. There is mention also of a campaign elsewhere in Khurasan 
against two vassals who had rebelled. Both their lands are said to have been 
incorporated. While in Marv Sultan Alp-Arslan married his son Malik-Shah with a 
Karakhanid princess, the niece of the ruler of Samarkand, and apportioned the now 
united Seljuk realms among remaining members of the dynasty. He assigned Balkh, 
Khwarazm, and Tukharistan and Chaganiyan to his brothers Siileyman, Arslan-Argun 
and llyas. His sons Arslan-Shah and Togan-Shah were assigned Marv and Herat. Er-
Ta~'s remaining sons Mawdud and Mascud were assigned Bagshur and Isfizar. Finally, 
Ina~ or loan~ yabgu (possibly Musa's son or his regent) was assigned Mazandaran. 
Although Sultan Alp-Arslan's sons Ayaz and Ismacil are not mentioned either, the 
absence of Yakuti's name seems to confirm his death. From Marv Sultan Alp-Arslan 
seems to have gone first to Khwarazm, where the Tiirkmen are said to have been 
raiding passing caravans with the Kt.p~ak. When d1e men took refuge on an island, the 
sultan took their women and children prisoner, confiscated their livestock, and 
subordinated the Kt.p~ak chieftain responsible. Moving on to Jand, he is said to have 
visited his grandfather's tomb, also receiving the allegiance of its Kt.p~ak ruler (April 
1 066). On his return to Marv, the sultan appointed Malik-Shah heir apparent (May 
1066) [Koymen, 1972:75-8, 83-4 & 90; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:368 and 1953:12-5 & 
15 and Turan, 1965:113-6]. 
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While the sultan was thus occupied in Khurasan, his eldest brother Kara-Arslan Kavurt 
appears to have dropped Alp-Arslan's name from the khutba with . his vizier's 
encouragement, having coins minted in his own name. This is taken to suggest that his 
intentions were limited to establishing an independent polity rather than to challenge his 
brother for the Seljuk throne. Just prior to Sultan Tugrul's death, Kavurt had taken Fars 
in south Iran from the Buyids' former vassal, the Shebankarid dynasty (1 062). When the 
head of the dynasty proclaimed his allegiance to Sultan Alp-Arslan in person, Kavurt is 
thought to have been ordered to return Fars. The consensus among Turkish scholars is 
that the sultan had in mind to reduce Kavurt's realm because he had advanced as far as 
Isfahan on Sultan Tugrul's death, withdrawing after Sultan Alp-Arslan's victory over 
Kutalm1~. While Sultan Alp-Arslan was in Azarbayjan the Shebankarids had attacked 
Shiraz, but Kavurt had defeated them (1 064). On being informed of this by the 
Shebankarids' ruler, Sultan Alp-Arslan had advanced on Shiraz Ganuary 1065). Kavurt 
had sent his treasury and family back to Kirman, withdrawing to a fortress by the sea. 
Although their forces had skirmished, Sultan Alp-Arslan had not pursued the issue and 
Kavurt had withdrawn from Fars. This time, however, the sultan marched on Kirman 
via Isfahan Gune/July 1067). When his advance units were defeated and fled the 
fortified city of Bardasir where he had taken up position, Kavurt sent an envoy 
proclaiming his allegiance and asked to be forgiven. Sultan Alp-Arslan received him at 
court and reinstated him. Matters did not end there, however, for Kavurt now changed 
tactics. Having made an alliance with the Shebankarids, he ensconced himself in one of 
their fortresses. Sultan Alp-Arslan again advanced from Isfahan (October 1068). When 
he arrived in Shiraz the Shebankarid ruler's brother asked to be entrusted with the 
conquest of the fortresses in Fars. Instead, Sultan Alp-Arslan appointed his vizier 
Nizam al-Mulk to the task and marched on Kirman to besiege Bardasir, where Kavurt 
83 
had withdrawn upon the falling out among the Shebankarids. On learning that Nizam 
al-Mulk had captured his ally, once again Kavurt sent an envoy to proclaim his 
allegiance and asked to be forgiven. As it turned out, however, while besieged Kavurt 
had gained the allegiance of the sultan's soldiery. The commanders were killed and 
having left Malik-Shah with a small force in Bardasir the sultan hurriedly evacuated 
Ki.rman (October 1069) [Merc;il, 1980:32-43; Koymen, 1963:65-8 & 1972:85-7; 
Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff; Turan, 1965:116]. 
After Sultan Alp-Arslan had withdrawn he is said to have received a letter of allegiance 
from Kavurt's son Sultan-Shah who was asked to come to court. Once there Sultan-
Shah appears to have offered to take Ki.rman from his father with the sultan's aid. The 
sultan seems to have agreed, entrusting him with thousands of Turkic mamluks and 
Tiirkmen. Kavurt, however, defeated his son and the sultan's attempts to tighten his 
grip on Ki.rman failed (1 070) [Merc;il, 1980:43-4; Koymen, 1963:68 & 1972:88-9]. 
4.3 The War for Anatolia 
The Byzantine Empire had recovered from earlier losses of territory under the 
Macedonian dynasty founded by Basil I (867-886). At the end of Basil II's reign (976-
1 025) its domains stretched from the Alps to the Caucasus and included southern Italy. 
However, possibly never as developed as along its shores and to the west, central and 
eastern Anatolia had been devastated by warfare with the Iranians and then the Arabs, 
its depleted regions being resettled from time to time with Slavs, Bulgars, and 
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Armenians. 18 Quite apart from any cultural disjunction this may have introduced/9 Basil 
II's reliance on a new group of families only loyal to him seems to have encouraged the 
concentration of land-ownership in fewer and fewer hands, including that of the 
church. The old military aristocracy's loss of power coincided with attacks from the Uz 
and the Pec;enek in the Balkans, the Normans in Italy and the Seljuks in Anatolia, their 
replacement by civilian administrators coming to a head during the .reign of Constantine 
IX Monomachus (1042-55). Although many generals rebelled, these were suppressed 
(1 041-7), further weakening the local populace's ability and will to fight for the 
Byzantines. 20 When Romanos Diogenes, who had been successful against the Pec;eneks 
in the Balkans, became emperor through marriage to the Empress Eudoxia Qanuary 
1 068), the once mighty Byzantine military capability had fallen into a perilous state. In 
particular the forces stationed in Anatolia seem to have been reduced to plundering in 
order to clothe and feed themselves. Said to have been unable to undertake any 
fundamental changes due to the empress' fl.rm grip on the administration, Romanos IV 
Diogenes crossed into Anatolia now under pressure from the north, east and south 
[Sevim, 1990b:13-5 & 21; Ymanc;, 1944:62; Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 7:242ff & 1953:77; 
Cahen, 1984:79-80; see also Karolidis, 1993:17-9 & 37-41]. 
tB During the Byzantine incorporation of Armenia (1020-2), reportedly 40,000 people were resettled forcibly in 
central Anatolia, namely Sivas and also Kayseri [Sevim, 1983:7-10]. 
t9 Particularly in view of the persecution ofleading Armenian families and the Gregorian Church during the reign 
of Constantine IX Monomachus [Sevim, 1983:13-4]. 
20 Such as the Ducas in Bythnia, the Comnenus in Paphlagonia, the Dalassenos in Armeniakon, the Diogenes in 
Harisanda, the Botaniates in Anatolik and the Phocas in Cappadocia, all of whom had private armies 
[Kafesoglu, 1953:77, footnote 58]. 
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After his campaign in the Caucasus, Sultan Alp-Arslan had appointed Giim~-Tekin to 
lead the raids into Anatolia (1 066). He and the Tiirkmen beg Bekc;ioglu Af~in2' set off 
from Ahlat on the north-western shore of Lake Van, taking many small fortresses 
situated between the Murat and Tigris rivers before Af~in extended his raids towards the 
Euphrates where he defeated and captured the Byzantine general Aruandanos whom he 
ransomed for 40,000 gold pieces. When they returned to Ahlat Af~in is said to have 
killed Giimii~-Tekin for previously killing his brother. Possibly afraid of Sultan Alp-
Arslan's wrath, Af~in returned to Anatolia (August 1 067), sacking Kayseri (Cresarea) and 
raiding as far as Konya (!conium) before withdrawing to Aleppo. A Byzantine force sent 
out under the command of Botaniates dispersed without engaging him. The following 
year, as Romanos Diogenes prepared his army, Af~in laid siege to Antakya (April 1 068), 
but on receiving the sultan's pardon, raised the siege in exchange for 100,000 gold 
pieces and war materials. At the same time Sultan Alp-Arslan entered Georgia with 
Nizam al-Mulk and his senior commander, the eunuch Sav-Tekin, in order to secure the 
region. Under pressure from the Kimek (Ktpc;ak/Kuman) migration, the Alan, Komuk, 
Sabir and various remnants of the Khazars had been pushed toward the Caucasus. The 
sultan's campaign, however, may have proved only partially successful. The Karakhanid 
ruler's death and Kavurt's attempt to break free forced him to turn back [Koymen, 
1972:40-2; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 7:242ff, Turan, 1965:116-21, Sevim, 1990b:19-22 and 
Ymanc;, 1944:62-5]. 
2t Both Afpn and lhpd are considered to be the tides of dynastic leaders in pre-Islamic Transoxania [Barthold, IA 
Vol. 1:146]. As such these appear to have been appropriated by or given to Turkic chieftains who accepted 
Islam. One such Turkic A~in is thought to have suppressed an uprising in Azarbayjan as early as 830 [Cahen, 
1984:26]. Interestingly enough, belefi means guard or sentry; thus Belep"oj,/11 is the son of a sentry and, therefore, 
possibly denotes descent from a Central Asian marchlord. 
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Possibly encouraged by Af~in's siege of Aotakya, a group of Ti.it'kmeo thought to have 
been able to field between 500-1000 men affiliated to a certain Haruo 22 took two 
Byzantine fortifications toward Antakya with the support of Arab contingents Quly 
1 068). Harun appears to have been active between Aleppo and Diyarbakt.r since 1063, 
selling his services to the local dynasties, namely the Marwanids in Diyarbaku: and the 
Mirdasids in Aleppo, not to mention the Byzantines. As such Harun seems to have 
helped the Mirdasid Mahmud take Aleppo from his nephew (1065) [Sevim, 1965:19-28]. 
The army that Romanos Diogenes had gathered is said to have consisted of Greeks -
mainly from his home region of Cappadocia- Macedonians, Bulgars, and those Uz and 
Pec;enek settled in the Balkans, not to mention mercenaries recruited from the Franks, 
the Germans, the Varank and the Normans. In view of Af~in's devastating raids 
throughout south-eastern Anatolia the previous year, Romanos Diogenes first moved 
toward Syria (11arch 1068). Before he arrived in Kayseri, however, he learnt that Niksar 
northeast of Kayseri toward the Black Sea, had been sacked. Leaving his army in Sivas 
under the command of Ducas, Romanos Diogenes advanced on the Tiirkmen with his 
best troops. Surprised, the Ti.irkmen are said to have left behind most of their captives 
and plunder after a fierce battle. The emperor then marched back south to the 
Euphrates so that Has Inal, who had been raiding in the region, withdrew. The emperor 
pressed on to Aleppo where he ransacked the countryside. When the Uqailid Mahmud 
paid him off Romanos Diogenes laid siege to Manbij (Ierapolis), then one of the most 
important fortifications in northern Syria. Mahmud, however, began to harry and harass 
the Byzantine reserves around Aleppo with Harun. When the forces sent to rescue 
22 Referred to in the historical record as Hanoghl, literally the son of a khan, Harun is thought to have migrated 
from Central Asia or further east still, after having fallen out with his father who was possibly of a branch of 
the ruling Karakhanid dynasty [Y man~, 1944; Sevim, 1965] 
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them were routed Romanos Diogenes was forced to return to the environs of Aleppo. 
Mahmud and Harun managed to encircle him, but he broke out and returned to Manbij 
(November 20, 1068). Said to have been unable to supply his forces because of the 
devastation he had inflicted on the environs of Aleppo and afraid that he would be cut 
off, Romanos Diogenes withdrew toward the Toros Mountains, retaking the 
fortifications Harun had taken earlier that year. Here he heard that Af~in had penetrated 
as far west as the Sakarya River, destroying the city of Amorion en route. Although he 
tried to cut off Af~in's retreat he was unsuccessful. Once he had returned to Istanbul 
for the winter, he learnt that the Italian Crispino was extorting money on the grounds 
that local Byzantine administrators were disrespectful. Crispino defeated the forces sent 
against him under the Bulgarian Alufasianos. When Romanos Diogenes marched on 
him, however, Crispino surrendered, being pardoned in view of the parlous 
circumstances in Anatolia [Koymen, 1972:42-3; also Sevim, 1965:24-7 & 1990b:23-4, 
Yman~, 1944:65-6, Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 7:242ff, Turan, 1965:123ff & Karolidis, 1993:44-
9]. 
Throughout that winter the Tiirkmen begs, thought to have been Bek~ioglu Af~in, 
Sabuk, Ahmad-Shah, Uvakoglu Ats1z and his brother c;avh, Tiirkman, Demle~oglu 
Mehmed, Duduoglu, Serhenkoglu, Tavtavoglu, Tarankoglu and Arslan-Ta~ continued to 
raid south-eastern Anatolia from Aleppo. After Easter, Romanos Diogenes divided his 
forces into three. Manuel and Philaretos Brachamios were sent to Sivas and Malatya 
respectively while the emperor marched to Kayseri. There he found that the Tiirkmen 
from Ahlat had positioned themselves in the surrounding hills. In the engagement that 
followed, many of their begs were taken prisoner and killed despite offers of ransom. 
When Romanos Diogenes advanced to take back the fortresses between the Euphrates 
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and Tigris rivers, however, Af~in attacked Malatya. Defeated, Philaretos joined the 
emperor who was still in Harput, immediately to the northeast Af~in and the Ti.irkmen 
begs did not lay siege to Malatya. Instead, they raided deep into central Anatolia, sacking 
Kenya. Romanos Diogenes returned to Kayseri to cut off the Tiirkmen retreat but 
Af~in crossed the Toros Mountains and retired to Aleppo [K.oymen, 1972:43-5; also 
Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 7:242ff, Turan, 1965:123ff, Sevim, 1990b:24-5, Ytnan<;, 1944:66-7 & 
Karolidis, 1993:49-52]. 
The following year Romanos Diogenes remained in Istanbul given the objections to his 
so far unsuccessful Anatolian campaigns (1 070). Consequently, he is thought to have 
been pressured to assign Manuel to the defence of Anatolia. Having situated himself in 
Kayseri, Manuel was forced to move his headquarters to Sivas in view of the Tiirkmen 
raids along the Pontic Mountains, which run parallel to the Black Sea. When the 
Ti.irkmen based in Aleppo entered south-eastern Anatolia, however, Manuel was 
ordered by Romanos Diogenes to send an army against them. Manuel did not realise 
these Ti.irkmen were under the command of Sultan Alp-Arslan's brother-in-law Er-
Basgan, who had rebelled the previous autumn with Kara-Arslan Kavurt. Manuel 
engaged them on the banks of the Kt.zthrmak River between Sivas and Kayseri. Er-
Basgan feigned retreat and the Byzantine forces separated in pursuit, severing their 
communication lines and hence the chain of command. Er-Basgan turned on the 
Byzantines and captured Manuel along with some of his generals. Afraid of Sultan Alp-
Arslan's wrath, Er-Basgan continued westward, raiding along the Toros Mountains. It 
appears that when Er-Basgan learnt the sultan had sent Af~in in pursuit, Manuel was 
able to persuade him to seek refuge in Istanbul. By then, Er-Basgan was only a few days 
ride from Izmir and the Aegean Sea. Af~in, however, did not give up and finally set up 
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camp in the hills overlooking the Bosporus. From there he sent an envoy to Romanos 
Diogenes who declined to hand over Er-Basgan and the Tiirkmen with him. Whether 
he went as far as the Bosporus or not, Af~in returned to Azarbayjan the way he had 
come, wreaking havoc [Koymen, 1972:45-6; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 7:242ff, Turan, 
1965:128-31, Sevim, 1990b:22-4, Ymanc;, 1944:68 & Karolidis, 1993:52-4]. 
4.4 Victory at Malazgirt 
Romanos IV Diogenes embarked on his last campaign, as Sultan Mascud had done, with 
the intention of taking the fight to the Seljuks (I\1arch 13, 1071). In addition to the 
forces he had already, there were now also mercenaries of Klpc;ak, Khazar, Goth, 
Bulgar, Georgian, Armenian and Rus origin. The army is thought to have numbered 
close to 100,000 with the inclusion of some 30,000 infantry and 3,000 supply wagons, 
not to mention a siege machine that requit:ed 1,200 people to operate. While still on the 
banks of the Sakarya River, however, he appears to have ordered back to Istanbul those 
generals whom he did not trust, such as the experienced Botaniates. Nonetheless, at a 
war council held in Sivas, Briennios and those who remained, such as the Georgian 
Trachaniotes, are said to have tried to change Romanos Diogenes' mind. Accordingly, 
they argued that it was better to defend Anatolia from Sivas, but if the emperor wanted 
to engage the Seljuks this would be accomplished best on the Pasin Plain immediately 
east of Erzurum. With the support of the younger generals, Romanos Diogenes is said 
to have insisted that the Seljuks, and hence the Tiirkmen, would be driven back into 
Transoxania, Byzantine governors general appointed to Khurasan, Iraq al-Ajam and 
Iraq al-Arab, and mosques replaced with churches [Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 7:242ff; Ymanc;, 
1944:71; Suer & C::akm, 1981:16; Turan, 1971b:21-32 & 1969:132-4; Sevim, 1993:219ff]. 
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Whatever the case, on the way Romanos Diogenes had to put down a rebellion by the 
Franks. In Erzurum he ordered two months' supplies to be procured, sent Er-Basgan 
and his son back to Istanbul, lest they desert, and deployed a small force to assist the 
Bagratid dynasty in their efforts to regain Georgia from the Seljuks. In order not to be 
out-flanked while he attacked the fortress of Malazgirt, he assigned the Norman 
commander Roussel (referred to also as Urselio and/or Ruselio) to his rearguard with 
Trachaniotes, ordering them to advance on Ahlat. Although the commander of 
Malazgirt surrendered, most of the Seljuk soldiery seem to have been put to the sword 
[Sevim, 1993:219ff; Dirimtekin, 1993:230ff; Kafesoglu, lA Vol. 7:242ff; Ymanc;, 
1944:71-2; Turan, 1971 b:21-32 & 1969:134ff; see also Karolidis, 1993:56-7]. 
Meanwhile Romanos Diogenes is said to have sent a letter to the sultan, either offering 
Manbij in return for Ahlat and Malazgirt, or simply demanding these and another 
fortification. Whatever the content, Sultan Alp-Arslan received the Byzantine envoys 
outside Aleppo, en route to Egypt at the invitation of the Fatimid vizier. This meeting is 
thought to have occurred on the very day the sultan was informed of the Byzantine 
advance and hence his decision to abandon the Egyptian campaign. Although what 
passed between the Byzantine envoys and the sultan is not known, it is further assumed 
that Romanos Diogenes gained the impression from them that Sultan Alp-Arslan had 
withdrawn toward Iraq al-Ajam. This is then taken to explain the deployment of his 
forces prior to the fall of Malazgirt, which are considered to have been militarily 
unsound given the sultan's advance [Sevim, 1993:219ff; Dirimtekin, 1993:230ff; 
Kaymaz, 1993:261; Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 7:242ff; Ymanc;, 1944:71; Turan, 1965:134ff]. 
Be that as it may, in view of the difficulty of procuring supplies on the way, or because 
many of their mounts drowned, Sultan Alp-Arslan is thought to have crossed the 
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Euphrates with only fifteen to twenty thousand horsemen, of whom four thousand 
were mamluks (April 27, 1071 ). Before arriving in Mosul, however, the sultan is 
assumed to have doubled back toward Urfa and then proceeded north to Ahlat over 
Diyarbalur and Silvan. Whatever the case, clearly the Byzantines were unaware of the 
sultan's approach. When Roussel and Trachaniotes were engaged outside Ahlat by its 
commander Sabuk Beg and withdrew Romanos Diogenes sent a reconnaissance unit 
under the Armenian Vasilakios(?). Sabuk Beg feigned retreat, then surrounded and 
captured him. Sent to help, Briennios appears to have been equally unsuccessful 
although managing to return badly wounded. Vasilakios was taken to Sultan Alp-
Arslan's headquarters, thought to have been established 15-20 km east of Malazgi.rt, in 
the hills overlooking the Zaho (also Zehve, Zahva or Rahve) Plain (August 23, 1071 ). In 
short, Sabuk Beg's engagement and defeat of the various Byzantine units sent to Ahlat 
seems to have cloaked Sultan Alp-Arslan's manoeuvre around Malazgirt, because 
Romanos Diogenes then advanced on Ahlat. When he learnt of Sultan Alp-Arslan's 
true position, however, he is said to have returned, sending word for Roussel and 
Trachaniotes to join him. If so, they appear to have decided that it was safer to put as 
much distance as possible between themselves and the Seljuks [Sevim, 1993:219ff; 
Dirimtekin, 1993:230ff; Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 7:242ff; Suer & <::alan, 1981:17 & 20-1; 
Turan, 1971 b:21-32; Ymanc;, 1944:72-3; Koymen, 1972:48-9; see also Karolidis, 1993:57-
60]. 
On the way, Kutalrm~'s sons Silleyman and Mansur, not to mention the Tiirkmen begs 
named in the context of their Anatolian raids, are all thought to have joined Sultan Alp-
Arslan. Although this may be probable, it seems unlikely that the Seljuks' forces 
therefore more than doubled to between forty and fifty-five thousand, inclusive of ten 
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thousand Kurdish auxiliaries from their vassals in south-eastern Anatolia, not to 
mention those Uz and Pe<;enek who deserted to them before the battle. Despite this 
last, those forces ordered back to Istanbul at various times, the one sent to Georgia and 
those with Trachaniotes and Roussel, the Byzantine army is still thought to have 
numbered near on 100,000, which no doubt is equally exaggerated [Sevim, 1993:219ff; 
Dirimtekin, 1993:230ff; Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 7:242ff; Ymao<;, 1944:73-4; Suer & <;aktn, 
1981:17 & 21; Turao, 1971b:21-32 & 1969:134ff; Togao, 1946:192; Koymen, 1972:49]. 
Most likely in view of the disparity between their forces, Sultan Alp-Arslan is thought to 
have approved an envoy from the caliph, the jurist al-Muhalban (or al-Muhallaban), to 
offer Romanos Diogenes peace. The emperor is said to have responded with the retort 
that talks could begin only in Rayy, asking whether it would be better to winter in 
Isfahan or Ramadan? He is said to have added that he had been informed Ramadan 
would be cold and that he would stable his horses there while he wintered in Isfahan. 
Turkish scholars note that according to al-Azrak the envoy agreed that Ramadan would 
be best for the horses, but that he could not profess to know where the emperor would 
be spending the winter. Once the jurist had returned (August 24, 1071 ), the Seljuks 
appear to have started to harry and harass the Byzantine camp [Sevim, 1993:219ff; 
Dirimtekin, 1993:230ff; Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 7:242ff; Siier & <;aktn, 1981 :22; Yman<;, 
1944:74; Koymen, 1972:52-3; Turan, 1965:136-7; see also Karolidis, 1993:60-1]. 
The following morning (August 25, 1071), Romanos Diogenes took command of the 
Byzantine centre. The Cappadocian Attaliates took command of the wing consisting 
mainly of heavy cavalry from Anatolia and the remaining Pe<;enek light cavalry while 
Briennios took command of the other wing, which consisted mainly of heavy cavalry 
from the Balkans and the remaining Uz light cavalry. It must be pointed out, however, 
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that Turkish scholars are disagreed as to who was in charge of which wmg [see 
Koymen, 1972:62]. In any case, the Byzantine cavalry on the flanks appears to have 
totalled 15,000. The rearguard, which is thought to have included Armenian nobility, 
was under the command of Andronicos Ducas. According to Turkish military 
historians [Suer & c_;:akm, 1981:25-9], Sultan Alp-Arslan is said to have divided his forces 
into three, hiding the main part in the hills to his left and rear. Thus, instead of a 
rearguard, it is thought a small reserve was assigned to each wing of the force, 
presumably the mamluks under his command being in the centre, with the exception of 
Sav-Tekin. Koymen disagrees with this, accepting only that Sultan Alp-Arslan set a trap 
by hiding the forces under the command of Taranges [Koymen, 1972:62-3], which 
seems to be a misspelling of Sarhang, Sav-Tekin's rank [Siimer & Sevim, 1971:XX]. 
As pious Muslim legend would have it, having put aside his bow and quiver, the sultan 
took up only his sword and mace like the common soldiery under his command. 
Dressed all in white, which is equally unlikely, he is said to have tied his horse's tail into 
a knot. Finally, after Friday prayers, and therefore possibly at 13:30, Sultan Alp-Arslan is 
thought to have fmally launched the attacks aimed at dispersing the cavalry shielding the 
Byzantine centre so as to draw out Romanos Diogenes into the trap. The Byzantine 
cavalry appear to have broken under what is thought to have been a relendess shower of 
arrows. Whether he thought the Seljuks' main force was also at their centre, or in order 
to bolster the gaps opened in the cavalry lines, Romanos Diogenes is known to have 
advanced and Sultan Alp-Arslan feigned retreat as planned. Thus the Byzantines would 
have entered the trap fighting around 16:00. It is at this juncture that the Uz and 
Pe<;enek said to have deserted in batde would have broken ranks. If so, this would have 
coincided with the fresh onslaught unleashed by the main body of Seljuk soldiery, and 
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hence possibly the reported break in the Byzantine right wing, which exposed their 
centre to bloody fighting. While Romanos Diogenes tried to reo.rde.r and bolster his 
right flank to stabilize the situation, the left wing is said to have also collapsed -possibly 
under attack from Sav-Tekin hidden to the sultan's rear. Afraid that his camp would fall, 
it is at this juncture that Romanos Diogenes seems to have ordered a retreat. In view of 
the distance his camp now would have been from the battle and, therefore, possibly 
under the impression that the main force had broken, it is known that at this point 
Andronicos Ducas took flight and the Armenian nobility followed suit. Completely 
encircled as a result by 19:00 the Byzantines' defeat would have been fmal. Romanos 
Diogenes was wounded as night fell and captured by a common soldier who allegedly 
kept him tied to his tent-pole until the next morning [Koymen, 1972:62-4; Siier & 
C::ak.m, 1981 :25-9; Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 7:242ff; Sevim, 1993:219ff; Dirimtekin, 
1993:230ff; Yman<;, 1944:75-6; Turan, 1971 b:21-32 & 1969:137ffj. 
When his captor brought Romanos Diogenes to Sultan Alp-Arslan's tent, apparently 
Vasilakios fell to his feet in tears. Accordingly, the jurist al-Muhalban conf1.rmed his 
identity. Sultan Alp-Arslan is said to have criticized Romanos Diogenes for having 
.refused his peace offer and ticked off his e.rrors on the battlefield. When asked by the 
sultan what kind of treatment he expected, Romanos Diogenes is said to have replied 
that most likely he would be killed, or put in chains to be shown off throughout 
Islamdom, or possibly that he could be sent back to Istanbul as an ally [Kafesoglu, IA 
Vol. 7:242ff; Yman<;, 1944:76-82; Tu.ran, 1971 b:21-32]. Certainly, Sultan Alp-A.rslan 
allowed Romanos Diogenes to return to Istanbul, but the conditions of his release 
remain unclear. Whatever these may have been, upon news of his capture his enemies 
declared Empress Eudoxia's son Michael Ducas emperor. On his way to reclaim his 
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crown, Romanos Diogenes was defeated at Sivas and later in Adana, where he gave 
himself up on the condition that he was allowed to live out his life as a monk. Having 
been blinded, he died soon afterwards in a monastery [Koymen, 1972:69-73; see also 
Karolidis, 1993:65-72]. 
Lauded and celebrated throughout Islamdom, his victory at Malazgirt having been 
equated with those previously won at Yarmiik (636) and Qadisiyya (637) against the 
Byzantines and the Sasanians respectively, Sultan Alp-Arslan embarked on his fmal 
campaign. The sultan's brother llyas, who was then in Khwarazm, had been at war with 
the Karakhanid ruler in the West, Shams al-Mulk Nasr Khan, who resided in 
Samarkand. While in Transoxania, however, Sultan Alp-Arslan was stabbed by a fortress 
commander he had captured and consequendy died (November 1 072) [Kafesoglu, IA 
Vol. 10:370] .. 
4.5 Contention for the Throne 
Although Malik-Shah was his favourite, Ayaz was the eldest of Sultan Alp-Arslan's sons, 
of whom Togan-Shah, Tutu~ and Teki~ were all younger than Malik-Shah [Kafesoglu, 
1953:14 & IA Vol. 10:353ff]. The sultan appears to have been quite specific in his will, 
which he is said to have communicated verbally on his deathbed, assigning Nizam al-
Mulk as executor. Accordingly, <;ago Beg's real estate and 500,000 dinars in Balkh were 
to be given to Ayaz on the condition that he supported Malik-Shah. Otherwise Malik-
Shah was free to use his grandfather's fortune to fight Ayaz. Furthermore, Fars and 
Kirman were to remain _Kara-Arslan Kavurt's, on the condition he married the sultan's 
widow and settled in Shiraz [Ibid. 1953:16-7; also Mer<:;il, 1980:45]. 
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Malik-Shah acceded at the age of 1 ~ (November 25, 1 072). I--Iis ftrst action was to 
increase the pay of the soldiery (accession money?) by 700,000 dinars. The new sultan 
then buried his father in Marv, next to c,;ag-n Beg, and moved to Nishapur where he 
distributed the contents of the treasury kept in the inner castle among his retinue and 
commanders. Thinking that he had ensured their support, he informed his father's 
governors and vassals that he had acceded to the throne, asking them to have the 
khutba read in his name. Encouraged by some Turkic mamluk commanders who 
secretly offered their services, Kara-Arslan Kavurt refused, saying I am the eldest brother; 
you are the younger son, hence I merit my brother Alp-Arslan ~ inheritance more. To this Malik-
Shah is said to have replied that while there iJ a son, a brother can not inhen·t. Kavurt appears 
to have hoped also to gain the support of the Tiirkmen situated between I-Iamadan and 
Rayy. I-Ie is said to have departed for Rayy with 2,000 cavalry and 4,000 foot soldiers. 
Once there Sultan Malik-Shah disbursed 500,000 dinars along with 5,000 suits of 
armour and weapons among the Tiirkmen, possibly pre-empting his uncle who arrived 
in the environs of I-Iamadan two days later [Kafesoglu, 1953:18-21; Mcr<;il, 1980:46-7; 
Koymen, 1963:69]. 
Sultan Malik-Shah's forces are thought to have included not only his mamluks but also 
the Tiirkmen (though the Tiirkmen may have simply remained irnpartial [Koymen, 
1963:1631), as well as Arab and Kurdish contingents, which seems certain. The latter 
were the forces of two Seljukid vassals who had been on their way to Sultan Alp-Arslan 
and included an envoy from the caliph. The two armies met outside Hamad an (1 073). 
When Kavurt attacked the sultan's right wing, the mamluk soldiery under the command 
of Sav-Tekin begged for mercy. The critical blow appears to have been dealt by the 
Seljuk's vassals' forces on the left wing, under the command of Temirel (or Temrek), 
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who disrupted Kavurt's right wing, enabling Sultan Malik-Shah and Nizam al-Mulk at 
the centre to win the day. Having been thwarted on the battlefield, the mamluk soldiery 
is said to have pillaged the tents of the said vassals, not to mention the caliph's envoy 
[Mer<;il, 1980:47-51; Koymen, 1963:69; Kafesoglu, 1953:22]. 
Apparendy Kavurt escaped into the mountains where he was reported by a peasant and 
captured. What emerges from the contradictory versions of subsequent events is that 
Kara-Arslan Kavurt remained insistent he had acted upon the invitation of the sultan's 
mamluk commanders, possibly also providing their letters as proof, which Nizam al-
Mulk burned in the sultan's presence without opening. In any case, Kavurt appears to 
have been moved to Ramadan to prevent further provocation. The Turkic commanders 
sympathetic to Kavurt had gathered outside Nizam al-Mulk's tent immediately after the 
battle and asked for more money and further iqtacs while shouting Kavurt's name. 
Appearing to acquiesce, the vizier had Kavurt killed. The consensus of Turkish scholars 
is that given the sultan's reported reluctance to have his uncle removed once and for all, 
Nizam al-Mulk acted with alacrity to prevent further bloodshed. Nor is it clear if 
Kavurt was strangled according to Turkic tradition with his own bowstring by an one-
eyed Armenian, or by a K1pc;ak with whom he fought for an hour before succumbing, 
or indeed if he took poison as reported. In any case, Kavurt is said to have been buried 
next to Ibrahim Ymal [Merc;il, 1980:52-9; Koymen, 1963:70-1; Kafesoglu, 1953:23 & 
26]. 
The confusion surrounding Kavurt's demise extends to his eight sons. Current opinion 
is that his two eldest, namely Sultan-Shah and Emiran-Shah, possibly also Turan-Shah, 
were with him on the battlefield along with Ibrahim Y mal's son. All are said to have 
been blinded in Sultan Malik-Shah's presence after their father's execution, Emiran-Shah 
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dying in the process. Upon hearing of these events, some of the Turkic mamluk 
soldiery are rumoured to have dispersed and begun to pillage the environs of Hamadan, 
cursing Nizam al-Mulk. Whatever the case, Sultan-Shah and possibly also Turan-Shah 
were not disabled completely by their ordeal and later escaped. Certainly, Sultan-Shah 
(1 07 4-85) and Turan-Shah (1 085-98) lived to rule Kirman, Fars and Oman. Finally, 
Sultan Malik-Shah is known to have mounted a campaign against Sultan-Shah for 
reasons unknown, which clearly did not alter the status quo (1 07 5-6 or 1 079-80) [Mer<;il, 
1980:59-63 & 69-74; also Kafesoglu, 1953:25-6]. 
4.6 Transoxania 
Upon hearing of Sultan Alp-Arslan's death and Sultan Malik-Shah's return to Khurasan, 
the Karakhanid ruler in the West, Shams al-Mulk Nasr Khan entered Tirmiz from 
Samarkand where he resided (December 1072). Taking advantage of Alp-Arslan's eldest 
son Ayaz's absence, he also entered Balkh. Ayaz appears to have returned immediately 
and taken back this city (January 1073). However, when he attempted to take back 
Tirmiz as well, he was defeated and lost most of his 10,000 strong force while retreating 
across the Syr-Darya (March 1073). Concurrent with the Karakhanid advance, the 
Ghaznavids attacked <:;igil-Kent in Tukharistan and captured the sultan's uncle Osman 
whom they took with his treasury to Ghazna (January 1073) [Kafesoglu, 1953:19-20]. 
Sultan Malik-Shah did not move to secure the Great Seljuk Empire's eastern realms 
until he received the caliph's endorsement (October 1073). In the meantime his uncle 
Ayaz died in Balkh (1073-4). When he was ready the sultan advanced on Tirmiz via 
Herat, sending Sav-Tekin ahead to sever the city's connection with Samarkand. When 
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Sav-Tekin had defeated a Karakhanid army by the Syr-Darya, the sultan laid siege to 
Tirmiz. Isolated, Shams al-Mulk Nasr Khan's brother capitulated. The sultan released 
him upon entering Tirmiz and having garrisoned Sav-Tekin there advanced on 
Samarkand. When Shams al-Mulk Nasr Khan evacuated the city and asked to be 
forgiven for his transgressions, the sultan retired to Rayy. Here he received the 
Ghaznavid envoy, sent with a considerable amount of money and gifts to secure the 
sultan's sister's hand for Sultan Ibrahim (1058-99), which was granted. It is presumed, 
therefore, that his uncle Osman was released earlier, during Sultan Malik-Shah's advance 
through Herat. Certainly, the sultan appears to have journeyed to Serakhs next, where 
he is said to have received his uncle and given him the governance of a city, the regions 
of Gur and Herat having been given to Bori-Pars. Similarly, those of Balkh and 
Tukharistan were given to the sultan's brother Teki~ [Ibid. 28-30; also Ongiil, 2000:325]. 
4.7 The Caucasus 
Next, Sultan Malik-Shah took charge of a campaign against the Georgian King Giorgi 
II (1 072-89). This appears to have transpired upon the instigation of the commander 
Ioannes Liparit who having put down a rebellion but then sold the castle concerned to 
the Shaddadid dynasty in Ganja (Gyandzha). At the end of this campaign, which both 
Ioannes and his son appear to have joined, the sultan took Ganja from the Shaddadids 
and assigned it to his brother Tutu~, leaving Sav-Tekin in Yerevan as commander (1076). 
King Giorgi II defeated Sav-Tekin twice as a result of which he lost Yerevan as well as 
Kars. This seems to have prompted the former king of Ani, Gagik, to try to re-establish 
his kingdom. Ioannes Liparit now began to resist Seljuk authority from the castle he had 
been given. The sultan returned, laid siege to Ioannes and took him prisoner, leaving 
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Sav-Tekin additional forces (1 078-9). King Giorgi II again defeated Sav-Tekin, so that 
the sultan next sent an army under Ahmad who established Seljukid authority 
throughout the Caucasus, inclusive of Trabzon (frebizond) on the Black Sea coast 
(1 080-1 ). As a result King Giorgi II was forced to travel to Isfahan to proclaim his 
allegiance, which was accepted. Subsequently, the Caucasus region was included in the 
province of Azarbayjan under Yakuti's son Ismacil (1 084). But the sultan had to return 
yet again. Although Ganja and Ani appear to have been sold to the Shaddadids in the 
meantime, these were taken back by force. At the end of this campaign, Ganja and the 
surrounding region were incorporated directly into the Great Seljuk Empire (1 086) [Ibid. 
113-7; also Sevim, 1965 & Ross, IA Vol. 11 :381-2]. 
4.8 Anatolia 
It is at this anarchic conjuncture of events that Kutalrru~'s sons, Mansur, Silleyman-
Shah, Alp-Ilek (or Alp-llig) and Devlet (or Donat) enter the historical record in 
northern Syria and the Tiirkmen colonization of Anatolia gains coherence. Although 
most Turkish scholars agreed that they were assigned to the conquest of Anatolia by 
Sultan Malik-Shah, possibly on the instigation of the caliph [Yman<;, 1944:57-8, 86 & 
88; thus also Kafesoglu, 1953:62 & IA Vol. 10:370, Koymen, 1963:102-3 & Sevim, 
1990b:70], it is more likely that they benefited from Sultan Alp-Arslan's death, making 
their way to south-eastern Anatolia in the confusion that ensued [Kaymaz, 1993:261]. 
After Malazgirt, the new emperor, Michael VII Ducas, appointed Isaac Comnenus with 
his brother Alexius and the Norman Roussel to clear Anatolia of the Tiirkmen. 
However, when they arrived in Kayseri, which had been badly damaged by an 
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earthquake, Roussel fell out with Isaac and departed with the 400 Norman mercenaries 
in his company. Whether for this reason or because the task he had been set was now 
beyond the means of the Byzantine Empire, Isaac was defeated and taken prisoner by a 
Turkmen force that appeared in the environs of Kayseri. Having bought his freedom, 
he rejoined his brother in Ankara, from where they appear to have had to evade yet 
another group of Tlirkmen who followed them west across the Sakarya River 
[.Kafesoglu, 1953:63; also Turan, 1971 b:51 ]. 
Said to have augmented his force from the region he was pillaging between Sivas, 
Kayseri and Ankara, Roussel next defeated a Byzantine force sent out under the 
emperor's uncle, Caesar Ioannes Ducas, whom he took prisoner with his son and 
Nicephorus Botaniates (1 073). The battle took place near the Sakarya River, which is 
taken to indicate that Roussel had been retreating ahead of the advancing Tlirkmen 
under Artuk Beg. Certainly, the emperor is said to have made an agreement with Artuk 
Beg who then defeated and captured Roussel with Ioannes Ducas near Izmit 
(Nicomedia), only 100 kms from Istanbul. Artuk Beg, however, did not hand his 
captives to the emperor. Instead, he ransomed them to their families. At this point 
Artuk Beg was recalled by Sultan Malik-Shah who was faced with Kara-Arslan Kavurt's 
challenge. Roussel returned to central Anatolia, where he re-established himself in 
Amasya. Although Alexius was assigned to deal with him, at fust he failed because the 
local populace is said to have preferred Roussel's rule to that of the Byzantines. 
However, when a large Turkmen force under Tutak Beg entered central Anatolia, 
Alexius was able to persuade them to capture Roussel. Since Roussel also had 
approached Tutak Beg, Alexius is said to have had to reward Tutak Beg handsomely. On 
his way back to Istanbul with Roussel, Alexius was engaged by yet another group of 
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Tiirkmen who had penetrated north-western Anatolia up to the Black Sea coast 
[Kafesoglu, 1953:64-8; also Turan, 1971 b:51-2]. 
4.9 Syria and Palestine 
Tiirkmen presence in Syria can be traced to 1063, with the arrival of Hanoglu Harun in 
the environs of Diyarbaktr in south-eastern Anatolia (see above, 4.3). After Ibrahim 
Ytnal's brother and Sultan Alp-Arslan's brother-in-law Er-Basgan's (or Er-Sigun) 
unsuccessful involvement with Kavurt and flight (1 068-9), an affiliate of his, Kurlu is 
thought to have broken away with Uvakoglu Ats1z and his brother \;avh (1 069-70). They 
appear to have been joined by a group of Harun's Tiirkmen with whom they became 
situated in the environs of Ramla, immediately north-western of Jerusalem, some of 
the Tiirkmen moving into the Jordan Valley. Kurlu Beg is said to have revived the 
deserted town by helping to improve the olive harvest and thus attracting farmers back 
to the region. Otherwise he appears to have sold his services to the highest bidder, 
namely the Fatimid governor of Acre (Akka) and the Mirdasid ruler of Aleppo, who 
had proclaimed his allegiance to the Seljuks (1 070), pillaging and confiscating when not 
paid. Whatever his reasons, Kurlu Beg laid siege to Damascus (Dimashq) and then Acre 
where he died (1 071) [Sevim, 1965:30-7 & 1990b:33; also Turan, 1965:45-50, Kafesoglu, 
IA Vol. 10:353ff & Cahen, 1984:89]. 
On his death, Uvakoglu Ats1Z of the Kmtk Oguz became the leader of the Tiirkmen in 
Palestine. His first action appears to have been to besiege Jerusalem. Its Fatimid 
governor, who was of !urkic origin, is said to have handed over the city on condition 
that it was not sacked (1071). Next Ats1Z Beg besieged Damascus (1071 & 1073), while 
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his lieutenants mounted expeditions along the coast toward Acre. When Acre fell to the 
Tiirkmen in the same manner as Jerusalem had done (October/November 1074), their 
beg, ~oklii, refused Atstz Beg's demand of half the spoils. In order to strengthen his 
hand against his former leader ~oklii Beg seems to have married his sister to the Fatimid 
governor of Damascus and exchanged hostages with branches of the Arab tribes in the 
region. Before his new allies could be of use, however, Atstz Beg is said to have lifted 
his siege of Damascus long enough to attack and defeat him (April/May 1075). 
Undaunted, ~oklii Beg invited an as yet unidentified son of Kutalmt~ said to have 
arrived duly from south-eastern Anatolia with a younger brother and nephew.2J On 
~oklii Beg's instigation they proclaimed their allegiance to the Fatimid caliph to attract 
help from this quarter. Atstz Beg, however, also pre-empted this development by once 
again advancing from Jerusalem and defeating ~oklii and his allies. Having executed 
~oklii and his son, Ats1Z Beg is known to have informed Sultan Malik-Shah of his three 
captive Seljukid princes (autumn, 1 075) [Sevim, 1965:43-7 & 1990b:35-7; also 
Kafesoglu, 1953:33]. 
Meanwhile another of Kutalmt~'s sons, thought to be Siileyman-Shah [Turan, 
1971 b:48], had laid siege to Aleppo. Persuaded by a combination of military force and 
money to lift the siege, Siileyman-Shah asked Atstz Beg to return his brothers and 
nephew. The request was refused, the captive princes being sent to Isfahan on the 
sultan's orders (December 1075). Next Siileyman-Shah is said to have besieged Antakya, 
forcing its Byzantine governor to offer to pay an annual tax. Upon hearing that the 
3,000 strong Tiirkmen force Atstz Beg had requested from Sultan Malik-Shah was 
2J The name of Resul-Tekin•s son(s) is not known [Kafesoglu, IA VoL 10:353ff]. It is thought likely that 
Kutalmt§•s sons were Alp-Ilek and Devlet [Sevim, 1990a:24]. 
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approaching Aleppo, Si.ileyman-Shah attacked and killed some of them, plundering their 
baggage train before returning to the environs of Antakya [Sevim, 1965:47-8 & 
1990b:37-8]. 
4.10 The Rise of Siileyman-Shah 
An absence of princes from the reigning branch of the Seljukid dynasty in Anatolia 
appears to have been critical in enabling Kutalrru.fs sons to take up leadership of the 
Tiirkmen in Anatolia. In particular those Tiirkmen who had rebelled against the Seljukid 
sultans at one time or another would have been more than amenable to Kutahru~'s sons. 
That said, the dire straits the Byzantine Empire found itself in after Malazgirt more 
than contributed to the power vacuum, helping this branch of the Seljuks to establish a 
polity of their own. 
The gravity of the situation in Anatolia did not escape the attention of Pope Gregory 
VII. He wrote to the emperor that the time had come to unite the Orthodox Church 
with that of the Catholics (July 9, 1073). Although Michael VII Ducas acquiesced, the 
pope's call for help (February 2 & March 1, 107 4) was not answered for another quarter 
of a century. Whether due to this or not, the emperor is known to have asked the caliph 
to mediate a peace agreement with Sultan Malik-Shah (June 1074). It is not certain, 
however, if the sultan received his envoys as a result (1 07 6), because a Byzantine 
embassy is dated also to his last campaign to the Caucasus (1 086). This latter date seems 
the more likely given the problems discussed immediately below. In any case, as with the 
reputed agreement between their predecessors, the outcome of these approaches is also 
. . 
not known [Kafesoglu, 1953:74 & 116; Turan, 1971b:52-3 & 57]. 
105 
Since those unable to take refuge in the towns and cities were more vulnerable to the 
Tiirkmen invasion that ensued after Malazgirt, Michael VII Ducas is thought to have re-
located large sections of the remaining population in the countryside to the Balkans. 
Although there may have been some migrations westward it is doubtful that this was on 
a large scale given the Bulgar uprising (1074), the Nestor rebellion (1075), and plague 
and famine in the Balkans (1 07 6). Amidst all this, the Byzantine army in Thrace revolted 
under the command of Nicephorus Briennios (1075). While still in Edirne 
(Adrianople), Briennios declared himself emperor and advanced on Istanbul (1 077). 
The commander of the Byzantine army in Anatolia, Botaniates, who had been busy 
lobbying the senators, clergy and populace of Istanbul, also rebelled. In response, the 
emperor is said to have released Roussel from prison and sent him against Briennios 
with Alexius Comnenus, arranging to capture Botaniates with Kutalmt~'s sons who are 
thought to have been in Konya (!conium) at the time. Certainly, Siileyman-Shah is said 
to have situated his men at key crossroads and passes in order to intercept Botaniates 
who was travelling at night and hiding by day. When his advance units ftnally engaged 
Botaniates near Iznik (Nicea), however, it is unlikely that Siileyman-Shah was persuaded 
to switch sides at Er-Basgan's instigation. This is not to deny that Botaniates may have 
gained the latter's support. What appears to be overlooked, however, is that at the time 
the Tiirkmen seem to have been supporting Nicephorus Melissenos. On deciding to 
become emperor, Nicephorus Melissenos is said to have toured those walled cities and 
fortifications in central and western Anatolia not yet under Tiirkmen control to gather 
support. However, as he did this under the armed protection of the Tiirkmen it is 
thought to have enabled them to enter these, too. For instance, Siileyman-Shah is 
thought to have entered. Iznik in this manner as early as 1078. As a result Botaniates was 
able to continue to Istanbul with the addition of 2,000 horsemen from Siileyman-Shah 
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and ascend to the throne (April 3, 1 078). Interestingly enough, this Tiirkmen force is 
deemed also to have enabled Alexius Comnenus to defeat Briennios, who. was equally 
dependent on the Pe<;enek and Uz [Turan, 1971 b:53-5 & 60-2 and Kafesoglu, 1953:70-
3,76 & IA Vol. 10:385ff; also Cahen, 1984:90]. 
At this point Silleyman-Shah is said to have fallen out with his elder brother Mansur 
who on being defeated by him sought refuge in Istanbul. Whether Mansur returned to 
Anatolia before Sultan Malik-Shah's envoys reached Istanbul to request his surrender, or 
the new emperor did not comply, Sultan Malik-Shah next sent Porsuk. With his help 
Silleyman-Shah defeated Mansur who is said to have died on the battlefield. As a result 
it is proposed that the sultan recognized Silleyman-Shah's sovereignty. Since those in 
favour of this interpretation are also of the opinion that Kutaltru~'s sons were assigned 
to the conquest of Anatolia, the implication is that Silleyman-Shah was rewarded for 
remaining loyal. As for the caliph addressing Silleyman-Shah as sultan, consensus is that 
this was intentionally divisive rather than a ratification of the sultan's assignation 
[Yman<;, 1944:105-7; Koymen, 1963:102-6; Kafesoglu, 1953:75; Sevim, 1990:29]. 
Turan disagreed. He took the report that the caliph had addressed Silleyman-Shah as 
sultan confirmation that Sultan Malik-Shah had sent his commander against Kutalnufs 
sons, rather than in aid of one against the other. Porsuk's campaign is coincident with 
not only the sultan's brother Tutu~ being assigned to Syria and Palestine, but also the 
Tiirkmen begs returning from raids into Anatolia being ordered to join him (1 078). 
Turan argued that possibly Sultan Malik-Shah and Emperor Michael VII Ducas had 
come to an agreement as concerns Anatolia (1074). Accordingly, this would explain 
Kutaltru~'s sons' suppo.rt for Botaniates, given that in return he would have been 
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amenable to their sovereignty over part of Anatolia (hopefully as his vassals) [Turan, 
1971b:56-60; also Kaymaz, 1993:263 & Cahen, 1984:90-1]. 
However, this interpretation of events seems equally unsatisfactory. Melissenos seems 
to have been preparing for the last leg of his journey with Siileyman-Shah nearby in 
Eski~ehir (Dorylaeum) when he was besieged (1080). Unable to persuade Alexius 
Comnenus to advance on Iznik, Emperor Botaniates is said to have assigned a palace 
official who appears to have ignored the advice of his generals. When news arrived of 
Silleyman-Shah's approach, however, he handed over his command. Although his 
generals attempted an orderly retreat, Silleyman-Shah caught up and routed them. As a 
result Silleyman-Shah made Iznik the capital of his domains, which now stretched from 
Adana in south-eastern Anatolia to the shores of the Bosporus, where he had 
established customs offices. As for Melissenos, his services were dispensed with soon 
afterwards, coincident with Alexius Comnenus being declared emperor by the Byzantine 
forces in Thrace (1 081) [Kafesoglu, 1953:76-9; also Turan, 1971 b:60-2]. 
During the following year Emperor Alexius I Comnenus dislodged the Tiirkmen from 
the Asian shores of the Bosporus, forcing them to withdraw. Having learnt that they 
could not engage the Tiirkmen in large-scale shock-combat, at least not until the 
Tiirkmen saw they had the advantage, the Byzantines likewise resorted to raiding. Eight 
to ten soldiery is said to have disembarked from boats at odd hours of the night and 
returned as soon as they had achieved their goal. In this way the Byzantines were able to 
regain a foothold, disembarking as many as fifty cavalry at a time even during the day. 
When the Tiirkmen had withdrawn toward Izmit, possibly because at the time 
Silleyman-Shah was engaged in the conquest of Tarsus in the southeast, the emperor 
offered peace. The acceptance of a stream, which is thought to be that of present day 
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Dragos (Drakon), as the boundary between the Byzantine Empire and the newly 
founded Seljuk polity clearly confirms the conquest of Anatolia (1 082) [Kafesoglu, 
1953:80-1; also Turan, 1971 b:60-2]. 
The agreement not only left Emperor Alexius free to grapple with the Normans, but 
also enabled Silleyman-Shah to consolidate his hold on Tarsus and its environs (1 083). 
Silleyman-Shah now came in direct contact with the Armenian Philaretos Brachamios, a 
former commander of Romanos Diogenes and thus also Botaniates' comrade, who 
until then had enjoyed a free hand in much of south-eastern Anatolia. Prior to the 
Seljuks, the region south of the Caucasus Mountains, between the Caspian Sea and Lake 
Van had in the main been under the control of members of the Armenian Bagratid 
dynasty, a branch of which had also resided in north-eastern Anatolia. This latter region 
and that of the Armenian Ardzruni dynasty, namely the region around Lake Van, 
however, had been incorporated into the Byzantine Empire during the reign of Basil II 
(976-1025), who as noted had resettled many Armenians in Sivas and Kayseri. 
Subsequendy, members of these and other leading Armenian families had been all but 
eradicated by Constantine IX Monomachus (1042-55). Nonetheless, in the years after 
the battle of Malazgirt, various Armenian dynasties re-emerged in eastern and south-
eastern Anatolia. Although Philaretos Brachamios gained control of these fledgling 
princedoms as well as of Antakya (1 078), his cruel and wanton approach is said to have 
made the local Christian population already under pressure from the Tiirkmen resentful. 
In order to maintain his position, therefore, Philaretos Brachamios appears to have 
proclaimed his allegiance to Emperor Botaniates while paying tribute and sending gifts 
to both Sultan Malik-Shah and his brother Tutu~, as well as the rulers of Aleppo and 
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Mosul [Sevim, 1983:7-10 & 21-2; also Kafesoglu, 1953:82-3 & Turan, 1971b:68-9]. 
There is no mention, however, how he fmanced this system if indeed so. 
Be that as it may, possibly on the invitation of Brachamios' son, Silleyman-Shah secretly 
advanced on Antakya while the Ti.irkmen laid siege to Malatya and various other urban 
centres in the southeast. Silleyman-Shah is said to have taken only a few hundred men 
with him to avoid alerting Tutu~ or Muslim, the Uqailid ruler of Mosul. Having been let 
in at night (December 12, 1084), Silleyman-Shah took the inner city despite some 
resistance Oanuary 11, 1 085) and consolidated his hold by also taking the towns and 
fortifications in the environs of Antakya [Sevim, 1965:80-4; Kafesoglu, 1953:83; Turan, 
1971 b:69-73]. 
In order to understand how Silleyman-Shah subsequently came into direct conflict with 
Tutu~ and lost his life, however, it is necessary to follow the developments not only in 
south-eastern Anatolia, but also in Syria and Palestine. Since Sultan Malik-Shah 
remained active throughout this period in the Caucasus and north-eastern Anatolia as 
well, Tutu~'s involvement in Syria and Palestine appears to have been part of a broader 
strategy concerning the western marches of the Great Seljuk Empire. Consequently, the 
events in south-eastern Anatolia have been included with those concerning Syria and 
Palestine. 
4.11 Incorporation of Syria and Palestine 
Kutahru~'s sons, thought to have been Alp-llek and Devlet, had been captured by 
Uvakoglu Ats1Z and sent to Sultan Malik-Shah (1075). Although at the time Ats1Z Beg 
requested help from the sultan in the conquest of Syria and Palestine, when the city of 
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Tyre (Sur) capitulated on the condition that the Fatimid khutba would not be changed, 
he agreed. Also it appears he demanded a share of Nasr's inheritance from his father 
Mahmud, although Nasr was Sultan Malik-Shah's vassal. When Nasr refused, he settled 
instead for 15,000 dinars. At this juncture the sultan is said to have wanted to replace 
Ats1z with his brother Tutu~ but that Nizam al-Mulk prevented him, thus possibly 
Tutu~'s appointment to Ganja instead. Certainly Ats1z Beg later took Tripoli (farabulus) 
and fmally also Damascus. In the latter case he is said to have been aided by its 
soldiery's revolt against the Fatimid governor, which the inhabitants joined Quly /August 
1075). When the Fatimid soldiery now under a commander of their own choice, still 
failed to break Ats1z Beg's stranglehold on Damascus, the inhabitants are said to have 
once again became restless. Consequently, the new commander seems to have 
capitulated without a fight, being rewarded with two coastal cities (March 1076). Unlike 
Tyre, however, in Damascus the Fatimid khutba was replaced [Sevim, 1965:48-52 & 
1990b:38-40; also Kafesoglu, 1953:31-2]. 
In the previous three years, Badr al-Jamali, the former governor of Damascus and later 
of Acre, had put Fatimid affairs in order by invitation of the caliph. Of Armenian 
origin, while still in Damascus he had formed a personal guard from his countrymen 
whom he took with him to Cairo. Once there, he surprised the caliphate's Turkic 
commanders and killed them, ending their anarchy. The son of one ll-Deniz, however, 
managed to escape with his father's valuables and some men, taking refuge with AtslZ 
Beg. With his encouragement, Uvakoglu AtslZ now embarked on a campaign against the 
Fatimids at the head of 5,000 Tiirkmen, Arabs and Kurds (1076). When this force 
arrived outside the city of Rif (Gaza?), Il-Denizoglu advised Ats1z that if he took the 
city he would have Egypt at his feet. After a siege said to have lasted nearly two months, 
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Atstz Beg succeeded. Then, for reasons best known to himself he demanded money 
from Badr al-Jamali in Cairo. Although promised 150,000 dinars, possibly because the 
money did not transpire, he advanced after a two-month wait. This period seems to 
have enabled Badr al-Jamali to take sufficient measures to defeat Atstz Beg outside 
Cairo, taking 10,000 women and children prisoner in the process, as well as 3,000 horses 
Qanuary /February 1 077). On the way back Ats1z Beg was not allowed into Rif, nor 
Ramla, being harassed all the way to Damascus where he is said to have arrived with 
only ten or fifteen horsemen [Sevim, 1965:52-6 & 1990:41-2; Kafesoglu, 1953:34-6]. 
In the wake of Atstz Beg's disastrous Egyptian campaign many if not all the urban 
centres of Syria and Palestine appear to have reverted to the Fatimid khutba. Aided by 
the arrival of a fresh group of Tiirkmen from Anatolia, however, Atstz Beg embarked 
on a bloody re-conquest of Syria and Palestine, which he started by saving his wife and 
family from enslavement in Jerusalem where he had left them en route to Egypt. But 
upon his return to Damascus he is said to have found that the city had been reduced to 
a population of only 3,000. Badr al-Jamali now sent out a force under Nasr al-Dawla al-
Juyushi, a commander from his personal guard who laid siege to Damascus (1077 /8). 
Although this was unsuccessful, the following year al-Juyushi returned with an army 
with which he invaded Palestine before besieging Damascus. This appears to have 
prompted Atstz Beg to ask the sultan's brother Tutu~ for help. On entering Damascus, 
Tutu~ had Uvakoglu Atstz and his brother <";avh strangled with their bowstrings 
(1078/9) [Sevim, 1965:57-60 & 1990:43-5; Kafesoglu, 1953:37-8]. 
After his defeat in Egypt, thinking that Ats1z had been killed, Sultan Malik-Shah had 
reassigned his brother Tutu~ to the conquest of Syria and Palestine. When Ats1Z heard 
of this, he sent the sultan gifts and 30,000 dinars, thus earning his reprieve (1077 /8) 
112 
[Sevim, 1965:59]. As will be remembered, however, by then the Georgians had regained 
most of the Caucasus such that Sultan Malik-Shah had taken command of a second 
campaign there. As this is coincident also with Porsuk's Anatolian campaign, which 
resulted in the death of Kutalm.t~'s son Mansur, it seems that Sultan Malik-Shah had left 
Ats1Z in place until the situation there clarified. Certainly, Tiirkmen begs such as Af~in, 
Sabuk, Dilma<;oglu and Davdavoglu are thought to have been ordered by the sultan to 
join Tutu~ [Sevim, 1965:66-7; Turan, 1971 b:57]. In short, with Suleyman-Shah's 
ascendance and the loss of Palestine to the Fatimids, not to mention the repeated sieges 
of Damascus by the resurgent Fatimids, Atstz must have been perceived as a liability. 
Diverted from his assignment to Syria and Palestine by Atstz's reappearance, Tutu~ 
nevertheless laid siege to Aleppo with the support of the Uqailid Muslim's forces in 
Mosul. However, on Muslim's instructions his soldiery instead joined in the defence of 
the city. It was when Tutu~ returned the following spring that he was called to 
Damascus by Atstz. With Tutu~ busy in Damascus and its environs, Muslim requested 
and gained permission from Sultan Malik-Shah to take Aleppo on the invitation of its 
inhabitants. Having done so (1 080), Muslim took all the fortifications in the region 
where the Tiirkmen were situated, killing or imprisoning them. Next he extended 
Uqailid power into south-eastern Anatolia by taking Harran (1081-2). Consequendy, the 
Byzantine governor of Urfa (Edessa), and subsequendy also Philaretos Brachamios in 
Antakya, ostensibly proclaimed their allegiances (1082-3). When Tu~ advanced on 
Aleppo with Artuk Beg, Sultan Malik-Shah ordered his brother back to Damascus and 
recalled Artuk Beg. Muslim, however, now laid siege to Damascus, withdrawing only 
when Harran revolted (May /June, 1 083) [Kafesoglu, 1953:40-44; Sevim, 1965:66-79]. 
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At this juncture Caliph al-Qa'im's and for a time his successor Caliph al-Muqtadi's vizier 
Fakhr al-Dawla Muhammad b. Jahir retired to the capital Isfahan Qune 1083). Originally 
from Mosul, he had started his career as the Marwanids' vizier. Consequendy, he seems 
to have been more than familiar with their fortunes, which are said to have taken a 
downturn with the appointment of a new administration. In any case, despite his 
advanced age he appears to have persuaded Sultan Malik-Shah that the Marwanids' 
domains, which included numerous cities and fortifications in south-eastern and eastern 
Anatolia, should be incorporated direcdy into the empire [Kafesoglu, 1953:46-8]. 
The commander of Iraq al-Ajam and Tiirkmen begs such as Artuk, Sabuk and 
Dilma<;oglu, not to mention two neighbouring vassals, were all assigned to Fakhr al-
Dawla. Alerted to the approaching Seljukid forces, however, the Marwanid ruler, 
Mansur, was able to engage the Uqailid Muslim who gathered all his forces and 
prompdy arrived in Diyarbak.tr, which Mansur had promised along with other towns 
and fortifications in return for his help. Faced by his fellow Arabs and townsmen, Fakhr 
al-Dawla appears to have prevaricated. When the Marwanid and Uqailid leaders opened 
negotiations, Muhammad ordered Artuk Beg to retreat in order to allow the U qailid 
forces to withdraw. Artuk Beg refused and during the night the Tiirkmen attacked under 
~ubuk Beg, apparendy without the knowledge of either A:rtuk or Fakhr al-Dawla Quly 
31, 1084). Defeated, the Marwanid and Uqailid forces retired to Diyarbak.tr, which was 
put under siege. Fakhr al-Dawla then ordered Artuk Beg to collect the plunder as well as 
the money gained from its sale by the Tiirkmen and to send it to Isfahan, which again 
he refused. Muslim was able to agree on a price with Artuk that enabled him to 
withdraw from Diyarbak.tr (August 1 084). For his part, Fakhr al-Dawla laid siege to 
Silvan (.Mayyafariqin), where Mansur had withdrawn. When the Seljuk forces began to 
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take the remaining cities, towns and fortifications, Mansur journeyed to Isfahan, but was 
unable to gain an audience with the sultan. In the meantime, the Muslim inhabitants of 
Diyarbakt.r had opened the city gates to the Seljuks (May 4, 1 085). Soon thereafter 
Silvan also fell (August 31, 1085). As a result, while Fakhr al-Dawla and his son. took 
charge of Silvan and Diyarbakt.r respectively, the remainder of the Marwanid realms 
were apportioned between the Tiirkmen begs [Kafesoglu, 1953:49-55; also Sevim, 
1965:85]. 
When informed of Muslim's support of the Marwanids, Sultan Malik-Shah had 
assigned the Uqailids' realms to Fakhr al-Dawla Muhammad's son, ordering the 
Tiirkmen begs under his father's command to join him along with Aksungur Beg. 
Although Mosul capitulated without resistance and the sultan set off from Isfahan, the 
Uqailid Muslim appears to have gained an audience and been re-instated (November 
1 084). Possibly the sultan was more concerned with his brother Teki~, who had rebelled 
again. On a prior occasion, 7,000 Turkic soldiery dismissed in Rayy for lack of 
discipline had joined Teki~ in Balkh and incited him to rebellion. Although Teki~ had 
taken Tirmiz, the sultan had arrived in Nishapur ahead of Teki~ who had asked to be 
forgiven (1 080-1 ). On this occasion, however, he appears to have been unable to take 
even Serakhs and withdrawn to a fortification near Tirmiz, having been tricked into 
believing that Nizam al-Mulk was on his way to relieve the city. When the sultan arrived 
from Mosul he had him caught and blinded, appointing Tekifs son Ahmad in his stead 
(1084-5). Teki~ was fmally strangled with his own bowstring on Sultan Berk-Yaruk's 
otrders (March-April 1094) [Kafesoglu, 1953:56-9; also Ongiil, 2000:325-6 & 329-31, 
Sevim, 1965:85 and Turan, 1971 b:73]. 
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Meanwhile, when the Uqailid Muslim asked Silleyman-Shah to pay the annual tax 
Philaretos Brachamios had promised for Antakya, the latter is said to have retorted that 
not only was he a Muslim but also likewise a vassal of Sultan Malik-Shah in whose name 
the Uqailid Muslim had made his demand. After each had raided the other's environs, 
Muslim appears to have set off to besiege Antakya. Siileyman-Shah, however, met him 
en route where the Tfukmen under <;ubuk Beg deserted Muslim who was defeated and 
killed Gune 23, 1 085). Although he seems to have besieged Aleppo immediately 
afterwards, Silleyman-Shah was unable to take it but returned the following spring 
(April 1 086). The current ruler of Aleppo seems to have played for time by sending 
Silleyman-Shah money while informing him that he was waiting for Sultan Malik-Shah's 
permission. The sultan, however, appears to have offered the city to Tutu~, who 
promptly advanced with Artuk Beg. Having failed to regain the sultan's favour after 
Diyarbala.r, Artuk had taken refuge with Tutu~ and been rewarded with Jerusalem. The 
two armies are thought to have met at Ain Salm, where Siileyman-Shah's all-out attack 
on the detachments from Damascus failed and the Tfukmen under Artuk Beg routed 
his forces. Silleyman-Shah is said to have been deserted not only by <;ubuk Beg but also 
by some of his closest comrades-in-arms, possibly because Tutu~ had succeeded in 
winning them over prior to the engagement. In any case, as a result Silleyman-Shah is 
thought to have committed suicide on the battlefield Qune 5, 1086) [Kafesoglu, 
1953:86-90; Koymen, 1963:106-8; Sevim, 1965:89-92; Turan, 1971 b:73-6]. 
Unlike Silleyman-Shah, Tutu~ took no notice of the Uqailid ruler of Aleppo who now 
informed him that once again he was waiting for the sultan's permission to hand over 
the city as promised. Although Tutu~ was able to breach the outer walls through a 
defending commander's defection, he is said to have abandoned his siege of the inner 
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city and retired to Damascus on learning that Sultan Malik-Shah was on his way 
(September 1 086). He is thought to have been fearful of the sultan after Siileyman-
Shah's death, but the fact of the matter may have been the siege of Damascus by the 
Fatimids. In any event, the sultan did arrive in Aleppo via Mosul and Harran, his forces 
taking any town or fortification that resisted, such as Manbij. Having appointed 
Aksungur to Aleppo, Sultan Malik-Shah sent Bozan to take Urfa from Brachamios' son, 
and advanced on Antakya. Siileyman-Shah's vizier handed over the city and Siileyman-
Shah's son Kilis: Arslan. Sultan Malik-Shah assigned Antakya to Yagt-S1yan. With Urfa 
assigned to Bozan who had taken it (February 28, 1 087), the sultan returned to Aleppo. 
From there he went on to Baghdad for the first time (March 13, 1087). Here he 
attended his daughter's wedding to the caliph [Kafesoglu, 1953:91-4; also Sevim, 
1965:94-8 & Cahen, 1979:92-3]. 
On learning of Tutu~'s return the Fatimids appear to have lifted the siege of Damascus 
and retired (1087 /8). While Sultan Malik-Shah was pre-occupied in Baghdad, Tutu~ 
seems to have tried to consolidate his hold on northern Syria while expanding the Seljuk 
realms back along the Mediterranean coast. The following year Badr al-Jamali sent out 
al-Juyushi (?) who was able to re-conquer most of the Mediterranean coast because 
Tutu~ is thought to have left it undefended, thus putting pressure on Damascus (1 089). 
Caught unprepared, Tutu~ asked the sultan for help, being assigned the commanders 
Aksungur, Bozan and Yagt-S1yan. However, after some initial success Tutu~ and 
Aksungur appear to have fallen out during the siege of Tripoli. Aksungur is said to have 
refused to continue after having secretly received money, claiming that the city had 
proclaimed its allegiance to the sultan. When Bozan also left for undisclosed reasons, 
Tutu~ was forced to withdraw to Damascus. Although he is said to have sent his son to 
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Sultan Malik-Shah to complain, Aksungur does not appear to have been punished 
(1090/1) [Kafesoglu, 1953:98-101; Sevim, 1965:99-103]. 
4.12 Anatolia after Siileyman-Shah 
On Siileyman-Shah's death al-Kasim is considered to have revoked the agreement he 
had made with Emperor Alexius, raiding toward the Bosporus (1 085). When on this 
occasion the emperor's tactics of launching night-raids from small boats proved 
unsuccessful, Alexius Comnenus is said to have suggested an alliance against Sultan 
Malik-Shah by flattering al-Kasim's military prowess. Initially this appears to have also 
failed. Instead al-Kasim took a fortification near Gemlik on the Sea of Marmara and 
started to build a small navy. The emperor then sent Butumites to burn the boats while 
a large force advanced under the command of one Tatichios who was of Pe~enek 
origin. Al-Kasim is said to have attacked Tatichios first, but was unable to defeat him 
and thus prevent Butumites from burning his fledgling navy. Caught in crossfire, al-
Kasim withdrew to Iznik. Tatichios, however, with<kew on receiving news of Porsuk's 
advance. Unaware of this, al-Kasim set off in pursuit and forced Tatichios back to 
Istanbul, taking Izmit. When al-Kasim realized Porsuk was after him, however, he 
accepted the emperor's peace offer and was invited to Istanbul. The emperor appears to 
have taken this opportunity to dispatch his commander Eustathios to Izmit by sea. 
Possibly because most of the garrison were of the local population, Eustathios appears 
to have had little difficulty in persuading them that al-Kasi.m had agreed to a joint 
defence of the city. Once the Byzantine force had been allowed into Izmit, however, 
Eustathios took control ·and had the walls strengthened. Al-Kasi.m is said to have 
become aware of the emperor's duplicity while embarking on his return journey after 
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Porsuk had withdrawn (1086/7?) [Turan, 1971b:84-5; Kafesoglu, 1953:101-4; also 
Cahen, 1984:94]. 
It is not known why Sultan Malik-Shah recalled Porsuk, or if he did. In any case, he 
seems to have assigned instead the governor of Urfa, Bozan (1088/9?). While still on 
campaign in south-eastern Anatolia, the sultan is thought to have sent an envoy to 
Emperor Alexius, requesting his daughter in marriage to one of his sons and offering in 
return some seaports on the Anatolian coast. Accordingly, having appointed the envoy 
whose mother was Georgian to a high position, the emperor used him to persuade one 
Kara-Tekin to vacate the seaport of Sinop on the Black Sea. More likely, however, Kara-
Tekin, who is rumoured to have been an affiliate of Erbasgan, was forced to withdraw 
from Sinop and its environs due to Bozan's advance across Anatolia and subsequent 
siege of Iznik. Bozan seems to have been in concert with Porsuk, who is thought to 
have stopped en route in Konya and nearby Aksaray, repairing these cities once they had 
proclaimed their allegiance to Sultan Malik-Shah. To be sure, al-Kasim is thought to 
have defended Iznik against Bozan with help from the Byzantines. Apparently Bozan 
lifted the siege after a number of unsuccessful attempts to storm the walls. Clearly 
under pressure from the sultan and faced with the erosion of his domains by the 
emperor's duplicitous opportunism, al-Kasim journeyed to Isfahan to proclaim 
allegiance to Sultan Malik-Shah. Unable to gain an audience, he was told to see Bozan 
who had him apprehended and strangled with his own bowstring. After this the military 
governors of Antakya and Aleppo, namely Yagt-S1yan and Aksungur, joined Bozan on a 
subsequent campaign, but al-Kasim's son al-Gazi once again thwarted them at Iznik. 
The commanders are said to have returned to their cities on Sultan Malik-Shah's death 
(1092), having considered. and abandoned the idea of going on to take Istanbul instead 
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[Turan, 1971 b:86-7; Kafesoglu, 1953:1 05-7]. Although a closer look would have told 
them that Istanbul could not be taken overland from the Asian side of the Bosporus, it 
is unlikely they would have even considered this, given Sultan Malik-Shah's repeated 
attempts at reconciliation with the Byzantines. 
There can be no doubt, however, that despite Si.ileyman-Shah's demise at the hands of 
Tutu~, not to mention the constant pressure exerted by Sultan Malik-Shah on Iznik and 
other cities, the Ti.irkmen begs in Anatolia continued to pursue their own fortunes. 
Rather than an indication of rebellion, however, this seems to have been due to their 
customary independence. On the other hand their cultural expectations did not prevent 
the Tiirkmen from adapting to their new environment. In attempting to build a fleet, al-
Kasim appears to have been following the example of <;aka (or <;akan) Beg of the 
<;avuldur Oguz in Izmir. <;aka Beg is thought to have been captured by the Byzantines 
after Malazgirt and educated at the palace in Istanbul, being given the aristocratic tide of 
protonobilissimos when Botaniates became emperor with Si.ile~man-Shah's help (1 078). His 
position is said to have deteriorated when Alexius Comnenus took the throne (1081), 
such that he escaped, eventually to emerge in Izmir and its environs (1 086). Unlike the 
other Tiirk.men begs, however, <;aka's power was based on a naval force he had created 
with the aid of Greek shipbuilders from Izmir and the islands. This appears to have 
gained him some degree of control over the northern Aegean and the Dardanelles, 
despite repeated attempts by the Byzantines to stop him [Turan, 1971 b:87-9; Kafesoglu, 
1953:108-111]. 
<;aka Beg's emergence is coincident with the Pe~enek onslaught in the Balkans. Having 
defeated the Pe~eneks who had withdrawn to the Danube River (1 086), Alexius 
Comnenus had refused their peace offer with the intention of dealing them a final blow 
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(1087). Although the Pec;eneks had requested help from the Kumans they were able to 
inflict a terrible defeat on the Byzantines before their arrival, forcing the e.mperor to 
retire to Istanbul (1 087 -9). When the Kumans asked for a share of the spoils, however, 
the Pec;enek appear to have fallen out with them. The emperor once again reverted to 
diplomacy by inviting the Kuman begs Manyak and Tongurdak to Istanbul, where 
Byzantine generals of Kuman origin, namely Karaca and Uzan, hosted them. It is at this 
juncture that C::aka Beg appears to have made an alliance with the Pec;eneks. While the 
Pec;eneks were waiting for C::aka Beg to join them, however, the Byzantines and Kumans 
attacked and massacred them- men, women and children- on April29, 1091. Those 
able to save their lives were christened and settled in Macedonia, east of the Vardar 
River, serving in the Byzantine army as Vardoroit [furan, 1971 b:90-2; Kafesoglu, 
1953:111-2]. 
According to Turan, C::aka Beg was the first Tiirkmen beg to have appreciated that 
Istanbul could not be conquered from land alone. In his opinion C::aka Beg's intention 
to do so can be deduced from his self-ascribed imperial tide of Basileus. C::aka Beg 
appears to have married his daughter to Sultan Kthc; Arslan I (1 092-11 07) of the Seljuks 
of Anatolia. Notwithstanding, Turan thought that his assault on Abydos in the 
Dardanelles with siege towers threatened his son-in-law's claims on the regton. 
Accordingly, Emperor Alexius took the opportunity to send a navy against C::aka Beg 
and a letter to Kthc; Arslan warning him that his father-in-law intended to usurp his 
domains, not those of the Byzantine Empire. As a result, Kthc; Arslan advanced on 
C::aka Beg who withdrew [1971 b:93-5]. Kafesoglu thought that C::aka Beg was executed 
by Kille; Arslan when he visited him to ask his help against Emperor Alexius [1953:112]. 
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4.13 Central Asia 
Having become unhappy with their treatment at the hands of their Karakhanid ruler, 
who had begun to confiscate also the possessions of wealthier inhabitants, the people 
of Samarkand are said to have complained to Sultan Malik-Shah. On the instigation of 
a Shafici jurist afraid for his security, the sultan undertook a campaign that extended into 
Central Asia. Accordingly, he took Bokhara and then Samarkand before advancing on 
Kashgar whose ruler proclaimed allegiance. On route he incorporated the regions 
around Talas and Issyk-Kol, so that the Karakhanids now became the Seljuks' vassals 
(1 088-9). Notwithstanding, Sultan Malik-Shah had to return to Transoxania when his 
commander in Samarkand fell out with the local c;igil soldiery and returned to 
Khwarazm. Afraid of the sultan's wrath, the c;igil beg invited Yakup Tekin, the brother 
of the Karakhanid ruler of Kashgar, thought to have been Harun Bugra Khan. While 
the sultan re-conquered Samarkand, however, the ruler of Kushan, Ymaloglu Tugrul 
captured Harun Bugra Khan. Deciding against pursuit, Sultan Malik-Shah appointed 
Yakup Tekin to Kashgar [Kafesoglu, 1953:119-23]. 
4.14 Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf 
When Artuk Beg was recalled from Anatolia (1076-7), he was assigned to deal with the 
Shicite Carmathians in Ahsa and Bahrain [Ibid 38]. Artuk Beg is said to have soon 
realized he could not fulfil his mission without replacing his horses with camels and 
returned to Basra. Properly equipped, he took Bahrain, then Ahsa (1 07 6-7) [Kafesoglu, 
1953:38-9]. 
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Artuk Beg's mission appears to have been part of a two-pronged campaign orchestrated 
by Sultan Malik-Shah. Although in Mecca the khutba had begun to be read in the 
Abbasid name (1068), after the death of Caliph al-Qa'im this had reverted to the 
Fatimids (1 073). While Artuk Beg advanced down the eastern coast of the Arabian 
Peninsula, the commander for Khurasan arrived in Mecca with some jurists and the 
khutba once again was read in the Abbasid name there and in Medina (1076). 
Notwithstanding, there was a brief setback in Medina as the Fatimid caliphate struggled 
to regain its standing in Islamdom (1 077). After the Abbasid khutba had been re-
imposed (1 079-80), during Sultan Malik-Shah's campaign in south-eastern Anatolia the 
Fa timid caliphs' names had been erased from the Qa'bah (1 086-7). Following the 
Fatimid recovery in Syria and Palestine, however, the sultan appears to have called his 
brother Tutu~ and the commanders Bozan, Aksungur and C::ubuk to Baghdad with still 
others (December 1091 ). Before returning to Isfahan (March 1 092), the sultan assigned 
Tutu~ with Gawhar-A'in, Bozan and Aksungur to the conquest of the remainder of 
Syria, Palestine and Egypt. Similarly the caliph's former vizier seems to have been 
assigned with C::ubuk to the conquest of the Yemen and Aden. This latter was achieved 
that same year by Yannku~, who took over the campaign when the commander Tur~ek 
died of natural causes [Ibid. 123-7]. 
4.15 Coming of the Assassins 
The leader of the Nizari Ismacili sect, Hasan al-Sabbah's family is thought to have been 
originally Arabic. Although they were of the Twelver Shicite sect, while being educated 
in Rayy, Hasan al-Sabbah ·came under the influence of the Ismacilis. Impressed by his 
intelligence and energy, the daci for Iraq al-Ajam, Ibn Attash, is said to have suggested 
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he journey to Egypt (1071). Nevertheless, Hasan al-Sabbah does not appear to have left 
Rayy until the Seljuks intensified their pursuit of Shicites, going first to Isfahan (1 077). 
From there he is thought to have travelled to Azarbayjan before arriving in Cairo (1 079). 
When the Fatimid Caliph Mustansir appointed his younger son heir instead of the then 
heir apparent Nizar, possibly because he was the vizier Badr al-Jamali's son-in-law, a 
vociferous supporter of Nizar, Hasan al-Sabbah is thought to have been unable to 
remain in Cairo, returning secredy to Isfahan (May 1081) [Kafesoglu, 1953:128-30]. 
Koymen was of the opinion that from the outset Hasan al-Sabbah seems to have 
wanted to centre his activities in Dailam, specifically Alamut. Certainly, Nizam al-Mulk 
is known to have assigned the governor of Rayy with the task of capturing Hasan al-
Sabbah upon his return from Cairo. Pursued, Hasan al-Sabbah appears to have moved 
first to south-eastern Iran, where Shicites appear to have been in the majority. After 
putting an end to the local dynasty (1077), Sultan Malik-Shah had left this region in the 
control of various commanders who were lodged in redoubtable mountain fortresses. 
Hasan al-Sabbah is said to have been able to summon converts from among these as 
well as the local populace and begun to send out missionaries. Nevertheless, he appears 
next in Alamut cas de (September 5, 1 090). Finally ensconced in his (eagle's nest', which 
he did not leave until his death, Hasan al-Sabbah launched a violent campaign of 
assassinations for which the batinis are remembered to this day [Koymen, 1963:211; 
also Kafesoglu, 1953:130-2]. 
Although Alamut was besieged, when the commander Yorun-T~ died of natural causes 
it was lifted. Alerted to the growing problem, Sultan Malik-Shah is said to have assigned 
Arslan-T~ to the capture of Hasan al-Sabbah and Klztl-Sang to the pursuit and capture 
of his missionary in Kuhistan, Hussein Qacini. Hasan al-Sabbah, however, was able to 
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call on his da'i in Kazvin, who surprised Arslan-Ta~ with an armed force gathered from 
the fortifications established near Alamut (September 1 092). Routed, . Arslan-Ta~ 
withdrew. As for Ktztl-Sang, he is said to have pursued Hasan al-Sabbah's followers in 
towns and villages throughout Kuhistan, but news of Sultan Malik-Shah's death caused 
him to retire [Koymen, 1963:212; also Kafesoglu, 1953:132-4 & Turan, 1965:246]. 
The sultan's death came within weeks of Nizam al-Mulk's assassination, which is 
commonly attributed to Hasan al-Sabbah. The vizier had made numerous enermes 
during some thirty years in office. Quite apart from his grip on the diwan (public 
fmancial register, thus government council) as chief officer, he had placed his numerous 
sons and sons-in-laws in key government positions. The vizier's retinue numbered 
nearly twenty thousand, inclusive of his mamluk soldiery who are better known as the 
Nizamiyya [Kafesoglu, 1953:197 & 203]. This power-base, however, was dependent 
ultimately on his relationship to the sultan, whose guardian he had been. It is thought 
that Sultan Alp-Arslan bestowed the title of atabeg first on his vizier. In Turkic ata meant 
father, more correctly patriarch. Not surprisingly, Malik-Shah is said to have referred to 
Nizam al-Mulk as father. Subsequently, if a Seljukid prince was too young to govern, an 
atabeg was appointed either from among the Tiirkmen begs or Turkic mamluks, 
preferably one who had risen in the sultan's service to the position of commander. 
As sultan, however, Malik-Shah does not seem to have been beyond showing his 
displeasure, or punishing transgressions of his authority by the vizier's dependants. 
Consequently, the influence Nizam al-Mulk is implied to have retained over the sultan 
needs to be questioned, particularly in view of Nizam al-Mulks' sons' arrogance. One 
such example concerns the sultan's court jester. Reports of his mimicry of Nizam al-
Mulk appear to have coincided with the rumour at court that the former vizier to the 
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military governor of Fars was being groomed to replace Nizam al-Mulk. Angered by 
this, Nizam al-Mulk's son Jamal al-Mulk journeyed to Isfahan from Balkh where he was 
governor. Accordingly, Sultan Malik-Shah was none too pleased when Jamal al-Mulk not 
only scolded the jester in his presence but also had him killed subsequently by having 
his tongue pulled out through his neck. Not satisfied with this, Jamal al-Mulk had his 
father's supposed contender blinded as well. Consequently, the sultan is said to have had 
Jamal al-Mulk poisoned (November 1082) [Kafesoglu, 1953:198-9]. 
Sav-Tekin's vizier, however, appears to have been more astute. Recommended to court, 
Taj al-Mulk Abu al-Ganaim became Sultan Malik-Shah's wife Tiirkan Khatun's vizier 
upon the death of the heir apparent Ahmad (1 088). Tiirkan Khatun wanted her newly 
born son Mahmud to become heir apparent while Nizam al-Mulk strongly favoured the 
sultan's eldest living son Berk-Yaruk from his marriage to his uncle Yakuti's daughter. 
Given the opportunity this presented to replace Nizam al-Mulk, Taj al-Mulk is said to 
have joined forces with Tiirkan Khatun. Soon afterwards one of Nizam al-Mulk's sons, 
the governor of Marv fell out with the shihna. Publicly insulted, the shihna complained 
in person to the sultan who sent Taj al-Mulk and another to confront Nizam al-Mulk. 
The vizier's reply seems to have been quite haughty. When asked whether he thought 
himself partner to Sultan Malik-Shah's sovereignty and dominion, Nizam al-Mulk 
replied that there would not be an empire without him. Threatened by Sultan Malik-
Shah with dismissal if he continued to abuse his power, the vizier is considered to have 
become vulnerable enough for Tiirkan Khatun and Taj al-Mulk to pave the way for a 
batini assassin, if he was that. Nizam al-Mulk was killed while en route to Baghdad with 
the sultan, Tiirkan Khatun, and her vizier Taj al-Mulk (October 15, 1092) [Ibid. 200-6]. 
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Sultan Malik-Shah continued on his journey despite his vizier's demise. Although Caliph 
al-Muqtadi had ignored the sultan's request that he marries his daughter from Tiirkan 
Khatun, he appears to have had a change of heart and subsequently asked for Mah 
Melek through the good offices of Nizam al-Mulk (1081). The marriage had taken place 
after protracted negotiations (1 087), producing a son, Jacfar (1 088). When the caliph had 
ordered Mah Melek Khatun's Turkic retinue from the palace, however, she had returned 
home with Jacfar (1 089). Most likely the caliph's expulsion of Mah Melek was due to 
Sultan Malik-Shah's request that his grandson be designated heir apparent [Ibid. 94-8 & 
206-8; Kitapc;:t, 1994:109-56]. Once in Baghdad Sultan Malik-Shah ordered the caliph to 
leave (October 29, 1092). The caliph appears to have gained ten days grace to prepare 
for his departure through the good office of Taj al-Mulk. Before the ten days had 
elapsed, however, Sultan Malik-Shah fell ill while on a hunt and died at the age of 38 
(November 20, 1092) [Ibid.]. 
4.16 Summary 
Turkish scholars were in agreement that because Nizam al-Mulk had been trained by the 
Ghaznavids and was vizier for some thirty years, Seljukid institutions were of an Irano-
Islamic character. Having said that, Sii.mer, Kafesoglu and Turan also argued for Turkic 
influences. According to Kafesoglu, not only were some offices referred to by their 
Turkish names, such as Agact, which was used for Hqjib (chamberlain), (avu; for Sarhang 
(usher) and Ulag or (tifga (courier), but also Turkic practices were introduced. Turan 
agreed with this last at length [Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:398 & 1953:136-42; Turan, 
1965:234ff & 237; Koymen, 1963:10-11 & 16; Siimer, 1965:94]. 
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Turan also thought that the Seljuks' adaptation of the iqtac system was in line with 
Turkic ideology [1965:237-8 & IA Vol. 5/2:949ffj. According to him, the ruling dynasty 
shared out the administration of their dominion not only among themselves but also 
among their affiliates. This also prevented Seljuk rulers from becoming despots, unlike 
their Iranian predecessors or Greek counterparts [Ibid. 239-41]. Furthermore, he 
thought that the assignation of iqtacs by the Seljuks without reference to the caliphs 
established a secular trend, because iqtac holders came to seek the sultan's approval as 
well as that of the caliph's for the redistribution of land that was fallow [Ibid. 198 & 
236]. For his part, Kafesoglu pointed to the code of law that carried Sultan Malik-Shah's 
name, encompassing marriage, divorce and real estate transactions. Moreover, according 
to Kafesoglu, although the qadis Gudges) administered Shari law according to the 
various schools of Islamic jurisprudence, and were supervized by a Chief Judge (qadi 
al-qudat) resident in Baghdad, a ruling could be referred to the sultan for review by 
other qadis [IA Vol. 10:400; also 1953:149-50]. 
In sum, according to Turkish scholars, given that the local population was already 
Muslim and Islam a key element of Seljukid legitimacy, during the reigns of sultans Alp-
Arslan and Malik-Shah, the character and concerns of the Great Seljuk Empire laid the 




This chapter follows Ozaydm's Sultan Muhammed Tapar Devri Se/ptklu Tarihi (498-
511/1105-1118) (1990) and Sultan Berk:Jaruk Devri Se/plklu Tarihi (485498/1092-1104) 
(2001), as well as Bi!Jiik Se/ptklu Emiri KUrboga (2000). In the case of the Seljuks of Syria, 
the chapter follows Sevim's Sunje Se/plklulan I- Fetihten Tutuj'un 0/iimiine Kadar (1965) 
and Suriye-Filistin Se/ptklu Devleti Tarihi (1989). Turan's Selftlklular Zamanznda Tiirkiye 
(1971) has been referred to for Anatolia. As in the previous chapters, references to 
other works are for supplementary material pertinent to the events being reviewed. 
5.1 Contention for the Throne 
Turkan Khatun kept the sultan's death secret, offering to send back the caliph's son 
Jacfar by Mah Melek Khatun on condition that he accepted to have the Friday khutba 
read in her Mahmud's name. Mah Melek Khatun had died the previous year. At ft.rst the 
caliph objected that Mahmud was too young, but fmally agreed. He is said to have 
stipulated that Oner was appointed Commander-in-Chief and reported directly to the 
vizier Taj al-Mulk. After the khutba had been read as agreed (November 26, 1092), 
Turkan Khatun set off for Isfahan, having dispatched the commanders Kur-Boga and 
Kumac ahead with the royal seal. With this they were able to gain control and imprison 
Berk-Yaruk [Ozaydm, 2001:16-8; also Koymen, 1963:72-3 & Kitap<;t, 1994:163-71]. 
129 
When news of the sultan's death reached Isfahan, Nizam al-Mulk's mamluks, the 
Nizamiyya, raided the deceased vizier's arsenals and released Berk-Yaruk, having the 
khutba read in his name. Before Tiirkan Khatun's arrival, however, Berk-Yaruk and his 
supporters, which must have included his atabeg Giimii~-Tekin and his soldiery, retired 
to Rayy where Nizam al-Mulk's commander Erku~ joined them with his soldiery. Once 
in Isfahan, Tiirkan Khatun is said to have spent millions of dinars to ensure the 
allegiance of her soldiery and the royal corps billeted there. However much the actual 
sum was it does not seem to have prevented some of the commanders from deserting 
Taj al-Mulk for Berk-Yaruk at the battle of Burujird Qanuary 17, 1093). Victorious, 
Berk-Yaruk pursued Tiirkan Khatun's remaining forces, which appear to have fled 
without Taj al-Mulk, and besieged Isfahan. On the advice of her Commander-in-Chief 
Uner, Bilge Beg and Majd al-Mulk, Tiirkan Khatun is said to have offered Berk-Yaruk 
500,000 dinars from the deceased sultan's inheritance to lift the siege. Apparently Berk-
Yaruk accepted, ceding Isfahan and Fars to her in the process. During the siege Taj al-
Mulk was captured and brought to Berk-Yaruk who offered him the vizierate. Although 
Taj al-Mulk is said to have gifted 200,000 dinars and valuables to the Nizamiyya, he was 
lynched for the deceased vizier's assassination on the instigation of Nizam al-Mulk's 
regent, Osman (February 1 093). In the meantime Tiirkan Khatun appears to have 
approached Yakuti's son Ismacil in Azarbayjan. Having accepted her offer of marriage, 
Ismacil gathered his Ti.irkmen forces and advanced on Berk-Yaruk with the inclusion of 
Sav-Tekin and also Kiir-Boga, whom Tiirkan Khatun had sent in support. However, he 
was defeated when his commander Yelberd and others changed sides and withdrew to 
Isfahan (February 1093) [Ozaydm, 2001:18-22 & 2000:405; also Koymen, 1963:73 & 
1966:25, Kitap<;t, 1994:172-4, Turan, 1965:177 & Zettersteen, IA Vol. 2:556ffj. 
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Tutu~ was en route to Baghdad to refresh his allegiance to Sultan Malik-Shah when he 
learnt of his brother's death. After the death of Silleyman-Shah, Tutu~ is thought to 
have been reluctant to appear at court in case he was punished. Having hurried back to 
Damascus he sent word to the governors of Aleppo, Antakya and Urfa, namely 
Aksungur, Yagt-Styan and Bazan, who accepted to join him. Thus strengthened, Tutu~ 
took Rahba (February 1093), then Raqqa and Habur. When he advanced on Nisibin, 
however, he met with resistance. On taking the city by force, Tutu~ is said to have had 
twenty Arab commanders and two thousand people killed, including those who had 
sought refuge in the mosques (March 1 093). From Nisi bin Tutu~ next advanced on 
Mosul where the U qailid Ibn Quraysh had been reinstated. On her return to Isfahan, 
Tiirkan Khatun appears to have released him, possibly to gain an ally against Tutu~. Ibn 
Quraysh and his uncle were killed in a bloody battle outside the city even though they 
apparendy out numbered Tutu~ three to one (April 2, 1 093). After this Tutu~ asked 
Caliph al-Muqtadi to have the khutba read in his name but he refused, pointing out that 
he needed to gain the allegiance of the remaining Seljukids and have control of the 
treasury in Isfahan. Tutu~ advanced on south-eastern Anatolia, apparendy to prevent 
the Marwanids from gaining control of their former domains. Diyarbakir and its 
environs were assigned to Y maloglu Ibrahim, Bidis and its environs to Dilma~oglu 
Dogan-Arslan, Hisn Kayfa and its environs to Ktztl-Arslan. From here Tutu~ is thought 
to have continued north into Azarbayjan and then Tabriz. Hearing of Tutu~'s arrival, 
Berk-Yaruk is said to have advanced as far as Rayy. When Aksungur persuaded Bazan to 
defect, Tutu~ withdrew to Diyarbakt.r then Antakya [Sevim, 1965:104-112 & Ozaydm, 
2001:30-6 & 2000:406; also Koymen, 1963:74-5, Kitap~, 1994:167 & Siimer, 1965:20-1]. 
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Although Ismacil's name was read after Mahmud's in the Friday khutba and coins were 
struck with both their names, Ismacil does not seem to have been popular with the 
Commander-in-Chief Uner who is thought to have felt threatened. Consequendy, 
Ismacil appears to have defected to Berk-Yaruk's camp where he was strangled or 
possibly even beheaded by Aksungur and Bozan among others (August-September, 
1093) [Ozaydm, 2001:22; Koymen, 1963:74; Kitap<;t, 1994:174-5]. After this Berk-Yaruk 
seems to have decided to accompany both governors general on his journey to Baghdad 
(October 1 093). Possibly this is why Tutu~ withdrew from Antakya to Damascus 
(December 1 093). From here Tutu~ seems to have plotted with his brother Te~ and 
his son Ahmad who were with Berk-Yaruk. As a result, Berk-Yaruk, who had been 
declared sultan (February 3, 1 094), had his uncle Teki~ strangled with his own bowstring 
(March 1094) [Ozaydm, 2001:51]. Having prepared his forces and married his eldest son 
Ridwan to Yagt-Styan's daughter, Tutu~ advanced against Aksungur with the aid of Yagt.-
Styan (March-April 1094). When Aksungur asked for help, Sultan Berk-Yaruk sent Kiir-
Boga f!bid. 36; Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 6:1084ffj, originally one of Aksungur's mamluks 
[Ozaydm, 2000:422], as well as a force of 2,500 Tiirkmen under Abukoglu Yusuf, the 
military governor of Rahba, ordering Bozan to join Aksungur. The mamluk contingent, 
however, appears to have been quite small since with the addition of local forces from 
the Banu Kilab and still others from Dailam and Khurasan, Aksungur is said to have 
fielded at most 6,000 men. Of similar magnitude, Tutu~'s forces are thought to have 
consisted mainly of Arabs setded in northern Syria. Although worried that his Arab 
contingents might desert in mid-batde, Aksungur is said to have attacked without 
waiting for Bozan and Kur-Boga who were unable to cross the irrigation canal near Tel 
Sultan, 35 km from Aleppo. Instead Abukoglu Yusuf and the Tiirkmen defected and 
Aksungur was captured (May 27, 1 094), forcing Bozan and Kiir-Boga to seek refuge in 
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Aleppo. Tutu~ is said to have had Aksungur and fourteen other commanders beheaded. 
Notified of the defeat, Sultan Berk-Yaruk assured Bozan and Kfu:-Boga tha,t help was 
on the way. When Tutu~ besieged Aleppo, however, some of the soldiery opened the 
gates (May 29, 1 094). Tutu~ executed Bozan but on Oner's intervention sufficed to 
imprison his son-in-law Kiir-Boga and Kiir-Boga's brother Altun-Ta~. Advancing on 
Urfa, Tutu~ is said to have gained access by parading Bozan's head on a spear [Sevim, 
1965:112-6; Ozaydm, 2001:37-40 & 2000:406-7]. 
After Ismacil's demise, Tiirkan Khatun approached Tutu~ with an offer of marriage, 
which he seems to have agreed to. Tutu~ now advanced on Azarbayjan instead of Mosul 
where Sultan Berk-Yaruk is thought to have been. Although Tiirkan Khatun set off 
from Isfahan, once Tutu~ had re-asserted his authority in Azarbayjan and began his 
advance on Hamadan, she was taken ill (poisoned?) and had to return. Tfu:kan Khatun 
died soon afterwards (September 1094), most of her forces joining Tutu~ as planned. 
Encouraged, Tutu~ is said to have dispatched Abukoglu Yusuf to Baghdad with orders 
to have the khutba read in his name. Meanwhile, Abukoglu Yusuf's brother Yakup 
appears to have come upon Sultan Berk-Yaruk and defeated his 1,000-strong force. On 
receiving news of this Caliph al-Mustazhir (r.1094-1118) had the khutba read in Tutu~'s 
name (October to November 1094). Although Berk-Yaruk was able to withdraw toward 
Isfahan with his atabeg Giimii~-Tekin, Porsuk and a few loyal commanders, he was not 
allowed in. When fmally he did negotiate entry, he was tricked by Uner and imprisoned. 
Mahmud caught smallpox and died before the sultan could be blinded (October 1094). 
Released, Sultan Berk-Yaruk is said to have also fallen ill but recovered [Sevim, 
1965:116-9; Ozaydm, 2001:40-1]. 
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Tutu~ was unable to take Hamadan. However, when its commander Inan~ yabgu gave 
pursuit and began to plunder his baggage train, Tutu~ defeated him and took .the city. In 
Hamadan Tutu~ seems to have come across Nizam al-Mulk's son Fakhr al-Mulk, who 
had been ousted from Balkh by the sultan's great-uncle, Arslan-Argun. Fakhr al-Mulk 
had been en route to Isfahan to see his elder brother Muayyad al-Mulk when he had 
been attacked by one of Mahmud's commanders and forced to flee. At first Tutu~ is 
said to have wanted him executed, but on Ya@-S1yan's instigation instead appointed him 
vizier to ensure the local populace's good will. While in Hamadan, on hearing that the 
young sultan was ill with smallpox, Tutu~ is said to have sent word for the commanders 
in Isfahan to join him. They seem have stalled until certain of the sultan's recovery and 
then to have refused. On his vizier Izz al-Mulk's death, Berk-Yaruk now appointed Izz 
al-Mulk's brother Muayyad al-Mulk vizier. Muayyad al-Mulk sent word throughout the 
empire for commanders to join the sultan (December 1 094). As a result, Sultan Berk-
Yaruk appears to have gathered a 30,000-strong force that included the commander of 
Hamadan, Inan~ yabgu, who is thought to have defected while on a supply mission. 
Tutu~ withdrew from Hamadan, taking Rayy Ganuary-February 1095). Possibly equally 
mistrustful of its inhabitants, Tutu~ fmally seems to have accepted battle outside the city 
(February 26, 1095). Seeing Malik-Shah's banners on the battlefield, many of his 15,000-
strong army either deserted or refrained from fighting. As for Tutu~, one of Aksungur's 
commanders, Sungurca beheaded him on the field [Sevim, 1965:119-21; Ozaydm, 
2001:41-4; Koymen, 1963:76 & 78]. 
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5.2 Coming of the Crusaders 
Siileyman-Shah's son Kthc; Arslan and his younger brother Davud are said to have left 
for Anatolia on Sultan Malik-Shah's death, with a large group of Tiirkmen referred to as 
the Yabgulu. On their arrival in Iznik, the deceased al-Kasim's brother al-Gazi handed 
over the city to Kthc; Arslan (1092). Not only did Byzantine forces beleaguer the city, 
but also his dominion extended only as far as Konya. <:;aka Beg held the Aegean coast 
and the Dani~mends Ankara, Kayseri and Sivas, eastern Anatolia being divided among 
various Tiirkmen begs of whom only those appointed by Tutu~ are known for certain 
[Turan, 1965:95-7; also Cahen, 1989:97 & Siimer, 1990:2]. 
In view of Byzantine advances along the Sea of Marmara, Kthc; Arslan's ft.rst move 
appears to have been the establishment of good relations with <:;aka Beg, whose 
daughter he married. As noted (see above, 4.11), although <:;aka Beg's attempts to ally 
with the Pec;enek in Thrace and thus take Istanbul had fallen through, he does not 
appear to have given up. Possibly he hoped to renew his onslaught with Kthc; Arslan's 
help. However, Kthc; Arslan's forces, which had been sent to halt a fresh Byzantine 
advance, were defeated and their commander captured. Whether or not aware of this, 
when <:;aka Beg advanced north along the Dardanelles and besieged Abydos, Emperor 
Alexius sent an offer of peace to Kille; Arslan, warning that his father-in-law meant to 
usurp his domains, not Byzantium. Although Kille; Arslan is thought to have taken heed, 
rather than being killed by his son-in-law, <:;aka Beg most likely withdrew when Kille; 
Arslan advanced [Ibid. 93-8; also Kafesoglu, 1953:112]. 
After this Kthc; Arslan appears to have turned his attention on Malatya, which was being 
ruled by the Armenian Gabriel. He is thought to have laid siege to the city to pre-empt 
a similar move by the Dani~mends (1095/6). While thus occupied Kille; Arslan learnt of 
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the arrival of the Crusaders (August/September 1 096). Possibly because his brother 
Davud attacked and killed some 60,000 pilgrims outside Izmit, K.t.h~ Arslan seems to 
have taken his time. However, on arrival he found Iznik besieged by the Byzantines and 
the main body of Crusader knights (May 1 097). He was forced to retire with heavy 
losses and the city surrendered to the Byzantines, who were under the command of the 
Pe~enek Tadik Qune 26, 1097). Having asked help from the Dani~mend Giimii~-Tekin, 
Hasan Beg (the ruler of Kayseri) and other Tiirkmen begs, K.t.h~ Arslan rejoined battle 
with the Crusader knights outside Eski~ehir but was unable to defeat them and once 
again had to withdraw with heavy losses when they were relieved Quly 4, 1097). 
Although strengthened by the arrival of help, K.t.hc; Arslan was defeated one last time 
outside Konya (September 1 097). After this he seems to have avoided shock combat 
against superior numbers and body armour, not to mention the knights' long lances. 
Hasan Beg, however, was manoeuvred against the mountain that now bears his name 
near Kayseri and annihilated. As a result, the Byzantines were able to re-establish their 
authority in the towns and cities along the Aegean, Mediterranean and Black Sea, in 
keeping with their agreement with the Crusaders (1 097). The consequence of this being 
that the Tiirkmen were pushed back into the Anatolian steppe [Ibid. 98-1 04; also Sevim, 
1989:94-8 & Koymen, 1963:288-9]. 
Meanwhile, in south-eastern Anatolia, Syria and Palestine, where the Crusaders were 
headed, Tutu~'s sons were trying to establish themselves. Ridwan, who was the elder, 
had been en route to Rayy with his atabeg, local Arab commanders and Aksungur's 
former soldiery when he learnt of his father's demise. Presumed to have feared for his 
life, Ridwan retired to Aleppo where he appears to have negotiated the release of Kiir-
Boga and his brother Altun-Ta~, in return for his younger brother Dukak, Dukak's 
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atabeg, Yagt-Styan and Abukoglu Yusuf, who all had been with Tutu~, joined him from 
captivity (April/May & August 1095). With their help Ridwan took Urfa after.Artukoglu 
(Artuk's son) Sokmen proclaimed his allegiance in Suru<;. Having been given the inner 
citadel of Urfa, Yagt-Styan then began to plot against Ridwan with Tutu~'s former 
regent, al-Kasim, who had been imprisoned by Ridwan's atabeg, his vizier and 
commander-in-chief, Hussein. When Hussein was alerted to their plans and returned to 
Aleppo, Yagt-Styan and al-Kasim withdrew to Antakya with Abukoglu Yusuf (1095/6) 
[Sevim, 1989:83-6; Ozaydm, 2000:407 -8]. 
On Kiir-Boga and Altun-Tafs release, soldiery in the region- presumably Aksungur's, 
since originally Kiir-Boga had been his mamluk- are said to have joined the brothers 
who took Harran, immediately southeast of Urfa. They then laid siege to Nisibin 
further east, which along with Mosul still belonged to the Uqailids. The city fell after 
forty days. The brothers now besieged Mosul to the south. The U qailid Ali asked help 
of <::okiirmii~, but Altun-Ta~ defeated him. Despite this Kiir-Boga seems to have won 
over c,;okiirmii~ who joined the siege. After nine months Mosul also fell (October-
November 1096), its ruler fleeing to Hilla. Prevented from sacking the city, Altun-Ta~ is 
said to have detained the notables to confiscate their wealth. As a result, Kiir-Boga had 
his brother executed. After this Kiir-Boga also took Rahba to the south-western, having 
the khutba in his new iqtac read in Sultan Berk-Yaruk's name [Ozaydm, 2000:408-10]. 
While Kiir-Boga was busy removing the last of the Uqailids, Dukak seems to have 
secredy gone to Damascus on invitation from its commander, Sav-Tekin. Ridwan 
besieged Damascus while Dukak was on campaign but was unsuccessful because of 
Artukoglu Sokmen's departure for Jerusalem, which had been granted to him and his 
brother ll-Gazi by Tutu~. Although joined by ll-Gazi, who had been released by Dukak, 
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Sokmen was unable to defend Jerusalem against the Fatimids (August 1 096). Undaunted 
by Sultan Berk-Yaruk's acceptance of Dukak as his vassal, Ridwan seems to have 
advanced on Damascus only to fmd that Dukak had been joined by Yagt-Styan. 
Presumably on Sokmen's instigation, Ridwan appears to have changed plans and moved 
instead on Jerusalem. Dukak is thought to have taken advantage and started to raid the 
environs of Aleppo Qanuary /February 1 097), but his main advance seems to have been 
met by Ridwan and Sokmen who defeated him and Yagt-Styan (March 22, 1097). As a 
result, Dukak accepted to have the khutba read in his brother's name [Sevim, 1989:86-
90; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 6:1084f~. 
Possibly disturbed by the influence the Shtites had over Ridwan, Hussein is said to have 
left Aleppo for his iqtac in Rims with his wife - Ridwan's mother - and his soldiery. 
Although soon afterwards Yagt-Styan took over Hussein's official functions, the Alawis 
seem to have retained their grip. Approached by the Fatimids with a promise of 
fmancial and military aid, Ridwan agreed to have the khutba read in Caliph Mustacli's 
name. This brought him under pressure not only from Sultan Berk-Yaruk, the Abbasid 
caliph and others, but also from Yagt-Styan and Sokmen. Consequently, Ridwan 
retracted, sending letters of apology (September 1097). As he was preparing for another 
campaign against Dukak and Hussein with the help of Yagt-Styan and Sokmen, news 
arrived of the Crusaders' approach [Ibid 90-3]. 
Returning to Antakya before the Crusaders' arrival (October 20, 1097), Yagt-Styan is 
said to have evacuated most of its Christian inhabitants, sending his son Shams al-
Dawla to ask help of Sultan Berk-Yaruk, Ridwan, Dukak, Hussein and the Banu Kilab. 
His younger son Muhammad was dispatched to ask help of Kiir-Boga in Mosul, as well 
as Artukoglu Sokmen, Arslan-Ta~, ll-Gazi Silleyman and other Tiirkmen begs in south-
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eastern Anatolia. Dukak, his atabeg Tug-Tekin and Hussein appear to have responded 
immediately. While en route to Antakya with Shams al-Dawla, however, they came 
across Bohemond and Robert of Flanders who were scouring the countryside for 
provisions (December 31, 1 097). Badly defeated, the Seljuks withdrew to Ramah near 
Hims from where Shams al-Dawla appears to have journeyed north to Aleppo to seek 
help from Ridwan, who put a local contingent with Sokmen and his Tiirkmen under his 
command (February 1 098). Before they could reach Antakya, however, they were also 
attacked by the Crusaders and withdrew to Harim from where Ridwan's soldiery is said 
to have returned (March 1098). When Shams al-Dawla and Artukoglu Sokmen also 
departed, to join Kiir-Boga, the Armenians massacred the town's Muslim inhabitants 
and took control [Ozaydm, 2000:411-2]. 
In the meantime Godfrey of Bouillon took Urfa from the Armenians (March 10, 1098). 
Because a Crusader presence there is thought to have threatened his right flank, Kiir-
Boga seems to have insisted on trying to take back the city. After a futile three-week 
siege (May 4-25, 1098), however, he is said to have relented and fmally taken command 
of the forces gathered at Marj Dabik, north of Aleppo. These consisted of Dukak, his 
atabeg Tug-Tekin, Ridwan's atabeg Hussein, Arslan-Ta~ and Artukoglu Sokmen and 
their soldieries. When the pilgrims outside Antakya heard of this, many panicked and 
left, but Bohemond persuaded the Crusader knights who included Godfrey of Bouillon 
from Urfa to continue the siege (May 29, 1098). Possibly Bohemond was encouraged by 
his secret negotiations with an Armenian armourer, Firuz, whose stocks had been 
confiscated by Yagt-S1yan as punishment for hoarding. Having come to an agreement 
with Bohemond through his son, Firuz is said to have allowed the Crusaders to scale 
and thus enter the tower he was charged with defending Gune 2-3, 1098). Caught totally 
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unawares, Yagt-Styan seems to have thought that the citadel had fallen and left the city 
with thirty horsemen. When he learnt that his son Shams al-Dawla still held the citadel, 
however, he became so distraught that he repeatedly fell off his horse and was left to 
die by his companions. An Armenian wood-cutter is said to have beheaded him and 
received a bounty from Bohemond [Ozaydrn, 2000:413-5; also Koymen, 1963:290, 
Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 6:1084ff, Sevim, 1989:100-3 & Turan, 1965:179]. 
On learning that Antakya had fallen, Kiir-Boga dispatched advance units to Demir 
Koprii (al-Hadid) on the Asi River (Orontes) and also to the fortified town of Artah. 
The Crusaders defending Demir Koprii were routed Gune 5, 1 098). From captives 
taken there, Kiir-Boga learnt that the citadel had not as yet fallen. His units camped 
outside Antakya and within a few days had the city totally besieged Gune 7-10, 1098). 
Although Shams al-Dawla proclaimed his allegiance, Kiir-Boga replaced him with his 
own commander whom he charged with infiltrating the city from the citadel. Aware of 
the danger, Bohemond and Raymond are said to have hurriedly constructed a wall 
separating it from the city. This appears to have enabled Raymond of Flanders, 
Raymond of Normandy and Hugue of Vermandois to withstand a fierce attack 
launched from the citadel. As a result, Kiir-Boga is thought to have decided to starve 
the Crusaders into submission and decamped on to the plain from the mountainside 
southeast of Antakya. The knights were reduced to eating their mounts while the 
pilgrims made do with carrion and leaves. Growing desperate, the Crusaders seem to 
have sent conciliatory envoys to Dukak and Kiir-Boga while trying to persuade the 
Fatimids to open a second front. Their plight is underlined by William, Alberich and 
Lambert's flight to the port of Samandagt, which panicked the fleet into shipping 
anchor and putting out to ·sea. When William informed Alexius Comnenus that the 
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Crusaders had been defeated, the Byzantines preparing to relieve them returned to 
Istanbul, wrongly concluding that they could no longer regain parts of Syria as agreed 
[Ibid 415-6]. 
Unaware of the said knights' flight, Kiir-Boga appears to have been busy with his own 
affairs. For reasons best known to himself, he is said to have received Ridwan's envoy 
Abukoglu Yakup, whose brother Yusuf had been killed on Hussein's orders. This is 
thought to have made Hussein and also Dukak suspicious, weakening their allegiance to 
Kiir-Boga, who was doubdess in overall command despite Dukak's presence. Abukoglu 
Yakup seems to have also sown dissent among the Banu Mirdas Wassab's soldiery, such 
that some of the Tiirkmen put under his command left. Confident that they would 
surrender from hunger, Kiir-Boga is said to have refused an offer by Peter the Hermit 
and Herluin to hand back Antakya in return for safe conduct home Oune 27, 1098). The 
following day he allowed the Crusaders to leave the city in small parties, refusing to pick 
them off so as to annihilate their complete number. When the Crusaders attacked, 
however, Dukak, who is said to have received news that the Fatimids were advancing on 
Damascus, seems to have refused batde and departed. Consequendy, Artukoglu Sokmen 
and Hussein, who had been hidden in ambush, are thought to have been forced to 
withdraw with Kiir-Boga, who returned to Mosul via Aleppo. The Muslim irregulars 
who had volunteered were thus left behind to face the Crusaders who initially thought 
Kiir-Boga was feigning retreat Oune 28, 1098). Kiir-Boga's commander in the citadel 
surrendered and having converted to Christianity joined Bohemond [Ibid. 416-8; also 
Sevim 88 & 103-6, Koymen, 1963:291, Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 6:1 084ff and Turan, 
1965:179]. 
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5.3 The Rise of Muhammad Tapar 
Earlier, the sultan's great uncle Arslan-Argun, who had been assigned Khwa:razm by 
Sultan Alp-Arslan, had tried to occupy Nishapur, but the inhabitants had resisted. 
Nevertheless, after having taken Balkh from Fakhr al-Mulk with the help of the 
commanders for Marv, Kavdan (or Kodan) and Yaruk-Ta~, Arslan-Argun had gained 
not only Nishapur but also Tirmiz. Although effectively now in control of Khurasan as 
well as Khwarazm, Arslan-Argun is thought to have made it clear through Muayyad al-
Mulk that he did not want to challenge Sultan Berk-Yaruk. Nevertheless, Muayyad al-
Mulk seems to have persuaded the young sultan to send his uncle Bori-Pars, who is 
known to have advanced into Khurasan and defeated Arslan-Argun with his vizier, 
Muayyad al-Mulk's brother 'Imad al-Mulk, who was supported by the commanders 
Mascud and Altun-Ta~ (early 1095). Arslan-Argun seems to have withdrawn to Balkh 
rather than Khwarazm while Bori-Pars returned to Herat, which he had been assigned 
by Sultan Malik-Shah [Ozaydm, 2001 :47-51; also Koymen, 1963:77-8 and Turan, 
1965:178]. 
On defeating Tutu~ Sultan Berk-Yaruk had sent for his mother Zubaydah Khatun, 
despite Muayyad al-Mulk who having gained the support of a group of commanders 
had advised him not to do so. Majd al-Mulk Abu'l-Fadl al-Balasani, a member of the 
diwan who accompanied her on her journey is thought to have influenced her 
unfavourably by reporting on Muayyad al-Mulk. Fakhr al-Mulk, who had fallen out with 
his brother over their father's jewellery, was thus encouraged to send Sultan Berk-Yaruk 
a considerable sum of money with a request for the office of vizier. Muayyad al-Mulk 
was imprisoned and Fakhr al-Mulk appointed in his stead (1095). Nevertheless, Majd al-
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Mulk is said to have been able to use his position to undermine Fakhr al-Mulk's 
authority to such an extent as to render his appointment meaningless [Ibid. 12-13]. 
Possibly encouraged by Muayyad al-Mulk's demise, Arslan-Argun retook Marv with a 
Tiirkmen force. After his commander Ahur had the sultan's commander Mascud and his 
son killed by pretending to desert, Arslan-Argun captured Bori-Pars and imprisoned 
him in Tirmiz where he later had him strangled with his own bowstring. Bori-Pars' 
vizier Imad al-Mulk was also killed after having 300,000 dinars confiscated. As a result 
Sultan Berk-Yaruk is known to have taken his brother San car to Khurasan prior to 
appointing him malik. In the meantime Arslan-Argun seems to have been strangled by 
one of his slaves (February 3, 1097). As a result Sultan Berk-Yaruk is said to have 
pardoned his son Alp-Argun, appointing him malik. of an undisclosed place, and 
ordered the commander for Khwarazm to join him in Iraq al-Ajam. Ekinci appears to 
have left his 1 0,000-strong soldiery and instead gone to Marv, where he was killed while 
inebriated by the deceased Arslan-Argun's commanders, Kavdan and Yaruk-Ta~. 
Afterwards they appear to have gone to Khwarazm and claimed it, saying they had been 
sent by Sultan Berk-Yaruk. When the sultan sent the commander Habashi, Yaruk-Ta~ 
attacked without waiting for Kavdan and captured him. On receiving news of this 
Kavdan's soldiery appear to have rebelled and plundered his treasury. Kavdan is said to 
have fled to Bokhara where he was imprisoned for a time before being released. Having 
apparendy then joined San car in Balkh, he died soon afterwards. At the time Sancar was 
busy putting down a rebellion by c;ago. b. Siileyman's son Muhammad, who was married 
to one of Arslan-Argun's daughters. Muhammad whom Sancar had blinded on his 
capture appears to have been supported by the Ghaznavid Sultan Ibrahim (1 059-99), in 
whose name he is said to have been attempting to gain control of Khurasan [Ibid. 51-3]. 
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Before leaving for Khurasan with Sancar to deal with Arslan-Argun, Sultan Berk-Yaruk 
appears to have appointed Oner governor of Fars. After the siege of Isfahan Tiirkan 
Khatun had dispatched Oner to take the provmce from the Seljuks of Kirman 
Qune/July 1094), but he had been routed by Turan-Shah who subsequently died. As a 
result the Shebankarids appear to have to become re-established in Fars. Nevertheless, 
when Oner reappeared at the head of his forces they are said to have asked help from 
Turan-Shah's successor, Iran-Shah (1097-1101). Once again Oner was defeated and 
retired to Isfahan (1 098-99). Here he seems to have come under the influence of 
Muayyad al-Mulk. On having gained his freedom, Muayyad al-Mulk had sought refuge 
with Sancar's uterine brother Muhammad Tapar in Ganja. Muhammad Tapar had been 
in Baghdad when Sultan Malik-Shah died. From there he had been taken to Isfahan by 
Tiirkan Khatun, but had escaped during its siege by Berk-Yaruk who took him to 
Baghdad. On having been declared sultan, Berk-Yaruk had assigned him Ganja with an 
atabeg (November 1093 - February 1094). Having had his atabeg killed, Muhammad 
Tapar seems to have been in the process of trying to include Arran when Muayyad al-
Mulk joined him as vizier. Whatever Muhammad Tapar's ultimate ambitions were, it is 
Muayyad al-Mulk who is credited with fanning the flames of contention with the sultan. 
In doing so he is thought to have used his intimate knowledge of the parlous state of 
affairs in which Sultan Berk-Yaruk found himself f.!bid. 11-13; also Koymen, 1963:79]. 
The sultan's problems seem to have stemmed from his commander Porsuk's 
assassination by batinis, which his sons Zengi and Ak-Bori are said to have ascribed to 
al-Balasani. As Muhammad Tapar advanced from Ganja after having omitted Sultan 
Berk-Yaruk's name from the khutba, Muayyad al-Mulk's men spread word that 
commander Porsuk indeed had been assassinated by al-Balasani. At the same time Oner 
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advanced from Isfahan with a 1 0,000-strong force, threatening Sultan Berk-Yaruk that 
unless al-Balasani was handed over he would rebel. Although he was killed en. route by 
three of his soldiers, thought to have been Turks from Khwarazm, the commanders 
Inan<; yabgu, Bilge Beg and Toga-Yiirek sent word to Porsuk's commanders to petition 
the sultan to hand over al-Balasani in return for their allegiance. Sultan Berk-Yaruk is 
said to have received their ultimatum near Ramadan. Apparently the sultan refused, but 
when al-Balas ani was nevertheless killed he seems to have left for Rayy with 200 
horsemen. The rest of his army then joined Muhammad Tapar who had arrived nearby. 
In Rayy, Nizam al-Mulk's and Anu~-Tekin's sons, Mansur and Ymal, joined the sultan 
along with his mother Zubaydah Khatun [Ibid. 14, 23, 54-5 & 2001:57-8; also Koymen, 
1963:80]. 
Pursued by Muhammad Tapar, who had been strengthened with the inclusion of his 
soldiery, Sultan Berk-Yaruk made for Isfahan where the inhabitants are said to have 
refused him entry. Nevertheless, he seems to have left his mother behind in the city. 
After Muhammad Tapar entered Rayy (September 20, 1099), Muayyad al-Mulk appears 
to have gone on to Isfahan where he had Zubaydah Khatun imprisoned, forcing her to 
sign a promissory note for 5,000 dinars. Although counselled that her death might 
provoke the soldiery, he then had her brought back to Rayy and strangled. The 
commander of Baghdad, Gawhar-A'in, and still others such as c;okiirmii~ in Jazira now 
joined Muhammad Tapar in Qumm. As a result when Muhammad Tapar sent Gawhar-
A'in with a request for the khutba to be read his name, the caliph complied (November 
4, 1099). Meanwhile Berk-Yaruk appears to have plundered Wasit with Anu~-Tekin's son 
Ymal before advancing on Baghdad with the ruler of Hilla, Sayf al-Dawla Sadaqa. On 
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route he is said to have survived an assassination attempt by the commander for Isfahan 
[Ibid. 15-6 & 2001 :58-60; also Koymen, 1963:80-1]. 
Hearing of Berk-Yaruk's approach, Gawhar-A'in, Artukoglu Il-Gazi and others sent 
word for Sultan Tapar and Muayyad al-Mulk to join them in Baghdad. Instead the sultan 
appears to have dispatched Kiir-Boga and <::okiirmii~, but the latter excused himself 
claiming pressing problems at home in Jazira. Upon this, the commanders sent word to 
Berk-Yaruk that they would not oppose him. Apparently isolated, Gawhar-A'in and 
Kiir-Boga likewise seem to have proclaimed their allegiances to Berk-Yaruk, returning 
to Baghdad with him Qanuary 2, 1100). The city's inhabitants are said to have welcomed 
Sultan Berk-Yaruk who had succeeded in having the khutba read in his name a few days 
earlier (December 31, 1 099). When the caliph sent his vizier to greet him, however, he 
was arrested in lieu of taxes owed by his father from Diyarbalur and Jazira. On hearing 
of his predicament, the caliph is said to have sent a letter threatening that the sultan 
should not be fooled by his inaction to date given his previous mistakes. The 
confrontation was resolved when the vizier promised to pay 160,000 dinars [Ibid. 16-8 & 
2001:60-1; also Koymen, 1963:82]. Since the caliph appears to have had estates near 
Wasit, the 'mistakes' referred to may have been their plunder. 
After having wintered in Baghdad, where he replaced Fakhr al-Mulk with al-Mahasin 
Dihistani, Sultan Berk-Yaruk advanced on Muhammad Tapar apparently with the 
support of numerous Tiirkmen (April 17, 11 00). During the battle that ensued near 
Hamadan (May 15, 11 00), Gawhar-A'in is said to have attacked Muhammad Tapar's left 
flank, which consisted of the Nizamiyya under the command of Muayyad al-Mulk, 
forcing the vizier to retreat. When Inane; yabgu countered by attacking Sultan Berk-
Yaruk and Kiir-Boga on his left, however, Gawhar-A'in was unable to rally his troops 
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who were busy plundering and the sultan was defeated, having to flee with only fifty 
cavalry. Captured on the battlefield, the sultan's vizier was released and sent to Baghdad 
to arrange for the khutba to be read in Muhammad Tapar's name, which was effected 
(May 25, 11 00). Sultan Tapar also asked for the caliph's vizier to be dismissed, which 
seems to have been accepted after some time. The vizier and his brothers were 
imprisoned and 250,000 dinars confiscated Quly 10 to August 8, 1100) f!bid. 18-20 & 
2001 :62-4; also Koymen, 1963:82-3]. 
Meanwhile Berk-Yaruk is said to have approached the commander for Tabaristan and 
Jurjan, Habashi, who had fallen foul of Sancar. Although said to have been willing, 
Habashi was unable to join Berk-Yaruk who instead came to his aid against Sancar with 
a thousand horsemen. Interestingly, Habashi's 20,000 cavalry seem to have been 
supported by 5,000 Ismacili foot soldiers. Whatever the case, when Berk-Yaruk was 
defeated Habashi was handed over by the Tiirkmen in a nearby village. Having escaped 
to Damghan with seventeen horsemen, Berk-Yaruk seems to have been joined by c;avh 
Sakavu and other commanders. As a result, he is thought to have gathered a 3,000-
strong force with which he advanced on Isfahan. When Sultan Tapar arrived there 
before him, however, Berk-Yaruk approached Porsuk's sons, Zengi and Il-Begi for help. 
After a couple of months Berk-Yaruk appears in Hamadan, where Ayaz who had 
become commander upon Inan<; yabgu's assassination also joined him. Ayaz seems to 
have been of the opinion that Inan<; yabgu had been poisoned by Muayyad al-Mulk. 
Seeing the balance of power shift in favour of Berk-Yaruk, Sultan Tapar is said to have 
advanced on Hamadan where Berk-Yaruk received twelve consignments of weaponry 
on the morning before the battle, eight of which were shields for his foot soldiers. Out-
numbered, Sultan Tapar lost and Muayyad al-Mulk was taken prisoner by Majd al-Mulk's 
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I. 
soldiery (April 5, 1101). Berk-Yaruk is said to have personally killed Muayyad al-Mulk 
despite an offer of 100,000 dinars for the vizierate [Ibid. 20-3 & 2001:64-7; also 
Koymen, 1963:83-4]. 
As Koymen points out, in contrast to Berk-Yaruk who appears to have been left to fend 
for himself on more than one occasion, Sultan Tapar appears to have been able to 
withdraw from the said battle with his personal guard of three hundred and two 
commanders with three thousand soldiery. Moreover, his brother Sancar now joined 
Sultan Tapar in Damghan. When Sancar's soldiery started to pillage the city, the 
inhabitants took refuge in the nearby citadel of Girdkuh. Sultan Tapar and Sancar then 
journeyed to Rayy where the Nizamiyya joined them. For his part Berk-Yaruk 
apparently attracted a massive following after his victory, said to have been 100,000-
strong, which could not be supplied en route to Rayy. Whether or not this was the 
reason, many of the commanders now left Berk-Yaruk under various pretexts while 
Kiir-Boga was dispatched with a 10,000-strong force to put down Ismacil b. Yakuti's son 
Mawdud's rebellion [Ibid. 23-6 & 2001:67-8; also Koymen, 1963:85-8]. 
Notified of the situation, Sultan Tapar and Sancar are said to have advanced on 
Ramadan. Porsuk's sons refused to help Berk-Yaruk and forced him to return to 
Baghdad where the caliph once again had the khutba read in his name. In Baghdad 
Sultan Berk-Yaruk appears to have been joined by the commander for Ramadan, Ayaz, 
who had been relieved of his iqtac by Muhammad Tapar despite a proclamation of 
allegiance. Sultan Berk-Yaruk appears to have been so short of money as to have to ask 
the caliph for financial support. Despite an infusion of 50,000 dinars, however, the 
sultan's soldiery plundered Baghdad. When the sultan asked Sadaqa for one million 
dinars left from the Public Treasury, not to mention back taxes, Sadaqa added Kufa to 
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his dominion and had the khutba read in Muhammad Tapar's name. As Muhammad 
Tapar and Sancar approached Baghdad with the inclusion of Artukoglu Il-Gazi, Sultan 
Berk-Yaruk became ill. He was evacuated on a litter but fell into a coma in Ramla, on 
the western shore of the Tigris where Muhammad Tapar's advance units caught up with 
him. They are said to have shouted across the lines that he and his soldiery were batinis, 
a rumour that had been circulating in Baghdad. After withdrawing from Ramla, the 
sultan's soldiery seems to have continued pillaging all the way to Wasit [Ibid. & 2001:68-
71]. 
Although Muhammad Tapar and Sancar arrived in Baghdad and the khutba was 
changed yet again, they left soon afterwards due to Karakhanid incursions into 
Khurasan (October 23 to November 11, 1101). Koymen was of the opinion that the 
sultan did not as yet have commanders whose allegiance he could trust in the same way 
that San car could. Whatever the case, having recovered from his illness, Berk-Yaruk 
seems to have occupied some of the caliph's estates around Wasit and begun to speak ill 
of him, so that the caliph recalled Sultan Tapar and offered to join in the fight against 
Berk-Yaruk, which was turned down. Coming to Baghdad long enough to appoint a 
new mayor and ll-Gazi as commander, the sultan is said to have rejoined his troops. 
When Sultan Tapar and Berk-Yaruk met, however, the severe cold prevented battle. 
Next day their soldiery embraced on the field- which according to Koymen indicates 
that on this occasion all the soldiery was Turkic - while the sultan's commanders 
brokered a treaty with Berk-Yaruk's vizier (December 27, 1101). According to this 
treaty, Muhammad Tapar accepted Berk-Yaruk as sultan and as malik of Azarbayjan, 
Ganja, Diyarbalur, Jazira and Mosul, also accepted to pay 1.3 million dinars per annum 
in tax. In return, Sultan Berk-Yaruk accepted to help Muhammad Tapar whenever 
149 
necessary. Sultan Berk-Yaruk also accepted Sancar as malik in Khw:asan [Ibid. 27-8 & 
2001 :70-3; also Koymen, 1963:88-90]. 
Angered at being forced to sign, Muhammad Tapar had his commanders Besmel 
assassinated and Ay-Tekin blinded. When the sultan's commander Ymal, who had 
joined the Ismacilis, defected along with another commander, Muhammad Tapar 
declared himself sultan in Rayy. Nevertheless, when he took the field against Sultan 
Berk-Yaruk, his soldiery dispersed without bloodshed and his treasury was plundered 
(February /March 11 02). Despite this setback, Muhammad Tapar does not appear to 
have had any problem entering Isfahan with eleven hundred cavalry and five hundred 
infantry. Once under siege, he is said to have evacuated the poor and needy but was 
unable to sustain his defence due to growing shortages. Leaving with his cavalry 
(September 25, 11 02), due to the weakened state of their mounts Muhammad Tapar 
was caught up by Ayaz and his banners confiscated. Soon afterwards, in view of the 
plight of the inhabitants and attempts by the freebooters that had gathered to scale the 
walls, Sultan Berk-Yaruk was persuaded to lift the siege of Isfahan (October 6, 1102). 
Neither Muhammad Tapar nor his commander in Baghdad, Artukoglu 11-Gazi, 
however, had given up their quest. When Sultan Berk-Yaruk sent Giimii~-Tekin al-
Kayseri as commander to Baghdad, 11-Gazi notified his brother Sokmen and then 
journeyed to Hilla to secure the aid of Sadaqa. On route Sokmen is said to have taken 
turns pillaging the town of Tekrit with its military governor, fmally setting up camp 
outside Baghdad in Ramla, where 11-Gazi joined him. Encouraged by a group of 
inhabitants, Giimii~-Tekin entered Baghdad after a forced march (December 27, 1102). 
The Artukids then decamped and once again began to pillage. However, when they 
learnt that Sadaqa was en route to Baghdad likewise pillaging, they returned to Ramla. 
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Gi.imi.i~-Tekin was forced to leave for Wasit and the khutba reverted to Muhammad 
Tapar Oanuary 23, 1103). Sokmen and Sadaqa then appear to have forced Gi.imi.i~-Tekin 
out of Wasit, too [Ibid. 28-32 & 2001 :73-7]. 
While Muhammad Tapar was besieged in Isfahan, five thousand fresh troops had set off 
from Azarbayjan under Klzoglu, who was supported by Nizam al-Mulk's son Mansur 
and Muayyad al-Mulk's son Muhammad. When they arrived in Rayy (October 5, 11 02), 
however, they learnt that Muhammad Tapar had evacuated Isfahan. Nevertheless, they 
journeyed to Hamadan where he joined them. On learning that Sultan Berk-Yaruk was 
advancing on Hamadan, Muhammad Tapar is said to have split his forces in two 
(October 15 to November 13, 1102). One column under the command of Ymal and his 
brother 'Ali returned to Rayy where they forced the khutba to be read in his name while 
confiscating the inhabitants' goods. Having thus raised 20,000 dinars, they seem to have 
left Rayy (December 11 02). Muhammad Tapar, on the other hand, seems to have 
journeyed to Ardabil on the Caspian Sea, where by his brother-in-law, the deceased 
Ismacil's son, joined him. Although Mawdud died unexpectedly Oanuary 11 03), his 
commanders proclaimed their allegiance to Muhammad Tapar who now headed back 
into Azarbayjan where Sultan Berk-Yaruk caught up \vith him, inflicting another 
bloodless defeat (February 19, 11 03). Apparently Muhammad Tapar fled to Ahlat, from 
where he journeyed to Ani, then back to Tabriz, collecting fresh troops en route. It is at 
this point that Sultan Berk-Yaruk finally offered peace though ostensibly victorious 
[Ibid. 32-3 & 2001:77-8; also Koymen, 1963:90-2]. 
In Ozayd1n's view Berk-Yaruk was not only ill, but most likely also realized that the 
commanders' endless demands could no longer be met. In other \vords, it must have 
become self-evident that more than a decade of bloodshed and the now frequent 
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pillaging were hurrying the collapse of Scljukid dominion. On the other hand, on 
C)zaydtn's admission, the khutba was being read either in Muhammad Tapar's name or 
in conjunction with Berk-Yaruk's or Sancar's in all but Iraq al-Ajam. Whatever their 
immediate reasons, after some negotiation Oanuary 2-31, 11 04), the half-brothers 
effectively split the Great Seljuk Etnpire between them on condition that the 
commanders and military governors could change allegiance whenever they wanted. 
Accordingly, Berk-Yaruk's name was to be excluded from the khutba in towns and cities 
in Muhammad 'T'apar's dominion, correspondence between the two being conducted 
through their respective viziers. With the exception of Jazira and Sadaqa's dominions in 
Lower Mesopotamia, Iraq al-Arab and al-Ajam were to be in Berk-Yaruk's dominion 
\vhile the remainder of the Great Seljuk Empire was to be Muhammad Tapar's. Finally, 
Muhammad Tapar was to be Great Sultan after Berk-Yaruk [Ibid. 34-5 & 2001:78-80; 
also Koymen, 1963:92]. 
Although Sultan Tapar's commanders handed over Isfahan to Great Sultan Berk-Yaruk 
who is said to have aided the sultan's men and family on their journey with 300 camels 
and 120 mules, the governor of Mosul, <:;oki.irmi.i~, refused. After his soldiery and 
family had joined him in Tabriz, Sultan Tapar advanced on Mosul (October 23 to 
November 20, 1104). Despite the appropriate documentation, <:;oki.irmu~ claimed that 
subsequently Great Sultan Berk-Yaruk had ordered him not to hand over the city. While 
the siege was in progress, Sultan Tapar learned of Great Sultan Berk-Yaruk's death 
Oanuary 28, 11 05), upon which <:;oki.irmi.i~ proclaimed his allegiance [Ibid. 40-1 ]. 
Great Sultan Berk-Yaruk died of tuberculosis and haemorrhoids en route to Baghdad 
(December 22, 11 04). In accordance with his wishes, the khutba was read in his five 
year old son Malik-Shah's name Oanuary 6,1105). When Sultan Tapar arrived in 
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Baghdad (February 10, 1105), Great Sultan Malik-Shah IT's atabeg, Ayaz, who had 
withdrawn to the city's outskirts, prevaricated. Against the wishes of some of his 
commanders, he finally proclaimed his allegiance and Muhammad Tapar became Great 
Sultan (February 13, 1105) [Ibid. 39 & 41-2]. 
5.4 Anatolia, Syria and Palestine 
While Sultan Berk-Yaruk and Muhammad Tapar were fighting the First Crusade 
continued to advance. After Ki.ir-Boga's failures in Urfa and Antakya, Raymond of 
Toulouse took the citadel of Ruj and subsequently Godfrey of Bouillon besieged Bara, 
which also belonged to Ridwan. When the commander of Azaz, Omar, declared his 
independence, Rid wan besieged the citadel (September 1 098). Through his French wife, 
Omar asked Godfrey for help. Although Ridwan is said to have lifted the siege when 
faced by the superior numbers of the Crusader army, Godfrey seems to have been 
equally reluctant to engage in batde and likewise withdrew. When Ridwan returned 
Omar capitulated, proclaiming his allegiance. By comparison, Ridwan seems to have left 
his commander to his own devices in Bara, whose inhabitants \vere massacred 
(November 1098). Soon afterwards Ma'arrat al-Nu'man also fell despite requests for 
help from both Ridwan and I-Iussein in Hims (December 12, 1098). After their 
conquest of Jerusalem Quly 15, 1 099), the Crusaders took further citadels strategic to 
the defence of Aleppo. Although Ridwan regained Qalla, Bohemond of Antakya 
defeated him Quly 1101 ). With Ridwan thrown back on his remaining defences, 
Bohemond and Tancred are thought to have been preparing to move on Aleppo when 
Malatya came under pressure from Dani~mend Giimi.i~-Tekin. Taking advantage of 
Bohemond's hurried departure in response to Gabriel's request, Ridwan raided the 
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Crusaders supply dumps while I-Iussein recovered some of the lesser citadels [Sevim, 
1989:1 06-9]. 
Apart from 1-Iasan Beg's defeat and death, the Dani~mends appear to have been 
unaffected by the First Crusade. !-laving captured Bohemond (11 01 ), Giimii~-Tekin also 
completely destroyed a relief force, which had been badly mauled en route from Iznik 
by Kthc; Arslan. As a result Malatya finally fell to Giimii~-Tekin despite attempts by 
Baldwin of Urfa to relieve the beleaguered city (1102). This seems to have prompted 
Kthc; Arslan to make peace with Emperor Alexius I Comnenus, ceding the territories in 
his possession along the Aegean and Mediterranean seas in order to secure his rear to 
better deal with the Dani~mends and Philaretos Brachamios' heirs [Turan, 1971 b:1 05]. 
Meanwhile Seljukid dominion in Syria continued to unravel. Although Ridwan is said to 
have settled his differences \vith his former atabeg, he had Hussein assassinated by three 
Ismacilis during Friday prayers (May 1103). As a result, Raymond seems to have begun 
preparations to take Hims. Learning of this, 1-Iussein's wife- Ridwan's mother- is said 
to have summoned her son. Fearful that they might suffer because of Ridwan's enmity, 
the city leaders invited Dukak to come. Despite Dukak's absence at the time his regent 
Ay-Tekin appears to have responded immediately, forcing both Rid wan and Raymond 
to retire. Ridwan now came under pressure from Tancred who began to systematically 
raid the environs of Aleppo. Reluctant to take the field, apparently Ridwan tried to pay 
him off but was unable to stem the pillaging. It is at this juncture that Ridwan appears 
to have received a request from Kille; Arslan for supplies during his planned campaign 
on Antakya. Regardless of whether or not Ridwan was in a position to comply, this plan 
seems to have collapsed when Giimii~-Tekin released Bohemond on payment of 
100,000 dinars (11 03), entering into negotiations with the Byzantines for Richard's 
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ransom. Angered, Ktl1c; Arslan instead marched on Gi.imi.i~-Tekin, defeating him [Sevim, 
1989:109-11; also Turan, 1971 b:107 & ()zaydtn, 1990:59 & 76]. 
Evidently growing more desperate, Ridwan appears to have approached Artukoglu 11-
Gazi in Mardin, not to mention other Ti.irkmen begs in south-eastern Anatolia and 
northern Syria. 11-Gazi is credited with persuading Ridwan that they could not succeed 
against the Crusaders without c;;oki.irmi.i~'s soldiery. When as a result they besieged 
Nisibin near Mosul in order to wrest it from c;;oki.irmi.i~ (presumably because he refused 
to help), Arslanta~oglu was wounded and retired to his iqtac in Sincar. Although 
incapacitated by a stroke, c;;oki.irmi.i~ seems to have returned in time to subvert some of 
Ridwan's commanders, promising Ridwan funds and soldiery if he imprisoned 11-Gazi. 
Instead Ridwan appears to have asked 11-Gazi to allow c;;oki.irmi.i~ to join them, which 
he is said to have refused. More inclined to fight Sultan Berk-Yaruk and hence possibly 
his suggestion to move against c;;oki.irmi.i~ in the first place, 11-Gazi was captured by 
Ridwan and sent to Nisibin. When 11-Gazi's Ti.irkmen began to pillage the immediate 
environs, however, Ridwan is said to have withdrawn [Sevim, 1989:113-4]. 
1-Iowever, once the struggle between Sultan Berk-Yaruk and Muhammad Tapar was 
resolved, C::oki.irmi.i~ appears to have acted without hesitation. Combining with 
Artukoglu Sokmen, he defeated the Crusaders under Baudouin of Bourg, Joscelin of 
Courtenay, Bohemond and Tancred, in 1-Iarran south of Urfa, capturing Baudouin and 
Joscelin (May 7, 11 04). Although as a result Rid wan regained many of the citadels in the 
environs of Aleppo and I-Iims, he lost all his gains when he took the field against 
Tancred and was defeated (April 11 05). In the meantime Dukak had died of 
tuberculosis (11 04). Although at first the khutba was read in his one year old son Tutu~'s 
name, Dukak's atabeg, his counsellor and commander-in-chief Tug-Tekin (see above, 
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4.2) released l)ukak's twelve year old brother Er-Ta~ and had the khutba read in his 
name (September 11 04). Soon afterwards both Tutu~ and Er-Ta~'s unrelated deaths, 
however, Tug-Tekin took control of Damascus and its environs on behalf of Sultan 
Tapar (April 1105). Around this time Dani~mend Gumu~-Tekin also died (1104/5), 
Muhammad Tapar acceded to the Seljuk throne on Sultan Berk-Yaruk's death (1105), 
and Kili<; Arslan took Malatya (September 2, 11 06) [Sevim, 1989:111-2 & 162-6; 
Ozayd1n, 1990:59, 90 & 99; Turan, 1971 b:1 07J. 
5.5 Summary 
Sumer thought the lack of a clear principle of succession among Turkic people the 
main reason for the interregnum and subsequent dissolution of the Great Seljuk 
Empire [1965:7]. Turan was of the opinion that in general contention enabled the 
emergence of strong rulers [1965:234-7]. He blamed the interregnum on Tiirkan 
Khatun and the commanders. According to Turan, by placing members of his farnily in 
positions of power, Nizam al-Mulk left himself open to criticism, which Turkan 
Khatun and her vizier took advantage of in the pursuit of their personal ambitions. As 
for the commanders who supported Tiirkan Khatun, upon her death these extended the 
interregnum by supporting Muhammad Tapar [Ibid. 169-73 & 176-82]. 
In Kafesoglu's op1n1on, during this period the Seljukid contenders were without 
exception inept although courageous [1A Vol. 10:373]. Nevertheless, since in accordance 
with Turkic ideology dominion belonged to the ruling family rather than being solely in 
the sovereignty of one member, he argued that the Seljuks were unable to have an heir 
apparent accepted by members of their dynasty despite the efforts of their Iranian 
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viziers. Moreover, success indicated divine favour, so that contention arose whenever a 
member felt he could usurp another's sovereignty [Ibid. 397; also inalctk, 1993b:37-69]. 
Although Koymen accepted that the sharing of dominion among dynastic members 
undermined sovereignty [1963:11 ], he was far more specific in his analysis of the period 
in question. In his opinion, Tutu~ lost almost wholly due to lack of support from the 
Turkic commanders who must have felt their influence and wealth threatened by his 
authoritarian attitude. He also pointed out that Tutu~ pillaged the Seljukid domains as if 
he were re-conquering these and that this may have severely lessened his chances even if 
due to local support for Berk-Yaruk, whose claim to the throne was initially upheld by 
Nizam al-Mulk's sons [Ibid. 76-7]. With him out of the way, according to Koymen, 
Sultan Berk-Yaruk's youthful inexperience allowed the Turkic commanders to gain the 
upper hand throughout the empire. Once the Treasury was emptied of funds these 
preferred to remain at home on their iqtacs, particularly at harvest time, that is when 
they \Vere not trying to extend their holdings at each other's expense. This attitude was 
emphasized on the marches, such that the break-up of the empire began among the so-
called Frankish principalities established by the Crusaders during the interregnum and 
immediately afterwards. In the process, the diwan and civil administrators lost their 
prominence, while the Ismacilis were able to further the growing anarchy in pursuit of 
their goals. Last but not least, Koymen thought that the interregnum of Seljukid 
dominion rekindled the Abbasid caliphs' hopes for political power [Ibid. 93-5]. 
Initially, Ozaydtn agreed with Koymen except on the caliphate. In his opinion, although 
bereft of temporal power, Caliph al-Mustazhir was far too interested in his personal 
comforts even to inspire a jihad against the Crusaders [1990:89-90], a point also made 
by Kafesoglu [IA Vol. 1 0:397]. As for the Seljuks, Ozaydm thought that in the absence 
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of a clear principle of succession, Berk-Yaruk, Muhammad Tapar and Sancar were too 
young to have received the education and experience necessary to gain either the 
political acumen or the allegiance of their commanders and administrators. 
Consequently, the men of the pen as well as those of the sword tended more and more 
to defect when the situation did not suit them. In addition, he thought that during the 
interregnum not only many valuable commanders and soldiery but also thousands of 
civilians lost their lives. Worse, the political, social and religious anarchy devastated the 
Great Seljuk Empire economically. Unable to collect ta.xes, the contenders resorted to 
confiscating the local populace's disposable wealth whenever they could, leaving thern 
dispossessed and even hungry [1990:36-7]. 
Subsequently, Ozaydm has agreed with Turan, Kafesoglu and inalctk on the historical 
reasons for the indeterminacy of Turkic and hence also Seljukid succession [2001 :135-
40]. Besides the personal ambitions of the commanders who later benefited as atabegs 
to Seljukid princes [Ibid. 154-9 & 140-7], according to Ozaydm, there is also the 
ineptitude of Sultan Berk-Yaruk's viziers to consider, as this undermined central 
authority as a whole [Ibid. 147-54]. 
In sum, although in each instance their reasoning differed, Turkish scholars agreed on 
the main cause and general results of the interregnum. 
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6. DISSOLUTION 
This chapter continues to follow Ozaydtn's Sultan Muhammed Tapar Det'fi Se/fuk/11 Tarihi 
(498-511/1105-1118) (1990) for the reign of Sultan Tapar and Sevim's Sur!Je-Filistin 
5 e!ptk!tt DetJ/eti Tan"hi (1989) for the Seljuks of Syria. For the reign of Great Sultan 
Sancar and the Seljuks of Iraq, the chapter follows Koymen's Bi!yiik Se/ptk!tt 
jmparatorbtfl' - jJdnci jmparatorluk Devri (1984). As in previous chapters, Kafesoglu's 
HarezmJahlar Det;/eti Tan"hi (1956), Siimer's Oguzlar (1965) and Turan's 5 e/ptk!ular 
Zamamnda Tiirkzje (1971) have been referenced alongside others for supplementary 
material pertinent to the events being reviewed. 
6.1 Unruly Servants and Vassals 
One event that possibly captures the atmosphere at the beginning of Sultan Tapar's 
reign is the demise of commander Ayaz. A fortnight after the khutba had been read in 
Sultan Tapar's name, Ayaz gave a banquet in his honour (February 25, 1105). The Seljuk 
vassal in Hilla, Sayf al-Dawla Sadaqa also seems to have attended the banquet. After 
Ayaz presented valuables that had belonged to Muayyad al-Mulk, he ordered his 
mamluks to fetch weaponry from the armoury intended as a further mark of respect for 
the sultan. Presumably in a festive mood, the mamluks are said to have forced a 
strangely attired scribe they came upon to put on chainmail under his woollen clothing. 
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· The scribe, however, seems to have escaped his tormentors and sought refuge with the 
sultan's entourage. Becoming alarmed by the scribe's sweaty, frightened demeanour, the 
sultan is said to have departed without notice when informed of the chainmail. The 
remark attributed to him: the turbaned being armed, what state can his forces be in? suggests 
suspicion of Isma\li inftltration. In any case, under the guise of discussing Kille; Arslan's 
advance in south-eastern Anatolia, Ayaz was beheaded when he presented himself at 
court (March 1, 1105). Ayaz's vizier also was caught and killed (May 17 to June 15, 1105) 
[Ozaydtn, 1990:43-4]. 
Still only 23 years old, the sultan appears to have been able to use the Porsuks' military 
power to further his aims. When Bori-Pars' son Mengii-Pars found himself in ftnancial 
difftculties, he journeyed from Isfahan to Nihavand where on having gained the aid of 
the local commanders he rebelled. Although he approached the Porsuks, they had 
received a letter from their brother, Porsukoglu Zengi, informing them that he would be 
killed if they helped. As a result, the Porsuks are said to have tricked Mengii-Pars into 
captivity and taken him back to Isfahan where he was imprisoned with Teki~'s sons 
(11 05-6). One of these, Bori-Tekin seems to have subsequently escaped. Unable to gain 
refuge in either Aleppo or Damascus he continued to Cairo where the Fatimids put him 
on a retainer [Ibid. 44-5]. 
Commanders such as Ismacil, responsible for the policing of Rayy during Sultan Malik-
Shah's reign, however, tried to e~1:end or establish their authority with the aid of the 
Seljuks' vassals. Sultan Berk-Yaruk had assigned Ismacil to Basra, where during the 
interregnum he seems to have strengthened his position. When Sultan Tapar sent a tax 
collector, Ismacil refused him entry. As a result the sultan appears to have re-assigned 
the city to his long-time supporter, Sayf al-Dawla Sadaqa, ordering him to dispossess 
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· Ismal"il. Although on Sadaqa's instigation 400 dinars were collected, Ismacil arrested the 
'amil and confiscated the taxes. As a result Sadaqa besieged Basra despite Ismacil's 
proclamation of allegiance and having taken the city by force pillaged it 'from end to 
end' before appointing his own commander (February 10, 11 06). Soon afterwards he 
added Tekrit in a similar manner. Situated near the Tigris between Mosul and Baghdad, 
Tekrit had been assigned to a certain Kaykubad from Dailam by Majd al-Mulk. 
Kaykubad appears to have been quite remorseless toward the inhabitants, on one 
occasion taking turns with Artukoglu Sokmen to pillage his own city (1098/9). 
Although Sultan Tapar assigned Tekrit to Porsukoglu Aksungur, he failed to take 
possession despite a seven-month siege. After this Kaykubad is said to have invited 
Sadaqa who duly took charge (October 11 06) [Ibid. 45-7]. 
Sadaqa was a Sh{ite, which appears to have enabled those jealous of his growing power, 
such as the deceased governor of Antakya Yagt-S1yan's son Muhammad, to slander him 
by accusing him of being an Ismacili sympathizer. Certainly he seems to have refused to 
return a local Sh{ite iqtac holder, Kayhusraw, who was fearful of the sultan's wrath 
because he was accused of Ismacili sympathies. Learning that the sultan was en route 
from Isfahan because of his acquisition of Tekrit, Sadaqa prepared a force said to have 
totalled 20,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry. When the caliph sent an envoy to Sadaqa, 
counselling him not to rebel and offering to mediate, he expressed concern for his life 
in the event of reconciliation. Presumably at the caliph's instigation, the sultan seems to 
have sent his own envoy to reassure him, ordering him instead to assist C::avh Sakavu 
with C::okiirmii~ against the Crusaders. Both Sadaqa and C::okiirmii~ appear to have 
declined. C::avh, who had a reputation for cruelty and injustice, had successfully 
prevented another Porsukid commander, Kiir-Boga's nephew Mawdud b. Anu~-Tekin 
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from dispossessing him of Khuzistan and Fars on the sultan's orders. After eight 
months he is said to have finally journeyed to Isfahan and begged mercy from Sultan 
Tapar, being assigned Rahba instead to enable him to mount a campaign against the 
Crusaders [Ibid. 47-8 & 51-3; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:375 & Turan, 1965:183-4J. 
Notwithstanding further attempts at mediation by the caliph after the fall of Shahdiz 
(see below, 6.2), while in Baghdad with his vizier Ahmad al-Mulk, another of Nizam al-
Mulk's sons, the sultan is said to have dispatched Yagt-Styan's son Muhammad and his 
Tiirkmen to take Wasit from Sadaqa (December 8, 11 07). Although the city was spared, 
the Tiirkmen began to systematically pillage Sadaqa's domains. Sadaqa sent his cousin, 
but he was defeated. While the Tiirkmen pursued his soldiery, killing those they could 
not take prisoner, another group apparently ransacked Wasit with Sadaqa's men. 
Muhammad stopped this and Wasit was assigned to Porsukoglu Aksungur, who 
remained commander of Baghdad. Although Sultan Tapar now advanced on Sadaqa, he 
appears to have halted en route while the caliph tried to mediate one last time Oanuary 
18, 11 08). Having finally accepted the caliph's order to obey the sultan, Sadaqa is said to 
have assigned his son to head an embassy [Ibid. 48]. 
Seeing reconciliation in the offing, Muhammad is said to have decided to exact a final 
pillage that cost him his life, also causing Sadaqa to cancel his son's embassy to the 
sultan. As a result, the caliph is said to have sent yet another envoy \vith documents 
signed by the sultan, pardoning Sadaqa. Possibly interpreting this as a sign of weakness, 
Sadaqa demanded the reinstatement of Kayhusraw as well as recompense for the 
T'lirkmcn plunder. When the two armies fmally met between Hilla and Wasit (.M:arch 3-
4, 11 08), Sadaqa and some 3,000 of his cavalry lost their lives, his cousin deserting to 
the Seljuks at the outset. Sultan Tapar released Sadaqa's son Dubays after he proclaimed 
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·allegiance and promised to spare Kayhusraw's life if he could prove that he was not an 
Isma\li [Ibid. 48-51]. 
6.2 The Assassins 
While Sadaqa was expanding his domains in Mesopotamia, Sultan Tapar set out to take 
the citadel of Shahdiz (February-March 1107), which threatened the capital Isfahan. As 
well as well as having imposed ta.xation on the local populace, the leader of the Isma\lis 
in Isfahan and its environs, Hasan al-Sabbah's mentor Ibn Attash's son Ahmad (see 
above, 4.15), had been pillaging the surrounding countryside from Shahdiz. At first 
Sultan Tapar seems have been delayed by various rumours, namely that Baghdad had 
fallen to Kille; Arslan and Khurasan was in turmoil. After these were proven to be 
unfounded, the citadel was completely surrounded (April 11 07). Said to have been 
unable to procure supplies, Ahmad Attash seems to have asked for a fatwa, a 
proclamation legalizing the Ismacili Nizari creed in accordance \vith Shari law. Although 
many jurists are said to have been favourably disposed, Sultan Tapar does not appear to 
have been so inclined despite sending Sacid al-I-Ianafi and others to discuss the issue. l-Ie 
tightened the siege such that Ahtnad Attash offered Shahdiz in return for safe conduct 
to the fortress of Khalinjan, which was further from Isfahan. When assassins sent to 
kill the commanders more active in the siege wounded one, however, the sultan ordered 
Khalinjan to be razed to the ground [Ibid 79-80]. 
As a result Ahmad Attash is said to have asked for safe conduct to Alamut on condition 
that one group from Shahdiz was escorted to the fortress of Nazir and another to that 
of Tabas. Although the sultan complied, Ahmad Attash reneged. This appears to have 
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given rise to rumours that Ahmad Attash was being helped by Sacd al-Mulk, the sultan's 
vi%ier. Whether or not he was an Ismacili, Sultan Tapar seems to have decided that his 
vizier was plotting to have him assassinated. In any event, Shahdiz fell after Sacd al-Mulk 
and four of his 'associates' were hanged from the city gates Ouly 15, 11 07). Ahmad 
Attash's wife committed suicide by leaping from the walls, but he was captured and 
skinned alive after having been paraded around Isfahan [Ibid. 80-2]. 
Possibly under growing pressure to deal with the Crusaders entrenched in Syria and 
Palestine, after Shahdiz Sultan Tapar seems to have been content to contain the 
Ismacilis, replacing those ministers in his diwan from Iraq al-Ajam and al-Arab \vho 
were suspected of being sympathizers with others from Khurasan. To be sure, his vizier 
Ahmad al-Mulk was dispatched with <";avh Sakavu to besiege Alamut and a nearby 
fortress, but the sieges were lifted after the Ismacilis in their vicinity were hunted down 
and killed (11 09). This seems to have provoked an attempt on Ahmad al-Mulk's life. A 
few years later, Anu~-Tekin ~irgir took the fortress of Bira and having given the 
inhabitants safe conduct to Alamut systematically destroyed the crops throughout the 
region (1111 ). This war of attrition in the valley of Alamut and its environs, the region 
of Rudbar, appears to have continued until ~irgir was assigned several cotntnanders with 
which to make a fmal assault on Alamut Ouly 1117). 1-Iowever, this also came to nothing 
even if due to Sultan Tapar's death (AprilS, 1118) [Ibid 78 & 82-4]. 
6.3 The Crusaders 
Immediately prior to Muhammad Tapar's accession, Bohemond had returned to Europe 
for recruits, putting Tancred in charge of Antakya. As a result Tancred seems to have 
164 
· entrusted Urfa to Richard of Salerne, pending Baudouin's release (September 11 04). As 
noted (sec above, 5.4), Baudouin had been captured by (;oki.irmi.i~ (May 7, 11 04). 
Emboldened on being left in charge of Mosul by Sultan Tapar (January 28, 11 05), who 
is said to have been influenced in this decision by his good standing with the 
inhabitants, <:;oki.irmi.i~ now moved on Urfa, which was being defended by Richard who 
said to have been inexperienced if not martially inept. Certainly, a defensive sortie 
seems to have ended in disaster when the gates were shut behind Richard in order to 
prevent <:;oki.irmi.i~ from following his panicked soldiery into the city. <:;oki.irmi.i~ 
withdrew after destroying the harvest and killing as many field hands as possible [Ibid 
91-3]. Although the following year he was ordered by the sultan to support <:;avh Sakavu 
in a campaign against the Crusaders, like Sadaqa <:;oki.irmi.i~ appears to have refused (sec 
above, 6.1). As a result, Sultan Tapar re-assigned Mosul to <:;avh (October 31, 1106). For 
his part <:;oki.irmi.i~ is said to have enlisted d1e help of al-Khwaja al-Ki.irdi in Irbil. Out-
numbered, <:;avh nonetheless defeated and captured (;oki.irmi.i~ and later killed him. The 
city dignitaries in Mosul, however, do not appear to have wanted <:;avh Sakavu and asked 
Kills: Arslan, Sadaqa and Porsukoglu Aksungur to help <:;oki.irmi.i~'s son Zcngi to defend 
their city [Ibid. 51-3 & 93-4]. 
!-laving taken Malatya, Kills: Arslan is thought to have gained the allegiance of the 
Ti.irkmen begs in south-eastern Anatolia by laying siege to Urfa (1106). This is where he 
received the invitation of the inhabitants of Mosul. Although a good part of his 
soldiery is said to have been helping Alexius Comnenus fight Bohemond in the Balkans, 
when Kills: Arslan arrived in Nisibin <:;avh withdre\v and Aksungur returned to 
Baghdad. Sadaqa is thought to have refused the invitation from Mosul. With Sultan 
Tapar busy in Shahdiz, Kills: Arslan entered Mosul uncontested and had the khutba read 
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· in his name (March 22, 11 07). c;avh appears to have gone to Sin car and persuaded 
Artukoglu 11-Gazi to help him take possession of Rahba (February 26 to May 19, 11 07). 
While thus occupied, he received an invitation from Rid wan to join him against the 
Crusaders. c;avh asked help to relieve Mosul first, which Ridwan seems to have found 
acceptable, joining c;avh Sakavu as soon as he had made peace with Tancred. Although 
Kille; Arslan advanced on c;avh, the Tlirkmen begs are said to have left him en route 
because he was out-numbered. In any event, Kilic;: Arslan was defeated and drowned in 
the I-Iabur River while fleeing Oune 3, 11 07). Kille; Arslan's son Malik-Shah was sent to 
Isfahan, but his youngest son, Tugrul Arslan, was released with his mother, Aisha 
Khatun, who returned to Malatya [Ibid. 59-63; also Sevim, 1989:115-6 & Turan, 
1965:108-9]. 
Once he was the master of Mosul, c;avh imprisoned Il-Gazi and reneged on his 
agreement with Ridwan who quickly withdrew. Although Sultan Tapar had sanctioned 
his subsequent conquests in the environs of Mosul, c;avh is said to have disobeyed 
repeated orders to send soldiery in support of the sultan's campaign against Sadaqa. As 
a result, after his victory over Sadaqa, the sultan ordered the Porsukid commanders, 
Sokmen, Mawdud and others to dispossess c;avh of Mosul. Leaving his \vife, 
Porsukoglu Porsuk's daughter, to defend Mosul, c;avh began to pillage its environs while 
the said commanders laid siege (April 14 to May 13, 11 08). With the 1 ,500-strong 
cavalry in her command, c;avh's wife seems to have stripped the inhabitants of whatever 
she could before they let in the sultan's forces (September 11 08). Mawdud took 
command of Mosul and after imprisoning her in a tower for eight days gave c;avh's wife 
safe conduct [Ibid. 53-4]. 
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At this point <";avh appears to have been joined by Sadaqa's sons Badran and Mansur, as 
well as the new commander for Rahba. They are thought to have persuaded him to try 
and establish himself in Syria because the region had insufficient Muslim soldiery to 
counter the Crusaders. Learning of C::avh's intentions, Ridwan intercepted Baudouin's 
ransom and took counter measures. Establishing an alliance with the Arab Numayr 
tribe, Ridwan sent word to Tancred on learning that he had lost the citadel of Balis on 
the Euphrates to <";avh (September 27, 11 08). Tancred is said to have been angry with 
<";avh for releasing Baudouin because this had forced him to relinquish Urfa when the 
Patriarch intervened on Baudouin's behalf (September 18, 11 08). Thus Tancred came to 
face Baudouin, Joscelin and <";avh at Tell-Bashir, with Ridwan's cavalry. Initially defeated 
Tancred fled, but when <";avh's men rode off with Baudouin and Joscelin's spare horses, 
he returned and won the day. As a result Ridwan was able to retake Balis (November 
11 08) [Ibid. 99-1 02; also Sevim, 1989:116-7]. 
Despite the above <";avh seems to have been able to regrun the sultan's favour by 
capturing Teki~'s son Bekta~ and handing him over, being assigned Fars as atabeg to the 
sultan's two-year-old son <";agrt (1108-9). The reason behind this appointment appears to 
have been the resurgence there of the Shebankarids. During his seven-year tenure until 
his death, <";avh is considered to have secured the region for Sultan Tapar [Ibid. 54-8; 
also Men;il, 1980:92-4]. 
Meanwhile the jurist Fakhr al-Mulk Ammar, the ruler of Tripoli, appears to have grown 
desperate for help against the Crusaders who had increased their efforts to take the city 
(March 16 and April 13, 11 08). When the Crusaders first besieged Tripoli (11 04), 
doubtless inspired by his part in the capture of Baudouin and Joscelin (May 11 04), 
Ammar had asked Artukoglu Sokmen for help, promising him financial and military 
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support. Although Sokmen also received a similar request from Tug-Tekin in Damascus, 
which he favoured, he had died en route (October 11 04). Ammar had approached 
Sultan Tapar next (11 06), but this also came to nothing when c,;:okurmu~ and Sadaqa 
failed to support c-;avh. After Sultan Tapar's victory over Sadaqa, Ammar is said to have 
decided to ask help personally by journeying to Baghdad. While in Damascus he learnt 
that his cousin had rebelled in collusion with the Fatimids. l-Ie sent word for him to be 
captured and imprisoned, which seerns to have been effected. On his return from 
Baghdad, however, where he and Tug-Tekin's son Bori were well received by the sultan, 
Ammar found out that the Fatimids had seized Tripoli (August 25, 11 08). Possibly 
because Am mar and Tug-Tekin were not the only ones to ask help either by letter or in 
person, soon afterwards Sultan Tapar sent a communication to all those who accepted 
his sovereignty that he intended to march on the Crusaders (November 26 to December 
25, 1108) [Ibid. 95-8]. 
Some eighteen months later Sokmen al-Kutbi and Artukoglu Il-Gazi joined Mawdud in 
Mosul from Ahlat and Sin car respectively, and decided to besiege U rfa (May 2-11, 
1110). King Baudouin I of Jerusalem learnt of this during his siege of Beirut. After its 
fall (May 27, 1110), he left for Urfa with 600 knights and 300 foot soldiers, being joined 
en route by an army under Bertrand of St. Gilles as well as smaller groups of Crusaders. 
On the banks of the Euphrates Baudouin was joined by Tancred, who had 1,500 men. 
When they crossed the river in July, the Armenians Gog-Vasil and Apilgarip also joined, 
so that the Crusaders' combined forces are thought to have totalled 15,000 men. 
Baudouin II, who was in U rfa, informed the Crusaders that the Seljuks had 'Withdrawn 
towards J-Iarran where they clearly hoped to force a set-piece battle with the addition of 
Tug-Tekin's forces, which \vere still en route to Raqqa. As a result, after having 
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· strengthened the city defences with fresh supplies and Armenian soldiery, the Crusaders 
retreated along the Euphrates. Informed by their scouts, the Seljuk forces gave pursuit. 
Although the Crusaders' leaders crossed the river safely, 5,000 of their soldiery were 
killed as they watched helplessly. On hearing that rather than likewise endanger 
themselves the Scljuk forces had reverted to their plan to besiege Urfa, Tug-Tekin seems 
to have returned to Damascus. Unable to take Urfa, the Seljuk forces eventually 
dispersed [I bid 1 03-8]. 
As a result of this campaign Tug-Tekin seems to have been forced into giving up a third 
of his crop to Baudouin I (August 19 to September 16, 111 0), who also took Sidon and 
imposed a 20,000-dinar ransom per head on its inhabitants (December 4, 111 0). For his 
part Ridwan seems to have suffered likewise for taking the opportunity to regain as 
many fortresses as possible and raiding the environs of Antakya. Tancred retaliated by 
pillaging the environs of Aleppo, driving those able to save their lives from the region. 
Despite several offers of money, Tancred is said to have taken half a dozen fortresses 
around Aleppo (December 15, 1110 to January 12, 1111). This seems to have provoked 
a mass exodus worsened by the conditions of peace Tancred imposed on Ridwan, who 
was forced to give up his annual crop as well as 20,000 dinars and ten horses. In order 
to prevent a further exodus Ridwan is said to have sold treasury land at rock bottom 
prices [Ibid 108-1 0; also Sevim, 1989:118-20]. 
The Crusaders' response to the siege of Urfa caused a group of jurists, Sufis and 
merchants to journey from Aleppo to Baghdad. On February 17, 1111, they railed 
against the sultan and the caliph at the sultan's mosque, going so far as to smash the 
pulpit and preventing Friday prayers from being held. Sultan Tapar's administrators and 
commanders are said to have finally quietened the crowd "\vith promises of help against 
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· the Crusaders. The group and their supporters repeated their demands the following 
Friday at the caliph's mosque. Sultan Tapar had to intervene personally and stop the 
caliph from having the perpetrators punished. The caliph appears to have been more 
concerned with his forthcoming marriage to the sultan's sister [Ibid. 110-11 & 146; also 
Sevim, 1989:120-1 ]. 
Earlier the sultan appears to have received a Byzantine envoy proposing a co-ordinated 
effort to rid the Middle East of the Crusaders, but the Seljuks' campaign was as 
indecisive as their last. After numerous commanders once again joined Mawdud m 
I-Iarran, the Seljuk forces besieged the new Crusader fortress in Tell-Bashir Guly 28, 
1111 ). I-Iowever, Joscelin was able to bribe one of their number who withdrew. The 
main body then journeyed to Aleppo and camped outside the city walls. Possibly 
because he was not able to supply them, Ridwan shut the city gates when the soldiers 
began to requisition their needs from the local populace by force. After they had been 
joined by Tug-Tekin, the Seljuk forces journeyed to Ma'arrat al-Nu'man (September 6, 
1111). The environs were once again pillaged. Having become suspicious of Tug-
Tekin's involvement - possibly another reason why he withheld support for the Seljuk 
forces ostensibly sent to help him - Ridwan is thought to have tried to have him killed 
by some of the lesser commanders. Whether for this reason or not, Mawdud and Tug-
Tekin appear to have been left by the remaining commanders and withdrew to nearby 
Jalali on the Asi (Orontes) River. Seeing the Scljuk forces disperse, Tancred alerted 
Baudouin and Bertrand, but the Crusaders were defeated near Ma'arrat al-Nu'man 
(September 6 to October 6, 1111) [Ibid. 111-16; also Sevim, 1989:121-3]. 
The following year Mawdud is thought to have come to an understanding with the 
Armenians in Urfa, laying siege to the city (April30 to May 4, 1112). As in the campaign 
170 
· the year before, the Seljuk forces destroyed the crops, so that Urfa was faced with yet 
another year of deprivation due to the bad harvest in the intervening year. While 
pillaging further afield in the environs of Seruj Gune 28 to July 27, 1112), however, 
Joscelin seems to have made a successful sortie from Urfa and driven off most of the 
Seljuks' horses. Although Mawdud returned and was able to get a few men on to a 
tower on the city walls with the help of the Armenians, Joscelin caught them by surprise 
[Ibid 116-8]. 
Under pressure from Baudouin I in Jerusalem, the next year Tug-Tekin enlisted 
Mawdud's help. Joscelin had left Baudouin II in Urfa and been given Taberiyye 
(fiberias). Despite Joscelin's attempts to negotiate peace, Tug-Tekin joined Mawdud 
who was supported by the Artukid Ti.irkmen from Sincar. When they advanced on 
Jerusalem, they came upon the Crusaders while crossing the R.iver Jordan and severely 
defeated them Gune 28, 1113). Baudou.in was released from captivity after having been 
stripped of his sword because he was not recognized. The Crusaders withdrew to 
Taberiyye where they remained while the Seljuk forces raided as far as Jerusalem and 
Jaffa (August 1113). Deciding to winter in Damascus on Tug-Tekin's invitation 
(September 6, 1113), \vhile there Mawdud was \vounded by an assassin after Friday 
prayers (October 10, 1113), and subsequently died (March 9-10, 1114) [Ibid. 118-26; also 
Turan, 1965:182-3]. 
Next year the new military governor for Mosul, Porsukoglu Aksungur, undertook the 
annual Seljuk campaign on the County of Urfa (May 15, 1114), supported by Sultan 
'T'apar's son Mascud and Artukoglu 11-Gazi's son Ayaz. During the month long siege, 
which appears to have been qu.ite bloody, the Seljuk forces once again systematically 
pillaged the fields and orchards in the surrounding countryside. In the process, however, 
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· Aksungur seems to have arrested Ayaz on grounds that his father had not joined them 
as ordered and pillaged the environs of Mardin as well. Given Mascud's presence, 
possibly this was effected on the sultan's orders. Even if so it proved disastrous. On the 
Armenian ruler of Mara~ Gog-Vasil's death his wife invited Aksungur who sent the 
commander for I-Iabur, Sungur Diraz. While he was negotiating terms that would have 
re-established Great Seljuk dominion in the region north-west of Urfa he repulsed an 
attack by the Franks. Meanwhile, angered by Ayaz's arrest, 11-Gazi marched on 
Aksungur and defeated him Oune 1114), which enabled Baudouin to gain dominion 
over Gog-Vasil's former domains, strengthening his position in the region [Ibid. 126-8]. 
Although Artukoglu 11-Gazi immediately released Mascud, whom he had captured 
during his victory over Aksungur, Sultan Tapar threatened to dispossess him of his 
iqtac. Il-Gazi seems to have turned to Tug-Tekin for help. Under suspicion because of 
Mawdud's assassination, Tug-Tekin is said to have suggested that he and Il-Gazi 
approach Roger of Antakya. I-Iaving agreed, Il-Gazi appears to have started drinking 
heavily while en route home, being captured as a result by the commander of I-Iims, 
Kirhan Oanuary 1115). When Sultan Tapar's soldiery was delayed Kirhan and Il-Gazi 
came to terms. Accordingly, Il-Gazi left his son Ayaz hostage against an attack on I-Iims 
by Tug-Tekin. On being released, however, he seems to have gathered some Tiirkmen 
from the environs of Aleppo and besieged I-Iims until the arrival of the sultan's forces 
[Ibid. 128-301. 
In the meantime H.idwan died of tuberculosis (December 10, 1113). Consequently, 
Aleppo is thought to have effectively fallen into the grip of his si..xteen-year-old son 
Alp-Arslan's atabeg, the eunuch Lii'lii. As his father appears to have done in the case of 
his brothers Talib and Bahram-Shah, Alp-Arslan had his brothers Mubarak-Shah and 
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· Malik-Shah killed. Alp-Arslan did not stop there. On Sultan Tapar's request, he had the 
lsma\li leader Tahir and his associates beheaded, confiscating their property and 
disposable wealth along with those of 200 their followers. 1-Iaving established good 
relations with 'fug-Tekin, who is said to have proclaimed his allegiance, he invited him 
to Aleppo to sort out its governance. Presumably due to his youth, however, he seems 
to have been unable to shake off his atabeg's influence, killing many of his father's loyal 
commanders before Tug-Tekin's arrival. As a result Ridwan's mother left Aleppo with 
Tug-Tekin for Damascus. I-Iaving gained the remaining commanders' consent, Lu'lu had 
Alp-Arslan killed (September 1114). This ostensibly made the six-year-old Sultan-Shah 
the ruler of Aleppo. Devastated by more than a decade of war, Aleppo also suffered an 
earthquake (November 29, 1114), which collapsed some of the city walls and a gate 
tower. Unable to cope with the problems, Lu'lu offered the city and its environs to 
Sultan Tapar [Sevim, 1989:124-36]. 
Sultan Tapar seems to have assigned the military governor of Hamadan, Porsukoglu 
Porsuk with the multiple tasks of taking over Aleppo and dealing with the rebellious 11-
Gazi and Tug-Tekin, as well as organizing the annual campaign against the Crusaders. 
Having started preparations during winter Ganuary 29 to February 27, 1115), Porsuk 
crossed the Euphrates near Raqqa (May 7, 1115). 1-Iowever, when he informed Lu'lu 
and his commander-in-chief to prepare for the hand-over, sending the necessary 
documentation with the sultan's seal, they sent word to Tug-Tekin and 11-Gazi, 
requesting their aid. Apparently Tug-Tekin got to Aleppo while Porsuk was still in Balis. 
On learning that Lu'lii had joined the rebellion Gune 14, 1115), Porsuk besieged and 
took I-I am a, where Tug-Tekin had left his baggage train. After being plundered for three 
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days and nights the city was handed over to Kirhan in I-Iims [Ozaydtn, 1990:130-1; also 
Sevirn, 1989:136-7]. 
Unaware of the fate of l--lama, Tug-Tekin and Li.i'li.i's commander-in-chief appear to 
have journeyed to Efamiya where they joined up with Il-Gazi and Roger. Informed of 
the size of the force under Porsuk's command, they are said to have decided there was 
little to be done but wait until the Seljuk forces dispersed to their iqtacs for the winter. 
Porsuk likewise seems to have preferred to wait. At the beginning of September he 
appears to have feigned withdrawal so that his foes dispersed instead. Attacking a 
Crusader fortress between Aleppo and Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, Porsuk took it and killed 
everyone within. After what seems to have been a show of force outside Ma'arrat al-
Nu'man and subsequently Efamiya, Porsuk turned south toward Aleppo, evidently his 
primary objective. Presumably confident that his foes had been duly cowed, he seems to 
have thrown precaution to the wind, allowing his baggage train, which was at the head 
of his column, to be ambushed by Roger who had been tracking him. The main force is 
said to have followed their baggage train into the trap, being forced to withdraw with 
heavy losses before dispersing (September 14, 1115) [Ibid 130-5; also Sevim, 1989:137-
8]. 
Arguably Porsuk's rout ended Great Seljuk dominion in Syria and Palestine as well as 
south-eastern Anatolia, allo\ving the emergence of vassals and then successor states 
[Koymen, 1963:295]. In Aleppo, Li.i'li.i tried to escape but was killed (1116). After a brief 
period under his former commander-in-chief, Yaruk-Ta~, Sultan Tapar is said to have 
asked 11-Gazi to take charge of the city and its environs, which he did (1117 /8) [Sevim, 
1989:139-4]. As for Tug-Tekin in Damascus and Aksungur, who had been demoted to 
Rah ba, the former journeyed to Baghdad to refresh his allegiance to the sultan (April 9 
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to July 31, 1116). Assigned with the task of fighting the Crusaders, Tug-Tekin was 
joined by Aksungur. On learning that Pons, the ruler of Tripoli, was in the Bekaa Valley, 
Tug-Tekin and Aksungur surprised the Crusaders and routed their unprepared forces 
[Ozaydtn, 1990:137-8]. After this, however, Tug-Tekin seems to have been content to 
maintain his position in Damascus, helping out his ally Il-Gazi in Aleppo as and when 
necessary [Sevim, IA Vol. 12/2:44-6]. 
6.4 Transoxania and the Ghaznavids 
Sancar appears to have been highly active during his uterine brother's reign. I-Iaving 
killed the eastern Karakhanid ruler for rebelling against the Seljuks during the 
interregnum, Sancar is said to have re-organized Transoxania under the Karakhanid 
Muhammad II, whom he instated in Samarkand under the name of Arslan Khan. 
I-Iowever, Arslan Khan does not appear to have been popular. When the Karakhanid 
Omar Khan displaced Arslan Khan, Sancar pursued him personally and having defeated 
him in Kh\varazm killed him. Nevertheless, Sagun Beg, a descendant of Ali Tekin, now 
challenged Arslan Khan who defeated him with San car's soldiery (11 09-1 0). Finally 
secure, Arslan Khan appears to have pillaged the urban centres in his realm, 
confiscating the local inhabitants' wealth. Sancar advanced against him, but pardoned 
him after he dismounted and kissed the ground across the Amu-derya River (1113-14) 
jOzaydtn, 1990:139-40]. 
By comparison relations between the Seljuks and Ghaznavids appear to have remained 
peaceful during Sultan Mascud III's reign (1 099-1115). I-Iowever, when Shirzad acceded 
to the Ghaznavid throne, his brother Arslan-Shah rebelled and defeated him in a battle 
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·near the capital (February 17 to March 16, 1116). Shirzad was killed soon afterwards in a 
subsequent battle. Although Arslan-Shah imprisoned his remaining brothers, Bahram-
Shah escaped. Unable to hold his own against Arslan-Shah, Bahram-Shah sought refuge 
in Kirman from where he was sent to Sancar. Although Sancar sent an envoy to Ghazna 
entreating Arslan-Shah to settle his differences with Bahram-Shah, he does not seem to 
have responded favourably. On receiving news that Sancar was mobilizing, Arslan-Shah 
approached Sultan Tapar. The sultan's envoy appears to have been too late to stop 
Sancar's army, which defeated the Ghaznavid forces deployed against them. As a result 
Arslan-Shah is said to have sent his mother, Sancar's sister, but without avail. Sancar 
defeated Arslan-Shah and having entered Ghazna instated Bahram-Shah as sultan 
(February 25, 1117). Although Arslan-Shah returned immediately on Sancar's departure 
and regained control, a Seljuk army from Balkh pursued him with Sultan Bahram-Shah, 
pillaging and destroying any urban centres that offered Arslan-Shah refuge. As a result, 
given up to the Seljuks, Arslan-Shah was strangled on Sultan Bahram-Shah's orders 
(September 30, 1118) [Ibid. 140-4]. 
6.5 Great Sultan Sancar 
On Sultan Tapar's death after a long illness (April 9, 1118), his heir apparent, his eldest 
son Mahmud (b.11 OS) acceded to the throne. The cause of Sultan Tapar's illness is not 
known, but the report that his wife Gevher Khatun was strangled in her quarters on the 
hour of the sultan's death may explain the rumour that she had poisoned him and he 
knew of this. According to another rumour the sultan was afraid that if Sancar married 
her as was customary then his sons \vould never rule [Ozaydtn, 1990:149-51 ]. Gevher 
Khatun was Yakuti's granddaughter and as such ultimately responsible for Azarbayjan, 
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·which she seems to have ruled through her diwan [furan, 1965:184], so that presumably 
the commanders reported to her. 
Although no challenges arc reported from his four brothers, namely Mas cud (b.11 09), 
Tugrul (b.111 0), Si.ileyman and Selc;:uk-Shah, the reassignment of Dubays al-Sadaqa to 
I-Iilla and that of Mcngi.i-Pars as shihna to Baghdad in place of Mascud's former atabeg 
Porsukoglu Aksungur seem to have created a power vacuum in Iraq al-Arab. While 
Dubays gathered a force of Arabs and Kurds, Aksungur refused to hand over Baghdad 
and killed Mengi.i-Pars' brother who had come to negotiate the hand over. This 
conjuncture of events appears to have prompted Mascud's current atabeg Ay-Aba (also 
known as ~avu~ Beg) to journey from Mosul to Baghdad and propose that Aksungur 
join him in a raid on Dubays. Although this seems to have failed due to Mengi.i-Pars 
siding with Dubays, Sultan Mahmud is thought to have regarded Ay-Aba's action as 
inciting Mascud to rebellion and gathered his forces. Undaunted, Ay-Aba is said to have 
asked for Mascud's domains to be expanded, gaining Azarbayjan [Si.imer, IA Vol. 8:135; 
K6ymen, IA Vol. 12/2:14-5 & 1984:30-2]. Since Tugrul is reported in Ganja, this 
suggests that his atabeg Giindogdu was deemed unsuccessful against the resurgent 
Georgians. Around this time the Bagratid David II married the K1pc;:ak Kara-Khan's son 
Atrak's daughter and allowed 40,000 tents to settle in Georgia, apparently taking 5,000 
youths into service in his royal corps. Thus strengthened, David II is said to have 
refused to pay his annual tribute and forbidden seasonal Tiirkmen migrations, which 
caused many to migrate to Anatolia [Turan, 1965:183; also Minorsky, IA Vol. 12/1:267]. 
In the meantime Sancar declared himself sultan and marched on his nephew Qune 14, 
1118). He defeated and captured him near Sawa (August 14, 1119). Although he allowed 
Mahmud to keep the title of sultan, Sancar stripped him of Rayy, Mazandaran and 
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·Qomis, as well as retaining the revenues from Sawa and I-Iuy. Not satisfied with this he 
assigned Gilan and north-eastern Jibal to Tugrul and Fars and western Khuzistan to 
Selc;uk-Shah, creating two intermediate Seljukid dominions ostensibly subordinate to 
Sultan Mahmud. Last but not least, he is said to have assigned his own 'amils to 
determine the tax revenues due to Sultan Mahmud [Koymen, 1984:13-8; also Turan, 
1965:185-7]. In short, Great Sultan Sancar is credited with creating besides the Seljukid 
dominions already established in Kirman and Anatolia that of Iraq, which included 
Azarbayjan and south-eastern Anatolia. 
6.6 Sultan Mahmud 
Once agrun the first challenge to Sultan Mahmud came from Ay-Aba, who is not 
reported at the battle near Sawa. Possibly in the knowledge that Dubays al-Sadaqa 
would support him in Hilla, Ay-Aba appears to have moved suddenly on the capital 
I-Iamadan. Despite this Sultan Mahmud was able to gather sufficient forces to defeat 
him at Asadabad, west of the capital Gune 14, 1120). The battle seems to have enabled 
Porsukoglu Aksungur to redeem himsel£ Apart from fighting at the forefront, he is 
credited with persuading Mascud to present himself at court. After his vizier, the 
renowned jurist Fakhr al-Mulk Ammar (see above, 6.3) was killed on having been 
captured at Asadabad, Mascud seems to have attempted to return to Mosul. Although 
he forgave his brother Mascud, Sultan Mahmud is thought to have retained him at court 
[Koymen, 1984:32-5; also Siimer, IA Vol. 8:135-6]. 
()n learning of Ay-Aba's defeat, Dubays is said to have burnt the crops in the environs 
of Baghdad where he had been pillaging. When Caliph al-Mustarshid (r.1118-35) 
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threatened to retaliate, l)ubays marched on Baghdad and the caliph appealed to Sultan 
Mahmud (September 1120). Despite threatening Caliph al-Mustarshid that if he did not 
withdraw his appeal he would consider himself free to act as he pleased, Dubays seems 
to have sought reconciliation on Sultan Mahmud's arrival in Baghdad (September-
October 1120). Notwithstanding, the sultan occupied I-Iilla and Dubays was forced to 
seck refuge in Aleppo with his father-in-law Artukoglu Il-Gazi. Although the sultan 
appears to have prepared to return to I--Iamadan, Caliph al-Mustarshid seems to have 
dissuaded him by offering to meet his military expenses for the next four months [Ibid. 
37-40]. 
While in Baghdad Sultan Mahmud is said to have rewarded Porsukoglu Aksungur with 
Mosul and Jazira and increased Artukoglu Il-Gazi's iqtacs. I--Ie seems to have also re-
imposed non-Shari ta..xes that were suspended by his father. The most interesting 
development, however, is considered to be the embassy he sent to Great Sultan Sancar 
with the caliph Gune 1121). At a ceremony held later that year (October 29, 1121), 
Caliph al-Mustarshid presented Sultan Mahmud with two swords. While these are taken 
to signify a reiteration of Seljukid sovereignty over worldly affairs, since they were not 
presented to Great Sultan Sancar - \vhose name does not appear to have been 
mentioned- the purpose of the ceremony is thought to have been divisive. After this a 
joint envoy \vas sent to Aleppo, asking Il-Gazi to divorce his daughter from Dubays. 
When 11-Gazi declined though he took care to reiterate his allegiance, Dubays is thought 
to have secretly approached the caliph. I-Iaving come to an understanding and returned 
to I-Iilla, Dubays expelled the Seljuks' shihnas and 'amils with their dependants, many 
being killed in the process. T'his turn of events appears to have forced Sultan Mahmud 
to dispatch a force, which re-occupied Hilla without bloodshed. Although the caliph 
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-now asked for l)ubays to be ousted from the regton, the sultan accepted Dubays' 
brother Mansur as hostage and departed for I-Iamadan, having invited Aksungur to 
Baghdad (May 10, 1122) [Ibid. 43-55]. 
Whether or not of his own accord, Aksungur advanced on Dubays but was defeated 
Qune 9, 1122). As a result, Caliph al-Mustarshid unilaterally removed his vizier Ibn 
Sadaqa at Dubays' request while the latter took Wasit, once again forcibly removing the 
Seljuk officials. For his part Sultan Mahmud appears to have imprisoned Mansur and 
asked the caliph to appoint Ahmad al-Mulk vizier in Ibn Sadaqa's place. Consequently, 
for a time Nizam al-Mulk's relations became viziers not only to Great Sultan Sancar and 
Sultan Mahmud but also to Caliph al-Mustarshid [Ibid. 58-61]. Although he had not 
suggested a replacement, Dubays seems to have chosen this appointment as an excuse 
to confiscate more than 100,000 head of the caliph's livestock. When the caliph 
objected, Dubays is said to have given him five days to have Ibn Sadaqa killed, Ahmad 
al-Mulk removed, Aksungur returned to Mosul and Mansur released. In response the 
caliph declared jihad, arming those inhabitants of Baghdad \vho responded to his call. 
Possibly most important of all, he appointed one of his chamberlains Commander-in-
Chief despite the fact that on his request Aksungur returned from the Caucasus where 
he was on campaign with Sultan Mahmud. The remainder of the caliphal army seems to 
have consisted of local Arab and Ti.irkmen leaders who accepted d1e caliph's call to 
arms with their soldiery. The Ti.irkmen are thought to have been Togan-Arslan, the 
commander of Bitlis in south-eastern Anatolia, Ktpc;ak b. Arslan-Ta~, the commander 
of Shchrizor, the Saltukids from Erzurum and the Buka. Notwithstanding all the pomp 
and circumstance, Aksungur's forces are said to have made up the majority and it \vas he 
who appears to have prepared the army for the battle at which Dubays was defeated. 
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. Satisfied with this victory, toward the end of which he drew his sword and joined the 
fighting, Caliph al-Mustarshid returned to Baghdad without displacing Dubays Ganuary 
to February 1123) [Ibid. 62-8; also Sumer, 1965:113 & 118]. 
Sultan Mahmud's campatgn 1n the Caucasus appears to have been in response to 
T'ugrul's defeat two years earlier with 11-Gazi and Dubays, which allowed the Bagratids 
to take Tbilisi (1121). Nevertheless, Sultan Mahmud also seems to have been 
unsuccessful (1123). Turan was of the opinion that this was because Great Sultan 
Sancar replaced his vizier with al-Kumumi, regarded as being an enemy of Nizam al-
Mulk's sons. Possibly as a result Great Sultan Sancar ordered Sultan Mahmud to dismiss 
his vizier Osman al-Mulk while he was still in the Caucasus, forcing him to return. 
Whatever the case, according to Koymen, Sultan Mahmud may have taken this 
opportunity to blame the caliph's unilateral actions on his vizier, Osman al-Mulk's 
brother Ahmad al-Mulk, and asked for him to be dismissed. !-laving complied with the 
sultan's request, in turn Caliph al-Mustarshid seems to have asked for Aksungur to be 
removed from Baghdad. It is at this juncture that Dubays appears to have enticed 
Tugrul with the promise of his own dominion in Mesopotamia. Presumably after his 
defeat Sultan Mahmud removed him from Ganja, \Vhich had been assigned to him by 
Great Sultan Sancar (see above, 6.5). On learning of Tugrul's arrival, Caliph al-
Mustarshid is said to have instructed his vizier to mobilize and the Seljuks' new shihna 
Baranku~ to prepare for war [Ibid 69-77 & IA Vol. 12/2:14ff; also Turan, 1965:197-8]. 
During the following year in which Tugrul appears to have been inactive Caliph al-
Mustarshid asked for and married Great Sultan Sancar's daughter. When Tugrul and 
Dubays fmally advanced, the caliph took the field (March 13, 1125). This seems to have 
been sufficient to persuade them to withdraw without giving battle. After Dubays 
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. secretly tried to come to an accommodation with the caliph and failed, Tugrul and he 
journeyed to Khurasan for an audience with c;reat Sultan Sancar. On route Tugrul is 
said to have exacted an extraordinary tax from the inhabitants of I-Iamadan, which 
suggests that he and Dubays were short of funds. Sultan Mahmud's whereabouts do not 
appear to have been known. Retaining Tugrul at court, Great Sultan Sancar imprisoned 
Dubays who complained of the caliph's activities against him [Ibid. 75-81 & IA Vol. 
12/2:14ff]. 
After having established a military force of some 12,000 Arab and Kurdish cavalry, 
Caliph al-Mustarshid began to interfere in the Seljuk administration, threatening 
Baranku~ when he objected. As a result, the shihna journeyed to I--Iamadan to warn 
Sultan Mahmud of the caliph's ambitions for political autonomy (August 11, 1125). The 
sultan, however, sent a letter thanking the caliph for his recent action against Tugrul, 
which he interpreted as having been conducted on his behalf. After a further exchange 
of envoys Caliph al-Mustarshid agreed to help Sultan Mahmud depose Great Sultan 
Sancar by force. When the latter learnt of this he sent his nephew a letter. I--Iaving 
\Varned him of the caliph's intention to usurp Seljukid sovereignty altogether, he 
reminded him that despite having defeated him in the field he had appointed him his 
heir apparent and given him a second daughter in marriage after the ftrst had died. l-Ie 
ordered Sultan Mahmud to march on Baghdad where he \vas to imprison the caliph's 
vizier Ibn Sadaqa, kill the Kurdish soldiery and destroy the caliphal garrison. Last but 
not least, the envoy that brought the letter was to be appointed vizier and oversee his 
instructions !Ibid. 81-7]. 
Caliph al-Mustarshid refused Sultan Mahmud's proposal to journey to Baghdad on 
grounds that having only just emerged from famine Iraq al-Arab could not support two 
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.armtcs and that he should come the next year. He then ordered the inhabitants of 
Baghdad to vacate the suburbs on the eastern banks of the Tigris River where he set up 
camp. Sultan Mahmud appears to have been surprised to learn of this development and 
sent an envoy who confirmed the caliph's determination to fight. Although the caliph 
withdrew to the western banks of the river when Sultan Mahmud advanced on 
Baghdad, he sent the eunuch Afif to take Wasit. The sultan countered this by sending 
Zengi, Sultan Malik-Shah's governor Aksungur's son [Alptekin, IA Vol. 13:526ffj, who 
defeated Afif's forces in a bloody battle. On arriving in Baghdad Qanuary 4, 1126), 
Sultan Mahmud sent another envoy. It seems that the caliph refused to back down and 
the sultan had his palace on the eastern banks pillaged. Since the caliph's concubines 
were still in residence there, Caliph al-Mustarshid is said to have been able to rouse the 
populace against the Seljuks. I-Iaving crossed the river, the caliph's soldiery attacked his 
palace and killed the Seljuk soldiers unable to depart in time, while the populace pillaged 
the homes of those normally resident in Baghdad. Caliph al-Mustarshid then crossed 
the river with his army Qanuary 7, 1126). After some inconclusive skirmishes during 
which a caliphal commander appears to have defected, the sultan called on Zengi who 
ferried his soldiery into Baghdad on crafts he procured from Wasit and Basra, thus 
gaining advantage over the caliph's forces [Koymen, 1984:88-101; also Alptekin, IA Vol. 
13:526ff]. 
As far as can be ascertained, Sultan Mahmud appears to have been reluctant to push 
home his advantage despite his commanders' advice, preferring to negotiate his entry 
into Baghdad. Once the Seljuks were back in the city the sultan requested from the 
caliph that the inhabitants return their plunder, which they appear to have done. 
Koymen was of the opinion that as a result the sultan accepted the Abbasid Caliphate's 
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autonomy at least in Baghdad. This seems unlikely as besides minting devalued coinage 
in his name, Sultan Mahmud also appointed Zengi shihna to Baghdad. In any event, 
after a long illness the sultan departed for I-Iamadan (April12, 1126) [Ibid. 101-11]. 
Three months later Sultan Mahmud dismissed his vizier Dergi.izini and imprisoned him 
for conspiring with the caliph's vizier Ibn Sadaqa while they were in Baghdad Ouly 
1127). The accusation appears to have been made by Baranku~ [Ibid. 111]. Soon 
afterwards Great Sultan Sancar arrived in Rayy at the head of his army and invited 
Sultan Mahmud there. It is not clear when Sultan Mahmud journeyed to Rayy and how 
long he stayed there [Ibid. 118-9], but as a result of their meeting Tugrul's atabeg $irgir 
was replaced by one of Great Sultan Sancar's commanders, Karasungur. Although 
Arran was re-assigned to Tugrul, he appears to have stayed with Great Sultan Sancar 
[Ibid. 116 & 127]. Great Sultan Sancar also took charge of Mascud whom he assigned to 
Jurjan as amil [Ibid. 127-8]. Having ordered Sultan Mahmud to release Dergiizini, Great 
Sultan Sancar made him vizier to his daughter, the sultan's wife. He then appointed her 
Dubays' protector, instructing the sultan to ensure that Dubays became governor of 
Jazira and Syria. Apart from the caliph's enmity toward Dubays, a further problem with 
this was that Sultan Mahmud had assigned the said region to Zengi, who had not 
wanted to stay on as the shihna of Baghdad [Ibid. 117-24]. When Porsukoglu Aksungur 
was killed by Ismacili assassins (November 26, 1126), Sultan Mahmud left Mosul and its 
environs in Aksungur's son Mascud's hands. On his death the following year Ouly 1127), 
Aksungur's commander C::avh who had been running Mosul sent an envoy requesting to 
be confirmed in Mascud's son's name. However, the envoy seems to have suggested 
Zengi instead. Sultan Mahmud is said to have agreed, appointing Zengi also atabeg to 
his son Alp-Arslan [Alptekin, IA Vol. 13:526ffj. 
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Sultan Mahmud arrived in Baghdad without Dubays Oanuary 14, 1129). The caliph not 
only refused to pardon l)ubays as requested but also protested his appointment to 
Mosul as governor of Jazira and Syria in place of Zengi, offering the sultan financial 
compensation. At first the sultan seems to have ignored the caliph's offer and ordered 
Zcngi to hand over Mosul to Dubays. When Zcngi likewise offered the sultan money in 
return for being allowed to retain Mosul, however, the sultan relented. After having 
received Zcngi in Baghdad and allowed Dubays to enter the city, Sultan Mahmud left for 
I-Iamadan with Dubays (May 25, 1129) [Koymen, 1984:134-9]. 
When soon afterwards Sultan Mahmud's wife died and the sultan became ill, Dubays 
appears to have left Hamadan for Hilla with the sultan's youngest son. The shihna for 
I-Iilla, Bihruz, docs not seem to have offered any resistance and returned to I-Iamadan 
(August-September 1129). On learning that Sultan Mahmud had dispatched the 
commander Ahmadili to capture him, Dubays once again approached the caliph. It is 
thought that the open hostility of the inhabitants of Baghdad, who armed themselves 
against the possibility of Dubays' arrival, prevented the caliph from accepting 
reconciliation. Soon after Ahmadili (October 5, 1129), Sultan Mahmud also arrived in 
Baghdad (October 18, 1129). While Ahmadili advanced on I-Iilla, Dubays sent an envoy 
to the sultan threatening to withdraw to the desert unless the caliph agreed to a pardon. 
Sultan Mahmud refused and Dubays took the sultan's son with him. After news arrived 
that l)ubays had occupied Basra and pillaged both the sultan and caliph's estates, Sultan 
Mahmud also dispatched the commander Ktzu. Sultan Mahmud appears to have 
remained in Baghdad while Ahmadili and Ktzti pursued Dubays without success (1130) 
[Ibid. 140-8]. 
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}-laving left Sultan Mahmud's son with the commander of a fortress in Syria, Dubays is 
said to have sought refuge with the Crusaders. Apparently unsuccessful, he was later 
caught by the deceased Tug-Tekin's son Bori Ouly 6, 1131). On Tug-Tekin's death 
(I-1ebruary 11, 1128), Zengi had prepared to march on Damascus but Great Sultan 
Sancar's decision to assign Mosul and its environs to Dubays had forced him to abort. 
Subsequently he had imprisoned Bori's son, Sevin<;, and taken l-lama when Bori sent 
him in response to Zengi's request for support against the Crusaders (September 24, 
1130). On learning of Dubays' capture, the caliph sent a letter to Damascus asking Bori 
to surrender him. Although Bori accepted, while he was waiting for the caliph's soldiery 
Zengi offered to release his son Sevin<; with 50,000 dinars in exchange for Dubays 
(October 2, 1131). Having intercepted the caliph's envoy and soldiery en route to 
Damascus and plundered their baggage train before sending them back to Baghdad, 
Zengi released Dubays [Alptekin, IA Vol. 13:526ffj. 
While still in Baghdad, Sultan Mahmud learnt of his brother Mascud's approach 
(February 1131 ). Having declared his son Davud heir apparent, Sultan Mahmud 
prepared to leave in order to meet a possible challenge to his sovereignty despite the 
caliph's protestations that Dubays ·would return to l-Iilla on hearing of his departure. 
The caliph also refused to include Davud's name in the khutba on grounds that such a 
request would have to come from Great Sultan Sancar. Once back in l-Iamadan, 
ho\vever, Sultan Mahmud appears to have been successful in arranging a meeting \vith 
i\1asc ud at which the brothers were reconciled. I-Iaving snubbed Great Sultan San car's 
envoy, Sultan Mahmud arrested some of his commanders and confiscated the 
disposable wealth of the inhabitants of I-Iamadan before omitting the Great Sultan's 
name from the khutba in Iraq al-Ajam, Azarbayjan and Arran. As he \vas preparing to 
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. march on Baghdad with the intention of replacing Caliph al-Mustarshid, Sultan 
Mahmud fell ill and died (September 11, 1131) [I<oymen, 1984:164-9 & 173]. 
6. 7 Dissension 
Although some of the commanders supported the heir apparent Davud's accession and 
succeeded in having the khutba read in his name outside Iraq al-Arab, the caliph refused 
their application. Sultan Mahmud's vizier Dergi.izini also appears to have journeyed to 
Rayy with among others the commanders Porsukoglu Porsuk, K.tztl, Karasungur, 
Karadogan and their soldiery to await Great Sultan Sancar's orders. At the time Great 
Sultan Sancar is known to have been in Samarkand. It appears that after the Karakhanid 
Arslan Khan had suffered a stroke that left him partially incapacitated his son Nasr 
Khan took over the affairs of state. Nasr Khan is said to have been unpopular, 
particularly among the Karluk who made up the majority of the Karakhanids' fighting 
force. When Nasr Khan was killed by an Alawi who conspired with the ra'is (head of 
the town militia) of Samarkand, Arslan Khan sent word to his other son (Mahmud?) in 
Turkistan as well as to Great Sultan Sancar. On arrival his son appears to have killed the 
Alawi and imprisoned the ra'is despite their proclamation of allegiance. Arslan Khan is 
said to have informed his father-in-law of this development and withdrawn his 
invitation, sending a detachment of soldiery whose attempt to assassinate Great Sultan 
Sancar during a hunt en route appears to have been thwarted by the Khwarazmshah 
Atstz. As a result, the sultan took Samarkand by force and allowed his soldiery to pillage 
it (April 1130), sending Arslan Khan to Marv where he died sometime afterwards. 
During the year or more he is thought to have spent in Samarkand, Great Sultan Sancar 
appears to have appointed a commander Hasan Tekin (KtL.y Tamgay Khan) as his 
187 
. regent. When 1-Iasan Tekin died after his return to Khurasan, however, Great Sultan 
San car accepted Arslan Kahn's son Mahmud as the Karakhanid ruler [Ibid. 158-63 & 
174-5; also Kafesoglu, 1956:45-6 & SO]. 
On Davud's accession Mascud appears to have journeyed to Shehrizor and gained the 
support of its commander Ktpc;ak (see above, 6.6). With these Ti.irkmen he seems to 
have taken Tabriz where for a time his nephew besieged him (October 1131). Davud is 
thought to have retired when his commanders decided to support Mascud instead. 
Mascud is next reported in I-Iamadan, from where he requested that the caliph have the 
khutba read in his name. The caliph refused on grounds that such a request had to 
come first from Great Sultan Sancar. In the meantime Zengi is said to have agreed to 
support Mascud. Soon afterwards Selc;uk-Shah arrived in Baghdad at the head of his 
forces from Fars and Khuzistan (which may also have been Ti.irkmen). Although the 
caliph allowed Selc;uk-Shah to take up residence in the Seljuk palace in Baghdad he does 
not appear to have included his name in the khutba. While Mascud waited en route to 
Baghdad for Zengi to join him, Selc;uk-Shah's atabeg Karaca attacked and defeated 
Zengi near Samarra. As a result Mascud appears to have come to an agreement with his 
brother Selc;uk-Shah and Caliph al-Mustarshid to topple Great Sultan Sancar who they 
learnt had arrived in Rayy at the head of his army Qanuary-February 1132). Accordingly, 
although Mascud was to be sultan and Selc;uk-Shah his heir apparent, Iraq al-Arab was 
to be ruled by the caliph's regent. When the caliph followed Mascud and Selc;uk-Shah 
out of Baghdad (March 27, 1132), however, he did not have their names included in the 
khutba from which c;reat Sultan Sancar's was omitted [Ibid. 176-81, 185 & 190; Si.imer, 
IA Vol. 8:136 & 1965:113; Alptekin, IA Vol. 13:526ffj. 
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. Caliph al-Mustarshid did not join Mascud and Sel<;uk-Shah, camping outside Baghdad 
with his soldiery before advancing to I-Ianikin near I--Ialvan (May 21, 1132). The reason 
for this may have been Great Sultan Sancar's order for Zengi and Dubays to attack Iraq 
al-Arab (Baghdad?) while he advanced with Tugrul from Hamadan. Without Zengi or 
the caliph, Mascud seems to have decided that it was better to retreat to Azarbayjan. 
Certainly when Great Sultan Sancar cut off the route north near Dinavar, Mascud and 
Sel<;uk-Shah are said to have waited for the caliph and his soldiery before being forced 
to give battle (May 26, 1132). Although Karaca followed Ktztl's central attack on Great 
Sultan Sancar, Tugrul and the Khwarazmshah Ats1z surrounded Mascud and Sel<;uk-
Shah's forces from the flanks. Mascud is said to have fled, but it appears he returned on 
Great Sultan Sancar's inducement and was assigned Azarbayjan. There is no mention of 
Sel<;uk-Shah. Tugrul was appointed sultan with Dergi.izini as his vizier. As for Karaca, 
he and Yusuf ~avu~ were beheaded. After this Great Sultan Sancar returned to 
Khurasan, arriving in Nishapur on August 5, 1132 [Ibid 191-200; also Sumer, IA Vol. 
8:136]. 
For his part Caliph al-Mustarshid appears to have returned to Baghdad on learning of 
Zengi and Dubays' approach. In the ensuing battle near Baghdad Zengi and Dubays are 
thought to have been defeated due to the reluctance of their soldiery to fight the caliph 
who is said to have donned the Prophet's vest. Whatever the case, Zengi retreated to 
Tekrit and Dubays returned to I-Iilla. When Zengi offered peace Caliph al-Mustarshid 
demanded that he handed over Dubays, threatening to take Mosul by force if he did not 
comply. Although Zengi did not, Dubays seems to have been unable to re-establish 
himself in I-Iilla, which the caliph had assigned to his commander Iqbal. When his 
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_ soldiery joined him in Wasit, Iqbal and Baranku~ Bazdar are said to have defeated 
Dubays [Ibid. 200-3; also Alptekin, IA Vol. 13:526ffj. 
Meanwhile Davud, who appears to have remained in Tabriz throughout this period, 
advanced on I-Iamadan after the deceased Karaca's sons and his father's former 
commander Baranku~ Zakavi joined him. Once there, however, the commander 
Belengeri and his brothers deserted Davud whose forces were defeated by Tugrul. 
Davud fled to Baghdad with his atabeg Ahmadili Ouly-August 1132), where Mascud 
joined him from Ganja and took up residence in the Seljuk palace (December 1132). 
After the caliph had the khutba read in Mascud's and his heir apparent Davud's names, 
Mascud and his nephew departed for Azarbayjan with the caliph's commander Nazar 
and his soldiery Oanuary 27, 1133). In Azarbayjan Mas cud defeated Sultan Tugrul's 
regent Karasungur after which those iqtac holders \vho were not killed in the fighting 
fled. Mascud then advanced on I-Iamadan and having defeated Sultan Tugrul occupied 
the capital where apparently he had Davud's atabeg Ahmadili assassinated by Ismacilis 
(May 25, 1133). Sultan Tugrul fled to Rayy where the commanders whose iqtacs in 
Azarbayjan had been confiscated joined him. When he journeyed to Isfahan, ho\vever, 
he met with resistance from the inhabitants and was forced to return to Rayy where he 
had his vizier Dergi.izini killed. Pursued by Mascud's forces and possibly defeated en 
route back to Rayy, Sultan Tugrul is thought to have spent the winter in Tabaristan 
before returning with Dubays the following year. In the intervening months Sultan 
Tugrul appears to have been able to gain the confidence of Mascud's commanders who 
deserted him on the battlefield Oune 1134). 1-Iaving fled, Mascud reached Baghdad 
dressed as a Ti.irkmen [Ibid. 203-15 & 237-41; Si.imer, lA Vol. 8:137]. 
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. Possibly encouraged by Mascud's initial victory over Sultan Tugrul, the caliph had 
advanced on Zengi with Mascud's permission and the support of thirty Turkic (and 
Turkmen?) commanders aune 1133). !-laving arrived outside Mosul Ouly 26, 1133) the 
caliph besieged the city for 80 days but without success. After he had returned to 
Baghdad, Zengi sought to appease the caliph with gifts while attacking and defeating the 
commander of I-Iisn Kayfa, who had helped the caliph (April 26, 1134) [Ibid 215-8; 
Alptekin, IA Vol. 13:526ffj. Mascud remained in Baghdad despite pressure by the caliph 
to advance on Sultan Tugrul in I-Iamadan. Sel<;uk-Shah also appears to have been in 
Baghdad at the time. When the caliph discovered that the commanders who had 
supported him against Zengi had been in touch with Sultan Tugrul, he arrested one of 
them but this caused the remainder to defect to Mascud. As a result Caliph al-
Mustarshid asked Mascud to leave (October 15, 1134), but Mascud appears to have 
camped outside Baghdad. He is said to have remained there despite a gift of 30,000 
dinars from the caliph, presumably in aid of his campaign against Sultan Tugrul [Ibid 
242-7; Sumer, IA Vol. 8:137]. 
Mascud journeyed to Hamadan only after receiving news of Sultan Tugrul's sudden 
death (October 24, 1134). His arrival appears to have prevented commanders such as 
Ktztl, Sungur and Baranku~ Bazdar from deciding on their own Seljukid candidate. 
These and other commanders are said to have been opposed to Mascud due to his wife, 
Sultan Berk-Yaruk's daughter Zubaydah Khatun's patronage of Karasungur, Sultan 
Tugrul's former regent in Azarbayjan, whom Mascud had ousted. With Sultan Tugrul 
dead, Great Sultan Sancar clearly accepted Mascud's accession, ordering him to behead 
among others the commanders Porsukoglu Porsuk, Ktztl and Baranku~ Bazdar whom 
he seems to have blamed for Sultan Tugrul's problems. Instead of following Great 
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Sultan Sancar's order, however, apparently Sultan Mascud showed the letter to the 
commanders in an attempt to gain their confidence. Presumably because Davud's 
commanders also proclaimed their allegiance to Sultan Mascud, these commanders are 
said to have asked the caliph to send them a Seljukid prince of his choice (Sel<;uk-Shah?) 
to lead them against Sultan Mascud from Porsukoglu Porsuk's iqtac in Khuzistan [Ibid. 
248-53; Siimer, IA Vol. 8:137J. 
Presumably because Dubays was with them, at first the caliph appears to have refused 
their approach. After they tried to capture Dubays and he escaped to rejoin Sultan 
Mascud, the caliph sent word that he was on his way. On learning of this Sultan Mascud 
is said to have advanced on Khuzistan, which caused the commanders to flee to 
Baghdad. After having confiscated the commanders' property, Sultan Mascud pillaged 
Porsukoglu Porsuk's iqtac. At this juncture Zengi appears to have sent his son to the 
caliph with the keys of Mosul (November 20, 1134). Although Dubays also sent an 
envoy requesting to be pardoned, this was refused (November 21, 1134). Soon 
afterwards the shihna for Basra, Beg-Aba, seems to have proclaimed his allegiance to 
Caliph al-Mustarshid. When Sultan Mascud's advance units appeared near I--Iulvan under 
Dubays' command, the caliph asked Zengi and Beg-Aba to join him and sent out his 
own advance units. Dubays who had received reinforcements from the sultan defeated 
these and they returned to Baghdad (May 4, 1135). After replacing Great Sultan Sancar 
and Sultan Mascud's names with Davud's in the khutba, the caliph asked for and gained 
a fatwa from jurists in Baghdad for war on Sultan Mascud. Despite his vizier's advice to 
the contrary, Caliph al-Mustarshid fmally gave the order to advance (May 25, 1135). On 
route Beg-Aba deserted to Sultan Mascud, but Porsukoglu Porsuk joined with his 
soldiery. Nevertheless, the caliph seems to have made slow progress, providing Sultan 
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_ Mas'.ud with the opportunity to entice the Turkic commanders leading his forces with 
the promise of new iqta'"s [Ibid. 255-60; Si.imer, IA Vol. 8:137-8]. 
On learning that Sultan Mascud was approaching at the head of his forces, Caliph al-
Mustarshid is said to have held a war council in Kirmanshah Qune 22, 1135). The 
purpose of this appears to have been to persuade his vizier and the commanders to turn 
back. Advised that it was now too late, the caliph accepted battle Qune 24, 1135). It 
seems that many of the Turkic commanders defected or begged mercy and as a result 
the caliph was captured. When Sultan Mascud ordered those non-Turkic soldieries that 
had remained with the caliph to be killed they appear to have fled. Having brought the 
caliph to I-Iamadan, Sultan Mascud gave him an ultimatum. Caliph al-Mustarshid was to 
pay an undisclosed sum in war reparations, disband his remaining soldiery and never 
campaign again. Sultan Mascud also appointed Beg-Aba shihna to Baghdad where his 
arrival seems to have caused riots, resulting in some 150 inhabitants losing their lives at 
the hands of the Seljuks' soldiery. Beg-Aba had the city walls partially destroyed and 
took over the caliph's fledgling administration in Iraq al-Arab. After a brief campaign to 
Azarbayjan Quly 1135), Sultan Mascud is said to have received a letter from Great Sultan 
Sancar directing him to return the caliph to Baghdad after surrendering Dubays to him 
Quly 13, 1135). Instead Sultan Mascud persuaded the caliph to pardon Dubays before 
preparations were begun for his return. While these were in progress, allegedly a military 
detachment sent by Great Sultan Sancar arrived. During the ceremony welcoming its 
commander, Caliph al-Mustarshid is said to have been maimed and then killed by 
seventeen Isma\lis of \vhom seven were caught (August 29 or 31, 1135). Soon 
afterwards Sultan Mascud appears to have had Dubays killed for the caliph's murder 
[Ibid. 270-83; Si.imer, IA Vol. 8:138; Turan, 1965:199]. 
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Whether or not as claimed the Seljuks had the caliph killed, his death remained a source 
of contention between the two houses. Possibly because the amount was excessive, 
Caliph al-Rashid rejected to pay his father's promissory note for war reparations, which 
was presented to him on behalf of Sultan Mascud by Baranku~ Zakavi (October 29, 
1135). When Baranku~ insisted, he and Beg-Aba were forcibly ejected from Baghdad 
and the Seljuks' palace pillaged. Beg-Aba retired to Wasit and Baranku~ returned to 
I-Iamadan. Soon afterwards Davud arrived in Baghdad (October 14, 1135). Zengi 
followed with his charge Alp-Arslan whom he wanted declared sultan. Those 
commanders opposed to Sultan Mascud then joined them. After some delay Davud's 
name replaced Great Sultan Sancar and Sultan Mascud's in the khutba (November 22, 
1135). When Caliph al-Rashid arrested his father's trusted commander Iqbal and 
confiscated his wealth, however, Zengi demanded his release. After he had secured this, 
he demanded and received the money the caliph had confiscated from Iqbal. Zengi then 
consolidated his influence by appointing Davud's vizier. The caliph left Baghdad at the 
head of his forces to meet Sultan Mascud (May 27, 1136), but Zengi appears to have 
remained behind. On learning from Zengi that Sultan Mascud was planning a surprise 
raid, the caliph and his forces returned to Baghdad Qune 7, 1136). Zengi defeated Sultan 
Mascud's advance units. Although at first the sultan seems to have been unable to gain 
the confidence of the caliph's Turkic commanders, apparently he was able to sow 
distrust bet:\veen them. On realizing this Zengi is said to have decided to leave for 
Mosul, offering the caliph refuge there. Possibly afraid that he would be killed like his 
father had been, Caliph al-Rashid appears to have accepted this offer (August 14, 1136) 
lfbid. 285-96; Alptekin, IA Vol. 13:526ff; Siimer, IA Vol. 8:138; Kafesoglu, 1956:26]. 
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. As a result, after having besieged Baghdad for fifty days Sultan Mascud entered the city 
(August 15, 1136). Once he had established order, he appointed al-Muqtafi caliph 
(August 18, 1136). Sultan Mascud then confiscated the caliph's horses and treasury, 
including the jewellery of his harem. After Great Sultan Sancar had recognized Caliph 
al-Muqtafi, he ordered Sultan Mascud to ask Zengi to expel al-Rashid from Mosul. Thus 
ousted, while in Sincar al-Rashid is said to have sought help from Sultan Mascud (1116-
56) of the Seljuk Sultanate of Anatolia, not to mention the Dani~mendid Muhammad 
(1134-42), but without success. Once in Azarbayjan, however, Davud and the governors 
of Fars and Khuzistan, Mengii-Pars and Boz-Aba, ostensibly took up his cause. Sultan 
Mascud sent Karasungur to Azarbayjan, but when he was repelled the sultan advanced 
from Baghdad and defeated Davud, having Mengii-Pars killed immediately. While the 
sultan's forces were busy pillaging, however, Boz-Aba counter-attacked and captured 
most of the commanders, having them killed to avenge Mengii-Pars. Sultan Mas(~ud fled 
to Azarbayjan while Davud quickly occupied Ramadan. Evidently in charge, Boz-Aba 
appears to have decided to occupy Mengii-Pars's iqtac instead of either pursuing Sultan 
Mascud or occupying Baghdad. Consequently, Davud and al-Rashid seem to have 
journeyed to Fars with Boz-Aba. While subsequently preparing to march on Isfahan, 
allegedly al-Rashid was assassinated by the Ismacilis Qune 8, 1138) [Ibid. 298-305; also 
Sumer, IA Vol. 8:138, Turan, 1965:199 & Kafesoglu, 1956:26]. 
6.8 Defeat at Katvan 
While Sultan Mascud was struggling to assert his sovereignty over Iraq and Azarbayjan, 
Great Sultan Sancar was forced to reassert his authority over the Ghaznavids and the 
Khwarazmshah. First he appears to have set out against Sultan Bahram-Shah for 
195 
withholding the annual tribute (August-September, 1135). When Great Sultan Sancar 
arrived outside Ghazna despite the onset of winter, Sultan Bahram-Shah asked to be 
pardoned. Nonetheless, he seems to have balked at proclaiming his allegiance in person 
and withdrawn to India. Great Sultan Sancar entered Ghazna uncontested and having 
collected the taxes due confiscated all the removable wealth therein. l-Ie returned to 
Khurasan after receiving another envoy from Sultan Bahram-Shah and ostensibly 
pardoning him Guly 1136) [Ibid 306-11 ]. 
As on the campaign to Iraq al-Ajam, which ended with the battle at Dinavar (May 26, 
1132), the Khwarazmshah Atstz accompanied the sultan to Ghazna. Prior to that, Atstz 
is credited with discovering the plot by the Karakhanid Arslan-Khan to have Great 
Sultan Sancar killed while in Transoxania (1130). Although Koymen cited the 
commanders' jealousy of Atstz's fame and standing as having influenced the sultan 
against him, which he argues Atstz became aware of during the campaign to Ghazna, 
Kafesoglu discounted these reports as the reason for Atstz's behaviour on returning 
from Ghazna. Whatever the cause, Atstz appears to have started a many faceted 
campaign. While extending his dominion in bloody battles against the Ti.irkmen on the 
Mankishlag peninsula on the north-eastern coast of the Caspian Sea and toward Jand, 
he is said to have tried to affiliate also the Ti.irkmen in the environs of Marv, the Seljuk 
capital. When the sultan accused Atstz of spilling Muslim blood without his permission, 
Atstz arrested the Scljuk officials in Khwarazm and confiscated their wealth [Ibid 311-4; 
Kafesoglu, 1956:47; Si.imer, 1965:102-3]. 
Great Sultan Sancar embarked on the campaign to Khwarazm from Balkh (September 
1138). !-laving opened the irrigation canals and flooded the surrounding countryside 
along the Amu-Darya, Atstz awaited the sultan at the fortress of I-Iezaresb, en route to 
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his capital Gurganj. Although M. A Koymen argued that the sultan progressed slowly in 
order to give Atstz an opportunity to desist, Kafesoglu was of the opinion that due to 
the flooding Great Sultan Sancar was forced to traverse the desert in order to reach 
I-Iezaresb, which was on the river. At the battle that took place (November 16, 1138), 
the Khwarazmian soldiery dispersed and Atstz was forced to flee. The sultan had Atstz's 
son Atlig, who was among the captured, killed. Similar to the death of Caliph al-
Mustarshid, this remained a cause for contention between the Khwarazmshahs and the 
Seljuks. Although Great Sultan Sancar re-occupied Khwarazm and assigned it to his 
youngest nephew (February 1139), Atstz returned and having defeated Si.ileyman-Shah 
forced him to flee with the Seljuk commanders and officials. Soon afterwards he raided 
Bokhara, capturing and killing its governor and partially destroying the city walls [Ibid. 
318-20; Kafesoglu, 1956:48-9]. 
Meanwhile the Jurchen had superseded the Khitay, who had founded the Liao dynasty 
in northern China (936-1122). Although many of the Khitay accepted Jurchen rule, a 
small group led by Yeh-li.i Tah-shi, a member of the Khitay dynasty, fled westward into 
the Tarim Basin (1123). Having subjugated the Uygurs in Turfan, Ku<;a and Be~balig, 
the Khitay attempted to incorporate Kashgar. Unable to expand south against the Sung 
dynasty, the Khitay had attempted and failed to conquer l(ashgar and the Issyk-Kol 
region once before (1 017). This time the Karakhanid Arslan Khan defeated them 
(1128). As a result the Khitay appear to have turned north (1130), only to be forced 
westward by the Kugtz. I--Iaving established the city Imil east of Lake Balkash, Yeh-li.i 
Tah-shi was joined by other groups [Kafesoglu, 1956:51-2]. 
According to Barthold, these were 16,000 tents of Khitay that had left their homelands 
in Manchuria [IA Vol. 6:273-6 & 257]. Kafesoglu, on the other hand, asserted that 
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. according to Ibn al-Asir they were 'furkic people who included 16,000 tents 
discontented with Karakhanid rule. l-Ie argued that as Great Sultan Sancar was in 
Transoxania at the time due to the problems Nasr Khan was having with the Karluk 
(1130-1 ), most likely these groups consisted of the Karluk and the Kangh. In this 
context he also pointed out that the J(arakhanid ruler of Balasagun, who subsequently 
asked help of Yeh-lu Tah-shi, did so in order to deal with the unruly Kangh west of 
Issyk-Kol. Sumer thought there was little doubt the Kara-Khitay had displaced the 
I(angh who pushed the Oguz and Karluk into Transoxania ahead of them. Accordingly, 
some of the Oguz Av~ar, Salur and Y1va lineages continued into Iraq al-Ajam, namely 
Khuzistan and Shehrizor. While those Oguz who remained in Transoxania were able to 
establish good relations with the Karakhanids and were allowed to nomadize the 
pastures north and northeast of Bokhara, the Karluk rebelled against Nasr Khan (see 
above, 6.1). Turan agreed that the Oguz were in Transoxaoia at the time [Kafesoglu, 
1956:52-3; Sumer, 1965:100; Turan, 1965:189]. 
In sum, having affiliated the Kangh and Karluk and hence become known as Kur Khan, 
or the Khan qf Khans, Yeh-lu Tah-shi established the Kara-Khitay Empire (1124-1211) 
by occupying Balasagun and soon afterwards taking I<hoten on the southern edge of 
the Tarim Basin, not to mention Kashgar (1137) [Kafesoglu, 1956:53]. 
Not surprisingly, when the Karluks rebelled against Mahmud Khan in Samarkand they 
appear to have sought the Kara-Khitay's help. When Mahmud Khan was defeated he 
asked Great Sultan Sancar for help. After receiving Ats1z's proclamation of allegiance 
(May 25, 1141), the sultan advanced on Transoxania with an army consisting of forces 
from Sistan, Gur, Ghazna and Mazandaran Guly 1141). Once in Samarkand he appears 
to have sent his commanders against the Karluks who are said to have tried and failed 
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_ to appease him with a gift of 15,000 camels, 5,000 horses and 50,000 sheep. Whether or 
not this was the case, Klir Khan sent the sultan a letter asking for their pardon. Despite 
his vi2ier, Nizam al-Mulk's grandson Nasr al-Din Tahir's counsel to the contrary, in his 
reply Great Sultan Sancar threatened that unless Kur Khan accepted Islam he would 
march against him. At the battle that took place in Katvan, near Samarkand, the Kara-
Khitay are thought to have applied cavalry tactics that were not yet known in Central 
Asia. As a result the Seljuks \Vere surrounded and driven against the Dergam River 
where many drowned (September 9, 1141). Great Sultan Sancar is said to have broken 
through and fled to Tirmiz when the malik for Sistan, al-Fazl Nasr stood under the 
royal canopy (set!] in his stead. The Seljuks are said to have lost more than 30,000 men, 
including as many as 4,000 commanders and officials. The I<ara-Khitay, \vho are 
thought to have numbered at most 25,000 men - Karluk, Khitay and Chinese (the 
Khitay from Manchuria?)- also appear to have suffered heavy losses. Kiir Khan seems 
to have remained at the battlefield for some three months [Koymen, 1984:321-3 & 328-
32; Turan, 1965:190-1; Barthold, IA Vol. 6:274]. 
While in Tirmiz, Great Sultan Sancar returned Mazandaran to the Seljuks of Iraq and 
asked Sultan Mascud to await his orders in Rayy. l--Ie also asked for soldiery from Sistan, 
whose malik al-Fazl Nasr had been captured along with the sultan's daughter Tiirkan 
Khatun (Arslan Khan's widow) and his commander of the right wing, Kamac, and the 
latter's son. Although al-Fazl Nasr was released for his chivalrous behaviour on the field, 
Turkan Khatun and Kamac had to pay 500,000 and 100,000 dinars ransom respectively, 
apparently remaining in captivity for nearly a year. With Great Sultan Sancar thus 
occupied, Atstz occupied Serakhs in K.hurasan (October 1141). From there he advanced 
on the capital Marv, which he entered after some resistance (October 21, 1141). Having 
199 
. killed those religious leaders who had incited the inhabitants to resist, he took Great 
Sultan Sancar's treasury and many jurists and poets with him to Khwarazm. The main 
reason for his return, however, appears to have been the Kara-Khitay who had begun to 
raid the region. This suggests that Turan was wrong to assume Atstz was provoking the 
Kara-I<hitay against the Scljuks. Once he had agreed to pay an annual tribute of 30,000 
dinars Atstz returned to Khurasan and marched on Nishapur where he threatened to 
pillage the city unless the khutba was changed to include his name instead of Great 
Sultan Sancar's. Although this seems to have been accepted despite objections from the 
populace (May 29, 1142), possibly on Great Sultan Sancar's return from Tirmiz the 
khutba once again reverted to his name Quly 1142). During this time Atstz's brother 
Ytnal-Tekin is said to have pillaged much of Khurasan [Ibid. 336-42; Kafesoglu, 
1956:54-6; Turan, 1965:192]. 
Once the Kara-Khitay had established their administration in Transoxania and 
withdrawn, Great Sultan Sancar moved on Khwarazm where he besieged Atstz in the 
capital Gurganj Quly 1143). The Seljuks entered the city but were repulsed. 
Nevertheless, Atstz sent an envoy bearing gifts and begged pardon. This seems to have 
been granted on condition that he returned all he had plundered while in Khurasan and 
proclaimed allegiance. Although Atstz is said to have complied with these conditions, he 
seems to have continued to resist Seljuk authority. When the sultan's envoy to Atstz 
learnt that two Isma'ilis had been sent to assassinate Great Sultan Sancar and these were 
found and killed in Marv, \vhich caused Atstz to drown the envoy in the Amu-Darya, 
the sultan advanced into Kh\varazm (October 1147). Once again Atstz withdrew to the 
fortress of 1-Iezaresb and flooded its environs, but this time he did not come out and 
give battle. After a two-month siege the sultan took Hezaresb by force and Atstz fled to 
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. Gurganj where he begged pardon. Great Sultan Sancar demanded that he proclaim 
allegiance in public, by the banks of the Amu-I)arya River. Contrary to Turan, Atst% 
appears to have refused to kiss the ground as required, but the sultan accepted his 
proclamation Qune 2, 1148) [Ibid. 345-53; Kafesoglu, 1956:58-9; Turan, 1965:192]. 
6.9 Sultan Mascud 
After Davud and al-Rashid journeyed to Fars with Boz-Aba who although victorious 
against Sultan Mascud is thought to have wanted to secure the deceased Mengi.i-Pars' 
iqtac, the sultan seems to have quickly re-established himself. I-Iaving proclaimed his 
allegiance, Sel~uk-Shah was assigned Ahlat with his atabeg Oguzoglu. Nevertheless, 
Siimer [IA Vol. 8:139] and Koymen [1984:392] were of the opinion that during this 
period Zengi continued to undermine the sultan's position not only by provoking the 
commanders against him but also due to his growing renown. 
Zengi had crossed the Euphrates into Syria (May 1137) and besieged I-I.ims when he 
learnt that the Byzantine Emperor Ioannes Comnenus II likewise had entered Syria. In 
response Zengi lifted the siege and instead besieged the Crusader citadel of Bacrin 
(Montferrandus), which controlled the route between Aleppo and Hims. The ruler of 
Tripoli, Count Raymond, asked King Fulk in Jerusalem for help, but Zengi surprised 
them. King Fulk managed to flee to Bac rin but Raymond was captured. Although 
Joscelin II set out from Urfa with the intention of relieving Bacrin, the Crusaders 
capitulated before he could arrive. During the siege of Bacrin Ioannes Comnenus II 
took Antakya. The emperor is said to have sent Zengi an envoy, but he came to an 
agreement with the Crusaders that in the following year Aleppo, Sheyzer, Hama and 
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.l-Iims would be attacked jointly and if taken left to Raymond. Before the onset of 
winter Zcngi also took Ma'arrat al-Nu'man and Kafr Tab from the Crusaders [Alptekin, 
lA Vol. 13:529-30]. 
In the spring a joint Byzantine and Crusader force besieged and took Biiza'a northeast 
of Aleppo (April 9, 1138). This seems to have caught Zengi by surprise. l-Ie sent one of 
his commanders, Ali Kiis:iik, to Aleppo to strengthen the city defenses and asked help 
from Sultan Mascud who was wintering in Baghdad. Seeing that Aleppo was well 
prepared, Ioannes Comnenus II struck camp after three days (April 20, 1138) and 
having taken al-Asarib (April 21, 1138) besieged Sheyzer. Although his forces breached 
the outer walls, the inner citadel resisted for twenty days, after which the emperor raised 
the siege in return for a fee. Despite attempts to draw him into battle, Zengi appears to 
have successfully eluded the emperor who withdrew to Antakya. I-Iaving thus thwarted 
the joint campaign by the Byzantines and the Crusaders, Zengi re-entered Syria, where 
he gained Hims in exchange for Baalbek by marrying Ziimiirriid I<hatun, the mother of 
the ruler of Damascus, Mahmud, who in turn married Zengi's daughter. Zengi then 
attacked and captured Araka from the Crusaders, as well as retaking Bi.iza'a (September 
16, 1138), al-Asarib and Kafr Tab (October 7, 1138) [Ibid. 530]. 
For his part Sultan Mascud seems to have done little other than promise Zengi help, that 
is, until Zengi's envoy the jurist Kamal al-Din succeeded in provoking the populace. 
Kamal al-Din is said to have given money for people to rise and demand action during 
Friday prayers in both the caliph's and the sultan's mosques. Joined by soldiery, 
apparently the populace continued their demonstrations in front of Sultan Mascud's 
palace. Although as a result it seems that the sultan gave orders for an army to be 
prepared, when the Byzantine emperor lifted the siege of Aleppo, Zengi is said to have 
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instructed his envoy to stop Sultan Mascud as he would take the opportunity to occupy 
his lands. It seems Kamal al-Din was successful in this, too, as the sultan's army is said 
to have decamped and returned home [Koymen, 1984:390-1 ]. Possibly Sultan Mascud 
did not trust the commanders in his army to subordinate Zengi. Certainly during the 
following year he appears to have lost what little authority he may have had over them. 
After al-Rashid's assassination Sultan Mascud had dismissed his v121er who was 
subsequently killed on his orders. Appointed on Great Sultan Sancar's instigation, al-
Berekat is said to have formulated Seljukid policy against al-Rashid. Nevertheless, Sultan 
Mascud's new vizier, al-1-Iazin, had been responsible for Great Sultan Sancar's Treasury 
before serving as governor in Rayy. The vizier appears to have been highly successful in 
reforming the administration and increasing ta.x revenue during his short tenure. As a 
result the commanders united behind Karasungur, Davud's atabeg in Azarbayjan, who 
sent an ultimatum to Sultan Mascud, which threatened that unless they were sent the 
vizier's head they would serve another sultan. Karasungur is said to have brought a large 
army with Davud to the outskirts of I-Iamadan in order to make his point. When Sultan 
Mascud capitulated, Karasungur imposed his O\vn vizier 'Izz al-Mulk in al-Hazin's stead 
Oune 1139). Although Karasungur next journeyed to Fars and dispossessed Boz-Aba, 
assigning it to Sel<;uk-Shah whom he instated as malik, Boz-Aba appears to have 
returned and imprisoned the prince in a fortress where he subsequently died or was 
killed [Ibid. 383-4; Siimer, IA Vol. 8:138-9]. 
Even though Karasungur died soon afterwards (1040/1), Sultan Mascud does not seem 
to have regained a significant measure of authority over his commanders who are 
thought to have become the sole arbitrators as concerns the distribution of iqtacs. When 
on being defeated at Katvan Great Sultan Sancar returned Rayy to Sultan Mascud and 
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asked him to journey there with his forces to await further orders, 'Izz al-Mulk appears 
to have objected that Sawa would be a better choice. I-Iowever, the commanders are said 
to have sided with Great Sultan Sancar's envoy Abbas, who was the governor of Rayy, 
so that Sultan Mascud finally did as he had been asked. According to Koymen, since he 
is not mentioned in this context the sultan appears to have had litde say in whether 
orders should be awaited in Sawa or Rayy [Ibid. 385-8; Siimer, IA Vol. 8:139]. 
While Sultan Mascud was dealing with Karasungur's ultimatum, the ruler of Damascus, 
Mahmud, was killed by one of his men Qune 23, 1139), the isfahsalar Oner, who 
succeeded in instating Mahmud's brother Muhammad (1139/40). As a result Mahmud's 
other brother Bahram-Shah seems to have sought refuge with Zengi. I-Iaving been 
invited by Ziimiirriid Khatun to attack Damascus, Zengi first took Baalbek (October 
20, 1139). Next, he cut off all routes to Damascus (December 6, 1139), but on learning 
that the inhabitants were prepared to resist he lifted the blockade. When Muhammad 
died soon afterwards (March 29, 1140), however, and his son Abak was instated, Zengi 
marched on Damascus. This seems to have prompted the deceased Muhammad's vizier 
Oner to make a pact \vith King Fulk in Jerusalem. Accordingly, Abak would pay the king 
20,000 dinars tribute each month as well as joindy attacking Zengi's citadel Banyas, 
which if taken would remain with the Crusaders. As a result Zengi withdrew to I-Iavran 
where he seems to have waited for a month in case of a Crusader advance against him. 
When this did not materialize Zengi returned to Guta, near Damascus. While Zengi was 
in Guta, his commander in Banyas, Ibrahim Turgut, attacked a Crusader force en route 
to Jerusalem, but lost his life. This time Zengi seems to have withdrawn to Hama while 
a combined force from Damascus and Jerusalem besieged Banyas, which surrendered. 
Undeterred by the Crusaders' occupation of Banyas, Zengi is said to have assigned 
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. Baalbck to a group of Y1va 'I'i.irkmen from Arbil and Shehrizor, and in a surprise move 
besieged l)amascus Oune 22, 1140). Apparently Abak capitulated and accepted to have 
the khutba read in Zengi's name. On his way back to Mosul, Zengi also took the 
fortification of Bahmard by force from the commander l)avud of I-Iisn Kayfa 
[Alptekin, IA Vol. 13:530-1; Si.imer, 1965:117]. 
Apart from the commander for Mardin in south-eastern Anatolia proclaiming his 
allegiance to Zengi (1141), there appears to have been little if any activity in Iraq until 
Sultan Mascud gathered an army and announced that he intended to march on Zengi 
(1144). While the sultan was preparing his forces in Baghdad, Zengi is said to have 
offered 100,000 dinars but claimed he was too busy fighting the Crusaders to proclaim 
his allegiance to Sultan Mascud in person. Instead, he appears to have sent his eldest son 
Sayf al-Din Gazi as hostage. Possibly this is when the sultan ordered Zengi to take Urfa 
from the Crusaders. According to another rumour Sultan Mascud intended to assign 
Davud to take the figh~ to the Crusaders but Zengi had him killed in Tabriz by the 
Ismacilis. Whatever the case, on learning that Joscelin II had left Urfa, Zengi sent an 
advance unit under the command of Yagt-S1yan whom he joined with a force of 
Ti.irkmen. Zengi breached the walls and took Urfa, assigning it to his Ti.irkmen 
commander Ali Ki.ic;i.ik (December 24, 1144). Two years afterwards, however, Zengi was 
killed by one of his servants while besieging the fortress of Jaber, which was in the 
hands of the Uqailids (September 14, 1146) [Ibid. 531-2; also Koymen, 1984:393 & 
Si.imer, lA Vol. 8:139 & 1965:116]. 
The year following the fall of Urfa, the commanders Boz-Aba and Abbas in Fars and 
Rayy respectively seem to have set out from Isfahan \vith an undisclosed number of 
Seljukid princes on the pretext of proclaiming allegiance to Sultan Mascud in Hamadan 
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. (1145). Realizing that they were gc)1ng to depose him, the sultan appears to have 
withdrawn to Baghdad with the commanders Togan Yiirekoglu and Beg Arslan 
(I-Iasbey) when the commander C.::avh Candar failed to join them from Arran. Three 
months later Sultan Mascud met C.::avh in Azarbayjan and marched on the rebellious 
commanders who retired to their iqtacs. The following year the sultan sent Togan 
Yiirekoglu to the Caucasus with Beg Arslan who killed him on his orders, whereupon 
the sultan also had Abbas killed (1146). It seems that Togan Yiirekoglu had joined the 
conspirators. Boz-Aba now instated Sultan Mahmud's son Muhammad in Isfahan and 
marched on Hamadan, but Beg Arslan returned in time from Ardabil, which he had 
taken from Ak-Arslan, and defeated Boz-Aba, having him killed (1147) [Siimer, IA Vol. 
8:139]. 
After this Sultan Mascud is said to have handed over the running of his domains to Beg 
Arslan, the son of an Oguz beg who had migrated to Azarbayjan. Beg Arslan appears to 
have killed some of the commanders against him. As a result those afraid or jealous of 
his growing influence over Sultan Mascud rallied around his nephew Muhammad (1148). 
When the caliph refused to support them, the commanders besieged Baghdad. 
Apparently displeased with Sultan Mascud's dependence on Beg Arslan, Great Sultan 
Sancar once again journeyed to Rayy where Sultan Mascud seems to have persuaded him 
of Beg Arslan's virtues (although Koymen disagreed with .this interpretation [1984:395]). 
During his meeting with Great Sultan Sancar, several of the commanders are said to 
have journeyed from Baghdad to Rayy to proclaim their allegiance. The others appear to 
have proclaimed allegiance upon the sultan's arrival in Baghdad (April 1150). Having 
toured his domains, Sultan Mascud died at the height of his power from typhoid while 
in 1-Iamadan (October 2, 1152) [Ibid. 140]. 
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6.10 The Oguz Rebellion 
It is not known whether the Khwarazmshah Atstz's campaigns into Ost-Yurt and the 
Mankishlag peninsula were against the Ktp<;ak or the Oguz or both. The Ktp<;ak arc 
mentioned in the context of campaigns launched from Jand, cast of Lake Aral, but 
these campaigns are after Katvan, as is the reference to the Oguz destroying the walls of 
Bokhara. This suggests the Oguz migrated south toward the Syr-Darya River after the 
said battle [Kafesoglu, 1956:47, 60, 61 & 67]. Siimer was of the opinion that there was 
an independent Tiirkmen polity centred around the city of Mankishlag, which was 
subjugated by the Khwarazmshah Atstz after a long bloody war, giving cause for Great 
Sultan Sancar to accuse him of spilling Muslim blood. Accordingly, in the first half of 
the 12th century the main body of the Oguz who were organized as the Boz-Ok and 
0<;-0k shared pasturage and water with the Karluk to the north and east of Bokhara. 
Possibly due to the growing number of the Karluk they were forced south into 
Tocharistan just prior to Katvan [1965: 1 00-4]. There is also the report that a certain 
Zengi who wanted to co-opt them against Great Sultan Sancar's commander Kamac, 
the governor of Balkh, invited the Oguz. This appears to have failed when instead they 
sided with Kamac who promised them pasturage in the environs of Balkh. Even if so, 
the Oguz seem to have also deserted Kamac in a battle against the Gurid Ala al-Din 
Hussein, which enabled the latter to occupy Balkh [Koymen, 1984:406]. Whatever the 
case, haYing arrived in Tocharistan the Oguz became affiliated to Great Sultan Sancar 
during his ensuing campaign against the Gurids. 
After Katvan the Gurids appear to have taken Herat on the invitation of its inhabitants 
and successfully resisted Great Sultan Sancar's commander Kamac's efforts to retake it, 
possibly with help from the Oguz. As this endangered neighboring Sistan, its malik al-
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. Fazl Nasr is known to have offered military assistance, but the Gurids seem to have 
accepted to pay an annual tribute. Since this is thought to have taken place during the 
offensives in Khwarazm, it may explain why tnatters appear to have been left there 
(March 1147) [Ibid. 353-60]. 
Subsequently, however, Muhammad, a member of the Gurid ruling dynasty, appears to 
have fallen out with his half-brothers Mascud and Suri who was the senior by blood. As 
a result Muhammad is said to have sought refuge in Ghazna with Sultan Bahram-Shah 
who poisoned him because he was persuaded that Muhammad was trying to overthrow 
him. On learning of his brother's death, Sayf al-Din Suri marched on Ghazna and 
Sultan Bahram-Shah withdrew to Lahore. Possibly lulled into a false sense of security by 
the support he received from the Ghaznavid administration, Suri is said to have allowed 
most of his soldiery to return home. Consequently, when Sultan Bahram-Shah 
advanced from Lahore at the head of his army (March 13, 1149), he was forced to try 
and supplement his remaining forces with Oguz tribesmen and local militia. After some 
skirmishes between their advance units near Kabul (May 11, 1149), Sultan Bahram-Shah 
defeated Suri (May 12, 1149). Suri fled but was caught and hanged in Ghazna (May 19, 
1149) [Ibid. 360-7]. 
When Suri's brother Sam died of his 'grief' en route to Ghazna, the task of avenging 
the deaths of his brothers fell on Ala al-Din Hussein. This time Sultan Bahram-Shah 
withdrew into Sistan, but I-Iussein pursued and defeated him twice in succession. Once 
again the sultan fled to Lahore. Hussein took Ghazna by force and allowed his soldiery 
to burn and pillage the city for 'seven days and nights'. He is said to have also dug up 
the bones of Sultan Bahram-Shah's ancestors and burnt them \vhile exhuming his 
brothers' remains for proper burial in Gur. These actions seem to have earned him the 
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. distinction Jihansuz (burner of the world). Be that as it may, Suri had Great Sultan 
Sancar's name omitted from the khutba. Now J-fussein refused to send the annual 
tribute. After his visit to Rayy (1150), Great Sultan Sancar moved against the Gurids 
with support from al-Fazl Nasr in Sistan. Some of the Oguz appear to have defected 
during the batde that ensued Gune 24, 1152?). I-Iussein was captured and sent to Marv 
[Ibid 368-82 & 396]. 
It appears that as Great Sultan Sancar's affiliates the Oguz were expected to supply 
24,000 sheep each year for use in the palace kitchens in Marv, which Si.imer thought 
possibly showed they did not consist of 40,000 tents as other Turkish scholars appear to 
have accepted [1965:104]. The Oguz killed the tax collector because they claimed he 
insulted them when they refused to bribe him. Although the chamberlain responsible 
for the sultan's kitchens seems to have met the shortfall from his personal income, 
Kamac, the governor of Balkh, is said to have brought the issue to Great Sultan 
Sancar's attention and persuaded him to appoint him shihna to the Oguz as well. 
According to Koymen, who based his conclusion on records concerning the Turkmen 
in the Caspian Lowlands, a shihna was responsible for the establishment of migration 
routes, the protection of peasants and townsfolk along these, and the timely collection 
of tribal taxes. When the Oguz refused to recognise him, Kamac marched on them but 
he and his son lost their lives in the battle that followed [1984:400-1 & 406-9]. 
Although the Oguz appear to have offered Great Sultan San car 100,000 dinars for 
having killed Kamac and his son, as well as 1,000 Turkic slaves, his commanders 
entreated him not to let the Oguz insubordination go unpunished. As a result the sultan 
tnarched on Balkh where the Oguz are said to have begged pardon \vith their women 
and children, increasing their offer. Apparendy Kamac's grandson, no\v the commander 
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. for Balkh, and others prevented Great Sultan Sancar from accepting this improved 
offer. According to Koymen, when the Seljuk forces attacked the main Oguz 
encampment, they were annihilated and Great Sultan Sancar was taken prisoner (March-
April 1153) [1984:409-12]. According to Siimcr, however, Sancar fled toward Balkh. l-Ie 
was pursued and suffered another defeat after which he fled to Marv. On learning that 
the Oguz were approaching Marv he is said to have withdrawn. The Oguz are known to 
have sacked the city Quly 1153). Accordingly, soon afterwards they captured Great 
Sultan Sancar and brought him back [1965:105]. What seems certain is that they 
declared San car their sultan and seated him on his throne. Nevertheless, when San car 
refused the chieftain Bahtiyar's demand that he be assigned part of Marv, they sacked 
the city again. On their return to Balkh, while continuing to guard him during the day, 
the Oguz appear to have caged Sancar at night. But once they started to pillage 
Khurasan in earnest, Sancar appears to have been permanently caged and on occasion 
totally ignored so that he may have come near to starving [Koymen, 1984:414-7; Turan, 
1965:195]. 
Presumably because the remainder of the Seljuks' forces in Khurasan were dispersed on 
their iqtacs, many of which had reverted to the Treasury after Katvan [Turan, 1965:191-
2], at first the Oguz do not seem to have encountered any serious resistance. Those 
commanders who could appear to have gathered in Tabaristan, immediately south of 
the Caspian Sea, where possibly on the imprisoned sultan's vizier Fakhr al-Mulk's 
instigation they agreed to support Sultan Tapar's remaining son Silleyman-Shah who 
had been released on Sultan Mascud's death. Si.ileyman-Shah seems to have been 
declared sultan in Nishapur (September 4, 1153), while attempting to engage the Oguz 
who were busy sacking Marv for the second time (August-September 1153). Presumably 
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. unsuccessful, Siileyman-Shah eventually fled to Iraq (April-May 1154). During the 
following year the Oguz sacked Khurasan, entering Mashhad and Tus (November 
1154), then Nishapur (December 1154), where they may have appointed their one and 
only governor [Koymen, 1984:419, 428-30, 434-5 & 449; Kafesoglu, 1956:62-3; Siimer, 
1965:105; I-Ioutsma, IA Vol. 8:480-1]. Koymen came to the conclusion that at least a 
quarter of the urban population of Khurasan died at the hands of the Oguz in the 
eighteen months afterwards their victory near Balkh [Ibid. 438-45]. 
Meanwhile the Khwarazmshah Ats1z had advanced to Amiil (Amiiye), which was on the 
route from Hezaresb to Marv. Instead of taking the citadel by force he invited the 
commander to proclaim allegiance and \vhen he refused Ats1z applied to Sancar who is 
said to have replied that he could have this and more if he dispatched his son Il-Arslan 
to free him. Ats1z retired to Khwarazm but is thought to have sent his brother Ylnal-
Tigin who besieged Beyhak and raided its environs with such ferocity that the region 
suffered from famine for two years after his departure (from December 1153 to May or 
September 1154). Nevertheless, Ats1z returned to try and form a coalition against the 
Oguz (1154). To this end he is thought to have approached the Saffarid al-Fazl in Sistan, 
the Gurid Ala al-Din Jihansuz and the Bavendid Shah Gazi in Tabaristan. While he was 
thus occupied the Seljuk commanders declared Sancar's nephew the Karakhanid 
Mahmud Khan sultan but contrary to custom he does not seem to have announced his 
investiture to the heads of neighboring states. Certainly throughout this period in 
Baghdad the khutba continued to be read in Great Sultan Sancar's name. Although 
Mahmud Khan does not appear to have had any success against the Oguz, they are 
thought to have withdrawn to Marv and made peace Quly 1155). For his part Mahmud 
Khan seems to have approached Ats1z who apparently responded by arriving in 
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. I<hurasan with his son 11-Arslan (May 1156). I-Iere he learnt that Kamac's grandson 
Muayyad Ay-Aba had freed Sancar who was in Tirmiz (April 1156), his wife Turkan 
Khatun having died in captivity. When Great Sultan Sancar notified the heads of the 
neighboring states of his release, Atstz proclaimed his allegiance, dying of a stroke soon 
afterwards Guly 30, 1156). Before Great Sultan Sancar could re-establish his dominion 
he also died and the Great Seljuk Empire came to an end (April 22 or 29, 1157). Great 
Sultan Sancar had no sons and Khurasan became divided between Mahmud Khan who 
though married to Sancar's daughter at one point tried to join the Oguz, Kamac's 
grandson Muayyad Aba and the Khwarazmshah Atstz's son Il-Arslan (r.1156-72) [Ibid. 
422-6, 449-51 & 454-75; Kafesoglu, 1956:65-72]. 
Elsewhere Ala al-Din Jihansuz, who had been allowed to return to Firuzkuh in Gur on 
proclaiming his allegiance to Great Sultan Sancar, marched on Ghazna. When Sultan 
Bahram-Shah withdrew, he instated his remaining brother. Sultan Bahram-Shah 
returned and having taken Ghazna by force hanged Sayf al-Din. On Sultan Bahram-
Shah's death his son Khusraw-Shah succeeded to the throne. When he was in Lahore, 
Jihansuz took Ghazna by force and declared himself sultan (1155). Jihansuz died soon 
after Great Sultan Sancar's release from captivity (1156) [Ibid. 424-5 & 465; Kafesoglu, 
1956:63]. 
6.11 The Seljuks of Iraq 
Sultan Mascud had declared his nephew Muhammad heir apparent and married him to 
one of his daughters. On Sultan Mascud's death, his commanders ignored Muhammad 
who is thought to have been outside Hamadan at the time and instated the sultan's son 
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. Malik-Shah. Apparently they regretted their choice and three months later Beg Arslan 
instated Muhammad in his stead. Sultan Muhammad appears to have had Beg Arslan 
beheaded in order to win over the commanders in Azarbayjan and Arran, but these 
turned against him and gathered around Silleyman-Shah who had fled the Oguz (see 
above, 6.1 0). Siileyman-Shah seems to have been an irredeemable alcoholic and Sultan 
Muhammad returned from Isfahan where he had escaped [I-Ioutsma, IA Vol. 8:480-1 ]. 
Meanwhile Caliph al-Muqtafi had taken Hilla and Wasit (1154). When Silleyman-Shah 
came to Lihf and established contact with him, the caliph agreed to have his name 
included in the khutba on condition that he did not interfere in the affairs of Iraq al-
Arab (February-March 1156). Having defeated and imprisoned Siileyman-Shah Oune-
July 1156), Sultan Muhammad besieged Baghdad (February 1157). When Il-Deniz 
occupied Hamadan with Malik-Shah and his charge Arslan-Shah (I'ugrul's son), the 
sultan lifted the siege. Possibly because he could not gain the support of Sultan 
Muhammad's commanders, Il-Deniz withdre\v and the sultan re-occupied the capital. In 
the meantime the Seljuk palace in Baghdad was pillaged and burnt. Presumably since he 
was caught between the two, namely Il-Deniz in Azarbayjan and the caliph in Iraq al-
Arab, Sultan Muhammad does not appear to have attempted to campaign against either 
until his death (1159) [Ibid. 481; Turan, 1965:199-200; Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:377-8; 
Zettersteen, IA Vol. 8:576]. 
After this the Seljuks of Iraq came under the authority of the atabeg Il-Deniz who kept 
Sultan Arslan-Shah (r.1160-77) a virtual prisoner in Hamadan with his sons Jihan-
Pahlavan (the sultan's stepbrother) and Ktztl-Arslan. Malik-Shah \vas poisoned and 
Silleyman-Shah put to death (1161), but those commanders ill disposed toward the 
atabeg, namely loan<; Beg, Satmaz and Argu, the governors of Rayy, Isfahan and Kazvin 
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_respectively, approached the sultan's brother Muhammad's atabeg Sungur in Fars. Il-
l)eniz defeated them outside I-Iamadan and Muhammad was forced to flee to 
Khuzistan (1161). Although with the encouragement of the new caliph these 
commanders and others tried to instate Malik-Shah's son Mahmud, they were also 
defeated (1162). Finally all the commanders in Azarbayjan, Arran and Iraq al-Ajam 
appear to have journeyed to Isfahan to proclaim their allegiance to Sultan Arslan-Shah 
(1165), who remained in his stepfather's shadow. On Il-Deniz's death (1175), Sultan 
Arslan-Shah is said to have tried to campaign against Jihan-Pahlavan who had declared 
himself atabeg in Azarbayjan, but having fallen ill he was forced to capitulate and died 
soon afterwards (1177). Although his eight-year old son Tugrul became sultan, Tugrul 
remained in Jihan-Pahlavan's shadow until the latter's death (1185). When Tugrul tried 
to assert his sovereignty over Jihan-Pahlavan's brother K1ztl-Arslan with the help of the 
Tiirkmen affiliated to Ktpc:;ak's grandson Hasan, \Vhose sister he appears to have 
married, Caliph al-Nasir (r.1179-1225) became involved against him. Eventually Tugrul 
lost his life in a battle near Rayy against the Kbwarazmshah Teki~ (r.1173-1200) and the 
Seljuks of Iraq also passed into history (March 25, 1194) [Ytnanc:;, IA Vol. 1:610ff; 
Siimer, 1965:113; Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:377-8 & 1956:73-80; Koymen, IA Vol. 
12/2:19ff]. 
6.12 Summary 
Kafesoglu overlooked Sultan Tapar in preference for Great Sultan Sancar as a ruler in 
keeping with the stature of those prior to the interregnum. In his opinion this \vas 
warranted by the indisputable predominance of Great Sultan Sancar's name in the 
khutba from Erzurum to Samarkand and Ghazna [IA Vol. 10:373 & 376-7]. As for 
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. sultans Mahmud, Tugrul and Mascud in Iraq, J(afesoglu thought that they lacked the 
necessary personal qualities to come to grips with the resurgent Georgians in the 
Caucasus or the caliphs in Baghdad. In his opinion, the latter fuelled the ambitions of 
the commanders by taking sides in the conflicts between Sultan Tapar's descendants. As 
a result, the domains of the Seljuks of Iraq fmally became divided between the atabegs 
of Mosul, Azarbayjan and Fars, namely the Zengids (1127-1233), the Il-Deniz or 
Elgiizids (1146-1225) and the Salgurids (1194-1286), not to mention the Abbasid 
Caliphate in Iraq al-Arab [Ibid. 375-6 & 378]. With reference to the Crusaders, 
Kafesoglu can be said to have argued that the Seljuks' failure to oust them was due to 
dissent among the commanders sent to deal with them, primarily because they were 
more concerned with securing fiefdoms [Ibid 373ffj. 
Turan thought that the dissolution of the Great Seljuk Empire after the death of Great 
Sultan Sancar was due to internal weaknesses, which he summarized as 'Turkic 
feudalism' [1965:176 & 234-41 ]. He argued that while common ownership prevented 
the Seljuks from establishing absolute rule such as under the Sasanids or the Byzantines, 
it made fratricidal conflict inevitable on the death of a sovereign, at least until the 
strongest \Vas able to marshal the resources of state. In his opinion, the Seljuks' iqtac 
system mitigated the tendency for Turkic polities to fracture along dynastic lines in the 
absence of a strong member. This \vas because rather than being the tnuqta\ 
commanders and their soldiery became dependent on the local populace for their 
\velfare. Quite apart from the number of fighting men that could be supported by a 
large iqta\ according to Turan, governorship meant that along with lesser iqtac holders 
commanders acquired financial and non-Shari judiciary responsibilities. Some governors 
were favoured also \Vith the responsibility of bringing up members of the dynasty, on 
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the understanding that when these came of age they would continue to serve as their 
commanders-in-chief, viziers or regents. As for the Crusaders and the Abbasid 
Caliphate, Turan limited his comments to the events he included for this period 
concerning the Great Seljuks [Ibid. 179, 182-3 & 197]. As such he pointed to the 
dissension among the Seljuk commanders and the caliphs' resurgent political ambitions, 
which he associated with the weakness of the Seljuks of Iraq. 
Koymen was of the opinion that the complex of tributary relationships under Great 
Sultan Sancar doubtless had its origins on the steppe. That said, after the defeat at 
Katvan, in his opinion the Great Seljuk Empire began to fracture along tributary rather 
than dynastic lines. Although he was not specific in his criticism, he argued that the 
primary sources concerning this period were sufficient to avoid the application of a 
framework that was as imaginary as it was false [1984:XVI-XIX]. As concerns the 
Abbasid Caliphate, according to Koymen, the struggle that developed between the 
caliphs and the Seljuks arose from the weakness of the Seljuks of Iraq, who tried to 
legitimize their attempts to gain freedom from Great Sultan Sancar. l-Ie argued that this 
enabled the caliphs to try and re-establish the Caliphate as a political entity, which they 
succeeded in doing after Great Sultan Sancar's death [1963:194-204]. 
Koymen saw the Crusades as a phase in the struggle between the East and the West, 
though he did not specify its nature. In his opinion, although the initial motivation for 
the Crusades may have been religious, from the point of view of Turkish history, they 
were a response to the Seljuks' conquest of Anatolia. He pointed out that at first local 
rulers and governors in Syria and Iraq seem to have almost completely ignored the 
Crusaders. Even when they realized the seriousness of their intent, however, unlike in 
Anatolia, where Ktlt<; Arslan and Dani~mend Gazi allied, the Seljuks in Syria and 
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Mesopotamia failed to form a united front, which allowed for the rapid establishment 
of the Crusader principalities in Urfa, Antakya and Jerusalem [1963:287ffj. 
Ozayd1n thought that it was Sultan Tapar who restored the Great Seljuk Empire to its 
former glory [1991:151-3J. As for the Crusaders, he agreed with Koymen that they were 
a stage in the struggle between the East and the West, and that they benefited from 
local jealousies that came to the fore during the interregnum. In doing so he pointed out 
that when local commanders such as c;;:oki.irmi.i~ and Artukoglu Sokmen were willing to 
put aside their differences they were able to defeat the Crusaders as at I-I arran (May 7, 
1104), where they captured Baudouin de Bourg and Joscelin de Courtney [Ibid. 89-90]. 
For his part Si.imer concerned himself solely with Great Sultan Sancar's treatment of 
the Oguz who he pointed out were after all his own people. In his opinion Great Sultan 
Sancar's behaviour toward them differed little from that of the Iranians around him. l-Ie 
argued that even the Ghaznavid Sultan Mascud had not been so harsh with the 
Ti.irkmen of Iraq [1965:106]. 
In sum, although Turkish historians concurred that the weakness of the Seljuks of Iraq 
enabled the Abbasid Caliphate to become re-established on Great Sultan Sancar's death, 
they did not agree on the underlying reasons. By comparison, they agreed that dissent 
among the Seljuks enabled the Crusaders success. 
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·7. EVALUATION 
As stated at the outset, the aim of this thesis is not only to present for the first time in 
English the corpus of Turkish scholarly writing on the Great Seljuks, but also to 
evaluate the individual conclusions. Although Turkish scholars see the Great Seljuk 
Empire as the beginning of Turko-Islamic civilization, they remain disagreed on what 
the Seljuks' ideology and cultural expectations were. 
While Koymen agreed with Koprulu that martial aristocracies administered Turkic 
polities, he abstained from discussing the Turkic ideal of world dominion, which 
KoprUlu thought Turkic rulers shared with other cultures, such as the Abbasids and 
Byzantines. Turan and Kafesoglu, on the other hand, used the concept of world 
dominion to explain that Turkic aristocracies were of a hereditary nature, which they 
thought underpinned their propensity for founding empires. None of the Turkish 
scholars on the Seljuks accepted that Turkic sovereigns were elected. I-Iowever, they 
agreed that common ownership of the realm by dynastic members made succession 
indeterminate. Kafesoglu thought that the pursuit of divine favour on the battlefield 
cotnpounded the problem. Turan argued that the principle of common ownership 
prevented the c;reat Seljuk Empire from becoming an autocracy in the Iranian or Greek 
tradition. Last but not least, Kafesoglu related the religious tolerance of Turkic cultures 
to the tore, their secular customary la\v. 
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Kafesoglu went on to write Tiirk Milli Kiiltiirii (The 1itrkr' National Cttlt11re), a review of 
the historical roots of Turkic culture, but he did not draw any new conclusions as 
concerns the Seljuks. 'Turan's approach, which was propounded in Tiirk Cihan I-ldkimryeti 
Mefkiiresi Tarihi (Ifistory if the Tttrkr' Concept if World Dominion) and S e/ptklttlar ve isldmryet 
(The S ejjukr and Islam), likewise added little to views expressed in S elptklu/ar Tarihi ve 
Tiirk-isldm Meden!)eti (Se!Jttk Flistory and Tttrko-ls/amit: Chilization). More recently Sencer 
Divit<;ioglu has attempted an in--depth cultural analysis of the Kok Turk Empire (553-
7 45) in accordance with modern anthropological theory, extending the methodology 
with doubtful success to aspects of Karakhanid, Seljuk and early Ottoman history 
[1987, 1992, 1994 & 1996]. One reason for this is that - when not purely 
anthropological or rendered almost incomprehensible by his insistence on inventing 
words - as an economist his concerns appear curbed by whether or not history provides 
proof of economic theories such as Marx's Asiatic Mode of Production. There are also 
Halil inalctk's papers on the influences of Iranian and Turkic ideology in the Ottoman 
Empire [1993a, 1993b & 1994]. Although Divit<;ioglu and inalctk are more specific than 
either Kafesoglu or Turan \vere, with the exception of Divit<;ioglu's subsequent works, 
their conclusions likewise are based almost solely on the 8th century Orkhun stone 
inscriptions, Yusuf Has Hajib's Ktttadgtt Bilig (1 069-70) and Mahmud of Kashgar's 
Divanii Uigat-it-Tiirk (1 072-3). 
Although the Orkhun stone inscriptions refer to a Turkic people called the Oguz near 
Lake Baykal, clearly these were forced into accepting Kok Turk ideology. According to 
recent archaeological excavations, some appear to have migrated from Inner Asia after 
the establishment of the Kok Turk Empire, reaching the region between Lakes Balkash 
and Issyk-Kol during the 6th to Th centuries. However, their namesakes, situated 
219 
between the Caspian and Aral Seas in the 1Oth century, included Turkic people who had 
been affiliated to descent lines other than the Oguz from Lake Baykal. According to 
Barthold and Minorsky, the Oguz in the west may have been united by the $ul (from 
c;ol or desert), who were in Jurjan, south-east of the Caspian Sea, from at least as early 
as the 51h century. Consequently, the Orkhun inscriptions may provide only the most 
general framework for Seljuk ideology and Turkmen cultural expectations. 
Yusuf l-Ias Hajib was from Balasagun, thought to have been near Lake Balkash 
[Bozkurt, 1992:1 00]. 1-Iis opus, Ktttadgu Bilig, which was finished in Kashgar, was 
dedicated to the Karakhanid Tabgac; Bugra Kara Khan (r.1 056-11 03). Kashgar was 
situated on the westernmost part of the Tarim Basin, where the trade routes from 
China to Central Asia converged, after branching off to the Indus Valley at Yarband. 
Not surprisingly, Yusuf Has I-Iajib's influences have been traced to the Iranian, Chinese 
and Indian literary traditions, not to mention the Islamic philosophers Farabi (870-950) 
and Ibn Sin a (980-1 037) [Dilac;ar, 1988; Arat, lA Vol. 6:1 038ff; inalctk, 1993a; 
Divitc;ioglu, 1992:130-207]. Although Kashgar is known to have come under Turgi~ rule 
(632), this was short-lived. Initially on the Left Wing of the western half of the Kok 
Turk Empire, the Tiirgi~ broke away soon afterwards and established an independent 
kaganate (658-766). At the time situated between Lakes Zaysan and Urungu, with a 
branch east of the Irtish River, the Karluk became active in and around Kashgar from 
670 [Siimer, 1965:18; Arat, lA Vol. 6:351-2]. When the Uygur, \vho had ended the Kok 
Turk Empire, defeated them, the Karluk migrated to Transoxania, \vhere they ended the 
Turgi~ Kaganate. Consequently, Kutadgu Bilig seems more relevant for Karakhanid rather 
than the Seljuks' ideology and expectations. 
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As for the J)itJanii Liigat-it-Tiirk, although Mahmud of Kashgar appears to have been 
from a ruling lineage [Atalay 1992/I:xi-xiv], contrary to Dila<;ar [1988:23], it is not 
certain that this lineage was related to the Karakhanids (840-1212) [Bozkurt, 1992:92]. 
More importantly, Mahmud seems to have travelled throughout the Tarim Basin and 
Central Asia, visiting Turkic people and their cities [Atalay, 1992/I-IV]. Consequently, 
the work is not only a reliable lexicon of the Turkic languages at the time of the Seljuks, 
but in contrast to the Orkhun stone inscriptions and Ktttadgu Bi/ig it also provides 
invaluable insights into the cultural background of the Seljuks' Turkic affiliates. This is 
verified by Koymen's studies of everyday life throughout Central Asia with regard to 
Turkic housing, dress, food, culture and social life [1971 a, 1971 b, 1971 c, 1971 d & 
1975a]. Interestingly enough, Mahmud is thought to have finished the Dit/anii Uigat-it-
Tiirk in Baghdad (1 072-3), because allegedly it was presented to the caliph [Atalay, 
1992/l:xiv-xv], possibly al-Muqtadi. 
As with the Orkhun stone inscriptions and Ktttadgu Bilig, not to mention Oguz epics and 
folklore, such as the Oguz-Nama and Dede Korkut, or for that matter sedentary 
chronicles, the DitJanii Liigat-it-Turk points to differentiation rather than nomadic 
pastoral homogeneity. This is not to deny that along with others on the Eurasian 
steppes, in general Turkic expectations can be said to have idealized pastoral mobility 
over sedentary wealth.24 As late as the 15th century, for instance, Karayiiliik Osman, the 
head of the Akkoyunlu polity advised his sons that if they settled they would endanger 
their freedom and independence, namely their Turkishness [Woods, 1993:97]. 
Notwithstanding, although the rulers of the Khazar Kaganate and the Kok Turk 
24 For a discussion of the contradictory pull of mobility and wealth among nomadic pastoral cultures see 
Lattimore (1967:76-80 & 519-26]. 
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Empire were from the same imperial clan, namely the A-shih-na, the Khazar kagans 
were venerated. The Oguz yabt,'ll, on the other hand, seems to have been chosen from 
among the heads of the descent lines that made up their polity. Nor must it be 
forgotten that during the 5th to gth centuries many Turkic people from Inner Asia 
became sedentarized. !-laving started immediately north and south of the T'ien-shan 
Mountains' eastern ranges, the process is known to have spread westward to the 
Caspian Sea and from there into Khurasan [Ogel, 1962:333-40; Esin, 1980a:131-6; also 
Frye & Sayili, 1992:Chapter XIII]. 
Rather than the above-mentioned sources, it is Ibn Fadlan's personal observations of 
the Oguz that shed a direct light on the Seljuks' and their Tiirkmen affiliates' ideology 
and background. Although Ibn Fadlan pre-dated the Seljuks by nearly a century (922), 
there can be no doubt that the Oguz called their leader yabgu [~e~en, 1975:37], a title 
that Selc;uk Beg's eldest son Arslan appears to have subsequently appropriated. Whether 
or not as legend would have it Selc;uk Beg was the yabgu's Commander-in-Chief, it is 
clear that the Seljuks \vere from the very same Oguz situated between the Caspian and 
Aral Seas. 
Ibn Fadlan remarked that the Oguz Commander-in-Chief at the time of his visit had 
been chosen because he was considered their best rider and archer [Ibid. 38]. In view of 
the numerous families he observed in his camp [Ibid. 37], it is clear that the 
Commander-in-Chief had to merit the office although of aristocratic descent. It is also 
clear that the Oguz did not interpret merit solely in martial terms. Ibn Fadlan mentions 
that a chieftain, namely Kiic;iik Y mal, had become a Muslim but that he had to renounce 
because his affiliates had disapproved [Ibid. 35]. It seems, therefore, that Kiic;iik Ymal 
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had to comply with Oguz custom in order to retain his position as chieftain, let alone 
hold higher office. 
Although Ibn Fadlan thought the Oguz were heathens, relying on their judgements 
rather than religion, he related that like Muslims they believed there was one god, 
namely Tengri [Ibid. 30-1]. The underlying point being that the Oguz conducted 
themselves according to customary law, their tore [Ibid. 32-5]. In doing so, however, they 
do not appear to have adhered to hard and fast rules but benefited from a consultative 
process. Among the various examples Ibn Fadlan gave concerning Oguz customs, he 
noted that a plaintiff had say in the ruling ·passed by his chieftain [Ibid.]. Not 
surprisingly, Ibn Fadlan's first observations concerning the Oguz were that they 
determined everything in council. I-Iis personal experience verifies that an objection by 
their lowliest member could hold up a decision [Ibid. 30 & 39-40]. 
It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that in his notes on the text, $e~en chooses to 
highlight instead 'old Turkish' customs, such as burial, and even presents the concept of 
sovereignty among Turkic people as if it were another such custom [Ibid. 111-42]. 
Arguably this is because Turkish scholars have not developed a paradigm that enables 
them to put nomadic pastoralism in a historical context. There can be little doubt that 
social groupings sustained by agriculture were more advanced than those reliant on 
pastoralism were. Hydraulic agriculture in particular provided gainful employment for 
urban specialists - administrative, military, and religious, not to mention craftsmen and 
merchants. As the Scljuks clearly demonstrated, however, social customs and political 
institutions particular to people on the Eurasian steppes, \vhich tended to combine 
administrative, military and religious offices in that of chieftain, retained their viability 
in a mainly sedentary environment \vhere pastoralism could be practiced. 
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In the ensuing sections, the history of the Great Scljuks according to Turkish scholars, 
which has been summarised in Chapters 3-6, will be analysed from the standpoint 
provided by Ibn Fadlan's observations of the Oguz, with further references to modern 
studies in anthropology. 
7.1 Nomadic Pastoral Organization 
Arguably the basis of any paradigm that attempts to put nomadic pastoral polities in a 
historical context has to accept that economic considerations determined their socio-
political outlooks. 
First and foremost, it seems that while the m1n1mum number of animals a family 
required for survival changed according to the composition of its herd [Khazano'~ 
1994], the availability of seasonal pasturage and water determined the maximum 
number. Clearly, therefore, winter pasturage must have been critical to survival. 
Secondly, although nomadic pastoralists were as dependent on land as agriculturists 
were, they had little use for it unless they were able to move on. This is why grazing 
rights and hence migration routes and schedules are deemed to have been usufruct not 
absolute. Consequently, contrary to Khazanov [Ibid.], associated levels of hierarchical 
organization among nomadic pastoralists must be seen as having been primarily 
political, not territorial. Whereas kinship defmed one's blood genealogy, descent provided 
a political genealogy for all the affiliates (from various kinship groups). 25 It is this latter, 
2> For instance, although of the same kin group, the Seljuks were those clans affiliated to Tugrul and <;agn Beg, 
the Yabgulu were affiliated to Arslan Yabgu, thus his son Kutalmt~ and hence Kutalmt~'s sons, while the 
Ymallt were affiliates of Scljuk's youngest son Yusuf and hence his sons Ibrahim, Er-Ta~ and Er-Basgan. 
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the camp leader's political standing, that determined his and hence his afft.liates' grazing 
rights and migration schedules. 
It does not follow, however, as Barfield argued [1989], that the more powerful the 
nomadic pastoral polity the better its members' chances of survival, even if regular 
access frequently depended on the strength of the polity with regard to its neighbours, 
whether sedentary or not. 26 On the contrary, it seems that nomadic pastoral 
communities found economic and hence political regulation potentially restrictive of 
their fortunes. This is because, as Barth [1986] and also Divitc;ioglu [1987] have noted, 
livestock provided not only the means of production but also of consumption (meat, 
dairy products, felt, wool, etc.). However, the point requires some expansion because it 
is clear from Khazanov [1994] that the number of animals was as dependent on climatic 
and biological pulsation, namely severe winters, crippling spring frosts (jute), sutnmer 
droughts, or disease, as it was on their reproductive capacity. Certainly, the latter was 
affected by the quality of grazing made available through political affiliation. If the ratio 
of animals to people were upset by any of the former, however, not to mention a 
disproportionate rise in population, then survival must have been threatened. 
In short, if you ate your capital, then you could no longer produce and consume. Thus, 
whatever the minimum number and mLx of animals required for survival, social 
fragmentation into camps and hence independent economic units clearly ensured that 
26 An oft-cited story in this context concerns the founder of the Hsiung-nu Empire, Modun (209-174 BCE). 
When the Tung-hu requested first his finest horse, then his favourite consort, contrary to advice Modun 
complied because he wanted continued good relations. Encouraged, the Tung-hu next requested territory. 
When counselled to acquiesce because it was wasteland, Modun executed those advisors, saying: 'Land is the 
foundation of the state, so how can you give it away?' 
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not all members of a polity were affected by adverse conditions, whether climatic, 
biological, or for that matter human. 
7.2 Selfuk Beg's Lineage 
Kafesoglu argued that given Sel<;uk Beg's father's renown was Temir Yahg (Iron Bow) 
he must have been of a ruling lineage. Although Sumer agreed that the bow symbolized 
sovereignty, because according to the Kok Turk stone inscriptions the kagan in the East 
had sent three arrows to his counterpart in the West, he was careful not to draw the 
same conclusion. For his part Turan thought Sel<;uk Beg was of noble blood because 
offices held by the Oguz nobility were hereditary, as among the Khazar. Neither 
Kafesoglu's nor Turan's view can be justified by what is known. 
A good starting point is the Kok Turk Bilge Kagan's (716-34) Chief Counsellor and 
Commander-in-Chief, Tonyukuk - in fact this \vas his tide, thus Bilge Tunyukuk Buyla 
Baga Tarkan [fekin, 1994:4 & 68], who was also Bilge Kagan's father-in-law 
[Divit<;ioglu, 1987:169]. Tonyukuk was of the A-sheh-te who gave their daughters in 
marriage to the imperial A-shih-na dynasty [Ibid.], which doubdess was a sacred clan. 
Thus the Khazar kagan, who was of the A-shih-na, left his palace only four times a year 
and could not be observed by his folk who had to prostrate themselves until he had 
passed. The Khazar's Chief Counsellor and Commander-in-Chief, the Hakan-beh, who 
was responsible for the day-to-day running of the kaganate, had to report barefoot each 
day. If he or any commander lost a batde and lived to tell the tale, his wife, children, 
houses, livestock and weapons were given away in his presence by the kagan who could 
fmally also cleave him in two and have the cadaver crucified [Ibid. 126 & 130]. However, 
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it is not clear whether or not the Kok Turk's so-called house-kagans can be understood 
to confirm that initially their kagans also were venerated [Ibid 133]. Bilge Kagan 
asserted that like his father and uncle he had taken the field on many an occasion 
[Tekin, 1988:29 & 41 ffj. That said, a Kok Tiirk kagan was still ritually strangled during 
inauguration as among the Khazar and also the Uygur [Divitc;ioglu, 1987:136]. The 
Oguz tradition of strangling a rebellious member of the ruling dynasty with his 
bowstring until dead, so that his blood was not shed, arguably echoes a similar taboo. 
Be that as it may, although a combined post of Commander-in-Chief and Chief 
Counsellor seems discernible also among the Karluk, at least as late as Ali Tekin and his 
regent/ commander Alp Kara, it is clear that among the Oguz these offices were 
separate. The embassy Ibn Fadlan was part of first visited the yabgu and his regent and 
then the Oguz Commander-in-Chief, who appears to have been senior to the Chief 
Counsellor as every chieftain had one as his regent [~e~en, 1975:37; Divitc;ioglu, 
1994:17]. One Chief Counsellor mentioned in the Oguz-Nama is thought to be none 
other than Korkut Ata [logan, 1982:139-41 ], author of Dede Korkut [Boratav, IA Vol. 
6:860-6]. 
In Rashid al-Din's version of the Oguz-Nama, the list of the yabgu's regents, frotn the 
Salur, Yaztr, Doger, Baymdtr, Ytva, and other Oguz lineages are referred to as vizier or 
regent, then as antlzk, inak, or atabek [fogan, 1982:139-41 ]. Antltk seems to stem from 
and or oath [Atalay, 1992/I:42, 459], and hence possibly refers to a trustee or even a 
guardian. lnak also denotes a position of trust, as it seems to be a spelling of Ina/, inal 
or Yznal, namely brother-in-la\v. As for atabek (the Seljukid atabeg), it is unlikely to have 
been devised by Sultan Alp-Arslan except perhaps in name. The sultan is known to have 
appointed his vizier Nizam al-Mulk as his son Malik-Shah's atabeg. Although Kopriilii 
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thought the practice stemmed from the Turkic folk custom of entrusting the 
upbringing of a son to another family [IA Vol. 1 :712ffj, it is a form of reciprocity that 
continues to be common not only in tribal but also rural and urban communities. 
Accordingly, a family undertakes the upbringing of a poorer affiliate's son and even 
adopts him [see also Barth, 1986]. In short, the Oguz yabgu's Chief Counsellor (regent 
or vizier) appears to have been his brother-in-law, when not his trustee or guardian. This 
suggests that although noble, the title was not hereditary. Reports that the yabgu was 
chosen on merit or chance (one who merited divine favour?) from among all their 
nobles [Divitc;ioglu, 1994:17-9], seem to confirm this. Consequently, the title of 
Commander-in-Chief could not have been hereditary either, although an office held by 
one of noble birth. 
While this gives some credibility to Divitc;ioglu's suggestion concerning the latter part of 
the Seljuks' legend of origin [Ibid. 58-9], it must pointed out that his views remain as 
speculative as Kafesoglu's. According to Divitc;ioglu, in the last quarter of the 1Oth 
century the yabgu, who was of the Oguz Yaztr's Baranlu clan, broke with custom and 
appointed his son, Ali, heir apparent. This paved the way for his grandson- none other 
than Shah-Malik- who came to reside in Jand and nearly annihilated the Seljuks (1 034). 
Divitc;ioglu's point being that Selc;uk Beg rebelled against the introduction of a 
hereditary principle and, having lost, left. 
Whatever the case, given that Selc;uk Beg's office among the Oguz is not in dispute and 
there is no mention of the Kmtk following him to Jand as a body, he was most probably 
of a noble if minor lineage, as Koymen implied. 
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7.3 The Seljuks' Political Aspirations 
Koymen [1979:43-78] and Kafcsoglu [IA Vol. 1 0:353-8] argued that right from the 
outset the Seljuks were intent on establishing their own polity. Sel~uk Beg's possible 
usurpation of the taxes due to the Oguz yabgu from Jand and Arslan's eventual 
appropriation of the title of yabgu seem to support this argument, as possibly Sultan 
Mahmud's failure to entice the Seljuks into Ghaznavid service also does. Nevertheless, 
the Seljuks' political aspirations can not be linked, in accordance with Kafesoglu and 
Turan, to Sel~uk Beg's nobility and hence a quest for world dominion. Most likely the 
establishment of a largely sedentary empire by a nomadic pastoral clan was a result of 
the Seljuks long apprenticeship under the Samanids in Central Asia and to a lesser 
extent under the Ghaznavids in Khwarazm. 
Upon their arrival in Jand, the Seljuks are said to have decided that in order to gain 
favour they had to adhere to local custom and become Muslims. To be sure, as Muslims 
the Seljuks would have been able to attract other Ti.irkmen to their banner in resisting 
the yabgu's tax collector. Ti.irkmen of the Oguz and Karluk are kno\vn to have resided 
in Slit-Kent, near Lake K.arakul north of the Syr-Darya during the first quarter of the 
1Oth century. There were also a thousand tents of Ti.irkmen near Tashkent [Si.imer, 
1965:59]. There is no mention, however, if Sel~uk Beg claimed the ta.xes due to the 
Oguz yabgu. What is known is that Shah-Malik who may have forced Tugrul and (:agr1 
Beg out of Jand with their uncle shortly after Sel~uk Beg's death is mentioned as the 
city's subsequent ruler. On the other hand, there is the report concerning Sel~uk Beg's 
request from the nearest regional governor for a Muslim jurist to convert them 
[Koymen, 1979:21-3], which suggests that the Seljuks had taken Jand from the Oguz 
yabgu and allied with the Samanids. Moreover, Sultan Alp-Arslan visited his 
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grandfather's grave in Jand (1 066) [Koymen, 1972:78; Siimcr, 1965:92-3]. In any case, 
Selc;uk Beg's position there seems to have enabled the Seljuks to negotiate additional 
pasturage around the village of Nur, between Bokhara and Samarkand, effectively as the 
Samanid's marchlords. As such the Seljuks seem to have remained loyal to the Samanid 
dynasty, that is until the last moment when Arslan Yabgu, who was situated in Nur or at 
least its environs, failed to take the field against the Karakhanid Ilek Khan Nasr. 
1-Iaving left Jand, Tugrul and ~agn Beg are thought to have approached a junior 
member of the Karakhanid dynasty but seem to have been unsuccessful in gaining 
satisfactory terms of service. ~agn Beg's reputed journey across Iran into the Caucasus 
soon thereafter, ho\vever, seems unlikely. An idea that is introduced in this context by 
Turkish scholars is that Selc;uk Beg had been grooming Tugrul and c;agr1 Beg in his 
stead and therefore that Arslan Yabgu had not only remained in Nur but also kept his 
nephews at arm's length [Koymen, 1979:35 & 114]. The Samanid Ismacil Muntasir's 
negotiation with Arslan Yabgu in Jand, however, contradicts this. Furthermore, although 
Tugrul and ~agr1 Beg were the sons of the eldest Mikail, there is no mention -
legendary or otherwise - that Mikail had previously held Arslan's position during Selc;uk 
Beg's latter years. Possibly most telling of all, if ~agr1 Beg had been to Azarbayjan and 
was as successful as claimed, then surely on Arslan Yabgu's imprisonment by Sultan 
Mahmud his followers would not have hesitated to affiliate themselves with such a 
charisma? Most likely their failure to remain in Jand with their uncle damaged their 
reputations. Possibly this is also why Ali Tekin, the Karakhanid ruler of Bokhara, whom 
Arslan Yabgu supported against his relations until his capture and imprisonment by 
Sultan Mahmud, is said to have invited Yusuf Y mal to take up the leadership of the 
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Seljuks as yabgu. That is instead of the older Musa with whom Tugrul and C";agrt Beg 
remained. 
Contrary to Koymen, Kafesoglu and Turan, it is also unlikely that Ali Tekin would have 
had Yusuf Ytnal killed because Tugrul and C";agrt Beg refused to recognise him. Given 
that Ali Tekin was at odds with the Karakhanid line the Seljuks had been fighting since 
their arrival in Transoxania, the Seljuks \Vere arguably his natural allies. Consequently, as 
Si.imer proposed, the Seljuks most likely lost Yusuf Ytnal and their position in Nur 
upon Ali Tekin's death, especially as they are said to have defended Ali Tekin against the 
Ghaznavid Altun-Ta~ after Sultan Mahmud's death. When Ali Tekin died shortly 
thereafter, his regent and commander-in-chief, Alp Kara, probably found it expedient to 
realign with the senior Karakhanids and oust the Seljuks. 
The confused political mosaic of Central Asia during this period no doubt encouraged 
the centrifugal tendency of nomadic pastoral groupings, which needed to act 
independently because the wrong decision could mean death. The Oguz, Ti.irkmen and 
Ktpc,;:ak, not to mention the Karluk, all seem to have been vying for pasturage while the 
Karakhanids and Ghaznavids fought over the sedentary spoils left by the Samanids, 
whom they had defeated separately. Nomadic pastoralists caught up in this situation 
would have needed to ensure grazing rights and migratory schedules. What better way 
of securing these than through martial association with regional centres of power? This 
seems borne out by the Oguz or Ti.irkmen groups in Transoxania other than the Seljuks, 
such as 1-Iasan Tak who with 5,000 mounted archers deserted Ismacil Muntasir on the 
battlefield for Ilek Khan Nasr. Hasan Tak emerged again two years later, in Khurasan, 
this time at the head of Sultan Mahmud's forces, which are kno\vn to have contained an 
Oguz contingent [Si.imer, 1965:70]. 
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Tugrul and c;agn Beg would have been in their mid-teens when the Seljuks left )and, but 
they and their guardian Musa stayed together through all the Seljuks' subsequent trials 
and tribulations. Consequently, he may have been the one who built up their awareness 
of sedentary statecraft. Current archaeological work ncar Perowsk suggests that Jand 
was not a frontier town established by Muslim colonists, but existed well before the 
spread of Islam into Central Asia [Roux, 2000:251 ]. Furthermore, it must not be 
forgotten that during the fifteen years prior to their appearance in Khurasan, Musa and 
his charges may have wintered in Khwarazm, which was under Ghaznavid governance. 
This could have served to reinforce their knowledge of Irano-Islamic governmental 
expectations from Sel<;uk Beg and Arslan Yabgu's time as the Samanids' marchlords. 
7.4 Migrations and the Tiirkmen 
Turkish scholars have proposed a variety of reasons for the invasion of the Middle East 
by the Seljuks and their Tiirkmen affiliates. Togan implied that it was the result of the 
Klrgtz being displaced by the Khitay in Inner Asia. Kafesoglu and Turan maintained it 
was due to overcrowding among the Oguz. According to Koymen, however, the Seljuks' 
success attracted others to the Middle East. This last seems to be the correct 
interpretation. 
In 'logan's opinion, because the Ktrgtz never took up the Kok Turk's imperial mantle 
from the Uygur, whose empire they ended (840), they were driven out of Inner Asia by 
the Khitay (924), who were of Mongol origin. This precipitated the \vestward migration 
of the Kimek (Kuman/Klp<;ak) [fogan, 1946]. This argument overlooks that the Khitay 
subsequently founded the Liao dynasty in northern China (936-1122) and were follo\ved 
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by the Sung dynasty (960), which quickly established itself in the remainder of China 
(1 004). Unable to expand south, rather it is the Khitay's failed attempt to conquer 
Kashgar and the Issyk-Kol region that is thought to have caused the Kimek migration 
(1017) [Arat, lA Vol. 6:713ffj. 27 
Originally situated around the Irtish River, the Kimek appear next in Eastern Europe 
(1050), having driven the Pec;enek and Uz ahead into the Balkans. Possibly this is why 
by the beginning of Sultan Alp-Arslan's reign a Ktpc;ak beg ruled in Jand and other 
Ktpc;ak mingled with the Oguz/Tiirkmen in Ost-Yurt (1065-6) [see Siimer, 1965:92]. 
This seems to indicate that some Kimek had taken up the pastures vacated by the U z 
and Pec;enek. When not at war with the Oguz, the Ktpc;ak are said to have migrated 
south during severe winters [Siimer, 1965:64]. To be sure, there is a strong possibility 
the Ktpc;ak wintered in Khwarazm, where they are reported as early as the time of 
Altun-Ta~ (1017-1032) [Barthold, 1990:316], but they would still have had to share 
Oguz pasturage and water on the way. If there were internal pressure on their resources, 
the Oguz would not have allowed this. 
Consequently it seems unlikely that the Seljuks invaded the Middle East due to 
demographic pressure among the Oguz. Instead, as Koymen argued, it is the Seljuks' 
success in Khurasan that seems to have attracted others to the Middle East. 
Although Sultan Mahmud cleared Khurasan of the Tiirkmen of Iraq (1 028), his eldest 
son Mascud invited back Arslan Yabgu's followers, namely Yagmur, who helped him 
27 \Vhile the Kimek's departure can be likened to that of the Yiieh-chi, it is not known if the Khitay defeated 
them as the Hsiung-nu had defeated the Yueh-chi. Moreover, when Chinggis Khan established a Mongol 
imperial polity, most members were of the Kimek and the Uygur. Consequently, if the Khitay had been 
successful in establishing an imperial steppe polity, then most likely the Kimek would have remained to share 
tl1e sedentary spoils. 
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wrest the throne from his brother Muhammad (1 030). On Yagmur's instigation, Ktzt.l, 
Gok-Ta~ and Buka were also allowed back. Although the Tiirkmen of Iraq continued to 
serve well on campaign, their conduct remained the focus of local complaints. 
Distrustful of their intentions as well, Sultan Mascud had Yagmur and fifty of their 
lesser leaders killed - for refusing to be pressed into permanent military service (1 033). 
This caused a series of retaliatory raids by their sons and Ktzu, supported by the 
Tiirkmen from Balkhan Mountain and Transoxania. The raids coincided with the 
Seljuks' falling out with the Karakhanids and the subsequent assassination of their 
mentor the Khwarazmshah Harun by Sultan Mascud. Presumably this is why within 
months of crossing the Amu-Darya River into Khurasan with only 900 mounted 
archers, the Seljuks are said to have been able to field 10,000 Tiirkmen (1 035). Given 
the Tiirkmen of Iraq's earlier refusal, ho\vever, most likely those who now affiliated 
themselves with the Seljuks were in the main from Balkhan Mountain and Transoxania, 
not to mention those already in Khurasan. 
On receiving news of the Seljuks' arrival, Sultan Mascud's vizier remarked that whereas 
until then their problems had been with shepherds, now it was with erstwhile 
conquerors [Koymen, 1979:200]. Certainly, Sultan Mas cud does not appear to have been 
a match for Tugrul and <:;agrt Beg. Quite apart from his reported predilection for 
alcohol, which time and again delayed urgent decisions, he is considered to have 
preferred his own point of view despite good ministerial advice to the contrary. In this 
he is likened to his father Sultan Mahmud, but without his political acumen. Insistent 
that his decisions were seen through, Sultan Mascud is also thought to have lacked the 
moral courage to face up to the consequences of his bad judgement, notwithstanding 
physical courage on the hunt and in combat [Koymen, 1979; also Kafesoglu, 1953:5 & 
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Barthold, 1990:313]. Worse yet, during his reign corruption prospered on condition that 
the perpetrators shared their spoils with him. Accordingly, the Ghaznavid governor for 
Khurasan, al-Fazl Suri showered Sultan Mascud with gifts but extorted twice that from 
the populace whose leaders repeatedly asked the help of the Karakhanids in 
Transoxania lBarthold, 1990:313]. This is indicated also by a report sent to Sultan 
Mascud, which cites al-Fazl Suri's cruelty as the underlying reason for growing support 
for the Seljuks throughout Khurasan. As a result it seems that the Ghaznavid 
commander for Buzgan brought some 4,000 men after Ibrahim Y mal had entered 
Nishapur on Tugrul Beg's behalf with 200 mounted archers (1 038). Other Turkic 
mamluk commanders, such as Bori Tekin, Yusuf, Ali Karib, Gazi and Eryaruk, also 
deserted to the Seljuks with their soldiery (1 039) [Koymen, 1979:260-78]. 
When Caliph al-Qa'im complained about the Ti.irkmen depredations a few years later 
(1043/4), Tugrul Beg is said to have replied that the Seljuks' realms had grown too small 
for their number. During this period, a good many Ti.irkmen appear to have been 
encouraged to continue westward [Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 1 0:393-6]. A large group was 
directed to Azarbayjan via Tabaristan (1 047). There arc also the Oguz from 
Transoxania, \Vho were advised by Ibrahim Ytnal that Khurasan could not support their 
number (1048). Even in comparison to the Gobi and Kara-Kum, the Khurasan steppe 
is regarded to be almost completely without water and vegetation [Khazanov, 1994]. 
When this is taken in conjunction with the consideration that pasturage in both 
Azarbayjan and Anatolia is similar to Central Asia [Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:38Sff; also 
Cahen, 1984:77-9], the reports seem highly plausible. Nor must it be forgotten that the 
route westward appears to have been a familiar one. Most likely because others had 
fought there earlier [Cahen, 1984:26], Turkic gazi bands are thought to have attempted 
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passage into Azarbayjan and eastern Anatolia in the middle of the previous century 
!Frye, 1975:214-5]. 
Moreover, given the Ti.irkmen directed to Azarbayjan wanted to sack Nishapur (possibly 
Shapur in Fars [Koymen, 1963:162]), such redirection must have not only alleviated the 
pillaging of Muslims [Ibid. 163], but also severed a possible alliance between the 
Byzantines and the Fatimids, isolating both in relation to the Seljuks. In this context 
Koymen mentions Emperor Constantine IX Monomachus' refusal of Tugrul Beg's 
request to pass through Byzantine territory in order to attack the Fatimid caliphate, 
wherein he cited his standing friendship with the caliph (1 052/3) [Koymen, 1976:56-7]. 
7.5 The 'Tiirkmen Problem' 
Without exception Turkish scholars argued that right from the outset the Seljuks looked 
favourably upon Irano-Islamic institutions. They pointed to the report that when Tugrul 
Beg entered Nishapur he asked the jurist Sacid not to withhold his advice as the Seljuks 
were strangers to Iranian ways (1 038) [Si.imer, 1965:82; Koymen, 1979:277 -8; Kafesoglu, 
IA Vol. 10:386-7; Turan, 1965:62; Divit<;ioglu, 1994:80]. According to Siimer [1965:96], 
from this time onwards the Seljuks not only placed Iranians in their administration but 
also favoured the mamluk soldiery that had served them so well at Dandankan, angering 
the Ti.irkmcn. 
Although the Seljuks incorporated the existing mamluk soldiery in their military, there is 
no evidence that these replaced the Ti.irkmen. Consequently, the so-called Tiirkmen 
problem requires to be set in the context of Oguz cultural expectations rather than that 
of an assumed Irano-Islamic continuum. 
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l)ivit<;ioglu is the only one to have attempted an analysis of what these expectations 
may have been [1994:85-109]. Apart from arguing that Ibrahim Y1nal and Kutalm1~ 
rebelled because Tugrul Beg did not allow them a share of the Seljuk domains, he noted 
that the pillaging of Muslims arose from the nomadic pastoral inability to produce all 
the goods necessary for survival. This raises the question that if all the Oguz/Turkmen 
begs expected to gain from their exploits were sedentary plunder, why clid the Seljuks 
not behave like the so-called 'fi.irkmen of Iraq? Although the latter took Rayy and 
I-Iamadan, they are not known to have shown any interest in retaining either, except for 
K!ztl, who prior to his death took up residence in Rayy and married his daughter to 
Tugrul Beg. The Seljuks, on the other hand, established an empire by adding Iraq and 
the remainder of Khurasan to their conquests. That they were intent on doing so well 
before Dandankan seems clear from the manner of their initial occupation of Nishapur 
(1038) [see also Koymen, 1979:94-6]. On joining his brother there, <:_;agr1 Beg is said to 
have proposed its plunder. Having reassured the inhabitants prior to their capitulation 
that the city would not be sacked, allegedly Tugrul Beg refused. <:_;agn Beg insisted that 
unless permitted to do so the Ti.irkmen would defect to leaders who would, whereupon 
Tugrul Beg is said to have threatened suicide. As a result, the local populace was taxed 
and the proceeds distributed [Sumer, 1965:91-2; also Koymen, 1979:271]. 
Divit<;ioglu's argument that pillaging arose from the nomadic pastoral inability to 
produce agricultural and manufactured goods is all the more surprising given his earlier 
study of the Kok Turk. In this he argued that war, or better still the threat of war, 
ensured that China traded more rather than less silk28 for the number of horses offered 
78 On the Inner Asian steppes, in particular silk not only passed for money [Be kin, 1981 ], but also had ceremonial 
significance [Allsen, 1997]. 
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as 'tribute' in order to satisfy protocol [l)ivit~ioglu, 1987:252-66]. To be sure, this is very 
much in line with recent studies concerning the nature of war and trade between China 
and the I-Isiung-nu, Kok Turk, Uygur and Mongols Uagchid & Symons, 1989; Barfield, 
1993]. What must not be overlooked, however, is that although the Oguz in Transoxania 
are said to have accepted trade only when the Samanids were strong enough to resist 
their raids [Barthold, 1990:275], an essential difference between northern China and 
Transoxania was the closeness of urban centres. Whereas nomadic pastoralists traded 
with the Chinese along what came to be called the Great Wall, whether independently 
or in markets established solely for this purpose, in Transoxania they had much more 
immediate access to its, for their time, resplendent oasis cities. These cities were the 
entrepot of the fabled Silk Road that enabled trade in luxuries such as silk. Moreover, 
migration cycles were much shorter, given the proximity of sumtner pasturage in the 
T'ien-shan, Pamirs and I-Iindu Kush. While this clearly encouraged agriculture, hence 
semi-nomadic pastoralism, mounted archers did not have to travel too far to access the 
self-evident riches of Tashkent, Ferghana, Bokhara and Samarkand. Arguably, therefore, 
nomadization by pastoralists in terrain suitable for oasis cities, particularly among those 
on established trade routes, tended to vagabondage rather than trade in times of martial 
laxity, thus rarely if ever necessitating empires that could also exact tribute. 
1-Iaving said that, Turkmen expectations are better discussed with reference to the I<ok 
Turk Empire and the later Oguz polity rather than in the context of 'trade or raid'. 
According to Chinese sources, like the Hsiung-nu, who had 24 hereditary offices 
[Eberhard, 1942:77], their descendants [fa~agu, 1995:9-1 0], the Kok Tlirk, had 28 
hereditary offices [Divit~ioglu, 1987:192]. It is safe to conclude that outside those 
known to belong to the imperial A-shih-na clan, and thus in part to the A-sheh-te, these 
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offices were filled by subordinate ruling lineages [Ibid. 192-5; also Tekin, 1988:3, 55, 
etc.]. It is clear that the Oguz retained some of these titles, such as Erkin, as far as can 
be determined originally a high-ranking Kok Turk commander, although in their case 
K.uzerkin seems to have meant Chief Counsellor [Ibid. 192; Se~en, 1975:77]. More 
importantly, the office appears to have been open to all the patriarchs of the descent 
lines that made up the Oguz polity [Divit<;ioglu, 1994:17-9], even if those from one 
descent line may have predominated [Togan, 1982:139-41 ]. 
When his is taken in conjunction with Ibn Fadlan's observations, it is clear that among 
the Oguz the position of chieftain combined military, administrative and judicial 
responsibilities, albeit with the aid of a counsellor who appears to have acted as his 
regent. Consequently, the Tiirkmen must have expected more than pasturage from the 
Seljuks in return for their military support. That at times they did not even get this 
seems clear from their first request of Ibrahim Y1nal, namely that they should not be 
forced to campaign in Iraq al-Arab. Quite apart from the fact that a shortage of 
pasturage would have been a severe cause of hardship for their horses, the heat would 
have also affected their pack animals, the Bactrian camel. By all accounts the Tiirkmen 
\vere not paid soldiery. Otherwise, Ibrahim Y1nal \vould not have requested land from 
Sultan Tugrul to support his affiliates [Koymen, 197 6:61]. So that, forbidden from 
pillaging, they would have suffered doubly. 
This argument may be supported by events that took place both prior to and during 
Sultan Tugrul's northern Syrian campaign. When the sultan ordered the Tiirkmen to 
bring their families to the environs of Baghdad for the said campaign, they are said to 
have refused because the countryside in Mesopotamia and Syria could not have 
provided for them. Instead they asked to be allowed to go on home-leave, to rest their 
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horses and replenish their supplies Qune 1056). Although the sultan had a group caught 
and beaten, he is said to have rescinded, once the 1\irkmen gave their word that they 
would return in the autumn [Koymen, 1976:104-5]. This they must have done, because 
when Mosul fell to the sultan's forces (May 1 057), which appear to have included 
mamluk soldiery, they wanted to sack the city. Apparently at first the sultan resisted as in 
Nishapur eighteen years earlier, but then he had the city emptied and the inhabitants 
compensated for their losses at his expense [Si.imer, 1965:103]. In short, rather than 
exclusion from the Seljuks' administration, or for that matter nomadic pastoral exigency, 
the question at issue appears to have been one of Ti.irkmen livelihood in Je/j11kid service. 
In Si.imer's optnton, the Ti.irkmen's second request, that Ibrahim Ytnal was not to 
reconcile with the sultan, concerned specifically the Seljuks' growing preference for 
mamluk soldiery. 1-Iis argument was that although initially distrustful of the loyalty of 
the mamluks who had defected from the Ghaznavids, the Seljuks not only amply 
rewarded them after Dandankan but spurred on by their prevalence throughout 
Islamdom also increased their number at the Ti.irkmen's expense. Accordingly, toward 
the end of Sultan Tugrul's reign, Turkic commanders such as Erdem, Gawhar-A'in, 
1-Iumar-Tekin and Ay-Tekin Si.ileymani all \Vere mamluks [also Koymen, 1967:7-8]. 
Gawhar-A'in, for instance, was inherited from the Buyids [Ibid. 9-1 0]. Finally, Si.imer 
thought their last request, that the Seljuks' viziers should not be appointed without their 
consent, indicated that the Ti.irkmen also held the Seljuks' Iranian viziers responsible. 
l-Ie argued that these would have considered mamluk commanders and their soldiery 
not only more obedient but also better sedentarized than the unruly Ti.irkmen. 
To take the last point first, there were other reasons why the Ti.irkmen may have been 
angry with the Seljuks' Iranian administrators. As will be remembered, although the 
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Ti.irkmen of Iraq appear to have offered only their martial services in return for being 
allowed into Khurasan, they had been taxed, losing not only their livestock but also their 
children when unable to pay. Presumably this is why the Seljuks asked Sultan Mascud for 
local taxes to be handed to them for clearing Khurasan of <marauding' bands, which 
must have included the Ti.irkmen. Ostensibly the Ghaznavids complied \Vith this 
request, regarding the Seljuks as dihkans, local notables who collected taxes. Although 
possibly neither the Ghaznavids nor the Seljuks had any intention of complying, the 
Seljuks' victory at Dandankan elevated them into rulers who now had sedentary as well 
as nomadic pastoral concerns. The point being that the Seljuks' adoption of local 
administrative practices, at least until these were adapted to their needs, would have led 
in particular those administrators \vho were not sympathetic to the Ti.irkmen to 
<persecute' them, such as the dihkans \Vho were mainly landowners. Thus possibly the 
Ti.irkmen request for administrators who recognized them as their conquerors not 
subjects. 
As for their second request, likewise this seems related to Ibrahim Y1nal's first rebellion 
(1 050-1 ), not to the Seljuks' growing preference for mamluk soldiery at the expense of 
Ti.irkmen begs and their affiliates. The immediate cause of Ibrahim Y1nal's first 
rebellion is traceable to when 'fugrul Beg appropriated Rayy from him as his capital 
(1042). This is when Ibrahim Ymal is thought to have first made clear his 
disappointment at not being allowed to keep what he conquered [Koymen, 1963:59]; a 
situation that must have become particularly galling in view of the position Kara-Arslan 
Kavurt was to gain in Kirman, not to mention that of Alp-Arslan in Khurasan. After 
all, Ibrahim Y1nal and for that matter Kutalnu~ were of Tugrul and C::a~ Beg's 
generation (see also, 5.5). Given that a ruling Turkic dynasty shared their dominion [Ibid. 
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58; also Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:353ff, Turan, 1965:72ff & Divitc;ioglu, 1987:192-5], 
Koymen's argument was that when Tugrul Beg later also asked for I-Iamadan and other 
lesser fortifications toward Rayy, Ibrahim Y1nal refused, and, having left Tugrul Beg, 
gathered 'his forces' [Ibid. 59]. These 'forces', however, seem to have been the Tiirkmcn 
situated between I-Iamadan and Rayy. On being defeated, Ibrahim Ytnal is said to have 
asked Tugrul Beg to forgive him, which he did. It can be no surprise, therefore, when 
Ibrahim Y mal asked the Tiirkmen for support a second time that they stipulated he was 
not to reconcile ever again with Tugrul Beg who was now sultan. Ibrahim Ytnal does 
not appear to have sought reconciliation and was strangled with his own bowstring. 
Kutalm1~, who is thought to have joined in the rebellion, did not either. Subsequently 
defeated by Sultan Tugrul (1 060), he retired to his castle, Girdkuh, where he remained 
besieged. When the sultan died, he challenged Alp-Arslan, losing his life in the process. 
Siimer seems to have overlooked yet another point, which was brought out by Koymen 
[1963:158-67]. This is that in particular Ibrahim Ytnal's rebellions appear to have been 
crushed with the Tiirkmen \vho remained affiliated to Tugrul and C.::agr1 Beg. 
Consequently, regardless of any preference the Seljuks' leadership may have developed 
for mamluk soldiery, as suggested by the story concerning the northern Syrian 
campaign, even as late as 1057 the Tiirkmen seem to have formed by far the larger part 
of Seljukid forces. Although possibly of an earlier date, this is also reflected by a story 
concerning c_::agn Beg, who chided his brother for the disrepair of his realms. 
Apparently Tugrul Beg responded that he (C.::agrt Beg) devastated a built-up region like 
Khurasan in order to subdue it. Now that it was his, of course he \vas obliged to rebuild 
it. Not only had Iraq al-Ajam been devastated prior to the Seljuks' arrival, but also it 
remained surrounded by enemies, which necessitated Tiirkmen forces being situated at important 
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cross-roadJ (between I-Iamadan and Rayy?), making further depredation tn the regton 
unavoidable [Siimer, 1965:87]. 
Rather than a preference for mamluk soldiery or Iranian administrators it is the 
reference to obligation that finally serves to put the so-called 'Tiirkmcn problem' in its 
proper context. 'Ib be sure, on the Orkhun stone inscriptions erected in his name, Bilge 
Kagan claims that I clothed the naked folk, made the poor folk rich, the jew ma'!)' [Tekin, 
1988:45]. Rather than being taken on its own as an ideological tenet [inalctk, 1993a:1 0-5; 
Turan, 1965: 72], however, the claim is best understood in reciprocal terms - a 
framework of obligations [Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 1 0:389]. In lines 18-9 on the East Face of 
the stone inscription erected in his name, clearly Bilge Kagan demanded unerring loyalty 
in return for clothing and food [Tekin, 1988:43; see also Allsen, 1997:53]: 
As long as the Celestial Heaven above does not collapse, underneath the Earth is not holed: 
0! TUrk folk, who can pull down, disorder your state and laws? Turk folk give up your 
fractious habits and be contrite! By being disobedient you betrayed your sovereign and the 
prosperous state that had fed and satiated you, and introduced discord. From where came the 
anned enemies who defeated and dispersed you? From where came the lanced enemy that 
drove you from your home country? Folk of the sacred Otiiken Mountains, you left your 
home country. 2.9 
Lines 5-10 on the East Face [Ibid. 39-41], however, accept that the Turk folk had good 
cause: 
?9 This passage and the next are my translations of the original text that was edited and translated by Tekin 
[1988:38-40 & 42]. 
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Without doubt ignorant kagans acceded, without doubt bad kagans acceded. Their 
commanders, too, without doubt were unwise and without doubt bad. Since the nobles and 
commoners were not in order, the Chinese wily and false, deceitful, able to set younger 
brother against elder brother, noble against commoner, the Turk folk lost the state, the kagan 
it had made. This caused their sons, who were worthy of becoming Chinese nobles to 
become servants, their equally worthy daughters to become concubines. Turk nobles 
relinquished their Tiirk names. As Chinese nobles they held Chinese names, obeyed the 
Chinese kagan. For fifty years they gave their work and strength. [ ... ]Took their lands and 
forsook their customs and law for the Chinese kagan. The Tiirk commoners spoke thus: we 
were a folk with a state, where is this state now? For whom do we conquer provinces? We 
were a folk with a kagan, where is our kagan? Which kagan do we serve? Having thus 
spoken, they became the enemy of the Chinese kagan. Having become the enemy, but 
unable to organize and order themselves they surrendered again. [ ... ] The Tiirk God above 
and the Turk spirits of earth and water did thus without doubt: so that the Turk folk would 
not be annihilated, would become a nation, held my father Ilteri~ Kagan and my mother 
llbilge Khatun at the top of the heavens and without doubt raised them even higher. 
Put another way, some of the Tiirkmen must have likewise felt betrayed by the Seljuks' 
concern for their non-Turkic vassals and subjects' welfare, regardless of whether like 
them they were Muslims or not. 
This is not to deny that Tiirkmen also most likely regarded the domains conquered as 
theirs to plunder rather than to rule. Particularly as Tugrul and ~ago Beg only 
apportioned the realms the Seljuks had conquered among themselves. The Oguz called 
settled people yatuk or lqy-about [Atalay, 1992/III:14]. Merchants fared no better; sart 
[Ibid. 1:342 & 111:13], derived from san-it or yello\v-cur came to be applied to all 
sedentary people in Central Asia, not only merchants [Barthold, lA Vol. 1 0:236-7]. 
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Nevertheless, even though 'I'ugrul and C::agrt Beg may have adopted the existing system 
of government, it seems that neither Ibrahim Ytnal nor Kutalmt~, let alone lesser 
Turkmen begs, appear to have received their share of the revenues thus gained. While 
pasturage in Khurasan and to a larger degree in Azarbayjan and eastern Anatolia may 
have been similar to that available in Central Asia, Khwarazm and Iraq were in the main 
agricultural and urban. This appears to have created friction not only with the local tax 
collectors but also with the populace the Turkmen plundered. 
Instead of assigning part of the tax revenue to the Turkmen, Tuf,)"ful Beg appears to 
have created the opportunity for those who did not want to keep public order according 
to the customs and laws of Islamdom to feed and clothe themselves in Armenia and 
eastern Anatolia, which were suitably Christian. By appointing members of the dynasty 
to lead the Turkmen there, Tugrul Beg may have thought that he had fulftlled his 
obligations as a Turkic sovereign, even if the Seljuks could not claim to be of the 
highest descent. Whatever his thoughts on the matter, in return he seems to have 
expected unerring obedience. 
7.6 The Conquest of Anatolia 
Kafesoglu [IA Vol. 10:369] and Turan [1965:106 & 1971b:1-44] were of the opinion 
that the conquest of Anatolia was necessitated by the size of Turkmen migration from 
Central Asia. According to Koymen [1963:239ffj, it was Ibrahim Ymal's defeat of the 
combined forces of Katakalon, Aaron and Prince Liparit near Erzurum that 
encouraged Tugrul Beg to invade. 
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These v1ews overlook several aspects that must be taken into consideration for the 
Seljuks' victory at Malazgirt and the subsequent establishment of a dynastic offshoot in 
Anatolia can begin to be put in perspective. On the whole Turkish scholarship does not 
seem to have addressed the issues raised by events that led up to the Battle of Malazgirt 
or that followed it, let alone analysed the battle itself. For instance, Turan simply accepts 
the Seljuks faced a 200,000-strong Byzantine force with as little as 50,000 men 
[1971 b:25]. For their part, the military historians Si.ier and c;aktn, like Koymen, impose a 
conventional formation on the Seljuks' when evidence for nomadic pastoral warfare 
clearly contradicts this. 
To begin with, although the Seljuks seem to have redirected new migrants from Central 
Asia to Azarbayjan and eastern Anatolia, the state of Byzantine defences in the region 
cannot be ignored. After all, before the arrival of the Tiirkmen, the Byzantines had 
successfully reversed attempts by both the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates. It is all the 
more instructive, therefore, that the Chinese graded nomadic pastoral incursions as 
follo\vs: looting border areas, robbing border areas, border encroachment, invasion, a 
great invasion, deep invasion and large-scale invasion Oagchid & Symons, 1989:24]. 
7. 6.1 Incursion 
Like their kinfolk in Inner Asia, at first the Ti.irkmen appear to have merely looted and 
robbed border areas from the Mughan steppe (see Appendix 1, map A1.4), with the 
help of the Shaddadids through whose domains they most likely returned (1042-5). 
Although this may have alerted them to the parlous state of Byzantine arms (see below, 
1.6.2), Koymen's argument was that at the time even Azarbayjan was not as yet safe for 
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the Ti.irkmen habitation. Accordingly, Tugrul Beg assigned Yabgu Kalan's son I-Iasan 
and ~a£>rt Beg's son Yakuti to secure the region. When I-Iasan (possibly with Yakuti) 
encroached across the border into Anatolia, however, he lost his life in a battle with 
Katakalon and Aaron (1 047), the generals for Ani and Van respectively (the Armenian 
kingdoms of Ani and Vaspurakan being Byzantine protectorates at the time). Certainly, 
Tugrul Beg then seems to have assigned Ibrahim Y mal to avenge I-Iasan's death, which 
he did by invading Anatolia. Whether or not the Ti.irkmen continued to raid the 
Byzantine Empire after Tugrul Beg made peace, however, is not clear (1 050). What is 
known is that Tugrul Beg was otherwise occupied in Iraq al-Ajam with the Buyids, not 
to mention Ibrahim Ytnal's rebellion. 
What is known is that four years later Tugrul Beg took command of the Ti.irkmen at the 
head of his own forces (see Appendix 1, map A1.4). Although various dynasties in 
eastern Anatolia proclaimed their allegiance and raids were conducted as far north as 
the Caucasus, Tugrul Beg was unable to take the fortress of Malazgirt despite besieging 
it with Armenian help. Clearly, however, the Seljuks already regarded this redoubt as 
central to their operations. Moreover, Tugrul Beg appears to have left behind one of his 
commanders, Sabuk Beg, with three thousand men. Yakuti and Sabuk Beg are said to 
have won every engagement against Briennios (1057). The following year Ani and I<ars 
were besieged and Malatya sacked. On Sultan Tugrul's orders, two years later the 
Ti.irkmen once again invaded Anatolia. This time Sivas was sacked and U rfa besieged by 
Salar-i Khurasan, possibly a mamluk commander. After another Byzantine army \vas 
defeated (1061), Sultan Tugrul journeyed to Azarbayjan to review Yakuti's conduct of 
operations (1 062). 
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The problem for the Scljuks seems to have been one of gaining a foothold in the 
mountain fastness of eastern Anatolia in order to ensure the Tiirkmen's safe return and 
to protect their northern flank and rear, their main pastures being in Azarbayjan. 
Another consideration may have been control of the trade routes through the Caucasus 
and Arran. It is not surprising, therefore, that during his first campaign (1063), having 
cleared the Caucasus as far north as 'Tbilisi, Sultan Alp-Arslan's forces not only took 
numerous fortifications and walled towns situated in north-eastern Anatolia, including 
the walled city of Ani, but also torched them (sec Appendix 1, map A1.5). Soon 
afterwards the Seljuks seem to have finally taken the fortress of Malazgirt and 
established a base 1n Ahlat, under the command of Gi.imi.i~-Tekin, a mamluk 
commander (1 066). From here, until they fell out, Giimii~-Tekin and Af~in Beg are 
known to have taken fortifications between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, which 
clearly impeded safe return to Ahlat from sorties into central and south-eastern 
Anatolia. It was only when Af~in Beg fell out with Gi.imii~-Tekin and killed him that 
Ti.irkmen raids are reported also from Aleppo, which is where Af~in Beg took refuge 
after having sacked Kayseri and raided as far inland as Konya (1 067) (see Appendl_x 1, 
map A1.5). 
When Romanos Diogenes became emperor, therefore, Anatolia was under attack from 
not only the northeast and east but also the southeast. More importandy, however, the 
looting of border areas from Azarbayjan had turned into a large-scale invasion from 
eastern Anatolia. The emperor's first two campaigns (1 068-9) clearly reflect this fact (see 
also Appendix 1, map A1.6). 
In order to appreciate the remarkable consequences of Sultan Alp-Arslan's resounding 
victory at Malazgirt (1071), however, the Byzantine Empire's provincial administration 
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needs to be examined. The underlying point being that this was not the first time the 
Byzantines had to defend Anatolia from raiding, quite to the contrary. The Arabs had 
been doing so regularly since the establishment of the Umayyad Caliphate and had 
gained a foothold in eastern Anatolia that survived well into Abbasid times. 
7.6.2 Defence 
Faced with a sharp fall in t~x revenue on losing more than half of its domains at the 
beginning of the 7th century, it seems that during the reign of Emperor Constans II 
(641-68) the Byzantine Empire was organized into provinces under military governance 
(themes). It is thought that by granting most of the remaining imperial estates on a 
hereditary basis, Constans II made Byzantine soldiery self-supporting, selling them arms 
from state owned depots (c.659) [Treadgold, 1995:21-5]. Initially there were seven such 
themes in Anatolia and possibly another three in the Balkans, which had been mostly 
overrun by the Slavs. Subsequently the number of themes rose, but it is doubted that 
the rise in the number of soldiery was proportionate. This increase appears to have 
been caused as much by the s.ubsequent expansion of the Byzantine Empire as by the 
breaking-up of rebellious themes [Ibid. 25-8; Oman, 1924:179-84; also Dupuy, 
1984:52f~. The point being that the frontier themes defended the Byzantine Empire's 
borders while the soldiery in the inner themes maintained order, both being supported 
by the tagmata, heavy cavalry troops formed by Constantine V (741-5), which were 
independent of the provincial garrisons. 
On their south-eastern Anatolian border, the Byzantines attempted to keep the passes 
in the Taros and Antitoros Mountains under regular observation so as to gain advance 
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warning of Muslim raids launched from Tarsus and Adana, and later more frequently 
from northern Syria. It is thought that on being alerted, the nearest battalion tried to 
track the raiders while the main cavalry corps gathered. At the same time available 
infantry were sent to the passes by which the Muslims were expected to return. These 
were the Cilician Gates and those of Adata and Melitene. Once gathered, the Byzantine 
cavalry either attacked, or, if the raiding party was too large, defended until 
reinforcements arrived from neighbouring provinces. If the raiders retreated before 
they could be engaged, then the Byzantines endeavoured to attack their camp at night 
with infantry and/ or dismounted cavalry. Their best results seem to have been gained if 
their infantry were deployed at the right passes at the right time. A case in point was 
Nicephorus Phocas' brother Leo's victory over Sayf al-Dawla, the Hamdanid Amir of 
Aleppo (963). In this instance Sayf al-Dawla tried to return by the same mountain pass 
he had entered Anatolia, possibly losing as many as 4,000 men and his booty, barely 
saving his own life [Ibid 209-17; also Treadgold, 1995:30]. 
After this, however, Muslim raids seem to have fallen off if not totally ceased. Possibly 
this is why to\vard the end of Basil II's reign (976-1025) and more so at the start of that 
of Constantine IX Monomachus (1 042-55) civil administrators replaced the governors 
general whose rebellions the latter had to suppress (see also above, 4.3). Constantine IX 
Monomachus also debased the coinage, possibly to reduce army pay, and relieved the 
Armcno-Cappadocian provinces of their obligation of universal military service, ta..xing 
them instead [Treadgold, 1995:40; also Oman, 1924:180]. Arguably without their so-
called Iberian Army, a total of 50,000 men of the themes that stretched northeast from 
bct:\veen Urfa and Kayseri into the Caucasus, the Byzantines were no longer able to 
withstand the Turkmen incursions [Ibid 214-9]. In many cases soldieries appear to have 
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been reduced to plundering such that warlords arose 1n castles with subject villages 
whose inhabitants served as infantry [Oman, 1924:180; also footnote 20]. Nor must it 
be forgotten that during their incorporation into the Byzantine Empire, the Armenians 
suffered persecution and relocation, which is thought to have made them less than loyal 
(footnotes 18 & 19). In short, Malazgirt appears to have been a 'do or die' battle for the 
By zan tine Empire in Anatolia. 
7.6.3 Malazgirt 
Turkish scholars estimated that the force Romanos Diogenes gathered on the banks of 
the Sakarya River before Malazgirt was almost 1 00,000-strong, including 30,000 
auxiliaries with 3,000 supply wagons. According to the Tactica, a military manual 
compiled during the reign of Leo VI (886-912) [Dupuy, 1984:53], there should have 
been two carts and a pack horse for every 16 foot soldiers (decury), a battalion or 
regiment (banda or numerus) consisting of 480 men [Oman, 1924:191 ]. Consequently, 
3,000 supply wagons suggest 24,000 infantry. Each battalion could also expect support 
from a surgeon with six to eight stretcher-bearers [Ibid.], or 3,450 medical staff. In 
addition there would have been the engineering units attached to each corps (thema) 
[Ibid.]/0 not to mention a siege machine that required 1,200 men to operate. In short, 
30,000 infantry and auxiliaries seems consistent with 3,000 supply \vagons. 
Again according to the Tactica, it is thought that the number of infantry in a Byzantine 
formation varied between 11 °/o and 54°/o [Ibid. 196; also Dupuy, 1984:57-9]. To take the 
Jo A Byzantine corps consisted of two to three divisions (lurma), which were made up of five to eight regiments 
or battalions [Dupuy, 1984:54-5]. 
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latter percentage first, it is unlikely the emperor would have embarked on a campaign 
against an enemy wholly consisting of cavalry with only 25,000 of his own. A cavalry 
force of 300,000, not to mention half a million as some Muslim sources report [Siimer 
& Sevim, 1971 ], seems equally unlikely, despite mercenaries and soldiery from 
metropolitan and Balkan provinces [Oman, 1924:219]. There is, however, the report 
that Romanos Diogenes brought over the five Balkan tagmata, all told 12,000 men. 
These are thought to have been in addition to the 12,000 in Anatolia and the Varangian 
Guard of 6,000 mercenaries, which makes a total of up to 30,000 heavy cavalry. 
Separately there are the 5,000 cavalry known to have been garrisoned in Tarsus and as 
roughly a quarter of each provincial corps elsewhere seems to have been cavalry, 
another 1,000 in Antakya. In addition there is the cavalry of the disbanded Iberian 
Army, which Romanos Diogenes tried to drill back into a fighting force. Of these 
12,000 are thought to have been of the Christianized Banu I-Iabib, who deserted to the 
Byzantines in 934 and are assumed to have kept up their numbers. Since the Iberian 
Army seems to have totalled 50,000 men, this suggests that there were another 9,500 
cavalry besides the Banu Habib [Treadgold, 1995:34, 79-80, 83-5, 116-7 & 216]. This 
would make a possible 57,500 cavalry without the soldiery from Cappadocia, which is 
known to have been on the field. Nor does this include the Uz and the Pec;enek. 
Consequently, fifty-five to sixty thousand Byzantine cavalry with 15,000 auxiliaries 
seems a reasonable assumption [Oman, 1924:191 & 219]. 
The force dispatched to help the Bagratid dynasty may have been mostly infantry in 
order to strengthen their defences against the Seljuks. After Sultan Alp-Arslan's 
campaign into Georgia (1 066), the Tiirkmen appear to have raided along the rivers and 
streams stretching from Tbilisi into Anatolia south of the Pontic Mountains (1 070) (see 
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Appendix 1, map A 1.1). Likewise, infantry would have held the fortress of Malazgirt. 
There is also the infantry under Trachaniotes, who with Roussel was dispatched to take 
Ahlat [Ibid. 194]. Although Roussel's Normans most likely were heavy cavalry, it seems, 
therefore, that Romanos Diogenes had almost all his cavalry with him on the battlefield. 
Consequently, the Byzantines are unlikely to have been 1 00,000-strong at Malazgirt, as 
Turkish scholars have assumed. 
As for the Seljuks, it is doubtful they numbered forty to fifty-five thousand, let alone 
100,000 or more as some western European military historians have suggested [I bid. 
219]. In all probability even the twelve core tribes of the Kok Ti.irk could not field more 
than 60,000 men. It can only have been with the addition of the Tokuz Oguz and other 
affiliated tribes that the Kok Ti.irk Empire was able to put 400,000 men in the field 
[Divit~ioglu, 1987:21 0]. The Seljuks and the Ti.irkmen made up but a fraction of the 
lineages once affiliated to the Kok Turk. To be sure, the sultan's reported route from 
Aleppo suggests that he may have recruited additional soldiery before being joined by 
Sabuk Beg and the Ti.irkmen in Ahlat (see Appendi.x 1, map A 1.8). l-Ienee the 
assumption by Turkish scholars of Kurdish cavalry at Malazgirt. Nevertheless, if Sultan 
Alp-Arslan had outnumbered Romanos Diogenes, it is doubtful that the emperor would 
have risked a purely cavalry battle, let alone pursued the Seljuks on the field. 'fhis seems 
to be confirmed by Sultan Alp-Arslan's reported attempt at reconciliation before battle. 
Despite reports concerning the Uz and Pe~enek defections, Trachaniotes and Roussel's 
refusal to rejoin as ordered, or indeed Andronicos Ducas' dislike for the emperor, it 
appears that Romanos Diogenes' disregarded all that the Byzantines had learnt of 
steppe warfare during previous centuries [Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 7:242ff; see also Oman, 
1924:219 & Dupuy, 1984:61 ]. This kno\vledge was readily available in military manuals 
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[Dirimtekin, 1993:230ffj. Besides the Tactica, there is the earlier Strategicon, which is 
thought to have been compiled during the reign of Emperor Maurice (582-602) [Dupuy, 
1984:53], not to mention the work by Nicephorus Phocas (c. 980) [Oman, 1924:215]. 
According to the Tactica, which is accepted as having been based on the Strategicon, when 
combating a Turkic foe, generals were advised to protect their rear (with a natural 
obstacle if possible), take care of their flanks, never pursue blindly (or become 
separated), but engage at close quarters as soon as possible [Ibid. 206]. More 
importantly, the Tactica also recommended a front line of heavy infantry, supported by 
foot archers whose bows were bigger than those the cavalry had and hence shot further 
[Ibid. 206]. The Turkic composite bow, on the other hand, included a layer of split horn 
on the stave toward the archer. This gave it greater penetrative power and a range over 
300 meters. Although at that distance the arrows \vere ineffective against chain mail, at 
least until the Ottomans developed a superior bow in the 15th century [see Dupuy, 
1984:4-5], the Byzantine heavy cavalry could not match their firepower. If foot archers 
were able to shoot their mounts from underneath them, however, Turkic horsemen 
became vulnerable to both bowshot and lance as they wore little if any armour. Nor 
must it be forgotten that cavalry can not close if the infantry stand steadfast, as horses 
will shy away [also MacDowall, 1995:26-7]. 
The problem was that tnounted archers continually harassed with interchangeable 
groups, until death, fatigue and mounting frustration forced gaps in the enemy line. The 
gaps were then charged in wedge shaped formations known since the Scythians [Ibid. 
23; see also Maenchen-Helfen, 1973:201 ffj. However, this was difficult to effect against 
heavy infantry supported by cavalry, since the latter could parry flanking manoeuvres. 
Moreover, well drilled foot soldiers were more likely to keep to prescribed distances in 
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the heat of battle, something compressed cavalry formations could not do, as horses 
tend to panic when close to each other [Ibid. 24]. Consequently, the feigned retreat, 
which was an integral part of steppe warfare, invariably lured wholly cavalry formations 
into giving chase, particularly as their aristocratic members remained eager to inflict 
shock combat. Mounted archers gave the appearance of fleeing in disparate groups 
rather than executing an orderly retreat. As both riders and horses had different 
temperaments and battle experience, groups tended to disjoin in such circumstances 
[Ibid. 24-5], breaking up the chain of command. Having separated and tired their heavily 
armoured foe by feigning flight [Ibid. 21 ], mounted archers turned, encircled and began 
to shoot in arcade. This could demoralize the most battle hardened troops thus forced 
to stand their ground. Usually, therefore, when not able to fall back on their heavy 
infantry, the more inexperienced riders panicked, those better disciplined being captured 
or annihilated with them by ever larger groups gathered for the kill with sword, pike and 
mace. 
There is no doubt that armour impeded mobility Uankovich, 1971 :29], quickly tiring 
both horse and rider, but mounting a horse did not give the sedentary rider parity with 
those off the steppes. I-Isiung-nu children rode calves and foals, the smallest riding 
sheep and goats \vhile shooting arrows at field mice, small birds and poppies 
[Kafesoglu, 1994:209]. Nearly two centuries after Malazgirt, according to the oft-cited 
report by Johannes Plano de Carpini who was on an abortive ambassadorial mission to 
Nfongolia (1245-7), two to three year old children could not only sit in the saddle but 
also gallop a horse. Nor could sedentary horses match the mobility of the hardy steppe 
mounts [Koymen, 1967:56-7 & 59]. Although smaller, these were more manoeuvrable 
because of their high neck carriage, not to mention their long, thin limbs and hard 
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hooves [I<afcsoglu, 1994:206; sec also Macnchen-1-Ielfcn, 1973:203-21 ], which gave 
them speed and resilience. Taken in conjunction with the large hunting drives 
conducted each autumn (kurt qyumt, or the wolf's game) that served as war games flbid. 
274; also Ogel, 1993], it is clear that no matter how well-drilled, sedentary cavalry 
remained. hard put to combat superior Turkic horsemanship and archery. 
It is more than likely, therefore, that Romanos Diogenes would have survived to fight 
another day if he had retained his infantry units rather than relied on the numerical 
superiority of his cavalry. Arguably he attempted to close because his heavy cavalry was 
no match for the Seljuks. Once gaps opened on his flanks and units became separated, 
however, they had no steadfast infantry to fall back on. In the confusion he seems to 
have been unable to effect an orderly retreat, losing touch with his reserve. Forced to 
face about and stand his ground, possibly he dismounted and turned his heavy cavalry 
into infantry as prescribed in the Strategicon (MacDowall, 1995:24]. Even if so, however, 
his heavily armoured men would have been tired by then if not also demoralized, and 
the Seljuks' armoured mamluks comparatively fresh, which would have made all the 
difference in close combat. Whatever the case, encircled, gradually most of the 
remaining Byzantine heavy cavalry seems to have been annihilated \vith the exception of 
the reserve, thought to have consisted mainly of mercenaries and Armenian nobility 
[Oman, 1924:219-21; see also Dupuy, 1984:61 ]. 
7.6.4 The Seljuks of Anatolia 
Sultan Malik-Shah clearly continued from where his great-uncle and father left off by 
repeated campaigns in the Caucasus (1075-6, 1078-9, 1084 & 1086). Nevertheless, he is 
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considered to have been at best ambivalent if not outright hostile toward the Ti.irkmen. 
Thus his latter two campaigns are interpreted as attempts to control Ti.irkmen migration 
into Anatolia [Turan, 1971 b:77; also Cahen, 1984:93-4]. 
Although Sultan Alp-Arslan seems to have taken responsibility for the Caucasus and 
Anatolia - possibly due to the death of Yakuti who is not mentioned in the 
apportionment after his accession - with the unification of the Great Seljuk Empire 
under one ruler, the Ti.irkmen could no longer have been led as it were 'from the 
saddle'. Arguably this is why soon afterwards the sultan appointed a mamluk 
commander, Gi.imi.i~-Tekin, to supervize Ti.irkmen raids into Anatolia, which came to 
be launched from Ahlat (1066). The Ti.irkmen, however, appear to have expected a 
Seljukid. Thus possibly Gi.imi.i~-Tekin's death at the hands of the Ti.irkmen beg 
Bekc;:ioglu Af~in, who was quite happy to report to Sultan Alp-Arslan once he had been 
pardoned. Particularly so soon after Malazgirt, Sultan Alp-Arslan's death arguably 
created a power vacuum while Sultan Malik-Shah dealt with Kavurt, then the 
Karakhanids and Ghaznavids, one that was filled by Kutalm.1~'s sons. This is why Sultan 
Malik-Shah's approach may appear ambivalent. To be sure, there are the various 
reported attempts at reconciliation between the Seljuks and the Byzantines, whether 
through the good office of the caliph or directly. On the other hand, there were also the 
repeated campaigns conducted by mamluk commanders. These invariably ended with 
inconclusive sieges of Iznik, which suggests that like his great-uncle and father, Sultan 
Malik-Shah considered the Ti.irkmen in Anatolia in his dominion -even if Kutalmt~'s 
sons did not. 
It is also unlikely that the caliph unilaterally proclaimed Si.ileyman-Shah sultan, as this 
would have been feasible only prior to Kavurt's defeat. Sultan Malik-Shah did not move 
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against the Karakhanids until the caliph confirmed his status (1 073). Nor is Si.ileyman-
Shah's elder brother Mansur thought to have died until much later (1 078). As for the 
reports that Si.ileyman-Shah was appointed sultan by Malik-Shah, why were neither his 
brothers nor his sons released upon his death? It was only upon Sultan Malik-Shah's 
death that K.tL.c; Arslan emerged in Anatolia, very much as his father and uncles did 
when Sultan Alp-Arslan died. Moreover, despite his assurances to the contrary, when 
the Seljuks' Uqailid vassal Muslim asked for the annual tax Philaretos Brachamios had 
promised for Antakya, if as Si.ileyman-Shah claimed he was also Malik-Shah's vassal, 
arguably he would not have been asked to pay or for that matter attacked the Ugailids, 
let alone appointed a Fatimid jurist (1 085-6). Therefore, contrary to Koymen [1963:1 02-
7] and Kafesoglu [-1953:75 & IA Vol. 10:391 ], as Turan argued [IA Vol. 11:21 0-12], most 
likely Si.ileyman-Shah appeared subservient to Sultan Malik-Shah in order to rid himself 
of his brothers, particularly the older Mansur, and thus gain dominion in Anatolia. 
Once confident of his gains, Si.ileyman-Shah appears to have declared himself sultan 
unilaterally. 
As for the argument that Si.ileyman-Shah behaved like a Byzantine rather than a Seljukid 
vassal and hence that the Ti.irkmen in Anatolia would have become incorporated into 
the Byzantine Empire [Cahen, 1984:88-92], this must be considered doubtful to say the 
least. Emperor Alexius' peace agreement with Si.ileyman-Shah strongly suggests that in 
the wake of their defeat at Malazgirt, the Byzantine Empire had no central authority left 
in Anatolia (1 082). No matter ho\v temporary, Si.ileyman-Shah's customs' bureaux on 
the Bosporus certainly appear to conf.trm this. 
Consequently, on Si.ileyman-Shah's defeat by Tutu~ and his death (1086), Sultan Malik-
Shah, although he did not journey to Anatolia, appears to have made sure that neither 
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al-Kasim nor another beg gained dominion over the Tiirkmen [Koymen, 1963:1 09]. 
Under pressure from the Byzantines who seem to have used Porsuk and Bozan's 
campaigns to regain territory, when at last he did journey to Isfahan to proclaim 
allegiance, al-Kasim was strangled with his own bowstring, with or without Sultan 
Malik-Shah's consent. The sultan's reported offer of some seaports in his request for 
Emperor Alexius' daughter in marriage to his son, not to mention the reputed 
proclamations of allegiance by the begs of Konya and Aksaray, further strengthen the 
argument that after Malazgirt the Seljuks became established not only in the countryside 
but also in the towns of Anatolia - whether or not they had Byzantine help such as 
from Nicephorus Melissenos. 
Despite the self-evident enmity between the two main branches of the Seljuks, namely 
Arslan's and Mikail's descendants, Sultan Malik-Shah's continued concern with the 
Caucasus (1075-6, 1078-9, 1084 & 1086) also suggests that there was a steady migration 
through here into Anatolia. These campaigns were in the main against the Georgians, 
but it must not be forgotten that Sultan Alp-Arslan also returned here during Romanos 
Diogenes' ftrst and second Anatolian campaigns (1 068/9). This was when the region is 
said to have ftrst come under pressure from the K.imek migration. This is thought to 
have pushed the Alan, Komuk, Sabir, and various remnants of the Khazars, into the 
Caucasus. 
Certainly, the mountainous neck of land between the Black Sea and the Caspian appears 
to have been the favoured route for Turkic migrations into Anatolia. According to 
'logan, the Bulgars from the Volga region were the ftrst Turkic people to arrive in 
north-eastern Anatolia (149-129 BCE). Next the Sabirs moved into Azarbayjan from 
the south Caucasus (305). According to Byzantine sources, during the 5th century some 
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of the I-Iuns also centred themselves on the Mughan steppe (445). T\vo decades 
afterwards the Aga<;eri, a ruling lineage of the l-Iuns, arrived in Azarbayjan (465). In 
short, the argument is that Turkic people were situated in the Caucasus, Azarbayjan and 
north-eastern Anatolia from before the start of the Common Era rrogan, 1946:168-
171 ]. T'he Byzantines' known resettlement of some Avars in Anatolia (577 & 620) 
[Kalafat, 1992:29]/' not to mention the Abbasids' eastern Anatolian Sugur Army, which 
is thought to have consisted of Ti.irkmen (760) [Ibid 26], lend further support to this 
line of reasoning (see also above, 7.5). The Seljuks' conquest of Anatolia, therefore, 
may have been facilitated not only by the existence there of people of Turkic descent, 
but also by the familiarity of its Greek, Armenian, Slavic and other local populaces with 
immigrants per se. 
Yet another factor that must be considered in this context is the seeming hostility to 
Byzantine rule in western Anatolia, which appears to have remained mainly Greek. It is 
difficult to explain how else C";aka Beg and al-Kasim could have undertaken to build 
navies that were clearly intended to challenge those of the Byzantines in both the 
Aegean and Marmara seas. As much seems to be indicated also by the inhabitants of 
Izmit. Although only 90 kms from Istanbul, before they let in the Byzantine 
commander Eustathios, reportedly they had to be persuaded that al-Kasim and 
Emperor Alexius Comnenus had agreed to jointly defend the city against Sultan Malik-
Shah's commander Porsuk. 
11 Possibly the following villages in present day Turkey were originally Avar settlements: Avadan (farsus and 
Eski~ehir), Avaduri (Midyat), Avakent (Kulp, Diyarbaktr), Avak (Trak, Hisn Kayfa), Avalama (Konya), Avan 
(~irvan, Hisn Kayfa), Avana (Boa;:ka), Avanoglu (Kt~ehir), Avanu~agt (Pazarctk, Kahramanmara~), Avora 
(Niksar, Tokat), Avarek (Van), Avank (Egin), Avas (Baktrkoy, Istanbul), Avasorik (Erci~, Van), Avason 
(Manavgat) and Avasor (Muradiye, Van) [Ibid.]. 
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In short, immediately after Malazgirt the Seljuks seem to have benefited not only from 
contention among Byzantine generals for Emperor Michael VII Ducas' throne, but also 
from those local populaces ill disposed to being ruled from Istanbul. The more so since 
clearly Byzantine governance in Anatolia had fallen into disarray before most of what 
remained there of its military was destroyed on the battlefield. Familiarity with previous 
Turkic re-settlements throughout Anatolia - not to mention their descendants - may 
have also simplified matters for the Seljuks and the new immigrants, Oguz or other. 
7. 7 Governance 
As has been noted in reference to the 'Tiirkmen problem' (see above, 1.5), without 
exception Turkish scholars agreed with Kopriilii that the Seljuks took over Irano-
Islamic institutions. They thought this tendency was most prevalent during Nizam al-
Mulk's vizierate (1 063-92), particularly during the reign of Sultan Malik-Shah (1 072-92). 
On the evidence presented by Turkish scholars, however, the Seljuks appear to have 
acted in greater accord with their cultural origins than hitherto proposed. Arguably the 
reasons for this lie in the predominance of mounted archery before the advent of 
gunpowder, because it helped to reinforce Turkic expectations and ideology. 
A weapon with superior range tends to dominate battle formations [Fuller, 1998:21 ]. 
Since speed and mobility likewise command offensive considerations [Ibid. 23], it is not 
surprising that nomadic pastoral cultures, which were able to combine archery \vith 
equestrian pursuits quite naturally, came to raid and try to wear do\vn their foe before 
delivering the finishing blo\v. By comparison, in sedentary cultures, archery cloaked the 
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deployment of other weapons [Ibid. 21], mainly because agriculturists remained well 
adapted to infantry action, or shock combat. The problem with this was that on their 
own foot soldiers could not attack cavalry [Ibid. 68; also MacDowall, 1995:3-6]. 
Consequently, in order to defeat the growing armies of mounted archers, sedentary 
people were forced more and more to rely on cavalry [Dupuy, 1984:36ffj. 
As equestrian pursuits were not part of a sedentary culture's daily concerns, however, 
horses had to be bred specially [MacDowall, 1995:10-14]. There was also the expense of 
their upkeep and drill [Ibid.]. Nor must it be forgotten that archery required constant 
application [Dupuy, 1984:41]. Byzantine military manuals urged every subject and, if 
that was not possible, then each household to possess a bow and forty arrows for target 
practice [Oman, 1924:179]. When not hired, therefore, cavalry and/ or archers were 
almost without exception of noble birth. The development of armour, which few could 
afford, reinforced this tendency because it required special breeds of horses [Dupuy, 
1984:38; also Oman, 1924:126-30]. Besides the weight of its own chain mail, a mount 
bore a rider equipped with steel casque, mail shirt, gauntlets, steel shoes, large iron 
stirrups, shield, long lance and broadsword. Byzantine heavy cavalry also carried a 
dagger, axe, bow and quiver of arrows [Ibid. 56]. 
Although the Assyrians were the frrst to establish a professional army, their cavalry were 
drawn from their nobility (c.700 BCE) [Ibid. 7]. In ancient Greece, archers came from 
nobles \vho could not afford horses [Fuller, 1998:38]. Alexander the Great's Companions, 
his heavy cavalry of young Macedonian noblemen, were supported on the flanks by 
mercenary Thessalian cavalry and similar light cavalry units (356-23 BCE) [Dupuy, 
1984:36-7]. When the Romans were forced to switch emphasis from infantry to cavalry 
due to disastrous campaigns against the Persians (363) and the Goths (3 78), not to 
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mention the I-I uns soon thereafter, their arm1es came to include allies (foederatt) or 
mercenanes (bttce/lani) [C)man, 1924:8-21 & 176-7; also Dupuy, 1984:36-41]. Their 
inclusion appears to have enabled rich nobles as well as generals to form their own 
armies despite legal sanctions (476) [MacDowall, 1995:6-7]. Eventually the Byzantines 
were able to settle their armies, the bulk of their heavy cavalry becoming 'small free 
landowners' [Oman, 1924:189]. 
'The turning point for Muslim arms seems to have come during the Abbasid Civil War 
(809-3 7), when Caliph al-Amin's (809-13) 40,000-strong force was defeated outside Rayy 
by at most 5,000 cavalry sent from Khurasan by his brother al-Macmun (811). While 
Caliph al-Macmun is thought to have prevaricated whether to govern from Marv or 
return to Baghdad, its siege having ended with Caliph al-Amin's execution (813), the 
youngest brother, al-Muctasim, seems to have begun to build a personal army (814-5). 
Although this appears to have been founded on slaves trained for military service, such 
as Ithak, a Khazar cook, not to mention Turkic slaves supplied by the Samanids, it also 
included Transoxanian princes such as Af~in. Furthermore, even though many of these 
'slave' soldiers hardly spoke Arabic in their lifetimes, their sons were integrated into 
Muslim society. Possibly as a result, at first slaves do not seem to have been 
distinguished as such in the caliphate's new military elite. At least, that is, until the latter 
half of the 10th century, when ghilman or mamluks, as they came to be known, replaced 
them. Recruited mostly by Turkic men of arms, \Vho remained responsible for their 
keep, they appear to have led celibate lives, some going so far as to become eunuchs. 
Jlowevcr, even they were not all slaves. For instance, Anu~-Tekin al-Dizbari, who was 
from Khurasan, is thought to have become a mamluk of his own accord in order to 
further his prospects, retaining his mentor the Dailamite Dizbar's name as a mark of 
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respect. Not surprisingly, the allegiance of such men was to their leader [Kennedy, 
1994:148-160 & 206-7]. 
It is this last aspect, that of allegiance rather than slavery, which seems to have been the 
key consideration as concerns the Seljuks, too, particularly in view of the martial 
traditions that are known to have prevailed on the Eurasian steppes with respect to 
fealty in the pursuit of power. 'T'he Seljuks were mounted archers; their steppe origins 
arc clearly discernible not only in the manner in which the Tiirkmen overran Anatolia 
under their leadership, but also in the martial and secular character of their governance. 
7. 7.1 Warrior Elites 
The ongt.ns of these can be traced to before the emergence of a state, namely to 
attempts at resolving disputes peacefully through the good offices of elders. This 
common tribal feature concerned chiefs without coercive powers, who did not 
necessarily lead in raids either but could be appointed for a definite tenure of office to 
an executive and judicial council. By contrast, fighting men who banded together could 
gainsay a council's authority through their self-evident ability to enforce decisions. 
Better still, unlike chiefs who lost face when unable to resolve a quarrel within the 
common code, warriors could seek out certain types of wrongdoers and compel redress 
or mete out punishment. When confronted with new kinds of dispute such men could 
also make la\v. l\fost important of all, social groupings could be achieved on a basis 
other than kinship although the outcome might once again be expressed in terms of 
descent. In short, warfare gave autonomous power to the group that practised it 
[Gluckman, 1977]. 
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On the Eurasian steppes men who had distinguished themselves by their skill in hunting 
and combat arc thought to have banded together in stockades, called pi-:JIIng by the 
Chinese chroniclers of the 1st millennium BCE, a word not considered to be of Chinese 
origin. These fortifications, which consisted of an outer and an inner wall within which 
the warlord lived, came to be called ordtt or palace, thus its application to the cities of 
Turkic rulers. Apart from the Chou dynasty (c.1122-256 BCE), which is thought to have 
emerged from such a warrior band [Esin, 1980b:9-25]. A better example is the rise to 
power of Modun, the founder of the I-lsiung-nu Empire (209 BCE to 1 55 CE), whose 
natne is thought to redact to Batttr or Bagatttr (Moduk--Mokduk--Makdur--Bakdur 
[Lattimore, 1967:450]), Turkic for hero or brave. According to an oft-repeated story, 
Modun trained his loyal band of warriors to follow suit on the signal of his whistling 
arrow. First he took aim at one of his favorite horses. Those who failed to follow 
through were killed. After those who hesitated to kill one of his consorts met the same 
end, Modun aimed at one of his father's horses. When his warrior band shot it, at the 
next opportunity he loosed his whistling arro\v at his father and became kagan, or more 
correctly Shan-yu. 
Like Modun who had the Yueh-chi ruler's lopped skull lined with gold and encased in 
leather after he had drunk his blood from it, men of his ilk wore a drinking cup on their 
belts, which even if not the skull of their first kill, symbolized the same. First recorded 
among the Scythians, this practice is known also among the Oguz [Esin, 1980b:9-25]. 
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The latter's warrior bands arc thought to have consisted of an alp32 and those who had 
sworn fealty to him [Kopriilii, IA Vol. 1 :379-84]. Certainly it seems that among the 
descendants of the Kangb and Toles, too, there were warrior elites of twenty or more 
men who only accepted the leadership of one of their own, demanding to be buried 
alive alongside upon his death [Esin, 1980b:9-25]. This practice is thought to have been 
prevalent also among the Kok Turk [Divit~ioglu, 1987:206], not to mention the Angles 
and Saxons [Divit~ioglu, 1992:113-29], or Germanic cultures such as the Visigoths 
[Oman, 1924:177]. The traditions surrounding warrior elites, however, did not have to 
be so binding. The city rulers in Transoxania arc thought to have had guard corps 
consisting of the sons of the local aristocracy. In Samarkand, the most courageous of 
these warriors (called shakir or ~aker3} held an annual banquet where anyone who 
touched the food on the table had to fight to the death. The survivor was expected to 
repeat the challenge the next year [Barthold, 1990:195-7]. 
Social inequality among nomadic pastoralists could come about not only through 
martial skill and the virtue of courage but also through 'herding luck'. In the latter case, 
ho\vever, excess livestock tended to be entrusted to poorer families/' An alp who 
gathered around him others of his ilk in order to consolidate his standing was obliged 
to feed and clothe his men. As already discussed (see above, 7.1), he would not have 
17 Thought to go back to at least the 5th century, alp (also alpagu, alpaz111!, orytlpagu) means hero, brave, or stout-
hearted, whereas alpa,gut distinguishes an alp who takes on his enemies single-handed, one who can not be 
caught from any side. An alp is thought to have showed prowess not only through bravery and skill in combat 
but also from childhood as a hunter and rider. Consequently, as late as the 13th century, in Anatolia an alp who 
killed a tiger tied its tail to his wrist. Appropriately enough, the modern Turkish word for bragging 
(bobiirle11mek) is derived from bebiir (also babr or bebt), a type of tiger wild and vicious enough to tear apart an 
elephant jKoptiili.i, IA Vol. 1:379-84; Atalay, 1992/1:144, III:368 & IV:639]. 
JJ From {aqar, which in Turkic meant courtyard or fortified camp [Forard, 1961:10]. 
J4 In effect a form of reciprocity enabling the redistribution of wealth without the risks inherent in taking on 
indigent kinsmen or maintaining servants. According to Gluckman [1977], these latter forms remain prevalent 
among settled tribal communities where people without family, livestock, or land provide wealtl1ier members 
with a zisib/e 11umenc meamre of their sta11ding, as impoverished kinsmen or household servants. Such individuals, 
however, arc not considered the property of another and can release themselves through service. 
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done so at the expense of his herd. This further encouraged nomadic pastoral raids on 
other communities for agricultural or manufactured goods, not to mention livestock. In 
Central Asia, these had a human bonus. Captives were sold in the main to slave-traders 
who marketed them throughout Islamdom, but among the Kok Turk those retained as 
servants (kul) are thought to have possibly formed the nuclei of warrior elites 
[I)ivitc;ioglu, 1987:191 ]. 35 
T'he reported behaviour of the mamluk Gawhar-A'in, whom the last Buyid ruler 
transferred to his son Abu Nasr, has striking similarities with those warriors who chose 
to be buried alive with their lord. When Tugrul Beg imprisoned Abu Nasr, Gawhar-A'in 
seems to have remained at his master's side until his death. Subsequently appointed 
commander of Baghdad by Sultan Alp-Arslan, Gawhar-A'in was wounded while 
attempting to prevent him being stabbed to death. Gawhar-A'in went on to serve 
sultans Malik-Shah and Berk-Yaruk [Koymen, 1967:9-1 OJ. 
Mamluks such as Gawhar-A'in are thought to have been picked mainly from youths 
purchased on the slave market [Ibid 12]. There are also the 50,000 captives Sultan Alp-
Arslan is said to have taken while in the Caucasus. The 7,000 Armenian mamluks who 
were expelled despite Nizam al-Mulk's objections during Sultan Malik-Shah's re1gn, 
because Turkic commanders objected [Siimer, 1965:95], may have been of these 
captives. According to the vizier, it took twenty years to train a Samanid mamluk 
commander. This is why Koymen thought that at least initially the Seljuks inherited their 
J> It is known for instance that among the Huns warriors captured in battle were 'enslaved', but could purchase 
their freedom with their share of subsequent booty [Maenchen-Helfen, 1973:199]. Quite apart from the 
obvious fact that nomadic pastoral 'slaves' could easily escape unless employed in the household, this is also 
consistent with the point raised in the previous footnote. In other words, such men were not property, but part 
of a reciprocal system. As a elite, they would have enjoyed considerable privileges despite their 'enslaved' 
status. 
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mamluks. Certainly a long period of training may be indicated by the increased mention 
of mamluk commanders toward the end of Sultan Tugrul's reign, which may explain 
why their names remained to the fore during the first 3-4 years of Sultan Alp-Arslan's 
reign; the implication being that his mamluks became ready to take up positions of 
command only later. Nevertheless, Koymen suggests that in view of the importance 
Nizam al-Mulk attached to the training of mamluks in his Sryasat-Nama, it is doubtful 
that even during Sultan Malik-Shah's reign their training was institutionalized in the 
Samanid manner. According to Koymen, it seems rather that 'slave' soldiers were 
trained and equipped by a Turkic 'master' who served in the palace before being 
assigned to campaigns or regional posts [Koymen, 1967:12-5 & 1966]. Doubtless such 
service was intended to engender loyalty to the sultan's person. Arguably this is reflected 
in Sultan Malik-Shah's reported trepidation concerning Nizam al-Mulk's mamluk 
soldiery, said to have been more than 1 ,000-strong. 'fhe vizier was allowed to keep them 
only after he was able to persuade the sultan that they were in the service of the Seljuks, 
not his person [see Kafesoglu, IA Vol. 10:389 & Ozaydtn, 2001 :202-7]. 
Sultan Malik-Shah's royal mamluk corps billeted at the capital Isfahan is thought to have 
numbered 46,000 [Kafesoglu, 1953:1 56-8]. Whether or not these included foot soldiers 
capable of shock combae6 or siege warfare [Koymen, 1967:43-73], however, is not clear. 
Nor is it clear how many of them were auxiliaries or novices. Be that as it rnay, 
according to Kafesoglu, soldiery from the empire's core regions could augment these so 
that the Seljuks arc thought to have been able to field 300,000 men, excluding soldiery 
J6 There can be little doubt that the Kok Tiirk under Bilge Kagan had a royal corps, since Sebig Kiil Erkin is 
named as its commander [fekin, 1988:55]. Moreover, steppe tactics did not preclude shock troops. TI1e stone 
inscription erected for Tonyukuk, the Commander-in-Chief and Counsellor to the Kok Turk kagans, clearly 
states: tu'O squadrons U'ere 011 horse/Jack, ofle squadrofl JJ'OS 011 foot. There is also a reference to foot soldiers on the stone 
inscription erected for Bilge Kagan [Ibid. 49 & 1994:3]. 
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frotn vassal states or the Ti.irkmen [1953:1 56-163]. On the other hand, Ytnan<; 
j1944:174-6J, and possibly therefore Turan fiA Vol. 5/2:949ffj, argued that the 300,000 
soldiery mentioned by Ni%am al-Mulk in the Sfya.rat-Nama were in the main the 
Ti.irktncn in Iraq al-Ajam and al-Arab. Turan's argument was that by adapting the 
existing structures of land holding in line with Turkic expectations Nizam al-Mulk 
enabled the Ti.irkmen to gain means of support through agriculture and commerce 
rather than pillage [also Lewis, 1993:161]. 
What is clear is that even as late as the reign of Sultan Malik-Shah there were Ti.irkmen 
begs in the royal corps [Koymen, 1972:93-5]. Artuk, (;ubuk and Yagt-Styan are cases in 
point [Ibid.; also Siimer, 1965:97]. Aksungur is thought to have been of the Ktp<;ak 
Sabyu clan. Since his father El-Turgan was named Abdallah, presutnably the clan 
converted to Islam upon entering the Seljuks' service. Said to have been trained with the 
mamluk soldiery on Sultan Malik-Shah's orders, he became governor of Aleppo [Sevim, 
1990b:72]. Ya~-Styan also was appointed governor at Antakya. Consequently, rather 
than adopting the mamluk system because of their Iranian viziers' preference for 
'slaves' instead of freemen, as the most illustrious alps of their time, the Seljuks seem to 
have taken care to recreate a martial structure akin to those prevalent on the Eurasian 
steppes since at least the 1st millennium BCE. 
7. 7.2 The lqtac 
The conclusion of Turkish scholars that many of the institutions Nizam al-Mulk 
protnoted under Sultan Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shah are traceable to the Samanids, 
because he was trained by and worked for the Ghaznavid administration in Khurasan, is 
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most evident in the proliferation of madrasas under the Seljuks fKoymen, 197Sb]. By 
comparison, the other administrative development, namely the Scljuks' widespread and 
correspondingly varied use of the iqtac, does not seem to have evolved under the 
Samanids or the Ghaznavids, but rather under the Abbasids, that is, before being passed 
on to the Scljuks through the Buyids. The iqtac sheds light on how the Seljuks 
supported their warrior elite. 
An iqtac was originally known as a qatica, namely land vacated by the vanquished, in 
particular by the Sasanians in Iraq al-Arab. From as early as the reign of Caliph Umar 
(634-44) these were granted on a hereditary basis to Arabs, mosdy individuals but 
sometimes a tribal group. Nevertheless, there were lands still managed by their 
indigenous owners. Appropriations granted to Arabs on such land allowed them to pay 
the ushr (alms tax collected from Muslims) from the kharaj Qand tax collected from 
non-Muslims), the balance being their remuneration as citizen warriors Gund). Possibly 
with the incorporation of non-Arabs into the military, in time the latter type of holding 
appears to have fused with the former, that is become private property. Interestingly 
enough, however, after an attempted coup against Caliph al-Muqtadir (908-32), his 
vizier is said to have granted iqtacs to the Turkic mamluk commanders as before, that is, 
the holder collected the kharaj but only paid the ushr in return for the provision of fully 
trained and equipped soldiery. Under the Buyids, who were also unable to pay their 
mamluks, this type, known as iqtd al-istighlal, distinguished a grant of usufruct that 
enabled the recipient commander, the muqta\ to collect t~xes calculated to approximate 
his remuneration. By comparison, iqtd a!-tamlik denoted private ownership or more 
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correctly the hereditary character of land grants [I'uran, IA Vol. 5/2:950-2; also Kuc;ur, 
DVIA Vol. 22:47-8 & Kennedy, 1994:192-3].37 
That being so, under Mucizz al-Dawla (932-67), having depleted their grants some 
commanders returned them. Since those who retained theirs continued to complain that 
the taxes collected did not approximate to their expected remuneration, Mucizz al-
Dawla is said to have been forced to otherwise reward the former while extending the 
latter's grants. Despite appointing relatives to oversee such grants, Mucizz al-Dawla 
failed to prevent continued extortion by commanders. In Turan's opinion, commanders 
who continued to reside elsewhere in peacetime could not have had any interest in 
developing their grants. This was why, he argued, the grant of usufruct acquired a 
hereditary character under the Seljuks, to encourage the muqtac in the management and 
policing of his iqtac during peacetime- as well as providing fully trained and equipped 
soldiery on the proceeds. Thus, if on the death of the holder his son was a minor, then 
a deputy was appointed until he came of age. In the absence of direct descendants, the 
grant was allocated to his brother(s) or failing that his mamluk(s). I-Iowever, in keeping 
with the definition of usufruct, the land on \vhich it had been granted could not be 
gifted or sold to another, nor put into a pious foundation (waqf). Moreover, the local 
inhabitants remained free not only to appeal directly to the sultan's court, if they felt 
their rights were being usurped by the muqtac, but also to move for whatever reason. 
Not surprisingly, many grants were reallocated during a lifetime, either due to 
mismanagement or reappointment. Furthermore, according to Turan the grant was still 
approved in writing by the caliph as in theory all authority in Islamdom was delegated, 
J1 It must be pointed out that critics such as Akptnar [1993:47] are quite wrong to claim that according to Turan 
the Seljuks invented the said grants of usufmct. As such the criticism is more correctly levelled at Kafesoglu 
flA Vol. 10:399], who clearly ignored Turan and followed Kopriili.i. 
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whereas under the Seljuks this ceased to be so [Ibid.]. Although presumably at first the 
caliph continued to authorise such grants, according to Turan ownership of a grant of 
usufruct thus became customary rather than Shari [Ibid.], and hence different from not 
only iqtac al-tamlik, that is, private property, but also iqtac al-istighlal [IA Vol. 5/2: 951ff; 
also I<:afesoglu, 1953:165]. 
It must be pointed out, however, that his examples concerning both hereditary and 
customary characteristics are from later periods, particularly from Anatolia and Mosul 
during the time of the atabegs. Nor is it clear which periods he refers to in the case of 
the large administrative iqtacs he says prevailed in Iraq al-Arab. In this context he notes 
that by comparison in Iraq al-Ajam the smaller military iqtacs were incorporated in 
hierarchical fashion into larger administrative ones, some of which had to remit a 
percentage of the taxes collected to the central treasury [Ibid. 956-7]. 
To be sure, according to Lambton, under the Buyids iqtacs where the muqta'" had 
administrative functions normally associated with a governor remained the exception 
[1980/X:368]. This type of iqta'" seems to stem from the reign of Caliph al-Macmun 
(813-33), when Azarbayjan was offered on this basis in hope of suppressing the 
prolonged Babak rebellion (816-37) during the Abbasid Civil War (809-33). Accordingly, 
in return for an agreed remittance, several commanders appear to have tried but failed 
to govern the region with forces financed from tax revenue, that is until Caliph al-
~1uctasim's (833-42) Turkic mamluk Af~in. Apparently, Azarbayjan and Armenia 
continued to be governed by Turkic men of arms, first by Af~in's commander Moyun 
c;or, then al-Bokhara and fmally by the al-Saj of whom Yusuf seems to have agreed 
once again to remit a nominal amount to Caliph al-Muqtadir (908-32). As noted above, 
Caliph al-Muqtadir's vizier granted other iqtacs to the Turkic mamluk commanders on 
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the basis that the holder collected the kharaj but only paid the ushr fKennedy, 1994:156, 
166, 184 & 192-3; 'logan, IA Vol. 2:1 00]. Under the Buyids military iqtacs do not appear 
to have been granted for life either, except that if the muqtac died his family received a 
pension [Lambton, 1980/X:367J. This seems to have been to forestall a grant of 
usufruct defaulting to one of possession as before. 
I-Iaving said that, Turan's matn point was that from the beginning the Seljuks were 
inclined to treat iqtacs very much like appanages. Possibly as yet unaware of Koymen's 
research, the results of which were published a decade later, Turan took the 
apportionment by Sultan Alp-Arslan as his starting point. Accordingly, after the 
granting of some of the caliph's iqtacs to the Ti.irkmen (1 073), the system became fully 
established by the end of Sultan Malik-Shah's reign, as evidenced, according to Turan, 
in south-eastern Anatolia and northern Syria [IA Vol. 5/2:952-3]. This overlooks the 
fact that the mamluk commanders inherited from the Buyids already had iqtacs. 
Moreover, according to I<oymen [1976:61 ], Ibrahim Ytnal asked Sultan Tugrul to grant 
him an iqtac in order to support his forces. So that even if Tugrul Beg's grants to the 
Ghaznavids' mamluk commanders after Dandankan were not as yet called iqtacs, it 
seems clear that from his time on the word was part of official Seljuk vocabulary. 
This may explain why lands along probable campatgn routes used to stockpile 
provtstons and fodder for the royal corps were referred to as iqtacs [Lambton, 
1980/X:372], although technically they were 'crown' lands (hass). There are other cases, 
too. Khwarazm appears to have been governed by Arslan-A.rgun, but the Sultan Malik-
Shah's Tashtdar, the Khwarazmshah Anu~-Tekin, was also referred to as 'governor'. 
Anu~-Tekin seems to have been granted a percentage of the ta.'{es levied in Khwarazm 
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in rctnuneration for his expenses as the chamberlain responsible for the sultan's ewers 
and bowls [Kafesoglu, 1956:36-7]. 
A better perspective of land holdin£:,>-s under the Great Seljuks may possibly be gained 
from the organization of their Treasury. Incomes from 'crown' lands appear to have 
gone into the Private Treasury, as did those from non-Muslim vassals and also 
presumably plunder gained on campaign. Taxes from the provinces and presumably also 
tribute from Muslim vassals went into the Public Treasury, any shortfall in the latter 
being supplemented 'temporarily' from the former. Although Kafesoglu thought that 
non-administrative iqta" holders were exempt from the ushr [1953:145-6, 164 & 166], 
this is unlikely. 
In short, it seems that the Seljuks used the Buyids' iqtac al-istighlal only for the royal 
mamluk corps, the 200-strong royal guard being paid in cash [Ibid. 156-9]. Of those in 
the royal corps, however, the trainees (kara gulam) and mamluk soldiery not yet of 
appropriate rank (otak ba~1, ser-hayl, sarhang, hadim, hajib and fmally salar or amir) also 
appear to have been salaried [Koymen, 1967:14-5,24 & 40-1]. It is not clear whether the 
iqtacs of the forty commanders presented to Caliph al-Muqtadi on Sultan Malik-Shah's 
first visit to Baghdad (March 13, 1087) were military, administrative, or both [Ibid. 30]. 
Certainly, Antakya, Urfa and Aleppo were administrative iqtacs. 
Last but not least, while Kavurt's daughters' iqtacs were for their do\vries [Koymen, 
1972:88], Turkan Khatun had her own diwan and mamluk soldiery. There seem to have 
been yet other iqtacs, such as those granted to government officials, which although on 
occasion could be increased on merit, were nevertheless approximated to the 
remunerative requirements of their office, not their person. The distinguishing 
characteristic between these and the caliph's or the lesser Seljuk khatuns' grants seems 
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to have been the provision that each iqtac holder train and equip a required number of 
tnamluks fKafesoglu, 1953:164]. 
7.8 The Question of Legitimacy 
Turkish historians accepted that the Abbasid caliphs' ambition was to regain sovereignty 
over Islamdom. Although Kafesoglu and Koymen treated the relationship between the 
Seljuks and the Abbasids in dynastic terms, on the whole Turkish historians have failed 
to explore the tensions inherent in the Seljuks' expectation that the Abbasid caliphs also 
legitimize their rule. Instead they have tended to present the Seljuks as the saviours of 
Sunni Islamdom who treated the Abbasid caliphs with reverence until challenged. 
To be sure, the problem of legitimacy was not unique to the Seljuks. Although the 
1\velver Sh{ite Buyids had the khutba read in Caliph al-Qa'itn's name, the Sunni 
Marwanid and Mirdasid dynasties in south-eastern Anatolia and northern Syria had the 
khutba read in the Fatimid caliph's name. When on Sultan Tugrul's death Caliph al-
Qa'im tried to re-assert his political authority by inviting the local dynasts to usurp 
Seljukid rule under his leadership, the Sunni Uqailid Muslim entered Baghdad and, 
having taken up residence in the Seljuk's palace, pillaged the caliph's. It appears that he 
left only after it became clear that Alp-Arslan had gained undisputed control of the 
Great Seljuk Empire. Nearly a century later, the hostility of Dubays al-Sadaga, the ruler 
of Hilla, toward Caliph al-Mustarshid seems to have been based on a similar concern. 
l)cspite Tugrul Beg's request for recognition immediately after Dandankan (1 040), 
Caliph al-Qa'im does not appear to have responded until some years later when he 
appealed to the Seljuks to have peaceful relations with the Buyids (1 043/ 4). Tugrul 
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Beg's response seems clear; daughters were not exchanged in marnage between the 
Scljuks and the Buyids until Caliph al-Qa'im issued an edict that legitimi~ed the Seljuks' 
sovereignty, six years after the event (1046/7). Even after Buyid rule began to unravel in 
internecine warfare (1 048), such that Arslan al-Basasiri, their commander in Baghdad, 
had the khutba read in his name (1 050), Tugrul Beg is said to have declined the caliph's 
invitation and instead sent an envoy (1 052). It appears that Tugrul Beg arrived in 
Baghdad at the head of his army only after the caliph had persuaded the Buyid ruler al-
Rahim to proclaim his allegiance (1 055). Despite the caliph's protests Tugrul Beg then 
imprisoned al-Rahim on the pretext of causing the riots that started on the Scljuks' 
arrival. Arguably, therefore, Tugrul Beg used the caliph's good office to put an end to 
the Buyids, rather than championing Sunni Islam against the Sh{ite heresy as Turkish 
historians such as Turan have proposed. 
This is not to deny that Tugrul Beg dispatched Kutalmt~ to deal with Arslan al-Basasiri. 
Or that \vhen Kutalm1~ was defeated (1 056), he advanced on Arslan al-Basasiri with the 
help of Ibrahim Yu1al and Yakuti, forcing him to withdraw to Syria. On his return to 
Baghdad, the caliph declared Tugrul Beg sultan (1 058). Even if as Koymen claims 
Tugrul Beg was insistent that the caliph hand over all temporal rights [1963:178-9], he 
notes that the caliph intervened on rumours that Ibrahim Ytnal was going to rebel. 
Accordingly, Ibrahim Y mal \Vas called for an audience with Caliph al-Qa'im's vizier. As a 
result, Sultan Tugrul seems to have been persuaded to remain in Baghdad and instead 
assign Ibrahim Ytnal to deal with al-Basasiri. To be sure, \vhen Sultan Tugrul pursued 
Ibrahim Ymal after the latter had rebelled by declaring his allegiance to the Fatimids, 
Arslan al-Basasiri took Caliph al-Qa'im prisoner. On Ibrahim Ytnal's demise, however, 
Sultan Tugrul did not attempt to free the caliph until his offer of peace was rejected by 
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al-Basasiri, who insisted the khutba was read in the Fatimid caliph's name. Since the 
Seljuks' legitimacy would have suffered an irredeemable blow, Sultan Tugrul appears to 
have won over the caliph's captor, Quraysh, and having secured Caliph al-Qa'im's 
release advanced on al-Basasiri. 
While (_;agr1 Beg's daughter Arslan Khatun's marnage to the caliph and later Sultan 
Tugrul's to the caliph's daughter seem to have been childless, there is no indication that 
in either case the Seljuks wanted someone with their blood to become caliph [Koymen, 
1963:189f~. Sultan Alp-Arslan's daughter Flilane's marriage to the then heir apparent al-
Muqtadi also appears to have been childless, possibly due to the sultan's subsequent 
death, but it may be noteworthy that the ceremony is said to have taken place in 
Nishapur not Baghdad. To be sure, Sultan Malik-Shah's daughter Mah Melek's marriage 
to Caliph al-Muqtadi was not childless. I-Iowever, given that Jacfar was the youngest of 
the caliph's sons, the fact that Sultan Malik-Shah demanded Jacfar be appointed heir 
apparent arguably contradicts the opinions of Turkish scholars. Both K.oymen [Ibid.] 
and Kafesoglu [IA Vol. 10:364, 367 & 1953:96] argued that the exchange of daughters 
between the Seljuks and the Abbasids were dynastic, while Turan [1965:99] thought that 
from the marriages were an expression of religious reverence by the Seljuks. 
Once he had secured the throne, Sultan Malik-Shah sent the chief jurist for Khwarazm 
to the caliph to arrange the marriage of his daughter Mah Melek. Instead the jurist 
advised Caliph al-Muqtadi not to take a <coarse' Tiirkmen into his household. 
Interestingly enough, when confronted by Nizam al-Mulk, the jurist is said to have 
retorted that I am not one to sell my religion for the world! After the exchange of daughters 
during Sultan Tugrul's reit,m, however, the caliph could not have ignored Sultan Malik-
Shah's request. Particularly as al-Muqtadi had married Sultan Alp-Arslan's daughter 
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l1'i.ilane K.hatun when heir apparent. Consequently, most likely also under pressure from 
the sultan, the caliph appears to have been forced to ask for Mah Mclek through the 
good office of Nizam al-Mulk. If this were not sufficiently humiliating, then Ti.irkan 
Khatun's demands certainly would have brought home to him that the Seljuks thought 
more of worldly affairs, as the remark attributed to the chief jurist for Khwarazm also 
implies. As Mah Melek's mother, she had at first demanded 400,000 dinars, which both 
the l(arakhanid and Ghaznavid dynasties were offering. After C::agn Beg's daughter 
Arslan Khatun who had been married to Caliph al-Qa'im had intervened, Tiirkan 
I<hatun is said to have had accepted 50,000 dinars on condition that the caliph was not 
to maintain or entertain any other women and that at all times he would keep Mah 
Melek by his side (1081). It is for this reason that Caliph al-Muqtadi's marriage is 
thought not to have taken place until his first wife had died (1 087). In any case, the 
Seljuks' intentions appear to have been made absolutely clear to the caliph soon after 
the birth of his son Jacfar from Mah Melek Khatun. I--Iis expulsion of Mah Melek 
Khatun's Turkic retinue from his palace in Baghdad probably was in response to Sultan 
Malik-Shah's demand that he designate his grandson heir apparent although the 
youngest of four. Once Mah Melek Khatun had returned with Jacfar, who was referred 
to by the Seljuks as Amir ai-Miiminin, commander of all Muslims - a title reserved for 
the caliph - Ti.irkan Khatun had a palace built for him in Isfahan. Soon afterwards the 
caliph had his eldest son Ahmad designated heir apparent [Kitap<;1, 1994:1 09-52; I~titan, 
lA Vol. 8:573ff; Kafesoglu, 1953: 207; Turan, 1965:169-73]. 
Kafesoglu thought that possibly Ti.irkan Khatun had the sultan poisoned in conspiracy 
with the caliph. Given Nizam al-Mulk and hence his dependants' support for the heir 
apparent Berk-Yaruk, even with the vizier out of the way Tiirkan Khatun needed the 
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caliph's support to desit,rnate her four-year-old son Mahmud heir apparent and become 
regent. Thus, the argument goes, she was willing also to sacrifice Jacfar f1953:208-1 OJ. 
Turan went further still; he thought that rather than the sultan it was Ti.irkan Khatun 
who wanted to gain control of both the empire and the caliphate [1965:170). Kitapyt 
did not agree with either of his predecessors (1994:153-6], leaning more toward I~tltan's 
view that the caliph had the sultan poisoned in order to remain in Baghdad [IA Vol. 
8:573ff}. K.oymen appears to have preferred silence, only mentioning that a Seljukid 
princess married a caliph during Sultan Malik-Shah's reign [1963:193). 
Whatever role personal ambition may have played, these arguments ignore the broader 
context of Turkic legitimacy. The earliest known I<ok Tiirk stone inscription at Bugut 
(581 ), which is in Soghdian, not only reflects Buddhist but also Zoroastrian influences, 
not to mention Chinese ones. Certainly, Taspar Kagan (572-81 ), in \Vhose name the 
Bugut stone was inscribed, appears to have been a devout Buddhist. This is taken to 
indicate that in particular between 570 and 590 the Kok Tiirk thought Buddhism would 
better enable dominion, given that they waged war for universal peace and unity - good 
relations bet\veen the I-:Ieavens and the Earth [Roux, 1994:17-8].38 By contrast, more 
than a century later, the Orkhun stone inscriptions, which frequently refer to a l(ok 
Tengri (Supreme Celestial Being, hence the modern Turkish for Allah, Tann) and a 
pantheon of deities and spirits, do not even refer to shamans [fekin, 1988 & 1994]. 
Arguably when all was in order, under a kagan who merited divine favour, there \Vas no 
18 Arguably this is the source of the Turkic concept of JJ!()r/d domi11io11 noted by Koprulu and propounded by 
Kafesoglu [IA Vol. 10:392] and Turan [1993]. The more so since the Turks and later the Mongols insisted that 
as there is one Supreme Celestial Being in the Heavens so there can be only one ruler on the Earth [Roux, 
2001:61]. To be sure, on the steppe sovereignty may have been expressed as extending from where the sun 
rose to where it set. However, rather than Jl'Orld domi11io11 this explains better the bipartite division into Left and 
Right observed among Turkic polities, hence possibly also the title of the &tier of the East a11d the West. 
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need for shamans or monks. When their empire had dispersed, however, Kok Tengri, 
too, paled into insignificance, so that local beliefs once again came to the fore linan, 
1995:26; also Roux, 1994:53 & 92]. The point being that under the Kok Tiirk legitimacy 
and religion were united through kinship and descent in the A-shih-na dynasty, which 
maintained the rule of law. 
Although the Kok Tiirk kagans do not appear to have been sacred, the Khazar kagans, 
who also stemmed from the A-shih-na clan, were. There are also the Uygur and possibly 
the Ktrgtz rulers, who were taboo [Divit~ioglu, 1987:129]. To be sure, among the Oguz 
sovereignty appears to have been on felicitous merit, but there is no evidence that 
religious and political functions were separate. Quite to the contrary, they seem to have 
been shared among the nobility alongside their martial functions. As affuiates of the 
Oguz, the Seljuks must have been aware of the basis of dominion under both the Kok 
Tiirk and the Khazar. The former were their ancestors and the latter their 
contemporaries. Not surprisingly, the Seljuks seem to have tried to become ascendant 
throughout their empire on a similar premise. 
During the interregnum and immediately after the Abbasid Caliphate appears to have 
rubber-stamped the legitimacy of royal claimants to the Seljuk throne. The caliphs al-
Mustarshid and al-Rashid, on the other hand, lost their lives when they attempted to 
play one claimant off against another in an attempt to gain independence. The problem 
was that when the moment of truth came each was found wanting because military 
power remained in the hands of the Seljuks' Turkic commanders and the Tiirkmen. The 
Arab or Kurdish dynasts appear to have been neither strong enough nor willing to 
return to the days when an Abbasid caliph could demand absolute obedience, because 
as the Prophet Muhammad's successor he \vas the leader of the Muslim community. 
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7.9 The Question of Succession 
Neither common ownership nor the pursuit of divine favour on the battlefield as 
Turkish scholars have proposed explain the situation the Seljuks found themselves in on 
the death of Sultan Malik-Shah. In order to understand the problems they appear to 
have come face to face with so suddenly it is necessary to separate issues of kinship and 
descent from each other as well as from the basis on which decisions were taken in 
consultation among nomadic pastoralists. When this is done, arguably Turkic succession 
ceases to be indeterminate in principle as historians as diverse as Siimer [1965:7] and 
Barfield [1989:134 & 143] have proposed it was. 
Tugrul and c;a.gr1 Begs' father is thought to have been the eldest of Selc;:uk Beg's sons. 
Since Mikail was dead, Arslan was referred to as yabgu. Although Musa was the senior, 
upon Arslan's imprisonment, Ali Tekin appears to have appointed the youngest Yusuf 
Y1nal yabgu. After Ali Tekin had Yusuf killed, possibly because Tugrul and c;agn Beg 
refused to acknowledge his appointment, Musa came to be referred to as Yabgu Kalan, 
literally the Yabgu Remaining. This is not to deny that Sultan Tugrul was not only 
younger than c;a~ Beg but in the absence of sons of his own also chose his brother's 
youngest Siileyman heir apparent. What must not be forgotten, however, is that on the 
steppe the youngest son inherited the family hearth, since the older sons were expected 
to have taken their inheritances and set up on their own, even if they continued to share 
water and pasturage. Thus at Turkic campsites, the eldest son's tent appears to have 
been pitched next to the father's, where the youngest son stayed, then came the father's 
brothers' tents, starting from the eldest [Inalctk, 1993b:S1 & 54]. In the case of an 
empire, therefore, it seems possible to assume that the eldest son was the one expected 
to head the dynasty on the sovereign's death, \vhile the youngest took possession of 
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what was under his father's direct dominion, the so-called 'hearthlands'. 'This appears to 
be confirmed by both Mongol and Ottoman practices [ibid. 49-52]. Consequently, rather 
than the Great Seljuk Empire, Sultan Tugrul may have been bequeathing his domains to 
Si.ileyman, whose mother he had married upon his brother's death Qeviratus), the 
remainder of the empire already having been apportioned among c;;agn Beg's sons. 
C.::agn Beg's eldest son, Kavurt, not only challenged Sultan Tugrul's will, but also 
continued to question Alp-Arslan's right to be sultan, although ostensibly this had been 
gained on the battlefield. Likewise, as Malik-Shah was the second of Sultan Alp-Arslan's 
sons, in his testament the sultan seems to have expected his eldest son, Ayaz, to object 
to his accession. Interestingly enough, however, once again it was Kara-Arslan Kavurt 
\vho challenged Sultan Malik-Shah, stating that as his uncle he was senior. Sultan Malik-
Shah's response is equally interesting in that he claimed the Seljuk throne was his 
because inheritance was from father to son. Sultan Malik-Shah designated his eldest heir 
apparent, that is, 'I'i.irkan I<hatun's son Ahmad (1 077-87) [Ozaydtn, 2001 :6], and when 
he died, Berk-Yaruk. Ti.irkan Khatun's insistence that her son Mahmud accede upon the 
sultan's death was based on seniority of birth [Ibid. 16]. She was not only a Karakhanid 
(see below) but also Sultan Malik-Shah's first wife, his marriage to his first cousin 
Zubaydah Khatun possibly being a derivative of the principle of leviratus in that Yakuti 
and his wife may have died before their children had come of age. Nobility of birth tnay 
also explain the 'bloodless' defeats that Muhammad Tapar suffered at the hands of 
Berk-Yaruk after Muayyad al-Mulk's death. Both Muhammad Tapar and his uterine 
brother Sancar appear to have been born of a concubine. 
The Seljuks' dynastic struggles clearly echo those of their ancestors, the Kok Turk. Of 
the two brothers who founded the Kok Ti.irk Empire (552-741), which at its height 
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encompassed all but the westernmost steppe cultures, Bumin Kagan (542-52) seems to 
have been older than Istemi Kagan (552-76). When Bumin Kagan died, however, Istemi 
Kagan did not come cast and claim seniority. Instead Bumin Kagan's sons, Kara (552-
3), Mukan (553-72) and Taspar (572-81) followed as Great Kagan, although according 
to one report Bumin Kagan's brother A-i became Great Kagan before Kara [Ta§agu, 
1995:18]. Problems did not arise until Taspar Kagan's death, possibly because both 
Mukan and Taspar Kagan were already well established and in each case the previous 
Great Kagan willed that the office should pass to them [Ibid. 19 & 27]. According to 
Taspar Kagan, however, since Mukan Kagan had passed over his son Ta-lo-pien in his 
testament, the favour should be returned. 
The problem with this seems to have been that Ta-lo-pien was not of a Turk mother, 
being the offspring of a marriage of dynastic convenience. Mukan Kagan's Turk wife 
was childless. Kara Kagan's son She-t'u is said to have stated at the council gathered to 
decide the matter that for this reason he would support Taspar Kagan's son An-lo, but 
not Ta-lo-pit.'Il. Although An-lo was confirmed, he was not able to establish order and 
the council reconvened, She-t'u becoming I§bara Kagan (582-7) with An-lo's consent 
[Ibid. 34-5]. Ta-lo-pien, \vho became A-po Kagan, and more importantly Istemi I<.agan's 
son Tardu Kagan (576-603) who with the death of his uncle's sons was now the most 
senior of the ruling A-shih-na lineage, objected, pitching the Kok Turk Empire into a 
protracted period of inner strife coincident \Vith its collapse. Although I~bara Kagan 
\vas succeeded by his brother Baga Kagan (587 -8), when his son Tou-lan Kagan (588-
600) took over, An-lo's son Jan-Kan who became Ch'i-min Kagan (599-609) also 
refused to accept either Tou-lan or Tardu as Great Kagan [Ibid. 35-63; also Barfield, 
1989:133-8]. 
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According to l)ivitc;ioglu !1987:137-50; also Barfield, 1989:136], Kok Turk succession 
was inherently problematic because they regarded their brothers' sons to be brothers, 
but not the brothers' grandsons who were related back only to their fathers. True as this 
may be, it does not necessarily explain the war of succession among the A-shih-na 
during the rejuvenation of the Kok Turk Empire. It is not known whether Bilge Kagan 
(716-34) and his father Kutlug Ilteri~ Kagan's (682-92) younger brother Kapagan 
I<~agan's (692-716) sons were 'brothers' or 'cousins'. What can be said is that KUI Tekin, 
Bilge Kagan's younger brother, killed all of Kapagan Kagan's clan, thereby ensuring 
accession by seniority from within the ruling A-shih-na lineage until the demise of the 
emptre. 
What was never in question throughout the history of the Kok Turk Empire \vas the A-
shih-na's right to office. The overriding importance of descent is discernible also among 
the Oguz. The rulers listed in both Rashid al-Din and Bahadir Khan's versions of the 
Og~tz-Nama seem to have been mostly from the senior Kay1 lineage, which according to 
legend derived its genealogy from Oguz Khan's eldeJt son Kun Khan [also Tnalctk, 
1993b:54-5], whose mother came from the I-Ieavens to the Earth in a shaft of blue light. 
That said, in both versions of the Og11z-Nama the appellation Ina! or brother-in-law 
appears frequently as a ruler's name alongside that of Ktfyt and Yci!Jqt!_Y (yabgu). Togan 
argued that this indicated the Karakhanids gave their daughters in marriage to the Kayt 
in order to raise their lineage to Oguz Khan [1982:133-4]. Certainly, upon the demise of 
the Uygur Empire, Bilge Klil Kadir I<agan is kno\vn to have taken the title of Kara 
Khan, Ogu7- Khan's father's name, and related himself to the A-shih-na [Kafesoglu, IA 
Vol. 12/2:187). 
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As their letter to Caliph al-Qa'im may be taken to verify [K6ymen, 1979:361 j, the 
Scljuks could not claim to be of venerable blood, A-shih-na or other. To be sure, as 
Sunni Muslims the Abbasid caliph legitimized their sovereignty, but as a Turkic clan they 
appear to have been well aware of the role fictitious genealogies played in this context. 
In both Rashid al-Din's and Bahadir Khan's versions of the Oguz-Nama, not to mention 
Yaz1c1oglu's Tano-i al-i Se!ptk [Si.imer, 1965:171 ], the Ku11k are shown at the bottom of 
the list of Oguz lineages, in the service of the Ytva (Evya) I_Togan, 1982:124-5]. In 
Mahmud of Kashgar's Dit;anii Liigat-it-Tiirk, they are shown at the top [Atalay, 
1992/I:55ffj. Furthermore, in Rashid al-Din's version, Oguz Khan arrives through the 
Caspian Lowland, over the Volga (Atil, Itil, Etil, or Edil), crossing the Caucasus from 
Derbend into the Mughan steppe, and returns through Demavend and Nishapur in 
Khurasan. This is thought to coincide with the legendary Afrasiyab's western campaign 
as depicted in Firdausi's (c.940-c.1020) Sbab-Nama pagan, 1982:123], a cotnpendiutn of 
Pahlavi myth, legend and history originally presented to Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna 
[Ritter, IA Vol. 4:643-9]. The point being that Afrasiyab was considered to be 'Turkic 
[fogan, 1946:18-9, 108-10, 134-5, 167-8 & 174]; Mahmud of Kashgar unmistakably 
refers to him as Alp Er Tonga [Atalay, 1992/1:41 ], more correctly Tonga Alper [Ibid. 
III:368], and Yusuf Has Hajib idealizes Tonga Alper as a model leader [Dila~ar, 1988]. 
The Ferghana and Vienna manuscripts of the Oguz-Nama confirm that the Karakhanids 
also claimed to have descended from Tonga Alper. A similar rumour came into being 
concerning the Seljuks, which they are known to have appropriated [Mansuroglu, IA 
Vol. 4:192-3]. 
Rather than being the fundamental principle of Turkic succession as inalclk concluded 
[1993b:41 ], divine favour was used similarly - to assert seniority of descent. For 
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instance, the title of the I-Isiung-nu ruler was Cheng-li Ktttll Shan-yii, which is thought to 
translate as Tengri Kttltt Shan~yii [Roux, 1994:134], or Shan-yu, the Celestial Supreme 
Being's felicity. Tengri is the oldest word identified as Altaic [Ibid. 91]. The origins of the 
I-Isiung-nu ruling lineage are not known, but the founding members of the Kok Turk 
A-shih-na are thought to have been shamans [inan, 1995:4]. Of their two legends of 
lupine origin [fa~agu, 1995:11-2; also Divitc;ioglu, 1987:72-3], one clearly reflects a 
shamanistic character [inan, 1995:160-SJ. The other, however, refers to their prowess as 
smiths. Before Bumin Kagan founded their empire, the Kok Turk were the Juan-Juan's 
ironsmiths rra~agu, 1995:17]. The Stnith's craft is accepted as being second only to the 
shaman's vocation, namely that of leaving his or her body during a self-induced trance 
to ascend to the !-leavens or descend into the Earth [Divitc;ioglu, 1987:83ff; see also 
Roux, 1994:49-51 & 64-5 and M. Eliade, 1989:5 & 470f~. This is of some importance 
because shamans are not known to have represented the Celestial Supreme Being [Ibid. 
87], most likely because they did not believe in one [inan, 1995:27-8]. The reason for 
this must be sought in current consensus according to which shatnanism spread among 
Turkic people long after the establishment of their belief in a Celestial Supreme Being 
[Ibid. 1; see also Ocak, 1983:33-6). Not surprisingly, a divine mandate is thought to have 
precluded a shaman from rising to the Heavens and eclipsing his or her ruler [Roux, 
1994:53 & 118]. Thus possibly sovereignty was legitimized among the Kok Turk as 
under the Hsiung-nu, through kut rather than trance. As recorded on the Orkhun stone 
inscriptions, Kok Tengri pulls Kill Tekin's parents by their hair to the Heavens where 
the Turk sacred lands and water are in order. Arguably the ritual strangulation of Kok 
Turk kagans during inauguration merely emphasizes the point, because it was not self-
induced as in the case of a shamanistic trance. 
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Certainly, as inalctk pointed out [1993b:41; sec Atalay, 1992/IV:388J, Mahmud of 
Kashgar defined kut as 11jpr (good luck or omen, also auspiciousness), devlel (state or 
government, also prosperity, success or good luck), baht (destiny or fortune), talih (good 
fortune) and saadet (happiness, also prosperity). On the other hand, although deemed 
essential for life [inan, 1995:37], kut could be transmitted, visited, or gifted, not to 
mention that one who was in receipt of it could be disapproved of in light of his 
actions [Roux, 1994:31 & 131-4; also Divitc;ioglu, 1987:59; see Atalay, 1992/1:92 and 
Tekin, 1988:17 & 51]. Arguably this is very much in keeping with the alternative 
meanings of Ogur, or the clans, namely to split a bone (also nation, as in Ak and Kara 
Kamag B11d11n) and felicity/ statecraft. In short, kut was not a divine right. The 
expectation that divine favour must be renewed is indicated in Turkic accession rituals 
from at least as early as the Tabgac; (f'o-pa) or Wei dynasty (386-534). Their emperor 
was seated on the ground while being told of the virtues expected of him and of the 
harmony anticipated between the Heavens and the Earth. Subsequently, the high 
officials raised both the emperor and empress several times [Ibid. 118]. Nor did it have a 
fatalistic implication as Kafesoglu and in particular inalctk suggested. According to the 
latter, any human attempt to regulate succession was considered to have been in vain 
given the magico-religious source of sovereignty [1993b:43]. Instead, kut is best defined 
as a life force, which having been divinely gifted, could be renewed as well as ruined 
[Roux, 1994:132, 133 & 207; also inan, 1995:37]. Not surprisingly, kut may have 
originally denoted 1/idorio11J strength or the light if vidory as in the Indo-Iranian ht'(Jrnah 
[Ibid. 134), that is a celebration of victory rather than a justification of the pursuit of 
power, hence its association \vith statecraft. 
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Whether they were senior by blood, age or indeed ability (merit), royal claimants who 
did not gain the support of the majority of those who enabled dominion failed to gain 
sovereignty. Atnong the Kok Turk's ancestors, the I-Isiung-nu, the Luan-ti was the ruling 
if not sacred lineage. Unlike the Kok Ti.irk A-shih-na lineage, however, who as far as 
can be determined married the daughters of the A-sheh-te, the Luan-ti married the 
daughters of at least three other lineages, namely the 1-Isi.i-pu, I-Iu-yen and Lan. Until 59 
BCE succession among the I-Isiung-nu was from father to son, or, in 'unusual situations' 
such as that of an infant shan-yii, from elder to younger brother. After the interret,YOum, 
succession was from younger to elder brother !Barfield, 1989:41-2 & Divityioglu, 
1987:168 & 192-8]. 39 The point being that since at least the heads of these 'imperial' 
lineages were a part of the council, the I-Isiung-nu succession, whatever the underlying 
principle, was the more stable because more clans had a vested interest. Moreover, as 
both the I-Isiung-nu shan-yiis and the Kok Tiirk kagans, great or small, consulted with 
their councils throughout their reigns, decisions taken by the former may have had a 
comparatively better chance of being upheld. 
Like the Kok Ti.irk council (kengef), doubtless the Oguz council (kengef) had a say in who 
became yabgu and in his subsequent decisions. Besides Dukak's legendary altercation, 
according to Ibn Fadlan [see $e~en, 1975:30], decisions among the Oguz were taken on 
a consultative basis. Although it is known that the Seljuks also held councils, there is no 
39 This dichotomy is reflected also in the Kok Ttirk legends of origin. In the one that emphasizes their prowess as 
smiths the eldest son becomes ruler, while in the one that emphasizes their shamanistic powers the youngest 
becomes ruler through personal merit [fa~agtl, 1995:11-2; also Divit~Yioglu, 1987:72-3]. Although this may 
indicate the Hsiung-nu origins of one branch of the ruling A-shih-na lineage (see Sinor, 1994:287-91], it does 
not follow, as for instance Beckwith argued, that because the Greek Arsilos from the Turkic Arslan 
"undoubtedly" equates to A-shih-na they were of Tocharian origin on the female side as "the habitat of the 
lion did not extend as far north as Central Asia, let alone Siberia" (1987:206-8]. As Eberhard made clear, lions 
were well known in China before the Common Era as imports or gifts from present day Iran and Afghanistan 
[Kopriilu, IA Vol. 1 :598-609]. Since the Turkic Arslan most likely stems from am~ Arsittm and hence Arsilos 
may well be from Turkic and not Tocharian. 
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evidence that affiliated Ti.irkmen bet,:rs were included in the apportionment of their 
dominion after Dandankan, let alone when Sultan Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shah 
apportioned the Great Seljuk Empire among the family. Perhaps not surprisingly, rather 
than a kenge~ the Scljuks were better known for their toys, the feast held at a kenge~. 
But this custom also appears to have been relaxed under Sultan Malik-Shah. 
Most likely this was because the Seljuks conquered the Middle East without the main 
body of Oguz. As far as can be determined, Selc;uk Beg was a breakaway chieftain of 
the Klntk. After his death, when Arslan Yabgu was imprisoned, the latter's affiliates 
refused to recognise Selc;uk Beg's remaining sons and struck out on their own. Possibly 
Kutalmt~ and Ibrahim Ytnal also acted independently, since there is no mention of 
them when Musa, Tugrul and ~agr1 Begs' affiliates were massacred by Shah-Malik. 
Ibrahim Ymal seems to have joined the Seljuks after they entered Khurasan. Kutaltnt~ 
does not receive mention until after Dandankan. Along with Ibrahim Ytnal, those who 
joined the Seljuks in Khurasan appear like them to have been breakaway kin groups of 
Oguz descent. With the establishment of the Great Seljuk Empire, Iranian 
administrators and mamluk soldiery further diluted the Seljuks' following. The Iranians 
retained their local affiliations, but unlike the Ti.irkmen the mamluks did not even have 
immediate kin except for some wives and children. 
Right from the outset the administrators of the Great Seljuk Empire attempted to 
determine who acceded to the throne. There is the case of Sultan Tugrul's 
Khwarazmian wife Altuncan Khatun's son Anushirvan. Kunduri is known to have tried 
to put him in the sultan's place while Ibrahim Y mal besieged the latter in Hamad an 
(1 058-9). The failure of these attempts \Vas not totally due to Kunduri's personal 
shortcomings and go beyond a lack of support from the soldiery, either mamluk or 
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Ti.irkmen. Kunduri is referred to as Sultan Tugrul's vihier, but the sultan is said to have 
consulted his wife in matters of state not Kunduri, who merely offered counsel 
[Koymen, 1976:72]. Consequently, as his first letter to Alp-Arslan also may be taken to 
testify, it is doubtful he headed an administration that encompassed the whole of the 
emptre. 
Certainly, c;agn Beg and his sons appear to have acted independently, as did Sultan 
Tugrul and his affiliates. When so requested they came to each other's aid. While Tugrul 
Beg helped c;agn Beg in Khwarazm, Kavurt and Alp-Arslan joined Sultan Tugrul and 
Yakuti to defeat Ibrahim Ymal. Kara-Arslan Kavurt was assigned Kirman and Kuhistan 
(1048) [Merc;il, 1980:21]. Subsequently Balkh, Tocharistan and Tirmiz were assigned to 
Alp-Arslan, with his father's vizier Shadan (1058) [Koymen, 1972:5]. I-Iowever, Alp-
Arslan is reputed to have been victorious in action against the Ghaznavids well before, 
when only 14 or 15 years old (1043-4) [Ibid. 4]. l-Ie is said to have taken comtnand due 
to his father's illness, from which c;agn Beg appears to have recovered when he learnt of 
his son's success. Most likely the story was based on Alp-Arslan's much later victory 
over Sultan Mawdud's son Mascud's forces (1057). Clearly Alp-Arslan's martial energy 
was regarded favourably by the tnilitary. Erdem, one of Si.ileyman's matnluk 
commanders, and others defected to Alp-Arslan after he was designated heir apparent. 
Nor must Alp-Arslan's resolve be underestimated. l-Ie journeyed frotn Balkh to 
Nishapur (1 063), only to have to return when he learnt that instead of being dead as 
rumoured Sultan Tugrul had been ill and was in Rayy [Ibid. 10]. 
Not surprisingly it was Alp-Arslan not Kavurt who received Kunduri's allegiance when 
the vizier failed to deal with Kutalmt~. Kavurt is known to have advanced as far as 
Isfahan at the time. I-Iaving lost the throne and subsequently also Fars, which the sultan 
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returned to the Shebankarids, Kavurt is said to have opted for independence [Koymen, 
1963:65-8]. True as this may be, as some of Sultan Alp-Arslan's commanders' change of 
heart indicates, at least subsequently he seems to have been encouraged to challenge his 
younger brother. The military also supported him when he challenged Malik-Shah. 
Unlike I<unduri, however, Nizam al-Mulk was in a better position because the only 
soldieries that appear to have needed encouragement - financial or other - were those 
garrisoned in the capital Rayy and of course the Ti.irkmen toward I-Iarnadan. 
Even if at the beginning the Seljuks' administrative servants were unable to determine 
who acceded, by the end of Sultan Alp-Arslan's reign they appear to have become at 
least as important as the Seljuk military was. Arguably this was due to the c;reat Seljuk 
Empire having been united by Sultan Alp-Arslan, with the exception of Kirman, which 
seems to have enabled Nizam al-Mulk to place his numerous sons, sons-in-law and no 
doubt others worthy of his trust in administrative positions. Clearly this created 
contention between the men of the sword and those of the pen, which isolated Nizam 
al-Mulk. Worse still for his dependants in power throughout the empire, Nizam al-Mulk 
had made an enemy of Ti.irkan Khatun by insisting on seniority in age rather than blood 
for the heir apparent. Although this seems to have been the nonn in lslamdorn, it went 
against Turkic ideology, according to which Turkic khatuns were expected to rule as and 
when necessary. 
Consequently, at the time of the vizier's assassination and the sultan's death, \vhich 
occurred soon afterwards, not only was the administration at odds with the military but 
also with the Seljuks. This deprived Great Seljuk succession of consensus at a critical 
conjuncture, when the Abbasid Caliphate's legitimacy had been challenged by the 
demand that a Seljukid become the next caliph. Particularly as Nizam al-Mulk's renown 
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among the indigenous urban populations made his legacy an even broader based force 
to be reckoned with. 
7.10 The Power Struggle 
Rather than the indeterminacy of Turkic succession or personal ambition and greed, 
which Turkish scholars attribute to Tiirkan Khatun in particular, it was arguably the rift 
between the military and the administration that started the interregnum and continued 
to fuel it. 
Given the support of the royal mamluk corps, Tiirkan Khatun's dealings with the caliph 
may have secured her regency until her son was of age, despite Nizam al-Mulk's sons 
and dependants, whom there had not been time to displace or distance from their local 
power bases. Although it was the caliph who is said to have stipulated that Dner was 
appointed Commander-in-Chief under Taj al-Mulk, it seems that Ti.irkan Khatun rnay 
have attempted to impose on the Great Seljuk Empire not only her vizier but also the 
commander of her mamluk soldiery. This may explain the vast sum she is said to have 
spent in accession money. As some of the commanders defected to Berk-Yaruk at 
Burujird, however, she does not seem to have been successful in gaining the allegiance 
of the royal corps, splitting it in the process. 
It is all the more important, therefore, that the Tiirkmen between I--Iamadan and Rayy 
who gained 500,000 dinars and 5,000 chainmail suits during Malik-Shah and Kavurt's 
struggle for the throne receive no mention in this context. References to Inan<; Yabgu 
and Bilge Beg suggest those that had not migrated to Anatolia had been resettled on 
iqtacs, as Turkish scholars have proposed. Whatever the case, at the time of Sultan 
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Malik-Shah's death, the Ti.irkmen seem to have been too thinly spread to be a decisive 
force even on a ret,>ional basis, that is, except in Anatolia. This seems to be supported by 
their known Seljukid affiliations during the period in question. There is C:,:agn Beg's 
remaining son Arslan-Argun in Khwarazm and Khurasan, Sultan Alp-Arslan's remaining 
son Bori-Pars in present day Afghanistan, C:,:agn Beg's grandson Ismacil in Azarbayjan, 
Sultan Malik-Shah's brother Tutu~ in Syria and south-eastern Anatolia, not to mention 
Berk-Yaruk and Muhammad Tapar. 
Arslan-Argun seems to have been unable to take Nishapur with his Ti.irkmen. It is only 
after he gained the support of the mamluk commanders in Marv that he took not only 
Nishapur but also Balkh and Tirmiz. Mamluk soldiery also supported Bori-Pars and his 
vizier Imad al-Mulk. In any event, Arslan-Argun appears to have been content to revert 
the Great Seljuk Empire to bipartite rule as in his father's time. Although Bori-Pars can 
be argued to have supported a unified empire, given that he retired to I-Ierat as soon as 
he had defeated his uncle, he can not have been too concerned with the state of affairs 
in Iraq either. In other words, even if there were a good number of Ti.irkmen in 
Khurasan and Khwarazm, these were not united when Arslan-Argun retook Marv and 
went on to defeat Bori-Pars and imprison him. 
As for Azarbayjan and Arran, given that Ti.irkan Khatun sent her commander Ki.ir-Boga 
to support I smacil with mamluk soldiery, there could not have been that many Ti.irkmen 
there. Although Tutu~ is known to have advanced on Iraq al-Ajam through eastern 
Anatolia and Azarbayjan, on the first attempt he was forced to withdraw when 
Aksungur and Bozan defected to Berk-Yaruk. On his second and last attempt he also 
waited for Ti.irkan Khatun's mamluk soldiery. 
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Finally, even though Berk-Yaruk had the support of the Ti.irkmen in Iraq al-Arab, 
Muhammad Tapar defeated him. l)uring their subsequent confrontations Muhammad 
Tapar seems to have tried to rally those Ti.irkmen in Azarbayjan and Arran to his side, 
but to little effect. 
Since the Ti.irkmen appear to have been dispersed if not disinterested and the 
Ni.zamiyya only a thousand or so strong, the question arises if the 46,000-strong royal 
mamluk corps was billeted in Isfahan as seems to have been assumed? According to 
Kafesoglu [1953:156-9; also C)zaydtn, 2001:209-10 & Lamb ton, 1980/X:372], who 
based his view on the Sryasat-Nama, mamluk commanders were assigned iqtacs that were 
dispersed throughout the empire to facilitate the procurement of supplies and payment 
while on campaign. More likely, however, this applied only to those who served in the 
palace under the I-Iajib-i Buzurg, the sultan's chief of staff and hence the most senior 
member of the Great Seljuk Empire after the sultan and the vizier. 
As chief of staff the I-Iajib-i Buzurg was not only responsible for the cotnmanders 
(hajib or agact) who received correspondence from notables of the realm, relaying the 
sultan's orders verbally to the vizier, but also in charge of the palace. Of the 
commanders who reported to him on this basis the Jandar was responsible for the 
security of the palace; the Silahdar looked after the palace arsenal and the sultan's 
weapons, which he carried for him; the Alam took care of the sultan's banners; the 
Ahur tended to the sultan's horses; the Tashtdar supplied the palace's ewers and bowls; 
the Jamcdar was responsible for royal and ceremonial robes; the Sharabdar procured the 
sultan's medicines and stocked the palace cellar; the Chashnigir oversaw the sultan's 
table and royal banquets. As for the remaining palace posts not filled by the military, in 
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time these seem to have lost their former status except for the sultan's personal 
secretary [Ozaydm, 2001 :202-7]. 
What seems clear from the above is that with exception of the I-Iajib-i Buzurg, his staff 
and the Amir-i Jandar, the commanders in the palace were involved in the procurement 
of supplies. Since of these the Tashtdar is known to have been granted a part of the 
income from Khwarazm as remuneration from \vhich he supplied the palace with ewers 
and bowls, it may be assumed that the other chamberlains had similar arrangements. 
Nor must it be forgotten that it seems all the commanders serving in the palace had 
mamluk soldieries to train and equip. As references to various Amir-i Ahur such as 
Inan<; Yabgu in I--Iamadan indicate, however, having proved their worth, the majority 
were assigned to police regions taxed directly. In such cases most likely their soldieries 
came to be supported by local iqtacs since they would have been garrisoned in the urban 
centres where the civil administrators presided. It follows, therefore, that their previous 
grants may have been re-assigned to their replacements, in effect the commanders of 
the royal mamluk corps billeted in Isfahan. To be sure, there were also commanders 
who either accompanied the sultan on campaign or were assigned to campaigns on their 
own, such as Artuk, Aksungur, Yagt-S1yan, Porsuk and Bozan. The first three were 
Turkic begs and can be assumed to have resided on their iqtacs, as the Porsuks seem to 
have in the environs of Hamadan. Nevertheless, \vhile on campaign, each would have 
benefited from the provisions stockpiled for this purpose on crown lands. 
All this suggests that the royal corps was considerably less than 46,000 and that contrary 
to Kafesoglu this number was possibly the total of so-called mamluk soldiery 
garrisoned on or in the vicinity of the iqtacs granted to their commanders for their 
upkeep. Certainly, within three years of Sultan Malik-Shah's death, Muayyad al-Mulk is 
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credited with sending word throughout the empire and gathering a 30,000-strong force 
with which Sultan Bcrk-Yaruk defeated Tutu~. Within another three years there arc 
reports of commanders being dispatched by Sultan Bcrk-Yaruk to take control of iqtacs 
from those that had displeased him. J-Iabashi was sent to reclaim Khwarazm from 
Kavdan and Yaruk-Ta~ who had killed its commander Ekinci whilst in Marv. 
When taken in conjunction with Ki.ir-Boga's unilateral inclusion of Mosul in the Great 
Seljuk Empire, Kavdan and Yaruk-Ta~'s attempt to establish themselves in Khwarazm 
can be interpreted as a scramble for iqtacs by commanders of the royal corps (1 096-7), 
but there is little evidence for this. Although Sultan Bcrk-Yaruk is said to have pardoned 
Kavdan and Yaruk-Ta~ on Arslan-Argun's death, they are thought to have felt their 
positions to be not secure after the assignment of Khurasan to Sancar. Whatever their 
motivation, Kavdan's soldiery did not support their commander's actions and rebelled 
when Yaruk-Ta~ captured J-Iabashi. As for Kiir-Boga, who was Tiirkan Khatun's 
Commander-in-Chief Oner's son-in-law, he seems to have been one of her matnluks. 
Possibly this is also \vhy Sultan Berk-Yaruk assigned Fars to Oner on Tutu~'s death. In 
both their cases, the problem appears to have been one of ensuring a comtnensurate 
position after their Seljukid mentors had lost the struggle to assert their sovereignty. 
Arguably, therefore, it was Sultan Malik-Shah's soldiery, those with him on route to 
Baghdad and those left behind to guard the capital Isfahan, which were divided at 
Burujird. Apart from the so-called mamluk commanders and their soldiery throughout 
the Great Scljuk Empire, Ti.irkan Khatun, Tutu~, Isma\1, Arslan-Argun and even Nizam 
al-Mulk all had their own forces. This may go a long way toward explaining the role the 
latter's soldiery is thought to have played in securing Berk-Yaruk's release and defeating 
Taj al-Mulk at Burujird. It seems all the more remarkable, therefore, that Berk-Yaruk 
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attempted to appoint Taj al-Mulk his vizier. This is not to deny that the young prince 
appears to have seriously misjudged the Nizamiyya's allegiance and possibly that of the 
local populace. Tutu~ was dissuaded from having Fakhr al-Mulk killed for the latter 
reason. Although Turkish scholars criticise Tutu~ for having been unnecessarily harsh 
on questions of personal allegiance [Koymen, 1963:76; Ozaydtn, 2001 :45], both his and 
Berk-Yaruk's desire to be rid of Nizam al-Mulk's sons and dependants may point to 
how deep-seated the Seljuks' suspicion of Nizam al-Mulk's patronage had become. 
In general Turkish scholars present Sultan Malik-Shah's reported accusation that Nizam 
al-Mulk considered himself a partner to his dominion, which the vizier confirmed by 
stating that one could not exist without the other, as having been fanned by those who 
were either jealous of his power or thwarted by him [Turan, 1965:169-73; Kafesoglu, 
1953:196-203; Ozaydm, 2001 :1-12]. 1-Iowever, as Koymen put it [1963:71-2], most likely 
the underlying reason was that Sultan Malik-Shah had become intent on giving his 
government a Turkic character, which Nizam al-Mulk's patronage impeded. The dispute 
between the vizier's son Osman al-Mulk and the sultan's commander Kavdan, 
respectively the amid and the shihna for Marv, which is said to have finally caused the 
sultan to reproach Nizam al-Mulk prior to his assassination, lends support to this vie\v. 
The argument being that as the Seljuks' warrior elite the commanders not only saw 
themselves as the governors of the empire rather than its police, but were also 
perceived as such at least by Sultan Malik-Shah. Most notably Bozan, Aksungur and 
Yagt-Styan were appointed to administer rather than to police. The latter two were 
Turkmen begs rather than mamluks. In other \Vords, as was prevalent on the steppe the 
Seljuks appear to have regarded the military as part of the executive, not subordinate to 
a sedentary administration. 
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If the warrior elite were spread throughout the empire, however, then besides the fealty 
of the regional commanders the key to dominion would have been the sultan's royal 
mamluk corps. Arguably this is borne out by events in that the regional commanders' 
standing seems to have been strengthened by Berk-Yaruk's first two encounters in the 
field, which even if not expending the royal corps must have diminished it substantially. 
The situation appears to have become acute for Berk-Yaruk after his battle with Ismacil. 
Although Oner and the commanders in Isfahan refused Tutu~'s invitation to join, 
despite Tiirkan Khatun's intention for them to do so prior to her death, Berk-Yaruk 
needed the regional cornmanders to finally defeat his uncle. I-Iaving thus become key to 
Seljukid dominion, it is not surprising that they resisted 'strongly centralist' viziers who 
would have wanted to revert to a civil administration supported by a central force 
financed from direct taxation. This is the reason proposed for Berk-Yaruk's 
commanders' petition for al-Balasani to be handed over to them in return for their 
allegiance while Muhammad Tapar advanced with Muayyad al-Mulk, whom in effect al-
Balasani had replaced [Ibid. 154-9; see also l(oymen, 1963:79]. 
Isolated by his commanders who murdered al-Balasani despite his refusal, Berk-Yaruk 
seems to have used among others the Ismacilis as and when possible [Ibid. 92]. What 
must not be overlooked, however, is that batini beliefs may already have made strong 
inroads among the Tiirkmen. In his first battle with Muhammad Tapar numerous 
Turkmen are said to have given Berk-Yaruk their support. In their second encounter 
(April 1101), Berk-Yaruk seems to have had a large contingent of infantry, which 
suggests the involvement of citizen soldiers Gund). Soon afterwards Sultan Berk-Yaruk 
led the massacre of 300 Ismacilis Oune 1101), plundering their tents and baggage train, 
their commander Muhammad Diishmenziyar being caught and killed the next day. 
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Although this suggests the said Isma'"ilis were soldiers, it is not clear whether or not they 
had been supporting the sultan. The massacre is said to have taken place because Berk-
Yaruk's commanders complained that even on the field Muhammad Tapar's men 
taunted them with being Ismacilis [Ibid 89], which suggests that at the very least they 
had inftltrated their forces [l-Iillenbrand, 2001 :208]. There is also the report that earlier 
in Khurasan 5,000 Ismacilis fought with 1-Iabashi and hence presumably when Sancar 
defeated him and Berk-Yaruk. 
The warfare lasted for eight years before it began to abate (1 092-11 00), a period that is 
coincident with the rise in batini activity. To be sure, the Ismacilis terrorized notables 
throughout the Great Seljuk Empire by highly public assassinations, but the year before 
the killings peaked they also took the citadels of Girdkuh and Shahdiz near Damghan 
and Isfahan respectively (1 096) [Ibid. 206]. The latter citadel was of considerable 
importance as besides its proximity to the capital it controlled the road to Khurasan. To 
these must be added the various fortifications in Dailam, where for instance Ghutinar 
appears to have been visible from Alamut, Lamasar and Maymiindiz [Ibid. 215], as well 
as those in Kuhistan, Khurasan and Syria, all of which seem to have exerted control 
over their immediate environs. 
Finally, five of the first SL'\: battles between Berk-Yaruk and the forces of his challengers, 
namely those with Taj al-Mulk, Ismacil, Tutu~ and Muhammad Tapar, which all took 
place in Iraq al-Ajam, seem to have been quite bloody. While Tutu~'s advances are said 
to have been especially disruptive, the continual \varfare doubtless devastated not only 
Iraq al-Ajam but also al-Arab. Quite apart from Berk-Yaruk who twice pillaged the 
Sawad, there was incessant fighting in and around Mosul, too, not to mention Syria and 
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Palestine. I-Iere Tutu~'s sons Ridwan and l)ukak seem to have fought each other to a 
standstill prior to the arrival of the Crusaders. 
Given the regional commanders' resistance to central taxation, it is not surprising that 
Berk-Yaruk ran out of funds if not earlier than then certainly towards the end of 1099. 
With both the Public and Private Treasury in Tiirkan Khatun's possession he seems to 
have been hard pressed from the beginning when he accepted 500,000 dinars for ceding 
Isfahan to her son Mahmud. Nevertheless, reports of his pillaging the caliph's estates 
near Wasit and demands of back ta.xes from the caliph's vizier begin in 1100. Soon 
afterwards there is the plundering of Baghdad, despite an infusion of 50,000 dinars 
from the caliph, and the demand for one million dinars in back taxes from the ruler of 
I-Iilla, Sayf al-Dawla Sadaqa. That same year the commanders imposed their flrst 
agreement on Muhammad Tapar and Berk-Yaruk (1101), wherein they also stipulated 
ho\v much tax Muhammad Tapar would pay into the Public Treasury. Muhammad 
Tapar seems to have been equally short of funds, likewise confiscating 250,000 dinars 
from the caliph's vizier, not to mention 20,000 dinars from the inhabitants of Rayy. Be 
that as it may, the second and fmal agreement clearly underlined the regional 
commanders' independence, confinning as it did that they could change sides whenever 
they wanted. 
In short, given the rift between the men of the sword and those of the pen, it seems 
clear that in the absence of an ongoing campaign no one Seljukid had a sufficiently 
large force with which to ensure sovereign power upon Sultan Malik-Shah's unexpected 
death. 
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7.11 The Question of Common Ownership 
It is true that when the older sons of a patriarch left the family hearth and set up with 
their families they continued to share water and pasturage. But only so long as they 
remained in the patriarch's camp. The point being that if the camp was overpopulated 
or became so during the father's lifetime, or indeed the eldest or another son decided to 
strike out on his own, then he and his affiliates shared grazing rights according to their 
position in the tribe, which was below his father's. As has been discussed, unlike among 
agriculturists nomadic pastoral grazing rights and hence migration routes and schedules 
were not absolute but 1/stifntct. Moreover, when an elder son left the hearth he took his 
inheritance with him, so that if the father was richer when the next son left then at least 
initially he was better off than his older brother was. 
Consequently, while the eldest son can be expected to have gained his father's position 
on the latter's death if of the right mother, it does not follow· that challenges arose 
because of common ownership as Turkish scholars have proposed, with or without 
reference to Turkic succession. Arguably once each had their own realm members felt 
free to improve their respective positions. Although possibly preferable for the polity, 
this did not have to be at the expense of someone outside those affiliated through 
descent or by kinship. 
After Dandankan c;agn Beg retained Khurasan while Musa Yabgu and presumably his 
sons were assigned to the conquest of Herat and Sistan. Tugrul Beg took upon himself 
the conquest of Iraq al-Ajam from Nishapur with Ibrahim Ymal and Kutalnu~ who 
were from the remaining two branches of the family. It is not clear what happened to 
Musa Yabgu's sons 1-Iasan, Yusuf and Bori of whom one may have rebelled in Herat on 
Sultan Alp-Arslan's accession. Since Herat was assigned to Sultan Alp-Arslan's son 
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'I'ogan-Shah, however, they may have died without heirs. c;agn Beg appears to have 
retained Alp-Arslan with his other sons Ilyas and Osman, that is, if the latter two were 
still alive, assigning the eldest Kavurt to the conquest of Kirman where he and his 
descendants remained. ~agn Beg's remaining son Yakuti (Alp-Sungur) later joined 
Tugrul Beg who assigned him to the conquest of Azarbayjan where he and his 
descendants also remained. 
Tugrul Beg clearly was reluctant to allow either Ibrahim Ytnal or Kutalmt~ to gain a 
foothold in Jibal and Jurjan, which they respectively conquered. Ibrahim Ytnal rebelled 
twice. First when Tugrul Beg took l-Iamadan and its environs from him and secondly 
after he had been assigned Mosul and its environs. Presumably he considered Mosul an 
inadequate reward for his undoubtedly invaluable services and seems to have decided 
that the only way to gain independence was to forcibly remove Sultan Tugrul. Likewise 
his brother Er-Ta~ was not allowed to keep Sis tan although he helped Musa Yabgu 
conquer it and returned to Khurasan where he died soon afterwards. 1-Iis sons 
Muhammad and Ahmad joined their uncle, Ibrahitn Ytnal, during his second rebellion 
and were killed in the process. The third brother Er-Basgan migrated to Anatolia after 
having taken part in Kavurt's ftrst rebellion, which rather than a challenge for the throne 
also seems to have been a bid for independence. !-laving been forced to seek refuge 
with the Byzantines at least for a time, Er-Basgan appears to have joined Si.ileyman-Shah 
who also migrated to Anatolia with his brothers on their father Kutalml~'s demise. 
Kutalmt~ and his brother Resul-Tekin are known to have rebelled of their own accord, 
as well as possibly supporting Ibrahim Ytnal. Although they failed, Kutaltru~'s son 
Si.ileyman-Shah established an independent polity in Anatolia. What is not clear is 
whether or not Siileyman-Shah accepted Sultan Malik-Shah's suzerainty. When the 
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Great Scljuks' vassal, the Uqailid Muslim lost his life after Siilcyman-Shah's occupation 
of Antakya, his descendants asked Sultan Malik-Shah whether to hand Aleppo to 
Siileyman-Shah or Tutu~. Not surprisingly he chose his brother and Siileyman-Shah lost 
his life over Aleppo, which neither had as yet entered. By comparison the city dignitaries 
in Mosul invited Siileyman-Shah's son Sultan Kille; Arslan, not to mention Sultan Tapar's 
vassal Sayf al-Dawla Sadaqa and commander Porsukoglu Aksungur. I-Iowever they did 
so without informing Sultan Tapar, possibly because he had assigned Mosul to (_;avh 
Sakavu who had defeated and killed their governor, c;okiirmii~, whom they appear to 
have liked. In any event, c.;:avh defeated Kille; Arslan who lost his life while in flight. Like 
his father before him, therefore, he can be said to have been trying to expand his 
domains at the expense of the Great Seljuks. 
After Kavurt had lost his life challenging Sultan Malik-Shah's right to the throne, which 
he appears to have first claimed in writing on grounds that he was the eldest, his 
descendants ruled Kirman independently. The nature and scope of Sultan Malik-Shah's 
brother Teki~'s rebellions are not clear. Possibly like Arslan-Argun's during Sultan Berk-
Yaruk's inconclusive reign, he merely wanted to gain a sustainable or larger dominion of 
his own in Khurasan, as his nephews had in Kirman and Anatolia. 
As for Tutu~'s sons Ridwan and Dukak, the so-called Seljuks of Syria, arguably they 
became isolated after their father lost his life in the attempt to gain the throne from his 
nephew Berk-Yaruk. They certainly appear to have accepted Sultan Berk-Yaruk's 
sovereignty even if their relationship to Sultan Tapar seems ambivalent. Clearly, 
however, Dukak wanted to be independent of Ridwan. When Ridwan was forced to 
accept this it seems that Dukak was quite happy to have his elder brother's name 
included in the kh utba before his. 
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In comparison to his predecessors, Great Sultan Sancar did not unify the Great Seljuk 
Empire after he had challenged and defeated his nephew Sultan Mahmud. Instead he 
established the Scljuks of Iraq alongside those of Kirman and Anatolia. The sultans of 
Iraq, Mahmud and Mascud, clearly resented Great Sultan Sancar's suzerainty over their 
affairs, Mascud being forced to take the field against him while challenging Tugrul's 
appointment as sultan. Nevertheless, the almost continual warfare between Sultan 
Tapar's descendants to become sultan of the Seljuks of Iraq was due to the ambitions 
of their commanders and the caliphs rather than a quest for independence. It seems 
that whenever they had matured sufficiently in age they tried but invariably failed to 
wrest control back from the commanders, one of whom always designated themselves 
their atabeg. 
Last but not least, none of the Seljuks appear to have questioned the right of Seljukid 
descendants to inherit their father's domains. This included female descendants. Sult~ 
Tapar's wife Gevher I<hatun - \Vho was Yakuti's son Ismacil's granddaughter- is said to 
have continued to be responsible for Azarbayjan after her father Mawdud's death. On 
her death, Sultan Mascud's wife, who as Sultan Berk-Yaruk's daughter was Yakuti's 
daughter Zubaydah Khatun's namesake and granddaughter, also seems to have had a say 
in who was appointed commander to Azarbayjan. 
In sum, it seems clear that in the main contention between the Seljuks arose in the quest 
for independence from a senior member's rule - the tendency being the greater the less 
their familial affinity was. Challenges for the throne during the reign of an incumbent 
arose only when independence was not granted or ambition drove a member to try and 
expand his dominion, even if at the expense of another. Consequently contention 
cannot be said to have stemmed from the concept of common ownership. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
The Scljuks' and their affiliates' rude vigour appears to have influenced Muslim men of 
letters adversely, obscuring the more important aspects of their culture and their 
perceptions of Islamdom. A century and a half before Sultan Malik-Shah, Ibn Fadlan 
was embarrassed by an Oguz woman who scratched her private parts in his presence. 
Seeing his discomfort, her husband admonished him that better so than she cover 
herself in public and commit adultery in private [~e~en, 1975:31 ]. Not surprisingly, 
when Caliph al-Muqtadi asked to marry Sultan Malik-Shah's daughter, Mah Melek 
Khatun, the chief jurist for Khwarazm charged with negotiating terms is said to have 
advised instead that the caliph did not take a 'coarse' Ti.irkmen woman into his 
household. Nevertheless, the caliph had to agree to Sultan Malik-Shah's wife Ti.irkan 
Khatun's terms. As a result it seems that he had to \vait for his chief wife to die before 
he could wed Mah Melek Khatun. Although Muslim historians appear to credit Ti.irkan 
Khatun rather than Sultan Malik-Shah with conducting negotiations, further references 
to Seljuk women seem incidental except for the interregnum in which Ti.irkan Khatun 
also played a central role. Even so, these references suggest that all Seljuk women 
enjoyed considerable freedom and authority throughout the empire. 
Sultan Tugrul is said to have consulted with his wife in all matters of state. During 
Ibrahim Ymal's rebellion it was Altuncan Khatun who came to Sultan Tugrul's aid while 
his vizier, Kunduri, atternpted to put her son Anushirvan on the throne. As a result, 
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rather than Kunduri, it was Altuncan Khatun who fought off Ibrahim Y1nal's advance 
units and enabled the sultan to withdraw to Rayy, where she joined him. 
Little seems to be known about Sultan Alp-Arslan's wife, but it may be indicative that 
the Great Scljuks' vassal in Khuzistan is said to have saved his life by paying part of the 
taxes outstanding from Sultan Tugrul's reign to Sultan Alp-Arslan's wife as well as 
Nizam al-Mulk. 
Sultan Malik-Shah's wife, Ti.irkan Khatun, had her own diwan and soldiery, and it was 
her vizier who replaced Nizam al-Mulk upon his assassination. When taken in 
conjunction with the marriage negotiations mentioned above, it seems clear that she 
played a similar role to that of Altuncan Khatun and Sultan Alp-Arslan's wife. Certainly, 
in his Sfyasat-Nama, Nizam al-Mulk counselled at length against allowing women a voice 
in affairs of state. Not surprisingly, Nizam al-Mulk's son, Muayyad al-Mulk, may have 
had Sultan Berk-Yaruk's mother Zubaydah l<hatun strangled because she also had say in 
the running of the empire. 
Last but not least, Sultan Mahmud's wife likewise had her own vizier and, on her father 
Great Sultan Sancar's order, at one time stood surety for the Seljuks' Sh{ite vassal 
Dubays al-Sadaqa, whom the Abbasid caliph feared. 
The argument is further strengthened in so far that Seljuk women seem to have had as 
much right to the empire as the men, although the latter ruled. Sultan Tapar may have 
had his wife Gevher Khatun killed on his death to prevent his brother from inheriting 
his realms by marrying her as was customary. Gevher Khatun was Yakuti's great 
granddaughter and as such directly responsible for Azarbayjan after her father 
Mawdud's death. On her death, Sultan Mascud's wife, who as Sultan Berk-Yaruk's 
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daughter was Yakuti's daughter Zubaydah Khatun's namesake and granddaughter, 
gained say in the running of Azarbayjan. (;reat Sultan Sancar's former commander 
Karasungur benefited from her patronage even though her husband had defeated and 
ousted him when he was Sultan 'fugrul's regent in Azarbayjan. 
As with the Seljuk women, so with many of the events referred to by Muslim men of 
letters with regard to the Seljuks and their military. The Seljuks were of the Oguz. 
According to Ibn Fadlan, the Oguz Commander-in-Chief was chosen on merit, which 
was not interpreted solely in martial terms. He mentions another Oguz chieftain \vho 
although he had become a Muslim had to renounce because his affiliates disapproved. 
The Oguz conducted themselves in accordance with their customary laws. When 
disputes arose, a plaintiff nevertheless had say in the ruling passed by his chieftain. Not 
surprisingly, Ibn Fadlan observed that the Oguz took decisions in council. 
There is little doubt that the Seljuks agreed in council on what action to take and on the 
relative standing of each of their members. I-Iaving defeated the Ghaznavid army based 
in Nishapur (1 038), they apportioned Khurasan among thetnselves at a council where 
they chose Tugrul Beg to be their leader. When Sultan Mascud personally took the field, 
the Seljuks held two councils at both of which <:;agrt Beg is said to have prevailed (1 039 
& 1 040). After Dandankan they once again apportioned Khurasan among their 
members and assigned others to conquer Iraq al-Ajam and Sistan. On succeeding to the 
throne and uniting the Great Seljuk Empire under his rule (1 063), Sultan Alp-Arslan 
likewise appears to have apportioned the realms in his dominion among dynastic 
members (1 065/ 6). Nevertheless, in view of the time lapse this may no longer have 
been a council in the full sense. There is no mention of one under Sultan Malik-Shah. 
Certainly the feast associated with such gatherings appears to have been dispensed with. 
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Sultan Malik-Shah is said to have affronted the c;igil by not holding one whilst in 
Transoxania (1 090). 
Unlike tribal etiquette, however, the virtues associated with merit do not seem to have 
fallen by the wayside. When J(unduri declared Sillcyman sultan, ostensibly in keeping 
with Sultan Tugrul's will, some of the latter's commanders left to join Alp-Arslan and 
Kutalmt~. Clearly they did not consider Si.ileyman merited the office of sultan. During 
Sultan Alp-Arslan's reign, many likewise came to favour Kara-Arslan Kavurt. As may be 
surmized also from their similar actions on Sultan Malik-Shah's accession, the 
commanders appear to have been opposed to the Irano-Islamic character that Nizam al-
Mulk was endeavouring to give the Great Seljuk Empire. 
Besides his views concerning 'meddlesome' women, in his renowned opus the vizier 
advised a heterogeneous military as had existed under Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna. 
Sultan Malik-Shah must have disappointed his atabeg when he expelled some Armenian 
mamluks on the objections of his Turkic commanders. Most likely these were from the 
captives Sultan Alp Arslan took in the Caucasus where he campaigned with Nizam al-
Mulk and Malik-Shah immediately after succeeding to the throne. Sultan Malik-Shah 
clearly not only favoured a wholly Turkic military, but also replaced his vassals with 
either Ti.irkmen begs or Turkic commanders rather than appointing Iranian 
administrators. This, too, was against his vizier's advice in the Sryasat-Nama, which 
recommended that because they had helped found the Great Seljuk Empire, a thousand 
youths from among the Ti.irkmen should be rewarded \vith positions in the palace as 
mamluks. 
With the exception of Artuk Beg, who disobeyed Fakhr al-Dawla Muhammad because 
the caliphs' former vizier was reluctant to attack his countrymen, the Ti.irkmen begs, 
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namely c;ubuk, Sabuk and Dilmac;oglu, apportioned the Marwanids' realms they had 
been assigned by Sultan Malik-Shah to conquer. Fakhr al-Dawla Muhammad and his 
son were allowed to retain Silvan and Diyarbalar respectively, but during the 
interregnum Artuk Beg's sons returned to Diyarbak.tr and established their own dynasty 
(1101-1231). 
There are also Sultan Malik-Shah's assignments of Yagt-Styan, Aksungur and Bozan 
respectively as the governors general of Antakya, Aleppo and Urfa. Yagt-Styan and 
Aksungur likewise were Turkmen begs. Bozan conquered Urfa, but the sultan personally 
took Aleppo from the Uqailids and Antakya from the Seljuks of Anatolia. Not 
surprisingly, it was Sultan Malik-Shah who sent Turkan Khatun's vizier Taj al-Mulk to 
reprimand Nizam al-Mulk because his son Osman, the governor of Marv, had publicly 
upbraided its commander. The vizier had responded haughtily that the sultan could not 
do without him, but he was assassinated soon afterwards. 
Rather than as Turkish scholars maintained, therefore, the interregnum can not be said 
to have been lengthened by the commanders' greed and ambition though doubtless this 
played a part. To the contrary, arguably they completed the re-Turkification of the 
empire that Koymen thought was Sultan Malik-Shah's policy, that is, despite Sultan 
Berk-Yaruk, whom they had supported against Tutu~. Clearly Tutu~ was not held in 
high esteem by either the Turkmen begs in south-eastern Anatolia or Sultan Malik-
Shah 's governors general. Both deserted him at the first opportunity. As with Sultan 
Alp-Arslan, however, the issue in question with respect to Sultan Berk-Yaruk was not 
one of martial merit but governance. It is clear from Ibn Fadlan's travelogue that apart 
from being elected to offices such as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Counsellor, the 
heads of the Oguz lineages made rulings in accordance with customary law. 
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Consequently, there can be no doubt that military, administrative and judicial functions 
among the Ogu~ were combined. Whether or not Sultan Berk-Yaruk's counsellor, al-
Balasani, had the commander Porsuk assassinated by batinis, arguably the Turkic 
commanders refused to become subordinate to a central administration that most likely 
would have attempted to re-impose civil authority. 
What must not be overlooked in any discussion of their role is that the commanders 
resided on their iqtacs, which as Turan maintained became hereditary grants where 
feasible. When Porsukoglu Aksungur was killed by Ismacili assassins, Sultan Mahmud 
left Mosul and its environs in Aksungur's son Mascud's hands. On his death the 
following year, Aksungur's commander C::avh, who had been governing Mosul as his 
regent, sent an envoy requesting to be confirmed in Mascud's son's name. The envoy 
seems to have suggested Zengi instead, to which Sultan Mahmud is said to have agreed. 
To be sure, the forces gathered from the regions by Sultan Berk-Yaruk to defeat Tutu~, 
not to mention subsequent reports concerning the dispersal of Sultan Tapar's armies at 
harvest time, suggest that residence became the norm during the interregnum. 
Nonetheless, it may have been the case from the outset. Quite apart from Tugrul Beg's 
promise of land to the Ghaznavid mamluk commanders who secured victory for the 
Seljuks at Dandankan, there is his alleged grant of the caliph's iqtacs to his Turkmen. 
Although there appear to be no such references as concerns Sultan Alp-Arslan, during 
Sultan Malik-Shah's reign commanders are known to have had viziers. Taj al-Mulk first 
served under Sav-Tekin. Although Sav-Tekin is not credited with being a governor 
general, there is mention of the vizier for the commander who was governor general of 
Fars. Sultan Malik-Shah appears to have been grooming him to take over from Nizam 
al-Mulk, before the latter's son had him blinded. Possibly, therefore, the Buyids' iqtd al-
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istighlal applied solely to chamberlains, such as Sultan Malik-Shah's Tashtdar who was 
remunerated from Khwarazm. 
Neither Sultan Tapar nor Great Sultan Sancar appear to have attempted to re-impose a 
centralized civil administration, as seems to have prevailed under Sultan Alp-Arslan. As 
was the case at the outset under Tugrul and c,;agn Beg, the c;reat Seljuks apportioned 
their realm among their members and adhered to seniority in their choice of sovereign. 
Although Great Sultan Sancar defeated the lesser sultans Mahmud and Mascud, he did 
not replace them with their youngest brother, Tugrul, whom he is said to have favoured, 
or put Iraq under his direct rule. When Sultan Mahmud failed to divest the caliph of his 
military as instructed, the Great Sultan appears to have detained him in Rayy for the 
best part of a year. Likewise, although he spent nearly a year in Samarkand, Great Sultan 
Sancar did not incorporate the Karakhanid realms into the Great Seljuk Empire either. 
He defeated the Khwarazmshah Atstz several times, but when his nephew Silleyman 
proved unable to take control of the region, also allowed Atstz to remain in place. It is 
noteworthy that none of this seems to have prevented Great Sultan Sancar from 
mobilizing the large forces he regularly took on campaign, or from maintaining peace 
and prosperity in Khurasan, which was under his direct dominion. 
As for the isolation of the Seljuks of Syria and later those of Iraq, arguably this was as 
much due to Sultan Tapar and Great Sultan Sancar's apparent refusal to see their 
cousins' and nephews' weaknesses. Certainly, neither Ridwan nor Dukak seem to have 
had the resources to defeat the Crusaders' attempts to expand into Syria. Both required 
the support of Sultan Tapar. Insufficient resources may also have been the underlying 
cause for the loss of the Caucasus and Lower Mesopotamia by the Seljuks of Iraq. 
Even if so, however, both Tutu~'s and Sultan Tapar's descendants can not be said to 
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have demonstrated merit as warriors. In sharp contrast to their fathers and forefathers, 
they appear to have preferred their soldieries to do the fighting for them. Unable to gain 
the fealty of their commanders, in time they became little more than their atabegs' 
sources of legitimacy and prestige. 
Despite being ruled by a martial meritocracy akin to that of the Oguz, the Great Seljuk 
Empire remained Islamic in judicial practice and taxation simply because their subjects 
were Muslims. The question of legitimacy, however, is more ambivalent. In releasing 
Caliph al-Qa'im from imprisonment by the Sh{ite Arslan al-Basasiri, Tugrul Beg was 
able to use the Abbasids' claim to the leadership of the Muslim comn1unity, as the 
Prophet Muhammad's successors, to legitimize Scljuk hegemony first in Khurasan and 
then also in Iraq. In the process he is argued to have made sure the caliph rescinded all 
claims to political power by being invested the R11ler ~f the Ea.rt and the fPeJI. Even if so, 
the caliphs could not have given up hope of regaining temporal power. Certainly, Caliph 
al-Muqtadi appears to have attempted this on Sultan Tugrul's death. Possibly this is why 
Sultan Alp-Arslan never journeyed to Baghdad, going so far as to marry his daughter to 
the caliph's son in Nishapur. Sultan Malik-Shah visited Baghdad to attend the marriage 
of his daughter to the caliph. When Sultan Malik-Shah next visited Baghdad, it was to 
oust the caliph for refusing to declare his son from Mah-Melek Khatun heir apparent. 
Most likely, therefore, the caliph had him poisoned. During the interregnum Sultan 
Bcrk-Yaruk pillaged the caliph's iqtacs and held his vizier to ransom, ostensibly for back 
taxes. Likewise Sultan Tapar imprisoned the caliph's vizier and confiscated his 
removable wealth. After the interregnum, the strained relationship between the Seljuks 
and the Abbasids deteriorated such that caliphs al-Mustarshid and al-Rashid lost their 
lives whilst being held captive by the Seljuks. 
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There is also the matter of the Scljuks' :~.cal as Muslim converts to the I-Ianafi school of 
jurisprudence to consider. This seems exaggerated to say the least. Sultan Tugrul 
allowed his vi:~.ier, who was a Muctazili, to anathematise the Hanafi and Shafti schools 
of jurisprudence before he gave in to objections and countermanded the imprisonment 
and exile of some 400 juriconsults and jurists. Sultan Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shah do not 
appear to have been concerned by Nizam al-Mulk's patronage of Shafici juriconsults 
either. Nor can they be said to have pursued the Ismacilis after the renowned vizier's 
death. The only important Ismacili stronghold to fall was Shahdiz, which threatened the 
capital Isfahan. Moreover, Sultan Berk-Yaruk may have used Ismacili soldiery in his 
struggle with Muhammad Tapar as well as Sancar. 
In sum, after Sultan Alp-Arslan's re1gn, under Sultan Malik-Shah the Great Seljuk 
Empire appears to have regained its distinctive Turkic cast despite Nizam al-Mulk, one 
that Sultan Tapar and Great Sultan Sancar reinforced. Arguably, therefore, the 
interregnum was caused by Sultan Malik-Shah's struggle to legitimize Great Seljuk 
sovereignty in terms consistent with Turkic ideology and to rule through a rnartial 
meritocracy rather than a civil administration staffed by Iranian notables. Although 
Sultan Malik-Shah failed in the fanner, his successors can be said to have succeeded in 
the latter. 
Consequently, the conclusion of this thesis is that the history of the Great Seljuks 
requires to be re-examined not only in the West but also in Turkey with regard to its 
ideology and cultural expectations. 
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APPENDIX 1: MAPS 
The maps in this section are in keeping with Turkish historiography. The first map 
attempts to show Turkic migrations according to Siimer and Kafesoglu. The second 
concerns the probable borders of the Great Seljuk Empire at its height during the reign 
of Sultan Malik-Shah (1 072-92). The third map aims to facilitate reference to place 
names used in the text. The remaining maps try to chart the raids and campaigns that 
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APPENDIX 4: M. A. K6YMEN'S 
SOURCES 
Koymen reviewed the history of the Great Seljuks in a brief work entitled Selptklu Detm 
Tiirk Tarihi. In this work he pointed out issues that he thought should be studied 
outside the general run of events and at the end of each such section discussed his 
primary and secondary sources, which are given here with their Turkish spellings as an 
example of his references. 
CONTENTION FOR THE THRONE: Koymen remarks that the subject remains 
key to understanding the Turkic concept of dominion and should be studied separately 
in order for the history of the Great Seljuk Empire to be evaluated correctly. Arabic 
sources: Sibt Ibnii'l-Cevzi's Mir'atii'z-Zaman in the Topkapi Palace Library, Ahmed III, 
No. 2931, is the main source. There is also Ibnii'l-Esir (fornberg edition), which 
J(oymen thought overlooked in this context. Separately he listed Imadii'd-din Isfahani's 
Nusretii'l-Fitre <i.,., Usrettt'l-Katre in Paris, No. 2145, and its abridged version by Bundari in 
Ziibdetii'n-lVmJre (I--Ioutsma edition); Beybars ~1ensuri's Ziibdetii'l-Fikre ji Tarihi'l Hicre, 
Feyzullah Library, No. 1459, which he thought quite accurate if brief; Ibnii'l-Cevzi's ei-
A1untazam, I--Iaydarabad, No. 1359, which he thought should also be valued highly as a 
source even if it is not as good as his grandson's work. Finally he mentioned the less 
important Ayni's IkdiiY-Cuman ji Tarihi Ehli'z-Zaman of which there appear to be quite a 
few copies available in Istanbul, such as the Veliiiddinefendi Library, No. 2390 or 2392. 
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Persian sources: Koymcn noted that these arc also of some value. Accordingly, there 
are Ravcndi's Rahatt/r-Sttdur (M. Ikbal edition, GMS NS II London 1921), Sadn'i'd-din 
Nishabttn', Ahbarii'd-DetJ/ettr-Selptktjye (M. Siddiki edition, Lahore 1933), ei-1-Jiisryni and ei-
Uraza ji'l-Fiikqyeti's- Se/ptktjye. 
ORIGINAL PROBLEMS: Koymen identified three, namely those relating to the 
'1\irkmen, the caliphate and the batinis. Tiirkmen: In addition to sources listed above, 
he points to Nizam al-Mulk's Sryasat-Nama (Seyyid Abbiir-rahim Halhali edition, 
Teheran 1310 - Koymen remarked that apart from Ch. Schefer's French translation, the 
English, German and Turkish translations are without value). Also, he noted his critique 
of Kafesoglu's Sultan Melik;ah Devrinde Bi!Jiik Se47tk!tt jmparator!ttjp in Belleten XVIII, 
1953, pp. 557-604, which was taken into account by Kafesoglu in his related article in 
the Is/am Ansiklopedisi. Caliphate: In addition to sources listed above, he listed the 
anonymous Kitabii'l-Enba.fi Tarihi'l-Hiilefa, in Fatih Library, No. 4229, which he thought 
was not only an original but also comprehensive primary source. Batinis: While he 
noted that all the sources noted above mention the batinis, in addition he singled out 
Ciiveyni's Tarih-i Cihankii~·a (M. Kazvini edition), Reshidii'd-din's Camti'i't-Tevan·h 
(fopkapi Palace, Treasury Library, No. 1653) and Abdu'l-Celil er-Razi's Kitabtt'n-Nakz 
(Seyyid Celalii'd-din I1iiseyni Urmevi edition, Tehran 1331). 
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES: East: Of those mentioned above he singled out 
Biindari, Nishaburi, Reshidii'd-din and Ravendi. West: As concerns the Fatimids, of 
those mentioned above he listed Sibt Ibnii'l-Cevzi, Ibnii'l-Cevzi and Ibnii'l-Esir as his 
main sources, which he supported with Ibnii'l Adim's Bugyetii't-Taleb, Topkapi Palace 
Library, Ahmed III, No. 2925, Ibnii'l-Kalanasi's Tan'h (Amedroz edition, Beirut 1908), 
Ibnii'l-Adim's Tan!J f-laleb (S. Dahan's edition, Damas 1951, 1954), Ibnii'l-Ezrak el-
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Fariki's Tarihii'l-Fariki (B. A. Avraz edition, Cairo 1959), Siretiir-Miif!JYed ji'd-din (M. K. 
l-Iuseyn edition, Cairo 1949) and Ibn Muyesser's Ahbar Misir (M .. I-I. Masse edition, 
Cairo 1919). Anatolia: Koymen's Byzantine sources were J. Skyletzes and M. Attaliates, 
his Armenian sources were Aridaghes of Lasdived and Matthieu of Edessa, and his 
Syriac sources were Michael of Syria and occasionally Bar l-Iebraeus. The main Arabic 
sources were Sibt lbnii'l-Cevzi and Imadii'd-din Isfahani. Finally, in addition to Ravendi 
and Reshidii'd-din, the main Persian sources were Kazvini's Tarih-i Giizide (London 1911) 
and Mirhand's Ravzatii's-Scifa (Bombay 1270). Crusades: For these he referred to 
secondary European sources. 
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